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HISTORY OF EUROPE

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE

FRENCH REVOLUTION

IN M.DCC.LXXXIX.

TO THE RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS

IN M.DCCC.XV.

BY ARCHIBALD ALISON, F.R.S.E.

ADVOCATE.

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VOLUME THE NINTH.

WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS,
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THE publication of the present volume has been delayed some months after it was ready, in consequence of the political events which, during that period, have absorbed so large a share of the public attention. As so large a work would necessarily be imperfect without an Index, and the size of the present volume precluded the possibility of its being contained within its limits, it has been deemed advisable to throw the three concluding chapters of the work—which will embrace the last Campaign in France—the American War—the Hundred Days—the Battle of Waterloo—and Concluding Reflections—into the same volume with the Index, which will be published early in December next. However much the Author may regret the length to which the work has extended, he cannot, on a retrospect, discover any thing that could have been omitted in consistency with its general plan; and he trusts to the indulgence of the public, if, in portraying the magnificent concluding events of

the contest, in which this country took so prominent and glorious a part, he has endeavoured occasionally, by minute painting, to convey an impression to the reader's mind commensurate to the importance of the events which were described.

A. ALISON.

Possil House, Lanarkshire,
July 15, 1841.

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Slow but steady growth of the Russian Empire.

THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE, which had thus repelled the most formidable armament ever arrayed against the liberties of mankind, and defeated the whole forces of Western Europe, led by the most consummate commander of modern times, is a state of such vast strength and boundless resources, that it is obviously destined to make a great and lasting impression on human affairs. Its progress has been slow; but it is only on that account the more likely to be durable. It has not suddenly risen to greatness—like the empires of Alexander in ancient, or Napoleon in modern times—from the force of individual genius, or the accident of casual fortune; but has slowly advanced and been firmly consolidated during a succession of ages, from the combined influence of ambition skil-

fully directed, and energy perseveringly applied. It received its greatest development from the French Revolution—the experience acquired, and the spirit called forth during the contest for its existence, doubled its power; and the cloud which had hitherto overshadowed in obscure and gloomy grandeur the north of Europe, now emerged, like the genie in the eastern fable, an armed giant, from the stroke of Napoleon.

There is no example in the annals of the world of an empire thus slowly and steadily advancing to greatness, which has not long endured, and left indelible traces of its power on the monuments of history. The probable length of life may be anticipated with tolerable certainty to national, not less than individual existence; it is in the duration of growth and adolescence, that the measure of future maturity and decay is to be found. Experience proves that this is not a mere fanciful analogy, suggested by the obvious resemblance of the growth of communities to that of single men, but a fixed law of nature—a part of that mysterious unity of design which runs through every part of creation, and blends together the minutest object in the material, with the sublimest combinations in the moral world. If we compare the winged insect, which is called into perfect being with the first rays of the summer's sun, and runs through its brilliant span of existence before his orb has set in the west, with the majestic growth of the oak, which beholds successive generations of men expire under its increasing boughs, and stands forth after the lapse of seven centuries a still undecayed remnant of the olden time—we shall have a lively image of those ephemeral dynasties which glitter awhile in the rays of fortune, "a moment bright, then lost for

Analogy in this respect of the physical and moral world.

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ever," contrasted with those more durable powers—like Rome in ancient, or Britain and Russia in modern times—which slowly, but steadily advancing, through a long course of ages, derive only additional strength from prosperous, and increased fortitude from adverse times.

Extent and statistics of the Russian Empire.

The extent and fertility of the Russian territory are such as to furnish facilities of increase and elements of strength, which no other nation in the world enjoys. European Russia, that is, Russia to the westward of the Ural mountains, contains 150,400 square marine leagues, or about 1,500,000 square geographical miles—being above sixteen times the surface of the British islands, which contain 91,000. Great part, no doubt, of this immense territory is covered with forest, or lies so far to the northward as to be almost unproductive of food; but no ranges of mountains or arid deserts intersect the vast extent, and almost the whole, excepting that which touches the arctic snows, is capable of yielding something for the use of man. The boundless steppes of the south present inexhaustible fields of pasturage, and give birth to those nomad tribes, in whose numerous and incomparable horsemen, the chief defence of the empire, as of all oriental states, is to be found: the rich arable plains in the heart of the empire, produce an incalculable quantity of grain, capable not only of maintaining four times its present inhabitants, but affording a vast surplus for exportation by the Dnieper, the Wolga, and their tributary streams, which form so many natural outlets into the Mediterranean Sea; while the cold and shivering plains which stretch towards Archangel and the shores of the White Sea, are covered with immense forests of oak and fir, furnishing at once inex-

[1] Malte Brun, vi. 638, 639. Hassel's Tables of Russian Empire.

haustible materials for shipbuilding and supplies of fuel, which, for many generations, will supersede the necessity of searching in the bowels of the earth for the purposes of warmth or manufactures for the inhabitants of the empire.*

Surprizing variety of climate, and extent of latitude in Russia.

It is stated by Humboldt—and the fact gives us almost an overpowering idea of the extent of the savannas of the New World—that while one end of the pampas of Buenos Ayres is charged with the snows of the antarctic circle, the other is overshadowed by the palm-trees of the tropics.[1] The dominions of the Czar, even in Europe, afford an example of a boundless extent of almost level surface, stretching over an equally broad space of the globe. While, in its northern extremities, the cold is so intense, and vegetation in consequence so stunted, that a birch-tree, full grown and of perfect form, can be carried in the palm of the hand; in its southern latitudes, the richest fruits of the vine, the apricot, and the peach, ripen on the sunny slopes of the Crimea, and fields of roses, which perfume the air for miles around, flower in luxuriant beauty on the shores of the Danube. In the northern provinces, corn

[1] Humboldt, vi. 67.

* The extent of the forests in the northern provinces of Russia is almost inconceivable. From actual measurement, it appears that, in the three governments of Vologda, Archangel, and Olonitz alone, there are 216,000,000 acres of pine and fir—being about three times the whole surface of the British islands, which contain 77,000,000. In one government alone, there are 47,000,000 acres of forest. It appears from M. Hermann's calculations, that there are in thirty-one governments in the north of Russia 5,195,295 firs, well adapted for large masts, each being above thirty inches in diameter—a number more than sufficient for a long supply of all the fleets in the world, besides 86,869,000 fit for building houses. In twenty-two governments only, there are 574,804 large oaks, each more than twenty-six inches in diameter, and 229,570,000 of a smaller size.—See *Trans. de l'Academie Imperiale de St Petersburg*, viii. 172–184; *and* MALTE BRUN, vi. 682, *and* BREMNER'S *Russia*, ii. 31.

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withers, pasture is scanty, and the marshy meadows yield only a crop of mosses and rushes; trees dwindle to shrubs, and at last entirely disappear on the sterile plains; the plants are stunted, and the whole of vegetable nature proclaims the vicinity to the pole. Further to the south, vast forests of pine overspread the surface of the earth; but "winter still lingers in the lap of spring." Masses of ice in caves, or under the shade of rocks, diffuse a perennial chill around; innumerable lakes and marshes render the soil cold and unfruitful even in the height of summer; and the earth, hidden from the sun over nineteen-twentieths of its surface by the dark shade of the fir, can hardly be made to bring scanty crops of oats and barley to maturity.[1]

[1] Malte Brun, vi. 443, 444, 457.

Luxuriant riches of the Crimea and southern provinces.

It is only on approaching the latitude of Moscow that grain crops are universal, and the country, as far as the eye can reach, exhibits a noble unbroken sheet of luxuriant harvests. Still further to the south, immense steppes of verdant turf afford rich pasturage, even to the foot of the Caucasian snows; while in the southern extremity of the Crimea, along the southern front of the Taurida range, the climate hardly differs from the opposite shores of Anatolia and Asia Minor. Winter is there hardly felt; the primrose and the crocus appear above the earth in the month of January, and the oak retains its green foliage through the whole year; the ever-verdant laurel grows beside the olive, the fig, and the date-tree, brought in former times to these mountains by the Greek colonists; the walnut, the peach, the nectarine, and apricot, flourish in the hanging woods, or rather natural gardens, in the valleys; the wild vine reaches the tops of the highest trees, and descending again to the ground, forms, with the viburnum, fes-

toons and garlands. "High hills, masses of rock, streams and cataracts, verdant fields and woods, and the sea that bounds the landscape, render the scene," says Pallas, "equal to any imagined or described by the poets. The simple life of the good Tartars, their cottages cut in the solid rock, and concealed by the thick foliage of the surrounding gardens; the flute of the shepherd, his flocks scattered on solitary hills, remind the traveller of the golden age. The traveller leaves the people with regret, and envies the destiny of mortals ignorant of war, the frauds of trade, and luxury accompanied with all its vices." [1] CHAP. LXVIII. 1812.

[1] Pallas, Tableau Physique de la Tauride, 37. Malte Brun, vi. 389.

The productive powers of a country of such extent, and so diversified in natural advantages, may be considered as almost inexhaustible. Russia in Europe contains a twenty-eighth part of the terrestrial surface, and numbers among its subjects a fifteenth part of the human race.* If its European territory were peopled as Germany is, it would contain 150,000,000 souls; if as densely as Great Britain, which, considering the great proportion of Scotland which is mountain waste, is perhaps not beyond the bounds of possibility, it would contain 311,000,000.† The population of the whole empire, in Asia as well as Europe, at present (1840) about sixty millions, adds nearly a million of souls annu-

Capabilities of Russia for future increase.

* The globe contains 37,000,000 square geographical miles of territorial surface, of which Russia in Europe alone occupies 1,500,000, or about an eight-and-twentieth part.—MALTE BRUN, vi. 628.

† In Great Britain there are acres:—

England, . .	32,342,400
Wales, . .	4,752,000
Scotland, . .	19,738,930
	56,833,330

of which 22,000,000 at present are wastes, and 13,000,000 irrecoverably so.—*See* PORTER'S *Prog. of Nations*, i. 177.

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ally to its number, and doubles in somewhat above half a century.* Thus, before the year 1900, Russia will, to all appearance, contain 120,000,000 inhabitants; and by the year 1950, nearly 200,000,000—a rate of increase which, how great soever, appears by no means incredible, when the prodigious extent of fertile land still uncultivated is taken into consideration, and the corresponding and still more rapid increase of the Anglo-Saxon race in the savannas of the New World. Nothing more is requisite to demonstrate the ascendancy which these two great families of mankind have acquired, or the durable impress which they have communicated to human affairs.[1]

[1] Malte Brun, vi. 638, 643, 628. Hassel's Stat. Tables of Russia, 1823. Balbi's Tables.

Vast extent and capabilities of Asiatic Russia.

Dominions so vast, resources so boundless, might appear sufficient even for the greatest monarchy on earth. But great as they are, they are inconsiderable when compared with the extent and capabilities of the Asiatic possessions of the empire. These amount to no less than 5,250,000 square miles, or above an eighth part of the whole surface of the terraqueous globe, and are thinly peopled with 11,000,000 of souls, being only at the rate of *two* inhabitants to the square mile.[1] Setting aside two-thirds of this immense region as sterile and unproductive, there will remain about 1,700,000 square miles capable of being cultivated, and yielding food to man. If these 1,700,000 square miles were peopled as Scotland is, they would support nearly 200,000,000 of inhabitants; if as densely as the whole British isles, above

[1] Hassel's Tables, 1823. Malte Brun, vi. 638.

* Mr Tooke states that, in his time, (1796,) the population of the empire was doubling in forty-nine years. Dupin now states it as doubling in sixty-seven years. Probably the medium of fifty-four or fifty-five years is about the mark.—*See* TOOKE'S *Russia*, ii. 146, and DUPIN *Tour Commerciale de la France*, i. 26.

500,000,000, or about half the whole present inhabitants of the globe. Without supposing that so immense a portion of the earth is to be permanently retained under one dominion, or that Europe is to be ever threatened with subjugation by a second irruption of barbarians from that great *officina gentium*, it is at least worth while to contemplate the vast room here afforded for the future expansion of the species, and interesting to enquire into the power which, even at present, retains the cradles of so many future nations under its sway.[1]

[1] Malte Brun, ii. 387, 388

Future capabilities of Siberia.

From the chilly and desert character of more than half its extent, and the melancholy associations connected with the whole, as the scene of European exile and suffering, we are apt to regard Siberia as a region of perpetual night and desolation, incapable of being ever converted into the habitation of happy and industrious man. But though this is doubtless true of a large portion of its surface, yet there are districts of immense extent in its southern provinces, watered by large and navigable rivers, which equal a great part of Europe in the fertility of their soil, and exceed it in the grandeur and sublimity of their scenery. Thus, the stupendous rocks which enclose the spacious waters of the lake of Baikal, the romantic range of the Altai mountains, approaching the Alps in elevation and beauty, are hardly excelled by the most celebrated scenery in Europe; while the immense plains which stretch to the eastward, along the banks of the Amour, are capable of containing all the nations of Christendom in comfort and affluence. Traces are not wanting of a much more dense population having formerly inhabited these remote regions than is now to be found in them; but the extreme difficulty of crossing the boundless steppes

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by which they are separated from the other abodes of man, and the circumstance of the greater part of their numerous rivers flowing into the Frozen Ocean, have hitherto prevented the human species from spreading in any considerable number into these vast reserves of humanity. It is steam-navigation which is destined to effect the transformation. The river Amour, which flows from the mountains of Mongolia into the ocean of Japan, by a course 1200 miles in length, of which 900 are navigable, in a deep channel, shut in on either side by precipitous rocks, or shaded by noble forests, is the real outlet of eastern Siberia; and though the Chinese are still masters of this splendid stream, it is as indispensable to Asiatic, as the Wolga is to European Russia, and erelong it must fall under the dominion of the Czar, and constitute the principal outlet of his immense oriental provinces.[1]

[1] Malte Brun, ii. 489, 490. Cochrane's Travels in Siberia, ii. 256, 260.

Character of the people, and their universal thirst for conquest.

Formidable as the power of Russia is, from the boundless extent of its territory, and the great and rapidly increasing number of its subjects, it is still more so from the military spirit and docile disposition by which they are distinguished. The prevailing passion of the nation is the love of conquest; and this ardent desire, which burns as fiercely in them as democratic ambition does in the free states of Western Europe, is the unseen spring which both retains them submissive under the standards of their chief, and impels their accumulated force in ceaseless advance over all the adjoining states. The energies of the people, great as the territory they inhabit, are never wasted in internal disputes; domestic grievances, how great soever, are overlooked in the thirst for foreign aggrandizement; in the conquest of the world the people hope to find a compensation, and

more than a compensation, for all the evils of their internal administration. Revolutions of the most violent kind have frequently occurred in the palace, and the order of succession, as in all eastern dynasties, has been often turned aside by the bloody hand of the assassin; but no republican spirit has ever animated any considerable part of the population. The troops who returned from Paris in 1815, brought with them a strong admiration for the institutions of Western Europe; and a large part of the officers who led the victorious armies of Alexander, were engaged for ten years afterwards in a dark conspiracy, which embittered the last days, and perhaps shortened the life of that great monarch, and certainly convulsed the army and the capital on the accession of his successor. But the nation were strangers to that political movement; the private soldiers who engaged in it were entirely ignorant alike of political rights, or the forms by which they are to be exercised;* and the authority of the Czar is still obeyed with undiminished oriental servility in every part of his vast dominions.

Universal belief in Russia, that it is one day to conquer the world.

If the belief in the ability of one Englishman to fight two Frenchmen is universally impressed upon the British peasantry, and has not a little contributed to the many fields of fame, both in ancient and modern times, where this result has really taken place, it is not less true that every Russian is inspired with the conviction, that his country is one day to conquer

* At the time of the conspiracy to put Constantine on the throne, in 1825, which Nicholas only stemmed by extraordinary courage and presence of mind, the cry of the party in the army who supported him was, "Constantine and the constitution." Some of the soldiers being asked what was meant by the "constitution," replied, they knew perfectly well. "It was the *new carriage* in which the Emperor was to drive."

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the world, and that the universal belief of this result is one of the chief causes of the rapid strides which Russia, of late years, has made towards its realization. The passion for conquest, the thirst for aggrandizement, are among the strongest natural propensities of the human mind: they need neither the schoolmaster nor the press for their diffusion; they are felt even more strongly in the rudest than in the most advanced and civilized ages; and have, in almost every age, impelled the wave of conquest from the regions of poverty over those of opulence. The north is, in an especial manner, the seat of this devouring ambition, and the fountain from whence it floods mankind; for there are to be found at once the hardihood which despises danger, the penury which pants for riches, and the churlish soil which denies them but to the sword of conquest. The meanest peasant in Russia is impressed with the belief that his country is destined to subdue the world; the rudest nomad of the steppes pants for the period when a second Timour is to open the gates of Derbend, and let loose upon Southern Asia the long pent up forces of its northern wilds. The fearful strife of 1812, the important conquests of 1813 and 1814, have added immensely to this natural disposition; the march through Germany, the capture of Paris, the overthrow of Napoleon, have spread, on grounds which can hardly be denied to be just, the idea of their invincibility; while the tales recounted by the veteran warriors of the deeds of their youth, the wines of Champagne, the fruits of Lyons, the women of Paris and Italy, have inspired universally that mingled thirst for national elevation and individual enjoyment, which constitute the principal elements in the lust of conquest.

The institutions and government of Russia are calculated in an extraordinary manner to foster in all ranks this ambitious spirit, and turn it in a permanent manner to the purposes of national elevation. Though property is hereditary in its descent, and titles follow the same destination, *rank* is personal only, and depends entirely upon military grade or the emperor's employment. Thus, a general of the emperor's creation takes precedence of a prince or count by birth; and the highest noble, if he has not a commission in the army, finds himself without either a place or consideration in society. This curious combination of the European principle of the hereditary descent of honours, with the Asiatic maxim that all rank is personal only, and flows from the gift or office under the sovereign, leads, however, to hardly any of the embarrassments in practice which might, *a priori*, be expected; for as the necessity of military office for personal rank is every where known, and, from the warlike turn of the people, cordially acquiesced in, it is universally sought after, and no one thinks of aspiring to any place in society who is not either actually, or by the emperor's gift, in the imperial army. The necessity of this real or fictitious military rank creates a multiplication of military honours and designations, which is not a little perplexing to foreigners, and sometimes excites a smile even in the Russians themselves;*

Rank depends on military employment, or the Emperor's gift.

*"There is another distinction in Russia, the frequency of which puzzled us not a little—that of *General*. We had heard several people, distinguished neither by warlike looks nor dress, spoken of as generals; some of whom were treated by the young officers with very little deference. One proved to be the *director of a theatre*, who held the office by gift of the emperor, as many do who have never been in the army. It is lavished in a way which makes it perfectly worthless. We heard of an apothecary who is a general, and the empress's accoucheur may

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but it is admirably calculated to foster a warlike spirit in the people, and, by keeping alive the feeling that distinction is to be won only by military honours, to coin for the nation the reality of military success.[1]

[1] Bremner's Russia, i. 210, 212.

Military spirit at the Imperial palace.

In consequence of this universality of the military spirit, and all-prevailing sway of military ambition, the whole energies of the nation are, to an extent which appears almost incredible to one of the democratic states of Western Europe, absorbed in the profession of arms. From the emperor's son to the peasant's child, the career of ambition lies in the same channel; the same objects of desire inflame and animate the heart. In the first years of infancy, the mind of the young Cæsarowitch is warmed by the recital of the exploits of his father's warriors; the long series of Russian victories is ever present to his mind; his earliest feeling of exultation, his proudest day in life, is when he is first arrayed in the mimic garb of the invincible grenadiers, who have carried the Muscovite standards in triumph to Paris, Erivan, and Adrianople.* He grows up under the influence

be lieutenant-colonel. A penniless lieutenant, with his epaulettes on his shoulders, will get horses instantly in travelling, when a merchant, who has thousands, must wait for hours, so universal is the respect paid to military rank."—BREMNER'S *Russia*, i. 210, 211. These are trifles; but they are straws which show how the wind sets; and Europe will find it a pretty stiff north-east wind which has set in from the plains of Muscovy.

* "In the interior of the *salle blanche* of the imperial palace at St Petersburg, on each side of the door, were placed two of the finest grenadiers of the regiment, measuring at least six feet two or three inches. When we had passed these in the outer-hall, to our amazement we beheld the two little grand-dukes standing as sentinels, and dressed with minute exactness as privates of the regiment, with their knapsacks, greatcoats, and haversacks, all in marching order. To the inexpressible amusement of every body, the emperor himself then put the little princes through the manual and platoon exercises, which they both did incom-

of the same feelings; the troops salute him, not with the title of emperor, but "father;" and his familiar and uniform appellation to them is, not soldiers, but "children."* The empire, in the opinion of the Muscovite peasant, is a vast family, of which the Czar is the head; the chief interest of all its members is to enlarge the possessions and extend the glory of the domestic circle; and their first duty, to obey the imperial commands, and sacrifice themselves or their children, when required, to the imperial will.[1]

[1] Lond. i. 198, 205. Brem. i. 360, 361.

When such is the tone of mind which pervades the palace and the peasantry, it may be readily believed, that the spirit of all the intermediate classes, and, in effect, of the whole empire, is essentially military, and that their energies are almost exclusively devoted to warlike pursuits. In truth, this object

Its general adoption through the Empire.

parably. The universal delight, from the oldest general to the lowest subaltern of the guards, was something I cannot describe."—LONDONDERRY'S *Tour to Russia*, i. 248. The author has the satisfaction of giving an entire confirmation to this statement, if any were wanting, from the evidence of his highly respected friend, General Tcheffkine, aide-de-camp to the Emperor Nicholas, and chief of the mining engineers of Russia, who has frequently seen the little grand-dukes on mimic duty on these interesting occasions.

* "The troops do not salute, but, as every division passes, the emperor hails them with the accustomed cheer of 'How are you, *my children*?' To which they reply, in enthusiastic roar, 'We thank you, *father*.' The corps having defiled, the emperor again touches his hat to all the officers, saying, 'Adieu, messieurs;' and then, walking from the regiment, he exclaims, 'I am satisfied with your zeal and conduct, my children.' 'We'll do better next time,' is then the cry from the battalions; and, in the midst of this shout, his imperial majesty, accompanied by the little Cæsarowitch, mounts his little open phæton, and drives off." —LONDONDERRY'S *Travels in Russia*, i. 244. The first time that the author heard these striking expressions used by the Czar and his troops was at Paris in May 1814, when Alexander reviewed his guards on the road from the barrier of Neuilly to St Cloud. He will never forget the impression which these words, repeated by thirty thousand voices, in accents of rapturous enthusiasm, produced on his mind.

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entirely occupies their thoughts, and every thing else is comparatively neglected. Commerce, though flourishing,* is held in little estimation, and is for the most part engrossed by the merchants of the English factory. Agriculture, though not less than in the American states the main source of the national strength, is left to the boors, who prosecute it as their fathers did before them; and, in consequence, make little advance in improved methods of cultivation. Judicial or other civil employments, save diplomacy, are held in utter contempt:† the whole youth of the empire who aspire to any station in society, are bred for the army. One hundred and eighty thousand young men, the flower of the empire, comprising ten thousand officers, among whom are found almost all its talent and energy, are constantly at the public seminaries,‡ where military education is taught in the very best manner, and the

	1835.	1836.
* Exports of Russia, .	107,033,563	129,601,862 rubles.
Imports, . . .	165,686,702	180,913,929 do.

—Lond. ii. 145.

† "Nothing astonishes the Russian or Polish noblemen so much as seeing the estimation in which the civil professions, and especially the bar, are held in Great Britain. The judicial profession, and the whole class of legal practitioners, are every where despised and wretchedly paid; and, as a natural consequence, the taking of bribes is all but universal."—Bremner, i. 344,350.—A young Polish nobleman once energetically expressed to the author how much he had been "effrayé," when he heard Sir Walter Scott was an *avocat;* and if these pages should fall under the eye of any similar military youth, he will probably be not less horrified at finding the author has been bred to the profession of Cicero and Demosthenes.

	1836.
‡ Military pupils at military schools under G. Duke Michael,	8,733
Pupils at Navy-Board schools, ...	2,224
Pupils at schools under Minister at War, . . .	169,024
	179,981

—Krusenstern, 79; and Lond. ii. 158.

whole knowledge communicated is of a kind to be available in warlike pursuits. Europe has much need to consider well how the pressure of sixty millions of men, doubling every half century, directed by the whole talent of the nation, educated at such seminaries, is to be averted; and those who believe that a pacific era is arising—that commercial interests are to rule the world, and one great deluge of democracy to overwhelm all other institutions, would do well to contemplate the spirit and institutions of this state, which now possesses an eighth part of the whole surface of the globe.[1]

[1] Krusenstern's Instruction Publique en Russie, Warsaw, 1837. Lond. ii. 156, 159. Marmont, Voyages.

As a natural consequence of this warlike spirit, and of the military institutions in the empire, military honours, badges, and other insignia, are universal, and distributed, both to civil and military servants, with a profusion which, to an Englishman, appears injudicious, and materially lessens their real value as a badge of merit. In the midst of these numerous decorations, however, there is one which none can wear but those who really earned it, which cannot by its nature be prostituted to unworthy objects, and of which the emperor is more proud than of the English order of the Garter—the medal given to all the soldiers who had served in the campaign of 1812. With this exception, however, and notwithstanding the numerous attempts to create distinctions by classes in the orders, they appear, at least to an English eye, exceedingly common; and Talleyrand expressed this feeling with his usual felicity, when, on seeing, at a Russian party, the English ambassador enter the room in a plain blue coat, amidst the galaxy of stars with which he was surrounded, he exclaimed—"Ma foi! il est bien destingué!"[1]

Universality of decorations to all persons in civil and military employment.

[1] Slade, Russia in 1838, 174.

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The military strength of the empire is proportioned to its vast physical resources, and the strong warlike disposition which distinguishes its inhabitants. It consists at present, (1840,) according to the information of Marshal Marmont and the Marquess of Londonderry, who had access to the best sources of information, of six corps, or separate armies of the line, comprising seventy-two regiments of infantry, twenty-four of light cavalry, ninety batteries of foot, and twelve of horse artillery. Each regiment of infantry consists of seven battalions of a thousand men each, of which six are always on active service, and the seventh at the depot in the interior; so that the infantry of the line musters, at least on paper, above five hundred thousand men. In addition to this, there are twelve regiments of infantry and twelve of cavalry, twelve batteries of foot, and four of horse artillery, in the Guards; twelve regiments of grenadiers on foot, four on horseback, and seventeen grenadier batteries. There are also twenty-four regiments of heavy reserve cavalry, and twelve batteries of reserve horse artillery; and the corps of the Caucasus, of Orenburg, of Siberia, Finland, and the interior, which number among them no less than a hundred battalions of a thousand men each, forty regiments of horse, and thirty-six batteries of artillery. In addition to these forces, the emperor has at his disposal one hundred and forty-six regiments of Cossacks, each eight hundred strong, and of which fifty-six come from the steppes of the Don, and are superior to any troops in the world for the service of light cavalry. If these immense bodies of men were complete, they would number above 850,000 infantry, and 250,000 horse. But the ranks are far from being complete: innumerable officers in

Military force of Russia.

every grade have an interest in representing the effective force as greater than it really is, as they draw pay and rations for the whole, and appropriate the allowances of the men of straw to themselves; and in no service in the world is the difference so considerable between the muster-rolls of an army on paper, and the real number of sabres and bayonets it can bring into the field. Still, after making every allowance for these well-known deficiencies, it is not going too far to assert, that Russia, without weakening her establishments in the fortresses and the interior, can produce 400,000 infantry, 100,000 horse, and 50,000 artillerymen, for offensive operations beyond her frontier, though it would require more than one year to bring even the half of this immense force to bear on any point in Europe or Asia.[1]

[1] Marmont, Voyages, i. 184, 189. Malte Brun, vi. 635.

Revenues of the Empire, and small cost of the Army.

The total revenues of the empire at this moment do not exceed L.14,000,000, (140,000,000 of florins,) and are derived from a capitation tax, to which alike every individual in the empire, whether serf or free, is subjected; a tax on the capital of merchants; the crown domains, which yield a large part of the public income, and proceed from the *obrok*, or personal duty paid by the peasants of the crown, and the rent of the lands which they cultivate; the custom-house duties; the tax on the sale of heritable property, which is rated at five per cent; the duty on spirits; the salt monopoly; and the produce of the imperial mines. It may appear surprising how forces so immense can be maintained by revenues so inconsiderable; but the marvel ceases when the extremely small sums which suffice for the pay of the troops are taken into consideration. Dr Johnson's celebrated saying, "that eggs are a penny the dozen in the Highlands; not because eggs are many, but

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because pence are few," was never more strongly exemplified. The cost of a foot soldier for a year in Russia is little more than a third of what it is in France, and a fifth of his cost in Great Britain; in the cavalry and artillery, the difference is still more striking.* The nominal pay of the soldier—nearly a ruble (or about 8d.) a-day—is not inconsiderable; but so much of it is stopped off by rations and other deductions, some of which go to enrich his officers, that he has not *half a farthing per diem* to spend on his own comforts—a pittance, small as it is, which is nearly double of what is enjoyed in the sea service. The Cossacks receive 8s. 6d. of clear pay annually, out of which they are obliged to furnish themselves with starched neckcloths. As some compensation, however, for the limited amount of his pay, every Russian soldier becomes free on entering the army; and he is entitled to his discharge after twenty years' service, on which occasion he receives four or five hundred rubles (L.16 or L.20) to stock a farm assigned to him on the crown domains.[1]

[1] Marmont, Voyages, i. 189, 190. Bremner, i. 368, 371.

Slavery of the Peasantry.

Predial slavery, as all the world knows, is general in Russia, with the exception of the crown domains, and the territories of the Cossacks and Malo-Russians in the south, where personal freedom has been long

		Francs.	£.	s.
* Cost of a foot soldier for a year in	Russia,	120 or	5	0
„ „	Austria,	212 or	9	8
„ „	Prussia,	240 or	10	0
„ „	France,	340 or	14	6
„ „	England,	538 or	21	14

The magnitude of this disproportion is not to be alone explained by the difference in the value of money in each of these states when applied to the purchase of the necessaries of life; for between some of them, especially France and Great Britain, this difference is inconsiderable. Much more is owing to the difference in the habits of enjoyment and good living in the working classes in the European states; and in this respect the British soldier, as well as citizen, stands far a-head of all the rest.—See MARMONT, *Voyages*, i. 189, 190.

established. This sullen line of demarcation, however, is much less strongly marked there than in many other countries, from the custom which prevails of the master allowing the serfs who have a turn for commerce or the arts, to engage in such lucrative employments, and realize their gains for themselves, upon paying him a certain *obrok*, or capitation tax, annually,—a practice which almost lets in to the industrious slave the blessings of freedom. Even to those who remain at their pristine occupations of the axe and the plough, the bond which attaches them to the soil, though often felt as galling at one period of life, proves a blessing at another: the labourers on an estate constitute, as they formerly did in the West Indies, the chief part of its value; and thus the proprietor is induced to take care of his slaves by the same motives which prompt him to do so with his buildings or cattle. Relief in sickness, care of orphans, maintenance of the maimed, or in old age, are important advantages to the labouring classes even in the most favourable circumstances; and with all the facilities for rendering themselves independent, which the habits of civilized life, and the power of accumulating and preserving capital arising from the interchange of commerce, afford; in rude periods, when these advantages are unknown, and the means of providing during the vigour for the weakness of life do not exist, they are of inestimable value. The long want of such maintenance and care for the poor, is the true secret of the misery of Ireland; it would be a real blessing to its inhabitants, in lieu of the destitution of freedom, to obtain the protection of slavery.* Stripes, insults, and

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* "I have no hesitation in saying, that the condition of the peasantry in Russia is far superior to the same class in Ireland. Provisions are plentiful, good, and cheap; good comfortable log-houses are to be seen in every village; immense droves of cattle are scattered over unlimited

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compulsory labour are no light evils; but they are as nothing compared to the wasting agonies of famine, the violence of ill-directed and ungovernable passions, which never fail to seize upon prematurely emancipated man. The servitude and forced industry of the serf fill up the interval, the long and important interval, between the roving independence of the savage, who lives by the chase or the milk of his herds, and the voluntary toil of the freeman, around whom artificial wants have thrown the unseen but riveting chains of civilized life. But for its existence, this wide chasm could never have been passed; for man will never labour voluntarily till he has acquired the habits and desires of an advanced stage in society; and those habits, when generally pervading the community, can exist only from the effect of previous centuries of compulsory labour.[1]

[1] Clarke's Travels, i. 90 and 170, Cox's Travels, iii. 183 Heber in Clarke, i. 170. Tooke's Russia, b. iv. c. 1.

Mode of levying the troops.

The army is kept up by a compulsory levy of so many per hundred or thousand, levied by government under the authority of an imperial ukase. In general, five in a thousand is the annual quota which is required; but on pressing occasions, two or three per hundred are demanded; and on occasion of the French advance to Moscow, ten in that number were voluntarily voted by the Russian nobles. Each proprietor is obliged, in addition to the man, to fur-

pastures; and whole forests of fuel may be had for a trifle. With ordinary care and economy the Russian peasant may become rich, especially in those villages situated between the two capitals. In Siberia, scarcely any full-grown man is to be found among the convicts who has not two or three horses, and as many cattle; and they yield him, from the price paid for their labour at the government prices, a sum adequate to the purchase of a pound and a half of meat and three of bread daily, in addition to the produce of the land allotted to the convicts.—COCHRANE'S *Travels in Russia and Siberia*, i. 79 and 190. It would be a happy day for the Irish peasantry, the slaves of their own heedless and savage passions, when they exchanged places with the Siberian convicts, subjected to the less grievous yoke of punishment and despotism.

nish his outfit to government, amounting to thirty-three rubles (L.1, 5s. 10d.) The day of drawing the men on the several estates is one of universal mourning and lamentation; the conscript leaves his paternal home, with scarce a hope of ever seeing it again; his mother and sisters make the air resound with their shrieks; chains are often necessary to secure his appearance at the appointed place of muster; and his companions in tears accompany him for miles on the road to his destination. In this, however, as in other cases, where a separation from old habits is induced by irresistible necessity, the human mind bends to the force of circumstances: with his military dress and the first use of arms, the young soldier puts off the recollection of former days; a new career of ambition, fresh rewards, hitherto unknown desires, stimulate his mind; he feels the dignity of a freeman, the elevation of a superior profession, and not unfrequently the most painful moment in life is afterwards found to have been the nativity of a more elevated state of existence. In one instance only, the natural feelings of grief at the separation of the young conscript from all that are dear to him, were overcome by a still holier feeling. When the regiments were raised in pursuance of the great levy which followed the French advance to Moscow, tears were shed in abundance when those on whom the lot had fallen took their departure: but they were tears of joy and exultation upon the part of their relatives, not of sorrow; and the only houses in which real grief was felt, were those whose sons were not called on to join their comrades in the sacred duty of defending their country.[1]

[1] Bremner, 370. Segur, ii. 90. Bout. ii. 117, 118.

Vast as are the military resources which this system of regular conscription, in a country so immense,

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and containing a population so rapidly increasing, places at the disposal of the Russian emperor, they form by no means the whole of those on which he has to rely. Whole nations of soldiers are contained in the Muscovite dominions, and are ever ready to start into activity at a signal from the Czar. The MILITARY COLONIES constitute an important and rapidly increasing part of the imperial possessions, and furnish no small addition to the warlike strength of the empire. They owe their origin to the Emperor Alexander, who, being struck with the advantages which similar establishments on the frontiers of Transylvania* had long afforded to the Austrians in warding off the incursions of the Mussulman horse, resolved in 1817 to establish them on a great scale in different parts of his dominions; and the same system was extended and enlarged under the guidance of the able general De Witt, in the southern provinces, in 1821. Several divisions of cavalry were colonized in this manner; and a floating population of seventy thousand wandering tribes located on the districts allotted to them, to furnish recruits to the troops. The holders of these lands, which they receive from the crown, are bound, as the only payment they make for them, to lodge and maintain a soldier; and to labour for forty-four days in the year for the public works in progress in the country. There are already in the military colonies twelve thousand men, constantly ready and equipped, as a depot for the twenty regiments which are distributed in this manner; and the warlike spirit of the youth from whom the recruits are furnished, is perpetually kept alive by the recital of glories, perils, and plun-

Military colonies.

* See for the Austrian frontier military colonies, MARMONT's Voyages, i. 226—228; WALSH's Constantinople, 287; and CLARKE's Travels.

der, which they hear from the veterans who are settled on the lands. The military spirit thus comes to animate the entire population: the *esprit de corps* is felt not by regiments alone, but the whole flourishing colony by whom they are surrounded. As the experiment has met with entire success, and there is no limit to the extent of waste land which may be appropriated in the Muscovite dominions to these purposes, it is difficult to see any bounds to the addition which may thus be made to the power of the Czar, by a system which superadds to the military tenure of the feudal ages the regular organization and powerful control of modern government.[1]

[1] Marmont, Voyages, i. 193, 215.

The Cossacks are another race of colonized warriors, who all hold their lands by military tenure, and are able, when occasion requires, to furnish the whole male population capable of bearing arms for the service of the state. The Cossacks of the Don inhabit a territory of immense extent: it spreads over no less than 57,600 square geographical miles in extent: a surface nearly two-thirds of that of the whole British islands, and incomparably more level and fertile. Some part of it is as fruitful as the Ukraine, and it is all destitute of hills; but a considerable portion, though covered with a velvet carpet of turf, is probably destined to remain for ever, from the want of rivers or brooks, inhabited only by nomad herdsmen. Unlike the peasants of the greater part of Russia, the people of this district are entirely relieved from the fetters of servitude. "Free as a Cossack," is a common proverb through all the south of the Muscovite dominions; their political privileges, even in the midst of the Russian empire, approach to those of democratic equality; and the active roving habits of the race are strongly exemplified even in

The Cossacks. Their territory, character, and manners.

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those situations where they are fixed in one situation, and permanently engaged in the labours of agriculture. Though their industry there is very conspicuous, the villages clean and thriving, the houses white and comfortable, and the produce of their fisheries on the Don very considerable;* yet the dispositions of the people are still those of their Scythian forefathers. Horses comprise their chief, often their only luxury; equestrian races or games their great delight; five hundred or a thousand stallions constitute the studs of the great, three or four are possessed by the poor; boundless pastures furnish to all the means of ample subsistence; and all are alike ready, at the call of their beloved hetman, to follow his fortunes to the scenes of European plunder or glory.[1]

[1] Malte Brun, vi. 402. Bremner, ii. 428, 446.

Description of the Ukraine, and the character of its inhabitants.

Under a pure and cloudless heaven are spread out the boundless steppes of the Ukraine, of which it was long ago said that "the sky is ever serene, and storms and hurricanes are unknown." One who has been accustomed to the gloomy forests, dark clouds, sterile lands, and marshes, of the north of Russia, can hardly figure to himself the boundless fields waving with corn, the valleys strewed with the fresh down of blooming vegetation, the meadows whose luxuriant covering conceals from the eye the waters of the streams. Still less can the habitations of the people in Great Russia convey an idea of the cottages in the Ukraine, built of carved trees covered with white-washed clay, with smooth polished earthen floors. The dirty peasant of Great Russia, with his long tangled hair, bespeaks the Tartar rule; while the vil-

* The export of fish and caviare from the country of the Don Cossacks is no less than 500,000 rubles, or about L.25,000 annually; a sum equivalent to at least L.100,000 a-year in this country.—MALTE BRUN, vi. 402.

lager of the north, with his clear blue eyes and light brown hair, attests the Sclavonian blood. But in the Ukraine, the serious reflecting countenance of the man, his tall figure, half-shaven head, long mustaches and abrupt speech, discover the mingled descent of the ancient Russian and savage Asiatic. His dress bears marks of the Lithuanian and Polish rule of four centuries. He is slow, taciturn, and of few words; but shrewd, intelligent, and rigorous in the observance of promises, both given and received. While the one lives entirely in the present, the other dwells chiefly on the past. Remind the Cossack of his former glories, his recent historical achievements, and you have found the passport to his heart: his countenance will brighten, his eye kindle, you will hear the song of the steppe, and be astonished at the cheerfulness of his disposition.[1]

[1] Polewoy, Hist. of Russia, ii. 317.

The origin of this singular people accounts in a considerable degree for their peculiar character. Nature and man have stamped an impress upon their minds, which can never be effaced. Placed on the frontiers of Europe and Asia, they have always dwelt in the plains which, from the earliest ages, have been the highway by which Scythian violence passed on to civilized plunder. Amidst tombs which, rising on either hand amidst the boundless wastes, marked the blood-stained passage of the multitudinous nations whose names, as Chateaubriand has said, "are known only to God;" amidst walls raised by unknown hands, and cemeteries whitening with the bones of Russians, Hungarians, Lithuanians, and Poles, the Tartar still discerned the tracks which led from his far distant steppes to the seat of civilized man. Flights of rapacious birds announced their approach, and the mournful omen was confirmed by the glowing sky

Incredible devastation of the Tartar tribes in Southern Russia in former times.

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that reddened as their torches consumed the villages. The barbarian hordes, in their sudden attacks, overpowered the inhabitants, and seized the fruits of their toil before the warlike proprietors could assemble from their castles for their defence. Prompt in aggression, prompter still in flight, they dragged into captivity the youth of both sexes, driving off the herds, and leaving behind them only the silence of ashes and the corpses of the slain. Notwithstanding this ceaseless havoc, the population still sprang up afresh upon that beautiful soil; cut up, as it was, says a Sclavonian poet, "by the tramp of horses, fertilized by human blood, and white with bones—where sorrow grew abundantly."[1]

[1] Gnorowski, Insurrection of Poland in 1830-31, 47, 48.

Origin of the Cossacks in these disasters.

It was amidst the misery and from the effects of this constant devastation, which continued for several centuries, that the Cossack nation took its rise. Two corners of land, overlooked in the great streams of conquest to the south-west, remained as places of refuge for the fugitives—one beyond the Don, towards the Sea of Azoff, and the other beyond the islands of the Dnieper, towards the Black Sea—and these were the cradle of this singular people, as the Lagunæ of the Po were, from a similar cause and, at the same period, of the Venetian Republic. About sixty miles below Kiow, the Dnieper forms a variety of islands, upwards of seventy in number. The banks of the river, here fringed with wood, there steep or marshy—the deep caverns in the rocky islands, concealed by spreading trees or tangled thorn bushes, offered a favourable place of refuge, when the open country was overrun by the barbarians. At the epoch of the first general invasion of the Tartars, and again during the Lithuanian wars, many persons found shelter here; and their

number was subsequently increased by the arrival of adventurers, guided by necessity or the love of change; by deserters from the Lithuanian, Polish, Hungarian, and Walachian ranks; by fugitives from Tartar bondage; or by serfs escaping from the oppression of their lords. The motley crew was at first held together, and prevented from overstepping its limits, by a rule enforcing, during the common calamity, celibacy, fishing, and hard labour. Gradually, as the danger rolled away, these restrictions were forgotten, and they ventured upon secret excursions to the neighbouring plains, which, by degrees, extended down the Dnieper and along the shores of the Black Sea to the very walls of Constantinople. In more peaceable times, they spread over the adjoining plains, fed vast flocks on the steppes, and cultivated the earth; and then, in huts built of clay, they led a rude life, mindful only of the subsistence of the moment. But they retained the character imprinted on them by their origin, their necessities, and their situation: fishing in the Don and the Dnieper ever remained, and still continues, a favourite occupation of the people, and a principal source of their wealth; the necessity of flight to existence was constantly felt; and the nation, true to its origin, still looked for its riches in prosperity, its refuge in adversity, to the swiftness of its steeds. "Let the flame of invasion," said they, "consume our huts: in a week we shall plant new hedges, fill up our ditches with earth, cover our thorns with reeds—soon others shall arise. Sooner shall the foe be wearied with destruction than we with restoration." Independence, amidst a world of serfs, gave charms to this precarious existence; freedom sweetened the toils and lightened the dangers of these unfettered rovers. Their own in-

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dustry, the spoils of others, brought them plenty: mounted on swift chargers, free as the wind of the steppes, they enjoyed their liberty; and generations grew up amidst the clashing of swords and the song of battle. Singing the airs of his native wilds, the Cossack of former days left his home on a cruise to Azoff, Sinope, or Constantinople; a beautiful captive often became his wife, the richest stuffs his attire, his enemies' best weapons his arms. He returned home with his trophies, distributed his spoils, and took no charge of the morrow; but the trophies of his prowess were religiously preserved; his children played with his sword, or arrayed themselves in the panoply of his enemies. These habits still continue, though the objects and scene of his warfare are changed; and the Cossack youth point to the cuirasses of the French horsemen, or the standards of the Imperial Guard, preserved in their churches; and honour these prizes of recent valour, as their ancestors did the trophies of Trebizond or the spoils of Constantinople.[1]

[1] Gnorowski, Poland, i. 74, 75.

Influence of the victories in Germany and France on the Cossacks.

Nearly the whole Cossacks of the Don capable of bearing arms, attended the standard of Platoff to the neighbourhood of Moscow, and by their indefatigable activity as light horse, mainly contributed to the astonishing results of the campaign; and nothing now arrests so certainly the volatile youth of the plains of the Don as the recital, by the old warriors, of their exploits on the fields of Germany and France, the marvels of Paris, the wines and the women of the south. The shining armour of the cuirassiers of the Imperial Guard, the trophies of the hard-fought field of Eylau;* the eagles and standards which were won amidst the cannonade of Leipsic, hang, the

* Ante, vi. 77.

objects of universal veneration, in the church of Tcherkask, the principal town of their country; and though their institutions are so free as almost to rival the ruinous democracy of Poland, the turbulence of pastoral republicanism is gradually yielding to the seductions and the address of the Imperial court, and on all important occasions it is effectually drowned in the indelible passion for warfare and plunder.[1]

[1] Malte Brun, vi. 402, 403. Bremner, ii. 425, 436. Clarke's Travels, i. 283, 296.

Above a hundred thousand Cossacks, distributed in one hundred and sixty-four regiments, are now to be found in the Muscovite armies; their physical force, and the vast influence which they exerted in the later years of the war, render them an object of serious importance and interest to all the European states. The word "Cossack" means a volunteer or free partizan;[2] their whole service is voluntary; one of their most highly valued privileges is, that they cannot be chained, when enrolled and on the march to the military stations, as the other conscripts of Russia are, when they prove refractory. They hold their lands by military tenure; and, in consequence of it, every individual is obliged to serve four years in the Russian armies, and this they do in time of peace for a mere nominal pay. This service is to them rather an amusement and delight than a duty. Trained from early childhood to the use of the lance and sword; familiarized to the management of the small but active horse, which can undergo almost any fatigue, and seldom falls even in the roughest country, the young Cossack joyfully mounts the playfellow and companion of his infancy, and wends his way, exulting, to the unknown but oft-imagined scenes of distant plunder. At home he is kind, gentle, and domestic in his habits; but when called

Their appearance, manners, and mode of fighting.

[2] Karamsin, vi. 476.

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to foreign warfare, he assumes at once the ferocious habits of his Scythian ancestors. Pillage is their principal object, and the whole produce of their marauding which will admit of being carried, is stowed away between the saddle and the girths; so that, after a long campaign, they sit fully a foot above the backs of their horses. They seldom, in former wars, gave quarter; but in the campaign of 1812, and the subsequent years, Alexander promised them a ducat for every French prisoner they brought in, which soon produced a plentiful harvest of captives.[1]

[1] Personal Observation. Scott's Napoleon, v. 363. Bremner, ii. 432, 440.

Their mode of fighting, and habits in war.

Like other Asiatic horsemen, to whom they belong by descent, if not by birth, the Cossacks do not attack in a close body like the European cavaliers, but in a *swarm*, or loose charge, where each man selects his individual antagonist; and, with a loud *hourra*, they bear furiously down upon their opponents. In the course of the war in Germany, however, in 1813, they came to act in a more regular and systematic manner; and both then, and in the campaign in the following spring in France, frequently and successfully charged squares, and performed all the duties of regular cavalry. But it is chiefly in the service of light troops that the Cossacks are seen to advantage, and then their services are invaluable. Never had an army such eyes as they furnish; none ever possessed a host capable of drawing such a screen before the observation of the enemy. Mounted on their hardy little horses, they have frequently been known to march a hundred miles in twenty-four hours, loaded with arms and plunder; and in their heaviest marching order, they plunge into rivers, thread morasses, explore thickets, and cross the most fearful deserts, whether parched by the heats of summer or charged with the snows of winter. No army

with the Cossacks in its front need fear a surprise; none with them heading the pursuit can be secure against it. Their velocity, activity, and courage, render them peculiarly dangerous to a retreating, often fatal to a flying enemy. When the rearguard halts, and a respectable force collects to oppose their incursions, they never hazard an attack, but fly without hesitation, like the Parthians of old, till a more favourable opportunity of renewing the pursuit occurs; and when the enemy again retires, they press upon his retreating columns, inundate the country on all sides of his line of march, and are frequently to be seen a hundred miles in advance of the pursuing force.[1]

[1] Personal Observation. Scott's Napoleon, v. 364. Sir R. Wilson's Camp. of 1807, 27, 28. Brem. ii. 437, 446.

Naval force of Russia.

The naval force of Russia, though far from being inconsiderable, and now an object of well-founded and serious alarm to Great Britain, is not the direction which the national spirit naturally takes, nor in which durable danger to other states is probably to be apprehended. At present, the Emperor Nicholas has thirty ships of the line and twenty-two strong frigates at Cronstadt; besides sixteen of the line and twelve frigates in the Black Sea. It has been maintained nearly at that level for the last thirty years; and what renders it peculiarly formidable to England is, that this large force is not distracted by the defence of any colonies or distant possessions; that it is kept constantly on the war establishment, and with stores and provisions on board ready for immediate operations; that the Baltic fleet in summer manœuvres for some months with thirty thousand men on board; that, though extremely deficient in nautical skill, the Russian sailors are admirably trained to the practice of gunnery, and stand with devoted resolution to their pieces alike in naval as military war;* and

* "Lay yourself alongside a Frenchman; but outmanœuvre a Russian."—NELSON.

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that, under protection of the bastions of Cronstadt, and the castles of the Dardanelles, they possess alike, in the north and the south, impregnable places of refuge.[1]

[1] Brem. i. 375, 376.

General disinclination of the nation to the Navy.

Still, though the danger to England is doubtless great while such a force lies within a fortnight's sail of London, with hardly any fleet at the disposal of the British government to protect the English shores,* it is evident that it is not from the naval power of Russia that the liberties of Europe are permanently to be endangered. The spirit of the nation is essentially military: territorial conquest, not commercial extension or distant colonization, is her destined path: the despotic nature of the government, the closing of the Baltic by ice during half the year, and of the Euxine by the gates of the Dardanelles during the whole, are alike inconsistent with naval greatness. If England were animated with her ancient national spirit, and her government were of sufficient strength to direct a part of her vast maritime resources into the public service, she might behold with contempt the plaything of the Czar performing its mimic evolutions on the Baltic. In the words of Demosthenes to the Athenian people, to whose situation in regard to Philip, that of Britain to Russia in these times bears a striking, even a fearful resemblance—"It is your weakness which is his strength; and he owes his present increase of power infinitely more to your indolence than to his own exertions."[2]

[2] Dem. i. Phil. 2d. Brenner's Russia, i. 375, 376.

There is one remarkable peculiarity of the Russian empire, which, to the people of the British isles, is a subject of particular interest and importance. Rich

* "It is a mistake to say that Great Britain is utterly unprotected. She has *three ships of the line, and three guard-ships* afloat, to protect the shores of England."—*Speech of* SIR CHARLES ADAM, *Lord of the Admiralty, House of Commons, March* 8, 1839. *Parl. Debates.*

as her territories are in agricultural productions, there is one mineral, without which she can never attain to manufacturing greatness, which is almost altogether wanting. Coal is scarcely to be found to the west of the Ural mountains; at least, where it is discovered, it exists in such inconsiderable strata as to be not worth working. The lid of the box in which this valuable mineral is found in the British islands is there; the bottom of red sandstone is there also: but the intermediate seams of coal and ironstone are very rarely found.* The latter occurs indeed in some places; and at Toula, extensive ironworks exist for the internal supply of the empire; but without coal she can never compete, in the supply of great manufactories, with those of countries where fuel is supplied from the spontaneous bounty of nature in the mineral regions of the earth. Thus the destinies of England and Russia are as clearly traced out by the hand of nature, in the physical peculiarities of the two countries, as they are in the moral character and disposition of their respective inhabitants.

Want of coal in the Empire, and its important effects.

They are obviously intended for greatness in different lines; they are calculated to grow with each other's growth, and strengthen with their strength. The world is large enough for both; and each will discharge its duty, and perform its mission best, by avoiding interference with the path of the other. Destitute of coal, and scantily supplied with ironstone—with its principal harbours blocked up half the year by ice, and the greater part of its population far removed from the ocean in the midst of vast agri-

* This important fact I had from my highly valued friend Mr Murchison, President of the Geological Society of London, whose recent travels in Russia have elicited so much valuable information in regard to the mineral riches of that empire.

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cultural or pastoral plains—the people of Russia are as manifestly disqualified from attaining commercial or manufacturing greatness, as they are calculated by their vast numbers, enduring valour, and submissive obedience to their chief, to attain the summit of military greatness. Abounding with coal, richly endowed with ironstone—encircled by the storms of the German and the Atlantic ocean, placed midway between European civilization and American increase—Great Britain is as clearly marked out by nature to be the workshop of the world, as she is evidently fitted, by the industrious habits, active character, and independent spirit of her inhabitants, to perform the great work of maritime colonization throughout the globe.

Venality of justice in the Russian dominions.

Justice is venal throughout the whole Muscovite, as all oriental dominions. The judges are numerous, and abundant means of appeal, ostensibly calculated to check injustice, are provided; but the one thing needful is every where wanting — a conscientious spirit, strict discharge of duty on the bench, and public respect for their functions. This is the natural consequence of the military spirit of the people, and the almost exclusive direction of the national resources to warlike preparations. The salaries of the judges of all grades are so miserably small, that they are driven almost by necessity to eke them out by presents from the suitors; and so low is the judicial office held in common estimation, that this is considered at once natural and unavoidable in such functionaries. Nothing surprises the Russians so much as to find that it does not equally stain the English ermine. An equal and impartial administration of justice, is the appropriate and peculiar blessing of a free government; it can neither exist in a despotic monarchy nor a democratic republic;[1]

[1] Bremner, i. 272, 284. Malte Brun, vi. 378.

for, in the first case, there is nothing to counterbalance the frowns of the sovereign; in the second, to withstand the passions of the people.

Great ability of the Russians in diplomacy.

But, for the same reason, the Russian monarchy is, in the general case, greatly superior to the British in external negotiation; and the diplomacy of the cabinet of St James's or the Tuileries has seldom proved a match for that of St Petersburg. This is the obvious result alike of the independence of the government of popular control, the strong ambitious spirit by which the nation is animated, and the concentration of nearly the whole of its civil talent in this one department. No seats in parliament are there to be won, no votes in the peers secured by promoting titled frivolity or influential imbecility over the head of unconnected talent or diplomatic address. The cabinet feels that territorial aggrandizement is the principal bulwark of the throne, and that a reign which steps from acquisition to acquisition, is never likely to feel the want of popularity; while the nobles, aware of the absolute necessity of abilities to secure these advantages, overlook the elevation of merit, even from the humblest ranks, to situations where they may thus advance the national fortunes. It is the constant practice of the Imperial ministers to promote young men of distinguished talent from the military or ecclesiastical schools into the civil offices; and as almost the whole youth of the empire who receive any education are to be found at one or other of these seminaries, and their number exceeds two hundred thousand, it is not surprising that a vast mass of talent is thus brought to bear upon the destinies of the state. The example of Maria-Theresa, whose discerning eye discovered a

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future Thugut in the clever answers of a boy of fourteen in a public hospital at Vienna, has found many imitators in the Muscovite rulers; and in the search of talent they are limited to no localities, and willingly draw diplomatic ability from foreign states, or even the ranks of their enemies.

It is the comparatively unrestricted power of doing this, which constitutes one great source of the strength of absolute monarchies: it is the necessity of sacrificing talent to influence, in ordinary times, in almost every department of the state, which is the chief cause of the acknowledged inferiority of the public servants, whether civil or military, in constitutional monarchies. But, for the same reason, the rulers of a free government, when public danger or the necessities of the times have compelled them to overlook the ordinary sources of influence, and seek for talent wherever it is to be found, have an incomparably wider field to search, and, in general, will in the end bring a greater and more wide-spread mass of talent to sustain the national fortunes. In the first case, the foresight and energy of government supply the want of vigour and animation in the inferior ranks of society; in the latter, the ability and information of the middle and lower classes, compensate, in the end, the weakness and vacillation of government. In the first instance, the government forces greatness upon the people; in the latter, the people force greatness upon the government. Hence the despotic state will be generally successful if a contest occurs in the outset; but the democratic community, if it withstands the shock, is more likely to prove victorious in the end: and hence a nation which, like the Roman in ancient, or the British

in India in modern times, unites the foresight of patrician direction with the vigour of democratic execution, can hardly fail to obtain the empire of the world.

Universal corruption which prevails in the inferior authorities.

But while the steady persevering policy of the Imperial cabinet, joined to the remarkable succession of able sovereigns, who, from the time of Peter the Great, have swayed the Russian sceptre, has hitherto at least drawn forth talent in a surprising manner, both in the civil and military career, from the inferior ranks in the state; yet a latent, but almost incurable source of weakness is to be found in the all but universal corruption which pervades inferior functionaries in every part of the empire. Doubtless there are some exceptions even in humble stations; and in the dignified situations of governors of provinces or fortresses, or high commands in the army, many of the most upright, patriotic, and honourable men in Europe are to be found. But these are the exceptions, not the rule. Generally speaking, corruption is universal in all but the higher officers of government, and even among them it is far from being unusual. The vast extent of the empire; the helpless condition and ignorance of the great majority of its inhabitants; the habits of abject submission to authority which they have imbibed from their religion, or derived from their eastern origin; the viceregal pomp in which the governors of the principal provinces live; the distance of their governments from the central power; and the boundless authority which they enjoy—all conspire to render abuses easy, detection difficult, and punishment dangerous. The salaries enjoyed by the persons in authority are in general small, and their expenses considerable: it is perfectly understood,

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what is almost universally practised, that they make up the difference in perquisites, presents, or fees, which soon degenerate into absolute corruption. The denunciation of crime is often followed by the discovery and punishment of the criminal, seldom by restitution or redress to the injured party; the official robber comes in place of the private depredator, and the last state of the injured party is often worse than the first.[1] *

[1] Slade's Russia in 1838, p. 370, 371. Bremner, i. 344, 350.

Efficacy of the Secret Police, and of the Emperor's vengeance.

In every country, however, except the most degraded, and those bordering on immediate ruin, there is, practically speaking, some check on the abuses of government. This check, which in Turkey was long found in the religious sway of the ulema, or the armed terrors of the janissaries, who, though no small abuse themselves, were the chief restraint on abuses in others, has hitherto in Russia been found in the unwearied activity, moral courage, and impartial severity of the emperors. A secret police is established through all parts of the Muscovite dominions: they are to Russia what the Lion's Mouth was to Venice, and, in a certain degree, supply the want of that perpetual check upon all but democratic corruption, which the unfettered press of free countries occasions. The members of this police are known to every one, and are, in an especial manner, an object of apprehension to persons in authority. They collect information, receive secret complaints, accumulate evidence, and are in constant correspondence with the emperor, by whom the stroke

* Informations as to crimes are often avoided from their only superadding the vexation of a prosecution, to no purpose, to the loss already sustained. It is seldom that stolen property, though often recovered, reaches the private sufferer. The head of the police at Odessa, on a salary of L.250 a-year, makes L.3000.—SLADE'S *Germany and Russia in* 1838–9, 385–389.—BREMNER, i. 46.

of justice is to be dealt out. When a victim is selected, against whom the evidence is clear, and whose enormities loudly call for a public example, an order suddenly arrives for his seizure, degradation from office, and dismissal to Siberia; or, if he is of so high rank or station as to render such punishment difficult or dangerous to subordinate functionaries, the emperor himself sets out in his britchska, travels post, with almost railway speed, a distance of a thousand or two thousand miles; calls the delinquent out at the head of his troops; and not unfrequently the terrible example is exhibited of a governor, holding almost royal dignity and authority, being seized unexpectedly when surrounded by his soldiers, his epaulettes torn from his shoulders, his head shaven, and himself sent off, in the dress of a convict, to the fortresses of Poland or the mines of Siberia. Alexander, notwithstanding his natural gentleness of disposition, and, still more, the present Emperor Nicholas, whose moral courage no dangers can daunt, have been particularly remarkable for the vigour, celerity, and impartiality, with which they exercised this awful but necessary attribute of sovereignty.[1]

[1] Slade, 370, 373. Bremner, i. 350, 351.

Evils and dangers of this system.

This system, however, though it may and does establish an important check, at least upon the higher class of functionaries, when carried into execution by the justice of an Alexander or the energy of a Nicholas, who do not hesitate to travel from one end of the empire to the other, to inflict punishment on a powerful delinquent, is attended with obvious hazard and liability to abuse. Personal, and, still more, moral courage cannot always be reckoned on on the throne; the dissolute days of the Empress Elizabeth may return, and the functionaries of the empire may be delivered over

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to impunity or connivance, to enable a voluptuous monarch to continue undisturbed the pleasures of the court or the seraglio at St Petersburg. It is impossible to contemplate, without shuddering, the probable condition of the empire if such a state of things should arise; if a modern Sejanus were to wield the powers of the secret police, only to denounce the virtuous or induce the confiscation of the wealthy; if the numerous spies throughout the Muscovite dominions were to be employed, as the infamous informers whom the pen of Tacitus has consigned to the execration of ages, in ransacking the provinces for worth to oppress, or iniquity to reward; and the obedient millions were, as then, to hail alike a Trajan or a Nero. Reflections of this kind arise unbidden in the mind upon the contemplation of the Russian empire; they recall at every step the mournful recollection, that in its annals, if a Caligula may be succeeded by a Nerva, an Antoninus may give place to a Commodus; and they are fitted to inspire a deeper thankfulness for those institutions which, in the free states of Western Europe, amidst all their concomitant evils, establish public prosperity on a broader basis, and strengthen the forces with which virtue combats the inroads of wickedness.

Extraordinary influence of Religion in Russia.

In this eternal conflict between the principles of good and evil, there is one, and one only, sheet anchor to which Russia has to trust, and it constitutes the grand distinction between European and ancient civilization.—RELIGION is all powerful with the bulk of the nation; it forms the true national bond of the empire; the foundation at once of the authority of the throne and the morality of the people. When Alexander, amidst the terrors of the French

invasion, issued proclamations, breathing devout confidence in Almighty protection, and invoking the prayers of the Church to the throne of grace to aid the warriors in the deliverance of their country, he appeared to the astonished French to have gone back to the days of the Crusades, and to utter an incomprehensible jargon of mysticism and superstition. He spoke the language, however, of all others the most calculated to rouse the national efforts; he touched a chord which vibrated alike in the hearts of the rich and the poor; he inspired that lofty spirit, that sublime patriotism, which, looking for its reward in another world, is superior to all the dangers and temptations of the present. Nor was his policy mistaken, even with reference to worldly success. The lever was well worth the wielding which broke the power of Napoleon; the enthusiasm not to be despised which fired the torches of Moscow.

State of the Church and the Clergy.

The Greek, as is well known, is the Established Church of Russia, and to which nineteen-twentieths of the people adhere. Its doctrines coincide in the main with those of the Romish persuasion, and the mass constitutes the chief part of their public worship; but it differs from the Church of Rome in two essential particulars—the marriage of the parish priests, and the spiritual authority of the Pope. The first is enjoined, instead of being prohibited; the second denied, instead of being obeyed. The worship of figures, statues, or graven images of any kind, is unknown; but ample amends is made in the innumerable crosses which are on almost every occasion made on the breast, and the devout adoration bestowed on painted or other *flat* representations of our Saviour, or their favourite saints. Among the dignified clergy are many men of profound learning and enlightened

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piety; but the great mass of the parochial priests are little, if at all, elevated above the peasants by whom they are surrounded, whose labours they share, and to whose manners they are generally assimilated. Drinking and other gross vices are very frequent among them; and not a few are to be found among the convicts of Siberia, suffering the just punishment of their crimes. Still the elements of incalculable usefulness are to be found among the Russian clergy. They are all supported by land of their own, which renders them independent, at least so far as subsistence is concerned. The profession of the clergy is in a manner hereditary, the sons of serfs not being permitted by their landlords to enter a profession which would deprive them of their services as labourers; and they are looked up to with unbounded veneration by their flocks. The most pernicious doctrines of the Romish church, purgatory, dispensations, indulgences, as well as predestination, election, and other doubtful Calvinistic tenets, are unknown. In the gradual elevation and cultivation of this established body of spiritual labourers, the true secret of Russian amelioration is to be found. All the efforts of its government should be directed to this object. Doubtless, in the present age, much that may be turned by unbelief into ridicule, is to be found in their customs; but the experienced observer, versed in the ways of human wickedness, surrounded by the profligacy of civilized heathenism, and acquainted with the necessity of impressing the mass of men by considerations or acts which strike the senses, will not slight even the countless crossings on the breast, and bowing to the ground, of the Russian peasantry. He will acknowledge, in these rites, the invaluable marks of spiritual sway which are thus testified by an illiterate people; he

will hope that an antidote to the temptations of the senses may thus be provided; and expect more from a people thus impressed, than from the orgies of Infidelity or the altars of the Goddess of Reason.[1]

[1] Bremner, ii. 118, 129.

Peculiar political system of the Russian Cabinet.

The policy of the Russian cabinet, from the earliest time that the Muscovite power has stood forth an object of alarm to the surrounding nations, has been governed by one ruling principle, which differs widely from that of any people who have hitherto made a great impression on human affairs. It is neither founded on the haughty maxim of the Romans, to spare the submissive and subdue the proud, nor the more politic system of the English, whether in Europe or Asia, to support the weak against the strong. It rests on a combination of physical strength with diplomatic address, of perseverance in object with versatility in means, which was never before exhibited on the theatre of the world. Its leading characteristic has been explained, perhaps with more candour than prudence, by the eloquent Russian historian Karamsin:—"The object and the character of our military policy has invariably been, to seek to be at peace with every body, and to *make conquests without war*; always keeping ourselves on the defensive, placing no faith in the friendship of those whose interests do not accord with our own, and to lose no opportunity of injuring them, without ostensibly breaking our treaties with them."[2] The slightest survey of Russian history, must be sufficient to show that this character is well founded; and that, formidable as the military power of the state is, it has prevailed, in every age, rather from pacific encroachments than warlike subjugation.

[2] See Bjornsjerna on Brit. Emp. in East, 244.

It has been observed that Russia can hardly fail in the end to obtain the victory over all her enemies,

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for she has two powerful allies always on her side—*time* and *space*. Relying with well-founded confidence on the inaccessible nature of the Muscovite territory—secured from attack on the north and east by the ices of the Pole and the deserts of Tartary—open to attack from the European powers only on the frontier of Poland, and capable there of wearing out even the greatest armies of the western world, by simply retreating until the invader is enveloped in clouds of Asiatic horse, or finds his winding-sheet in the snows of an arctic winter—the cabinet of St Petersburg has the means, without material danger to itself, of profiting by the weakness and dissensions of its enemies, and, by never provoking war till a favourable opportunity occurs of prosecuting it to advantage, of marching, without ever receding, from one acquisition to another. The Russians never originate a contest, but are always ready to carry it on. Passion never makes them anticipate the period of action; success never relaxes the sinews of preparation. So formidable is their weight, when fairly roused to exertion, that the powers with whom they are engaged in war, despairing of making any durable impression on such a colossus, are generally glad, even after victory, to purchase a respite from hostility by a cession of territory; and, surprising to say, Russia has reaped greater advantages from her defeats than other nations from their victories. Even the defeat of Friedland was immediately followed by an important acquisition of territory; and the conferences of Tilsit brought her frontiers to the mouth of the Danube and the head of the Gulf of Bothnia. He must be little read in European annals, who is not aware how steadily this system has been pursued by the Russian cabinet,

Its immense physical advantages for such a system.

and how signal has been the success with which it has been attended. Never since the god Terminus first receded with the Roman eagles in the provinces beyond the Euphrates, has so steady and uninterrupted an advance been made by any empire towards universal dominion; and it is hard to say, whether it has prevailed most by the ability of diplomatic address, or the vigour of warlike achievement.

Successive conquests of the Russians in their early history.

When Peter the Great mounted the throne of Russia in 1689, she had no seaport but the half-frozen one of Archangel; and his first naval effort was the construction of two small vessels, which were floated down the Don to the Sea of Azoff. Secluded in boundless solitudes, the Muscovite territory was hardly known to the European nations, and the Muscovite power estimated as nothing by the European cabinets. His successes over the Swedes gave him the first harbour which Russia possessed on the Baltic, but Smolensko was still the frontier town towards Poland; and Moscow, dimly descried through the haze of distance, was imperfectly known by having been twice taken and once burned by the victorious squadrons of the Lithuanians. The battle of Pultowa and treaty of Neustadt first gave the Russians the province of Livonia, and the site where Cronstadt and St Petersburg now stand; the disasters of the Pruth did not permanently check the progress of the empire; the partition of 1772, brought its frontier on the side of Poland to the Dwina and the Dnieper; by the treaty of Kainardgi, the Muscovite standards were brought down to the Crimea and the Sea of Azoff; vast acquisitions from Tartary, larger than the whole German empire, next spread their dominion over the boundless tracts

30th Aug. 1721.

Signed Sept. 1773.

1774.

1781.

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of Central Asia; the ukase of 1783, extended their sway over the Crimea, and the vast plains which stretch between the Euxine and the Caspian, as far as the foot of the Caucasus; the treaty of Jassy advanced their frontier to the Dniester, and brought the now flourishing harbour of Odessa beneath their rule; the infamous spoliation of 1793, gave them the command of Lithuania; the conquests of Suwarrow, in 1794, extended their frontier to the Vistula, and the provinces embracing nearly half of the old kingdom of Poland; even the disasters of Friedland, and the treaty of Tilsit, rounded their eastern frontier, by no inconsiderable province, at the expense of their ally Prussia.[1]

1781 to 1783.

1792.

1793.

1794.

[1] Martin's Sup. v. *voce* Russia.

Great and alarming as these encroachments were, they yet yield in magnitude and importance to the prodigious extension which subsequent events have given to the Russian empire. By the conferences at Tilsit, she acquired the liberty of pursuing without molestation her conquests over the Swedes and Turks; and the treaties of Stockholm in 1809, and Bucharest in 1812, gave her in consequence the whole of Finland, as far as the head of the Gulf of Bothnia, and extended her southern frontier to the Pruth, so as to confer the inestimable advantage of including the mouths of the Danube in her dominions. The astonishing victories of 1813 and 1814, and her formidable attitude at the close of the war, secured for her, at the congress of Vienna, not only a recognition of these important conquests, but the still more valuable acquisition of the grand duchy of Warsaw, which brought her frontier to within a hundred and eighty miles of both Berlin and Vienna, without the intervention of any defensible frontier to either: various conquests over the

Their progress in later times.

Sept. 17, 1809.

June 1, 1812.

1815.

Circassians and Persians carried the Muscovite eagles, between 1800 and 1814, across the Caucasus, and added the beautiful province of Georgia to their dominions; while that of Turkaman Chaj, in 1828, brought the bastions of Erivan and the peak of Ararat within their grasp, and rendered the waters of the Araxes the southern frontier of their Asiatic territories. If the war so imprudently provoked by the Turks, in 1828, has not ostensibly added to the dominions of Russia, it has done more: it has given security to, and rendered unassailable, those which she already enjoyed. Walachia and Moldavia are now her tributary subjects; the Danube is in reality her southern European boundary; her eastern provinces almost encircle the Black Sea; while by the infatuation of England, in refusing the Turks aid against Mehemet Ali, a few years after, she has acquired the exclusive command of the Dardanelles: the Euxine can be navigated only by her vessels of war; and her navy in the south has acquired the immense advantage of possessing a vast inland lake, where navigation is difficult, and seamanship may be acquired, while access to enemies is excluded, and foreign attack may be defied.[1]

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Ukases. 1800, 1803. 1805. 1806. 1814. 1828. 1829. 1834.

[1] Progress of Russia in the East, i. 164. Lond. 1838.

It is impossible to deny, and fruitless to attempt to disguise, that an empire of such extent and resources, is in the highest degree formidable to the liberties of Europe, and, from its rapid increase of numbers is daily becoming more so. What Macedonia was to Greece, that Russia is to Europe: happy if it could be said that the resemblance stopped there, and that the inconstancy, *imprévoyance*, and impatience of taxation in the Athenian people, bore no resemblance to the similar characteristics by which the democracy in the British islands is now distinguished.

Napoleon's account of the power of Russia.

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Napoleon has left a graphic and warning picture of the capability of Russia to repel alike foreign invasion, and conduct external aggression, if led by an able and enterprizing chief. "Backed," said he, "by the eternal ices of the pole, which must for ever render it unassailable in rear or flank, it can only be attacked even on its vulnerable front during three or four months in the year, while it has the whole twelve to render available against us. It offers to an invader nothing but the rigours, sufferings, and privations of a desert soil, of a nature half dead and frozen; while its inhabitants will ever precipitate themselves with transport towards the delicious climates of the south. To these physical advantages, we must join an immense population, brave, hardy, devoted, passive; and vast nomad tribes, to whom destitution is habitual, and wandering is nature. One cannot avoid shuddering at the thought of such a mass, unassailable alike on the flanks and rear, which can at any time with impunity inundate you; while, if defeated, it has only to retire into the midst of its snows and ices, where pursuit is impossible, and reparation of loss easy. It is the Antæus of the fable, which cannot be overcome but by seizing it by the middle, and stifling it in the arms; but where is the Hercules to be found who will attempt such an enterprize? We could alone attempt it, and the world knows what success we have had. Show me an Emperor of Russia, brave, able, and impetuous: in a word, a Czar who is worthy of his situation, and Europe is at his feet. He may begin his operations at the distance only of one hundred leagues from the two capitals of Vienna and Berlin, the sovereigns of which are the only obstacles he has to apprehend. He gains the one by seduc-

tion, subdues the other by force, and he is soon in the midst of the lesser princes of Germany, most of whom are his relations or dependants. A few words on liberation and independence will set Italy on fire. Assuredly, in such a situation, I should arrive at Calais by fixed stages, and be the arbiter of Europe.[1]"

[1] Nap. in Las Cases, iv. 81, 82.

Description of St Petersburg.

ST PETERSBURG, the capital of this boundless dominion, is not less surprising as a work of art, than the empire of which it is the head, is as the growth of nature. Little more than a century ago, the site of this noble metropolis was a salt marsh, lying between the lake Ladoga and the Baltic Sea, in which the natural sterility of the north was enhanced by unhealthy swamps and a wretched soil. It is now one of the most splendid capitals in the world, containing three hundred thousand inhabitants, and excelling any metropolis in Europe in the grandeur of its design and durability of the materials of which its public edifices are composed. The discerning eye of Peter the Great first appreciated the commercial advantages of its situation; and, at an enormous expense of life and treasure, his despotic power overcame the formidable obstacles of nature, and amidst the marshes of Livonia erected a noble gateway to European civilization. Vessels of heavy burden, indeed, cannot come up to St Petersburg; but its outwork of Cronstadt possesses a spacious harbour, where fifty sail of the line can lie in safety, defended by stupendous and impregnable bulwarks from external assault; while the vast power of the Czars, guided by European skill, but inspired by oriental imagination, has constructed the metropolis of their empire on a scale of solidity and magnificence, to which no parallel is to be found in modern times.[2]

[2] Lond. i. 182. Malte Brun, vi. 510.

More than any other capital in Europe, its public

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Its public edifices.

edifices are built in a style which seems to aim at eternal duration: the Russian emperors have ransacked all the parts of their immense dominions to obtain the most costly materials for its construction. The granite which is scattered in huge masses through the marshes of Livonia, the marble which lies buried in the mountains of Taurida, compose the columns which decorate the exterior of these edifices; while the malachite of Siberia, the lapis lazuli of the lake Baikal, and the porphyry of the Ural mountains, confer a matchless lustre on their interior apartments. The level surface on which it stands must ever prevent St Petersburg from vying with Rome, Moscow, Naples, Edinburgh, or Constantinople, in the beauty of its situation, or the imposing character of its distant aspect; and the construction of the greater part of the private buildings of brick, is a bar to the metropolis acquiring that historic interest which arises from the sight of the dwellings of many successive generations, standing side by side, like the shadows of the dead to impress the living: but the sublime public edifices, which the magnificence of successive sovereigns has erected in different reigns, will remain eternal monuments of the vast power and great achievements of the Czars. The quays of granite will for ever attest the prophetic conceptions and far-seeing sagacity of Peter the Great;* the imperial palace, the façade of the admiralty, the colonnade of the Church of Cazan,† are durable monuments of

* These quays, built of vast masses of solid granite, are, beyond all doubt, the finest in Europe. All the principal buildings in the metropolis are assembled on their sides—the winter palace, the admiralty, the English quay.—BREMNER, i. 82-83.

† The dome of this noble church resembles that of St Peter's at Rome, and it has a splendid converging colonnade in front, like its great prototype, of one hundred and thirty-two pillars. The interior rests on fifty-

the lofty spirit and grand ideas of Catharine; while the Church of Isaac, destined to rival, if it cannot equal, St Peter's itself in magnitude and splendour,* and the noble pillar, which exceeds the columns of Trajan and Antoninus in elevation, and will equal the obelisks of Egypt in durability, seem destined to convey to the latest generations,† a faithful image of the warlike achievements and religious character which have secured immortal celebrity for the name of Alexander.[1]

[1] Bremner's Russia, i. 82, 84. Lond. i. 92, 93. Malte Brun, vi. 504, 507.

The preceding sketch of the empire which has arisen to such an extraordinary eminence in recent times, will not be deemed misplaced by the reflecting reader even in a work of general history; and it becomes the more appropriate, as it will be followed in a future chapter by a similar description of the progress and institutions of the Anglo-Saxon race in America: exhibiting thus, in the close of the wars of the French Revolution, portraits of the two mighty

Importance of this sketch of Russia.

four beautiful pillars of grey granite, each of a single stone.—BREMNER, i. 98.

* The columns which support this gigantic cathedral are to be fifty-eight feet long, each of a single stone of polished granite. There are also to be forty-eight stairs of the same polished material. These columns are exactly the size of the celebrated ones, so well known to travellers, in the interior of the baths of Dioclesian at Rome.—*See* LONDONDERRY, i. 92.

† This column is one hundred and fifty-four feet high, including the figure at the top, and its diameter is fifteen feet. It is composed of mottled red granite, like that at Peterhead in Scotland, but susceptible of a higher polish. The column in the Place Vendôme is one hundred and forty feet, that in St Andrew Square, Edinburgh, with the figure, one hundred and fifty-two feet. The column of Alexander stands on massy blocks of granite, and is distinguished by its severe and awful simplicity. The shaft of the stone is eighty-four feet high, and on its top stands a statue, not of Alexander, *but of Religion*, blessing the surrounding city. It has a pedestal and capital of bronze, made from cannon taken in the war of 1828 and 1829 from the Turks.—BREMNER, i. 88.

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families of mankind who have risen to exalted destinies during the strife, and which, for good or for evil, have now, in an indelible manner, affixed their impress upon the history of the species.

Arrival of Napoleon at the Tuileries.

Almost outstripping even his couriers in speed, the Emperor Napoleon traversed Poland and Germany in fourteen days, and regained the capital of France before the Imperial Government was even aware that he had quitted the army. On the 5th December, in company with Caulaincourt, he quitted Dec. 10. Smorgoni in Lithuania;* on the 10th, as already mentioned, he passed through Warsaw, and had his celebrated conversation with the Abbé de Pradt:† Dec. 14. on the 14th, he was at Dresden, and wrote to the Emperor of Austria, "that in spite of his great fatigues, his health was never better," and urging him to augment his auxiliary force to sixty thousand Dec. 18 men; and on the 18th December, at eleven at night, he arrived at the Tuileries. He had written frequently to the empress, but without ever announcing his return, and he was totally unexpected, insomuch that, in his humble equipage, he had some difficulty in getting the gates opened. Melancholy and dejected, the empress had just retired to rest; and her attendants were about to do the same, when the voices of men were heard in the ante-chamber, and immediately after, two figures wrapped in travelling cloaks entered. The maid of honour in attendance instantly rushed forward to secure the door which led to the empress's apartment, when Caulaincourt drew aside the cloak of the foremost of the strangers,

* Ante, viii. 802. † Ante, viii. 806.

and the Emperor was recognized. A cry of astonishment from the lady made the empress aware that something extraordinary was passing in the antechamber, and she had just leaped out of bed when the Emperor caught her in his arms. Their interview was tender and affectionate; and although Duroc and Count Lobau, who had left Smorgoni a few hours later than the Emperor, did not arrive with his papers for two days after, yet, early next morning, he commenced his labours in the cabinet, and a new impulse was communicated to every branch of the administration.[1]

[1] Mad. Durand, 173. Fain, MS. de 1813, i. 1, 9. Napoleon to Francis, Dec. 14, 1813.

At nine o'clock a levee was held, and, as the news of the Emperor's unexpected arrival had spread like wildfire through the metropolis, it was very numerously attended. The 29th bulletin, containing the account of the disasters of the retreat, had not yet arrived, though it had left the army before the Emperor, and no other feeling than that of surprise at his sudden return was felt by the persons present. In the course of the forenoon, however, it came, and was immediately published. No words can paint the feelings of stupor, consternation, and astonishment, which pervaded the metropolis when the disastrous news was promulgated. The calamity, great as it was, and truly as it had been revealed in that celebrated paper, was exaggerated by the public terror: it was thought that the old system of concealment had been pursued on this, as on all previous occasions; that the army had been totally destroyed; and that the sudden return of the Emperor was owing to his being, literally speaking, the sole survivor of his followers. Gloom and disquietude, accordingly, pervaded every countenance at the levee on the morning of the succeeding day, which was attended by all the principal officers

Universal consternation at Paris on the news of the retreat, and the Emperor's arrival being received.

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of state; and the utmost anxiety was universally felt to hear what details the Emperor himself might furnish as to the extent of the calamity. Napoleon appeared, however, calm and collected; and so far from seeking to evade the questions which all were so anxious to put, he anticipated the wishes of those present, and himself began the conversation on the disasters of the retreat. "Moscow," said he, "had fallen into our power; we had surmounted every obstacle; the conflagration even had in no degree lessened the prosperous state of our affairs; but the rigour of winter induced upon the army the most frightful calamities: in a few nights all was changed; cruel losses were experienced; they would have broken my heart, if in such circumstances I had been accessible to any other sentiments but the welfare of my people."[1]

[1] Moniteur, Dec. 20, 1812. Fain, i. 8, 10.

Restoration of public confidence throughout the Empire.

The undisguised admissions and intrepid countenance of the Emperor had a surprising effect in restoring public confidence, and dissipating the impression produced by the greatest external disasters recorded in history. The old confidence in his fortune returned; his star appeared to emerge from the clouds by which it had been obscured, and again to shine forth the lord of the ascendant. His words, eagerly gathered and repeated, were soon circulated in the public journals through the empire; addresses, containing assurances of undiminished loyalty and unshaken confidence, were speedily presented by all the public bodies in Paris, and followed by similar ones from the chief towns of France; and soon the whole cities of the empire approached the throne with eloquent protestations of eternal loyalty and unchangeable devotion. The cities of Rome, Milan, Florence, Hamburg, Amsterdam, and Turin, particularly distin-

guished themselves by the fervour of their enthusiasm on this occasion.* Their addresses would be worthy of the highest admiration, as indicating a dignified constancy in misfortune, if the praises of servitude were not always suspicious; and if the subsequent conduct of the same functionaries, when the winds of adversity reached them, had not demonstrated that their present overflowing loyalty was rather the result of anticipation of future and prosperous, than of superiority to past and adverse fortune.[1]

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[1] Fain, i. 11, 12. Moniteur, Dec. 25, 1812, to Jan. 20, 1813.

But, though not insensible to these striking marks of devotion, and fully alive to the necessities of his situation, it was neither by the one nor the other that the attention of the Emperor was now riveted. It was treason at Paris which occupied his thoughts —it was on THE CONSPIRACY OF MALET that his eyes were fixed.

This extraordinary event, of which the Emperor received intelligence shortly before he left the army in Russia, might well arrest his attention; for it placed beyond a doubt the sandy foundation on which, amidst so many protestations of fidelity and devotion, his authority, and the prospects of succession in his family, were rested. An obscure but most able man, of the name of Malet, whose restless

Conspiracy of Malet.

* "Our kingdom, sire! is your handiwork: it owes to you its laws, its monuments, its roads, its prosperity, its agriculture, the honour of its arts, and the internal peace which it enjoys. The people of Italy declare in the face of the universe, that there is no sacrifice which they are not prepared to make, to enable your majesty to complete the great work entrusted to you by Providence. In extraordinary circumstances, extraordinary sacrifices are required, and our efforts shall be unbounded. You require arms, armies, gold, fidelity, constancy. All we possess, sire! we lay at your majesty's feet. This is not the suggestion of authority—it is conviction, gratitude—the universal cry produced by the passion for our political existence."—*Address from Milan, 27th Dec.* 1812, FAIN, i. 12.

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Oct. 22. Having taken these precautions, Malet with ease eluded the loose surveillance under which he was detained, and, dressed in his uniform of general of brigade, presented himself at the gate of the barracks of the 2d regiment and 10th cohort, and being refused admittance till the colonel, Soulier, gave

* Malet was born on the 28th June 1754, at Dole, and passed his early life in the army, where he commanded one of the first battalions of the Jura at the commencement of the Revolution. He was afterwards implicated in some illegal exactions at Civita Vecchia, in the Roman States, and was in consequence deprived of his command, and sent before a commission of enquiry at Paris in July 1807; and, in virtue of their sentence, he was confined in a house of detention till the affair blew over. In 1808, when he was still a prisoner, and the Emperor was in Spain, he conceived the first idea of his extraordinary project; but the sudden return of Napoleon to Paris disconcerted the design at that time; and it continued fermenting in his mind till the Emperor's longer absence in Russia gave an opportunity of renewing the design under more favourable circumstances, and when the conspirator had regained so much liberty as to be able to elude his guards.—FAIN, i. 14, 15.

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orders, he repaired to the house of the latter, which was not far distant, and announced to him that the Emperor had been killed on the 7th October before Moscow; that the senate had taken its measures, and that he himself had been appointed governor of Paris. The forged degree of the senate was well calculated to deceive even the most experienced, from the precision with which it was drawn, and the apparent authenticity of the signatures appended to it; but Malet had not trusted merely to these supports, for it also contained an appointment of Soulier as general of brigade, and a treasury order for 100,000 francs (L.4000) for his use. Deceived or won, that officer gave into the snare, and accompanied Malet into the barrack-yard.[1]

[1] Soulier's declaration, Fain, i. 145, 147. Thib. ix. 156. Savary, vi. 18, 19.

The chief difficulty in the enterprize was here to be surmounted; and in the way in which he overcame it, Malet gave proofs of a vigorous character. He instantly assumed a decided tone—ordered the gates to be opened—mustered the soldiers by torch-light—announced the Emperor's death—and commanded the drums to beat, that the cohort should assemble to hear the decree read which announced the Emperor's death, and the abolition of the Imperial government. Yielding to the habit of obedience, suspecting no deceit, and habituated to similar changes during the Revolution, the soldiers obeyed without a murmur; the acquiescence of the chief of the battalion was already secured by the order on the treasury for 100,000 francs, delivered at the time, with the promise of future gratifications; the common men were paralysed by the fatal intelligence of the Emperor's death, and knew not how to resist orders apparently emanating from such elevated functionaries. Malet instantly ordered a strong body to march with him to the prison of La Force,

Progress and great success of the conspiracy.

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which they forthwith did; and he there liberated Generals Lahorie and Guidal, who were sturdy republicans, of a bold character, and who had long been confined by order of Napoleon. They immediately set out with him, and took the command of the troops; and before daylight three columns had marched in different directions, under the command of Malet, Lahorie, and Guidal, to gain possession of the principal posts in the city.[1]

[1] Thib. ix. 157, 158. Savary, vi. 19, 21. Fain. i. 144, 147.

Extraordinary success of the conspiracy.

They were all successful beyond what their most sanguine hopes could have anticipated. Lahorie made straight for the hotel of Savary, the minister of police, forced his way into the house, surprised the great functionary in bed, made him prisoner, and after some altercation, carried him off to the prison of La Force, where he was received and lodged in safety. Guidal, in like manner, made prisoner Pasquier, the prefect of police, and lodged him in the same place of security. Soulier, the colonel of the 10th cohort, who had been gained by the bribe above mentioned, made himself master of the Hotel de Ville, and stationed a strong force in the small square in front of that building; while another detachment, under Malet in person, took possession of the Place Vendôme. Frochot, the prefect of the department of the Seine, was riding into town from his country house at a quarter past eight in the morning, when he was met by one of his servants on horseback, in great agitation, with a note from the Hotel de Ville, on the outside of which were written the ominous words, "*Fuit Imperator.*" On arriving at the Hotel de Ville he found the front occupied by the National Guards, and received a despatch from Malet, styling himself Governor of Paris, ordering him to prepare the principal apartment in the building for the use

of the "provisional government." Frochot was a man of probity and honour; but, like many others of a similar character, he wanted the resolution necessary to carry him through such a crisis. Instead of simply discharging his duty, by declaring his adhesion to the young Napoleon, and endeavouring to induce the soldiers to abandon the blind enterprise in which they were engaged, he at once acquiesced, and even went so far as to desire the officers at the Hotel de Ville to arrange the tables and apartment for the provisional government.[1]

[1] Sav. vi. 27, 29. Fain. i. 17, and Declaration of Count Frochot, i. 157. Thib. ix. 159.

While the inferior leaders of the conspiracy were achieving this astonishing success, its chief was not less fortunate in obtaining, almost without resistance, the command of the principal military authorities in the city. He dispatched forged orders, addressed to the commanders of two regiments of the paid guard of Paris, similar to those which had corrupted or deceived Soulier, and met from both with implicit obedience. By means of the one he gained possession of the whole barriers of Paris, which were closed, with positive orders to let no one go out or in; so that no messengers could be sent to the country for assistance. With the other he occupied the bank, in which, at that period, there was a large treasure in specie, the treasury, and the principal public offices. The chief himself meanwhile moved along the Rue St Honoré, with a detachment of only fifty men, twenty-five of whom he directed to station themselves in front of the office of the Etats-Major of Paris. The possession of this post was of the highest importance, as it was the headquarters of military authority in Paris. To effect this object, he sent a packet to the Adjutant-General Doucet, of a similar tenor with those given to Soulier and the other colonels,

Success of Malet, who seizes the Governor of Paris.

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and containing his nomination as general of brigade, and a treasury order for 100,000 francs. Doucet lost his presence of mind; and, seeing the troops before the hotel, obeyed his orders so far as to send for Laborde, whom he had been ordered to put under arrest. Meanwhile Malet himself went to the hotel of General Hulin, the governor of Paris, with the other twenty-five men. He entered his hotel, accompanied by a captain of the regiment which followed him; and having asked to see Hulin in private, shot him with a pistol in the face when desired to show his orders, and left him severely, but not mortally wounded, weltering in his blood. After this extraordinary scene, Malet repaired to the Adjutant-General Doucet's office, still accompanied and obeyed by the officer and detachment, who were so fascinated by his audacity, that they saw nothing extraordinary or reprehensible in the apparent murder of their general before their eyes. Nothing was wanting but the command of the adjutant-general's office to give him the entire direction of the military force of Paris, of the telegraph, and with it of all France, which, it was well known, would never shake off its submission to the central authority of Paris, by whomsoever wielded; and it was accident alone which prevented this consummation, after every real obstacle had been overcome.[1]

[1] Sav. vi. 24, 25. Thib. vi. 158. Fain, i. 17, 18.

His subsequent seizure and overthrow.

It so happened, that when Malet with his detachment came to the hotel of the adjutant-general, Laborde was coming down the stair to go home and yield to the arrest, and Pasques, the inspector-general of the minister of police, entirely ignorant of what had occurred, was at the door, to make some enquiries about an Englishman whom he had arrested at Passy by orders of Savary. Malet's detachment

stopped him agreeably to their orders; but Laborde called to them to let him in: and the men, accustomed to obey his voice, allowed him to enter. This functionary, who had had the charge of Malet in his place of detention, and had seen him there only the day before, no sooner saw him in the room conversing with Doucet, than he exclaimed—"This is my prisoner: how the devil has he made his escape? M. Malet, you had no permission to leave your house without my leave." And immediately turning to Doucet, he said—"There is something here I don't understand; arrest him, and I will go and inform the minister of police." Malet immediately put his hand on the pistol which he had in his pocket; the gesture was observed in a glass opposite; and before he could draw it, Laborde and Doucet sprang upon him, threw him back on the floor, and disarmed him. The arrest of its chief disconcerted the whole conspiracy; Laborde went out to the soldiers, informed them of the deceit which had been practised on them, and told them the Emperor was not dead. They immediately shouted "Vive l'Empereur!" and, ashamed of the extraordinary plot into which they had been drawn, returned with perfect docility to their barracks. By nine o'clock the minister of police was delivered from his prison; all was over; and with so little bloodshed, that it might have passed for a melodrama, had it not been followed by a real tragedy, in the death of Malet, Guidal, Lahorie, and eleven others, who were shot next day on the plain of Grenelle, by orders of the government—an unnecessary piece of cruelty when applied to such a number, which Napoleon, had he been present, would certainly not have permitted. Malet behaved with great fortitude in his last moments, and had the generosity to exculpate

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his companions in misfortune, by declaring that he alone imagined the conspiracy, and that he had no associates. When brought before the judge examinators, his intrepidity was such as to excite even awe among those whom professional indifference had rendered callous to such scenes. "Who are your accomplices?" said Dejean, the president. "All France," replied he, "if I had succeeded, and you yourself at their head. When you attack openly a government by force, the palm is your own if you succeed; if not—death." The president turned pale, and asked no more questions. On his way to the plain of Grenelle, with an intrepid step, haranguing the soldiers in the masculine language of the Revolution, he said—"I fall, but I am not the last of the Romans." Most of the others lamented loudly their fate, at being sentenced along with a person whose very name they knew not two days before, and for accession to a treasonable plot, of the objects of which they were entirely ignorant.[1]

[1] Sav. vi. 24, 25. Thib. ix. 160, 162. Fain, i. 17, 18. Capefigue, ix. 397, 398.

Effect which this conspiracy produced in Paris, and on Napoleon.

When the news of this extraordinary conspiracy spread in Paris, it excited a prodigious sensation, but rather tending to ridicule than fear, as before it was generally known, the danger was over. The ladies, in particular, were highly diverted at the ease with which their old tormentor, the minister of police, had been shut up in prison; and the saying made the tour of all the salons in Paris, that "the Duke of Rovigo had better keep his eye on the barracks, instead of prying into our boudoirs." But those better acquainted with the real hazard which had been incurred, made no secret of the narrow escape which the Imperial authority had made. "But for the singular accident," says Savary, "which caused the arrest of the minister of war to fail; Malet, in a few

moments, would have been master of almost every thing; and in a country so much influenced by the contagion of example, there is no saying where his success would have stopped. He would have had possession of the treasury, then extremely rich; the post-office, the telegraph, and the command of the hundred cohorts of the national guards of France. He would soon have learned, by the amount of estafettes, the alarming situation of affairs in Russia; and nothing could have prevented him from making prisoner of the Emperor himself if he had returned alone, or from marching to meet him if he had come at the head of his troops." [1] Nor is there any solid foundation for the obvious remark, that the success of such a conspiracy, founded on falsehood, could have been only of an ephemeral duration; for we have the authority of Thibaudeau for the assertion, that, to his personal knowledge, the conspiracy had ramifications in the provinces. It was set on foot by Barras and the old Jacobin party; and it is impossible to say what would have been the effect of a sudden overthrow of the government, occurring at the very time of the promulgation of the news of the Moscow disasters.[2]

[1] Sav. vi. 27, 31.

[2] Thib ix. 163, 164.

But if the narrow escape which the imperial government had undergone excited anxious disquietude in the breasts of all classes,* tenfold deeper was the impression which it made on the far-seeing mind of

Napoleon's opinion on the subject in the Council of State.

* Above all they were struck with the facility with which the conspirators had persuaded the troops of the death of the Emperor, without its ever having entered into the head of one of their officers to assure themselves whether it was true, or to bestow a thought on his son. These very soldiers suffered themselves to be led against the persons in possession of power, and without a murmur saw the governor of Paris, their general, struck down before their eyes, without a motion being made for his defence. It was in vain to disguise that such a state of things presaged many misfortunes.—SAVARY, vi. 28.

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Napoleon. One only idea took possession of his imagination—that in this crisis the succession of the King of Rome was, by the common consent, set aside. One only truth was ever present to his mind—that the imperial crown rested on himself alone. The fatal truth, well known to the world in historic lore, but hitherto concealed even from his piercing eyes by the effulgence of his glory, had now been demonstrated, that the Revolution had destroyed the foundations of hereditary succession; and that even the greatest achievements by him who had won the diadem, afforded no security that it would descend to his progeny. These reflections, which seem to have burst upon Napoleon all at once, when the news of this extraordinary affair first reached him in Russia, weighed him down more than all the disasters of the Moscow retreat. They constituted the secret reason for his leaving the army; they incessantly occupied his mind during his long and solitary journey; and they found vent in impassioned and mournful expressions, when, a few days after his arrival, he convened the council of state on the subject. "Gentlemen," said he, "we must no longer disbelieve in miracles; attend to the report of M. Real on Malet's conspiracy." The report being read, he resumed—"This is the consequence of the want of habit and proper ideas in France on the subject of succession. Sad effects of our revolutions! At the first word of my death, at the first command of an unknown individual, officers lead their regiments to force the jails, and make prisoners of the highest authorities. A jailer quietly encloses the ministers of state within his doors. A prefect of the capital, at the command of a few soldiers, lends himself to the preparation of his great

hall for the assembly of I know not what factious wretches! And all this, while the empress is on the spot; while the King of Rome is alive; while my ministers and all the great officers of state are at hand. *Is a man, then, every thing here? Are institutions nothing; oaths nothing?* It is to idæology that we are to attribute all these misfortunes: it is the error of its professors which necessarily induced, and in fact brought on, the reign of blood. Who proclaimed the principle of insurrection as a duty? Who cast adulation before the people, in elevating them to a sovereignty which they were incapable of exercising? When one is called to regenerate a state, it is principles diametrically the reverse which require to be followed. History paints the human heart: it is in history we must seek for the mirror of the advantages or evils of different species of legislation. Frochot is an honourable man: he is attached to the empire; but his duty was to have devoted himself to death on the steps of the Hotel de Ville. A great example is required for all functionaries. The noblest of deaths would be that of a soldier on the field of honour, if that of a magistrate perishing in defence of the throne and the laws were not more glorious still." These words gave the tone to all the public bodies to whom the examination into the affair was entrusted, and they unanimously reported that the prefect of the department of the Seine should be dismissed. This was accordingly done, and the urban guard of Paris was suppressed; but the matter was pushed no further, it being justly deemed inadvisable to make it known with what facility the regular soldiers had been misled, and with what ease the imperial authority had been all but overturned.[1]

[1] Thib. ix. 166, 167. Fain. i. 168, 195. Pièces Just. &c. 20, 21. Audience of Dec. 20, 1812.

In France, during the monarchy, the people had

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for their rallying cry—"The King is dead! long live the King!" On this occasion, however, when the report of the Emperor's death was spread and believed, no one exclaimed, "Long live the Emperor!" The fact is memorable: it was the first indication of the effects, not only of a new dynasty on the throne, but of a new era in the social history of France. The period of hereditary succession, with its stability, its security, its loyalty, its recollections, had passed away: personal qualities had become the sole title to distinction. In the effort to effect this change, all Europe had been convulsed to its centre; but the alteration had been made, and it could not be undone. Now, then, was seen the effect of the shock on one of the most momentous of national events, the demise of the sovereign filling the throne. It too had become elective: personal qualities were alone the passport to power: the principle of hereditary succession had been destroyed. Even the greatest and most splendid qualities in the founder of a new dynasty, and the most unheard of success attending his arms, could not, it was found, ensure the succession of his own son, or shake the inextinguishable passion for a rotation of rulers, which had arisen from the principles of the Revolution. The effects of that great convulsion were already unfolding themselves; the throne had become in effect elective; all power depended upon office; all office on the support of the military; the support of the military on the suffrage of the Prætorian Guards at Paris. European had been exchanged for Asiatic civilization; and the dream of perfectibility had terminated in the institutions of the Byzantine empire.

Reflections on this event.

Though Napoleon acquired the melancholy con-

viction, from this event, that the stability of his dynasty and the hopes of his son's succession rested on a sandy foundation, yet he resolved to leave nothing undone which might, for the present at least, guard against the dangers with which they were threatened. With this view, he resolved to fix at once, by an act of government, the cases in which a regency was to ensue, and the persons in whom the nomination was to be vested. By a *senatus consultum* early in February, the right of appointing a regent was in the first instance vested in the Emperor: if he had not made a nomination, the right of doing so devolved on the empress; failing her, on the first prince of the blood; and in default of him, on the great dignitaries of the empire. The same decree fixed, in the most minute manner, the duration and extent of the regent's power, the formation of his council, the oath to be taken to the empress if regent, the administration, during the continuance of the interregnum, of the royal domains, the forms for crowning the empress regent and the King of Rome. The object of the Emperor in this curious enactment, obviously was to arrange every thing for the transmission of the imperial authority, in the event of his absence or death, to the proper depositary, and to leave nothing to chance, or the inclinations of the military who happened to be in the capital at the time: forgetting that the real and only security for hereditary succession in the throne, is to be found in the reverence with which it is regarded by the people; that this reverence can neither be acquired in a single lifetime, nor be engrafted on revolutionary changes; and that to seek to establish it in a state which has destroyed its hereditary ranks, and the descent of private pro-

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Device concerning the French Regency.

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perty, can give no greater stability than casting anchor in a moving quicksand.[1]

[1] Decree, Feb. 5, 1813. Moniteur, and Thib. ix. 203. Mont. vii. 185.

Great conscription of 350,000 men voted by the Senate.

Well aware that the losses of the preceding campaign made a great effort necessary, Napoleon resolved to take advantage of the first moments of alarm and excitement consequent on the promulgation of the disasters, to demand ample levies of men from the Senate. "Great measures," said Regnaud St Angely, the orator of government, "are necessary; what suffices to-day, may not be adequate to-morrow: the insolence of the conquerors of Louis XIV., the humiliation of the treaties of Louis XV., seem again to threaten us; we are called to save France from these ignominious days." Amidst the tumult of feelings produced by these alarming revelations, the supporters of government demanded the immediate addition of three hundred and fifty thousand men to the armies, which were instantly and unanimously voted by the senate. The execution of the decree was entrusted to the war minister, and the conscripts were zealously furnished by the people. Some of the principal cities of the empire, particularly Paris, Lyons, and Turin, even went beyond these immense levies, and voted regiments of volunteers to be raised and equipped at their own expense. Never did the patriotic and warlike spirit of the nation appear with more lustre, nor was the firmness of government ever more warmly seconded by the generous devotion of the people. Yet, amidst all the enthusiasm, the allocation of the conscription demonstrated how nearly the military strength of the empire had been exhausted by the efforts which had already been made. The whole youth who arrived at the age which rendered them liable to the conscription in 1813, (from nineteen to

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twenty,) had already been drained off by the great levy of the preceding year;* and accordingly a hundred thousand of the conscription was ordered to be taken from the first ban of the National Guard of 1812, a hundred thousand from the classes liable to conscription in the four preceding years, and no less than a hundred and fifty thousand from those arriving at the legal age in 1814; that is, who were then only from eighteen to nineteen years of age.[1]

[1] Senatus Consultum, Jan. 11, 1813. Moniteur and Edinburgh Review, vi. 19 Nov. 5. Dec. 2. Dec. 18.

Napoleon arranges his differences with the Church.

The multiplied disasters of the Moscow campaign made the Emperor feel the necessity of at length bringing to an accommodation his long-continued differences with the Holy See. With one half of Europe openly in arms against him, and the other but doubtfully arrayed under his banners, he could no longer afford to brave the hostility of the head of the Church. It has been already mentioned,† that after the violent seizure of the Pope by the officers, and with the consent of Napoleon, and his passage of the Alps in July 1809, he was brought to Grenoble; from thence, he was shortly after transferred to Savona, where he was rigorously treated, and forcibly severed from the society of all those, among the cardinals or their servants, who were suspected of being hostile to the interests of France.‡ As this situation was not

* *Ante*, viii. 643, 659. † *Ante*, vii. 613.

‡ The following is an instance of the treatment to which the Pope was subjected. He had issued, in November and December 1810, three briefs on the subject of the institution of ecclesiastics to bishopries in the French empire without the sanction of the Holy See. Napoleon was irritated beyond measure at this resistance to his authority, especially from a captive, and he gave vent to his indignation in measures of the utmost severity. Cardinals Pietro, Gabrielli, and Opozzoni, were immediately conveyed from Samur, which had been assigned as the place of their detention, to the Castle of Vincennes; the intrepid Bishop of Gregorio, and Fontaria, the chief of the Barnabites, the principal ornaments of the Church, were immured in the same prison; the Bishop Doria,

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deemed sufficiently secure after the Emperor had departed from Paris on the Moscow campaign, he was at that time removed to Fontainbleau, where he was kept in confinement indeed, but a more dignified and respectable captivity. Though a prisoner, he had a handsome suite of apartments, was respectably entertained at table, and permitted to walk in the gardens of the palace, although he was still debarred from the society of his most esteemed attendants, lest they should encourage him in his resistance to the imperial authority. His occupations here were of the meanest description: age and long-protracted confinement appeared to have in a great degree weakened his mind; and the hands of the supreme Pontiff were not unfrequently engaged in the humble occupation of darning a stocking or hemming a garment.[1]

[1] Sav. vi. 49, 50. Artaud, ii. 302, 313. Pacca, Mem. ii. 37, 39.

In bringing the Pope so near to the French capital, and removing so studiously all those who were sus-

who had hitherto constantly been in attendance on his holiness, was sent to Naples; and many of his most faithful servants made to share the captivity of Cardinal Pacca in the Castle of Fenestrelles, amidst the snows of the Savoy Alps. No one was permitted to visit the Pope without the authority of the prefect of the department: he was interdicted in the most rigorous manner from any communication with his subjects in Italy, accompanied with a threat of a public trial and deposition in the event of contumacy. The state prisons of France were filled with a crowd of ecclesiastics who made resistance to the violent encroachments of Napoleon on the jurisdiction of the Holy See; and to such contemptible shifts was the imperial government reduced to break the courageous spirit of the captive pontiff, that not only were his whole papers seized, and many carried off, one day when he was absent from home, walking in his little garden with Berthier, the governor of his establishment; but he received intimation that the whole household, including himself, were to be put on the reduced allowance of five paoli (*twopence-halfpenny*) a-day: a measure of severity, however, which was only carried into execution for two weeks, as it was found that the good Catholics of Savona supplied the deficiency of the imperial treasury, by themselves furnishing to the pontiff provisions in abundance.—*See* ARTAUD. *Vide* Pope Pius VII., ii. 289; and CARDINAL PACCA, i. 37.

pected of being of an independent temper, or hostile to the imperial interests, from approach to his person, Napoleon was not actuated merely by the spirit of oppression, or jealousy of a rival, and inflexible authority; he had great views, which were well matured, on the subject of the Holy See—its more intimate connexion with the French government—the influence which he might acquire over its members, and the more extended base on which, by such means, he might establish his own power. He not only had no jealousy of, but he cordially approved of every institution which tended to bring the minds of men into a state of due subjection to constituted authority; all he required was, that all these institutions should be placed under his immediate influence and control.* With this view, he meditated the translation of the papal government to Paris; the extinction of its temporal dominion; its entire dependence on the French empire for revenue, and the consequent subjection of its chief to his own control; but having effected this, he had no wish to impair its spiritual authority; on the contrary, he was rather desirous to extend it. Like the Roman emperor, he was anxious to found his own authority not merely on temporal power but religious influences; to adorn his brows not only with the diadem

Napoleon's hidden designs regarding the Pope and the Catholic Church.

* "Don't be alarmed, bishop," said Napoleon to the Bishop of Nantes; "the policy of my government is intimately bound up with the maintenance of the spiritual authority of the Pope. I require that he should be more powerful than ever; he will never have as much influence as my policy requires he should possess." The bishop was astonished, and seemed to doubt the sincerity of the Emperor, but he spoke his real opinion; by translating the seat of the papal government to Paris, he expected to acquire the entire direction of this formidable power; and he would willingly have augmented the awful character of the thunder of the Vatican, when he held in his own hand the means of directing its bolts.—*See* NAPOLEON *in Montholon*, i. 161.

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of the conqueror, but the tiara of the pontiff; and as the forms of the Church prevented the actual union of both offices in his own person, he conceived that the next best system would be to have the Pope so situated, that he should be irrevocably subjected to his control. Napoleon says, "he wished to establish the spiritual authority of the Pope in France: he neither wished to profit by accidental circumstances, to create a patriarchship, nor to alter the belief of his people: he respected spiritual affairs, and wished to rule them without touching them, or mingling in their concerns: he wished to make them pliant to his will, but by the intervention only of temporal influences." There were persons at Rome who saw through his policy. They said, "It is his mode of carrying on war; not daring to assault it in front, he has turned the Church as he turned the Alps in 1796, or Melas in 1800."[1]

[1] Napoleon in Montholon, i. 159.

His plans for making Paris the head of the Church.

For this end, he relied entirely on the judgment of the Bishop of Nantes; whenever that learned prelate said, "That attacks the Catholics and the Church," he paused in his career. He felt assured of ultimate success, with the aid of time and the vast influence which he possessed. "In 1813," says Napoleon, "but for the events in Russia, the Pope would have been Bishop of Rome and of Paris, and lodged at the archbishopric of the latter city; the sacred college, the penitentiary, the office of propaganda, the archives, would have been around Notre-Dame, and in the Isle of St Louis. Rome would have been in the ancient Lutetia. The establishment of the court of Rome at Paris would have been fruitful in great political results; its influence on Spain, Italy, the Rhenish Confederacy, and Poland, would have drawn close the bonds of the Great Nation; and that

which the chief of the Church had over the faithful in England, Ireland, Russia, Prussia, Cambria, Hungary, and Bohemia, would have passed into the hands of the Emperor of France." So impressed was he with these ideas, and the immense addition to his influence which the papal authority would have given him, that he would have done every thing in his power to extend the Romish propagandism, the foreign missions, and to increase the power of the clergy. Already he had established the cardinals as the chiefs of the state; they took precedence at the Tuileries of all the world; all the dependants of the pontifical court were to have been magnificently endowed, so as to give them no cause to regret their past existence. "It was with this view, as he himself has told us, that the Emperor was unceasingly occupied with the amelioration and embellishment of Paris. He was so, not merely from the love of the arts, but in consequence of his system of government. It required that Paris should be an unique city; beyond all comparison with other capitals; the *chefs-d'œuvre* of science and art; the finest museums, all that had adorned and rendered illustrious former ages, should be there assembled; that the churches, the palaces, the theatres, should be beyond any elsewhere in existence. Napoleon regretted only that he could not transport to it the church of St. Peter's at Rome. He was mortified with the bad taste of Notre-Dame."[1]

[1] Napoleon in Month. i. 161, 162.

Commencement of the conferences with the Pope at Fontainebleau.

But the disasters of the Russian campaign cut short these splendid projects, and awakened the Emperor to the necessity of immediately, and at all hazards, depriving his enemies of the powerful subject of invective which arose from his contention with, and open imprisonment of the head of the Church. Within a fortnight after his arrival at

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Paris, he commenced the attempt by sending to congratulate his holiness on the beginning of the year; Cardinal Doria was dispatched from Fontainbleau, to return the compliment. This led to an interchange of civilities, and the renewal of the negotiations between the two courts. The Bishop of Nantes was entrusted with its direction on the part of Napoleon, and the Cardinals Doria and Dugnani on that of the Pope. When the negotiations were deemed sufficiently advanced to render the personal presence of the Emperor desirable, he appeared suddenly at Fontainbleau with the Empress Marie-Louise, and immediately hastened to the apartments of the captive pontiff. Appearing to forget altogether that there had been any difference between them, he immediately embraced him, and without touching on matters of business, spent the remainder of the evening in the most agreeable and varied conversation. No man possessed the art of fascination, when he chose to exert it, in a higher degree than Napoleon, or was more capable of dazzling the minds of his hearers by the charms of a seductive and entrancing discourse; and if these powers had acquired the mastery, at Tilsit, of a young and able Czar in the plenitude of his power, it is not surprising that they proved more than a match at Fontainbleau for an aged pontiff, whose intellectual faculties had been weakened by a long captivity and protracted misfortunes. * No violence was either required or employed; * the

Jan. 1, 1813.

Jan. 19.

Jan 22.

* "Chateaubriand has alleged, in his celebrated pamphlet of 'Bonaparte and the Bourbons,' that Napoleon, in a transport of rage, seized the Pope by the locks, and maltreated him grievously. But the Pope, often interrogated on that subject, has invariably answered, that it was not true; nevertheless it was easy to perceive, from the strain of the Emperor's conversations which he repeated, that he had assumed a high tone with him, and even went so far as to tell him he was not adequately versed in ecclesiastical matters."—*Mémoires de* CARDINAL PACCA, ii. 87.

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Pope and his attendants, charmed with this unexpected change in their fortunes, speedily fell into the snare which was so skilfully decked with flowers; and, six days after his arrival, the Emperor had the satisfaction of seeing the signature of his holiness to a concordat, which settled the principal points in dispute between the court of the Tuileries and the Holy See.[1] *

[1] Thib. ix. 197, 198. Pacca, ii. 81, 85. Artaud, ii. 315, 321.

The Emperor testified, as well he might, the most extraordinary satisfaction at the conclusion of this concordat, which not only tacitly ceded to him the whole ecclesiastical states in Italy, by stipulating nothing for their restitution, but in effect decided in

Extraordinary joy of Napoleon at this conclusion of the treaty.

* By this celebrated instrument, it was provided, 1. That the Pope shall exercise his pontifical functions in France and the kingdom of Italy, in like manner as his predecessors have done. 2. His ambassadors, ministers, and chargés d'affaires, shall enjoy the same immunities and privileges as the members of the diplomatic body. 3. The domains of his holiness, as yet unalienated, shall be exempted from all sorts of taxes; those already alienated shall be replaced till their revenue amounts to two millions of francs, (L.80,000.) 4. In the six months which shall follow the notification of a nomination of a bishop by the Emperor, the Pope shall give the necessary induction to the bishopric. In the event of no such induction being given by his holiness during that period, the archbishop of the district, whom failing, the senior bishop within its limits, shall proceed to give the necessary induction, so that in no event shall any bishopric be vacant more than a year. 5. The Pope shall appoint, both in France and Italy, to certain sees, to be afterwards fixed upon by the contracting parties. 6. The six suburban dioceses shall be restored, and put at the disposal of his holiness. 7. The holy father, in regard to bishoprics in the Roman states, from which the incumbents are absent by the force of circumstances, shall exercise his right of nomination *in partibus*. 8. The Emperor and Pope shall concert measures, at the proper time, for the reduction of the bishoprics in Tuscany and the Genoese states, as well as for those to be established in Holland and the Hanseatic departments. 9. The offices of propagandism, of the penitentiary, and the archives, shall be established in the residence of the holy father. 10. The Emperor awards a free pardon to the cardinals, bishops, priests, and laity, who have incurred penalties from past events. 11. His holiness consents to these conditions, from the confidence which he has in the good dispositions of his majesty to the numerous wants of the Church, in the time in which we live.[1]

Articles of the Concordat.

[1] See the Concordat in Martin's Sup. i. 552; and in Artaud, ii. 323.

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favour of the civil power in France the long-disputed question as to the ecclesiastical *veto* on the appointment of bishops by the temporal authority. Next morning, decorations, presents, and orders were profusely scattered among the chief persons of the Pope's household; the joyful intelligence was communicated to all the bishops; Te Deum was chanted in all the churches of France; all the restrictions upon the personal freedom of the Pope removed; mass allowed to be freely celebrated in the palace of Fontainbleau; a numerous body of cardinals soon after joined his holiness from their different places of exile; the concordat was solemnly published as one of the fundamental laws of the state; the Emperor loaded the Pope, and all the members of his court, with that gracious and insinuating kindness, which, when it suited his purposes, he could so well assume; and in the exuberance of his satisfaction, even gave orders for the liberation of his indomitable antagonist, Cardinal Pacca, from his long and painful confinement amidst the snows of Savoy.[1]*

[1] Thib. ix. 199. Artaud, ii. 325, 326. Pacca, ii. 87, 88.

Rapid changes in the opinion of the Pope and his Council.

But, while Napoleon was thus flattering himself that he had surmounted all his difficulties in this interesting particular, and that the whole weight of the Church would be thrown into the scale in his favour, a great and important revulsion was going

"I extorted from the Pope," said Napoleon, "by the single force of my private conversation, that famous concordat of Fontainbleau, by which he renounced the temporal power of the papacy. He had no sooner signed it than he repented of what he had done. On the day following, he was to have dined in public with me, but he feigned sickness, and did not appear. Immediately after I quitted him, he fell into the hands of his old councillors, who made him retract all he had done. If we had been left alone, I would have made him do whatever I pleased. He was truly a lamb; a real good man, whom I esteemed and loved, and who regarded me, I am well assured, in some degree, with similar sentiments."—Las Cases, v. 334, 335.

forward in the papal cabinet. The able members of the ecclesiastical body who returned to Fontainbleau, at once perceived that the Pope had been overreached in the transaction; that the penetration of an old man had been blinded by the specious arguments of the Emperor, and his firmness shaken by the rigours of a protracted confinement; and that at the very moment when the fortunes of Napoleon had begun to hang doubtful in the balance, he had had the address to elicit from his august captive greater advantages than he could ever have hoped for in the plenitude of his power. Shortly after the concordat was signed, the Pope repented of the step he had taken; and his grief was so profound, that when Cardinal Pacca arrived, he was strongly affected by his haggard and emaciated appearance. To the expressions of admiration, uttered by the cardinal, upon the constancy with which he had borne his long captivity, the frail pontiff replied—"But we have dishonoured ourselves at its close; these cardinals drew me to the table, and forced me to sign it." It was long and anxiously debated in the secret councils of the Church at Fontainbleau, what course should be adopted in this emergency; and at length it was determined that the Pope should solemnly retract his signature of the concordat, in a letter to the Emperor, and ascribe his acquiescence to the weakness of the flesh. Such a letter was in secret prepared by the aged pontiff, in terms suited to the solemnity of the occasion. Without attempting to exculpate his weakness, or palliate his fault, he confessed its enormity, and implored the Divine forgiveness; and at the same time fully and unequivocally retracted his consent to the concordat. No sooner was his resolution taken, than he recovered all his

March 24.

[1] Pacca, ii. 87, 124. Artaud, ii. 34, 330, 347.

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wonted serenity of mind and cheerfulness of manner, though both he and the whole conclave fully expected some acts of extreme violence from the ebullitions of the Emperor's wrath. *

Moderate and prudent conduct of Napoleon on this retractation.

In these expectations, however, the Pope and his councillors were in a great degree disappointed. Though mortally offended, Napoleon took the more prudent part to dissemble his wrath. He did not deem it prudent to push matters to extremities with the Church, when he was so soon to have Europe on his hands on the Rhine. Feigning, therefore, to disregard entirely this untimely retractation, he acted, and not without reason on his side, as if the matter

March 25.

were irrevocably concluded. On the very day after he had received the Pope's letter, he published the concordat as a law obligatory on all archbishops, bishops, and chapters; cognizance of all cases known by the name of "appeals on abuses," hitherto con-

* "As we have done wrong," said the Pope, in this touching manifesto, "we will imitate our illustrious predecessor, Pascal II., in 1117: we confess we have done wrong, and, with the aid of the Lord, we desire that it should be altogether annulled, in order that no damage may thence arise to the church, or injury to our own soul. The concession made in one of these articles is unjustifiable in the sight of God and man. What regulation can be admitted which infringes so deeply on the original constitution of the church of Jesus Christ, who established the primacy of St Peter and his successors, as that which subjects our power to that of a metropolitan, and permits him to give induction to bishops named, whom the supreme pontiff, in his wisdom, has deemed unworthy of induction; rendering thus judge of the head of the church an inferior functionary, beneath him in the hierarchy, and himself subjected to his authority."—PIUS VII. *to* NAPOLEON, *24th March* 1813. ARTAUD, ii. 342.—The reflecting reader, aware how exactly identical are the effects of similar passions and interests upon mind, in all ages and circumstances of the world, will compare this violent collision of the civil government in France, during the reign of Napoleon, with the papal power, with the parallel contest between Thomas-à-Becket and Henry II. in the early days of English history, and the conflict of the rights of patrons with the democratic pretensions of the church, and a portion of the laity in Scotland, in 1840.

fined to the ecclesiastical tribunals, as well as of all delinquencies arising from infractions of the concordat, was committed to the ordinary courts of the empire; and the "great judge" was directed to draw up a form of process for such questions. At the same time, an entire amnesty was published to all individuals of the departments of Rome and Trasymene, who had incurred civil penalties by refusing to take the oath of allegiance to the Emperor, provided they did so within thirty-five days; and the latter promoted to the rank of senators the cardinal Bayonne, and Bourlier, bishop of Evreux, who had been mainly instrumental in bringing about the concordat. The only act of severity on Napoleon's part, which followed the Pope's retractation, was the removal from Fontainbleau of Cardinal Pietro, who was seized early in April, and conducted to Auxonne, where he remained in detention till the fall of Napoleon. At first, the Emperor was inclined to measures of rigour when he heard of the retractation, and he said in the council of state held on the subject at Paris, "If I do not cut off the heads of some of those priests at Fontainbleau, I shall never settle the affair;" and councillors were not wanting who urged him, like Henry VIII., to break altogether with the see of Rome, and declare himself the head of the Church; but, on reflection, his better judgment prevailed, and he replied, in familiar but expressive words, "No, that would be to break our own windows."[1]

[1] Artaud, ii. 343, 355. Pacca, ii. 109, 136. Thib. ix. 200, 201.

It was from no apprehension of any revulsion in France itself against such a final rupture with the Church, that Napoleon, on this important occasion, was so guarded and lenient in his measures towards the ecclesiastics at Fontainbleau; it was by a well-founded dread of the effect it would produce in foreign

His reasons for this moderation.

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nations, especially Spain, Italy, and the southern states of Germany, that his conduct was regulated. In France, religious impressions of all sorts had been so completely obliterated by the cessation of public worship and instruction during the Revolution, and the education of a generation ignorant of the very elements of belief, that the dispute with the Pope excited very little attention, and the authority of the church of Rome might with ease have been thrown off at that period. Except in a few old women and devout ecclesiastics, indifference in regard to religion was general among all classes, at least in the urban and influential population. The churches, little frequented by any, were seldom entered except by women; labour, buying and selling, went on on Sundays and fast-days as on other days; the sacraments of the Church, even at the entrance or the close of life, were rarely sought after.[1] Fatal effects of a revolution! To extinguish the only durable bond which can hold men together, by voluntary union, during the agitations of an ancient and corrupted society; to destroy the basis of self-government, by weakening the strength of the moral restraints which can alone supply the place of those of force; and render liberty impossible, by leaving in the ruling classes in the state no power which can repress the sallies of wickedness, but the empire of the sword.

[1] Pacca, ii. 142. Thib. ix. 201, 202.

But other cares than these disputes with the Church now occupied the Emperor, and preparations were necessary for a graver contest than that with a captive pontiff and his enthralled cardinals. Russia was approaching; Prussia was preparing to shake off the yoke; the fermentation in Germany presaged an awful contest on the Rhine. Napoleon prepared to meet it with a gravity, resolution, and candour,

Napoleon's speech to the legislative body.

which are worthy of the highest admiration. The legislative body met early in February, and the speech of the Emperor made no attempt to disguise the losses of the Moscow campaign, or the imminence of the present dangers. "Success the most brilliant," said he, "in the first instance, attended our arms; but the excessive rigours and premature approach of winter brought frightful calamities on the army. In a few nights I beheld every thing changed; I have experienced great losses; they would have broken my heart, if in such circumstances I could have been alive to any other considerations than the interest, the glory, and the future destiny of my people. The agents of England spread among all our neighbours the spirit of revolt against their sovereigns; England would wish the entire continent to become a prey to the horrors of civil war, but Providence has determined that she shall be the first victim of the passions she would spread among others. The joy of our enemies, and above all, of England, has reached its height; but misfortunes have proved the strength of the empire: the energy of my people has brought them back to a more just appreciation of things. My differences with the Pope have been happily terminated by a concordat; the French dynasty reigns, and will reign in Spain. I desire peace—it is necessary. On four different occasions, since the rupture of the peace of Amiens, I have solemnly made offer of it to my enemies; but I will never conclude a treaty but on terms honourable and suitable to the grandeur and interests of my empire."[1] Feb. 14.

[1] Moniteur, Feb. 14, 1813. Thib. ix. 204, 205.

This ingenuous and intrepid address was accompanied by such a detail of the statistical and finan-

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cial situation of the empire, as almost justified the confident tone of the Emperor, notwithstanding the disasters of the Russian retreat. According to the *exposé* published by M. Montalivet, minister of the interior, the population of that part of the empire which embraced the territory of Old France, was 28,700,000 souls; an amount not materially different from what it was at the commencement of the Revolution;* a remarkable result, when the vast consumption of human life which had since taken place, from the internal bloodshed and external wars of the Revolution, is taken into consideration; but which hardly warranted the assertion of Montalivet, singularly ill-timed amidst the universal mourning produced by the Moscow retreat, that "the conscription itself, which every year made the *élite* of the youth rally round the standards of the empire, had contributed to the increase of the population, by multiplying the number of marriages, and favouring them, because it fixed for ever the lot of the young Frenchman who had obeyed the law on this subject." It *had* fixed their lot, it was universally observed; for it had consigned them to their graves. In other respects, however, the report exhibited a more gratifying and less questionable picture of the growing wealth and increased productions of the empire;[1] and the details are curious and interesting, as presenting a singular example of the extent to which a great expenditure by government, accompanied by a strong internal administration, a tolerable protection to property, and the stoppage of external competition, can increase the

Important statistical details with which it was accompanied.

[1] Thib. ix. 205, 206. Moniteur, Feb. 15, 1813.

* It was then estimated at 25,000,000; but no correct enumeration of the inhabitants had been made, and there was reason to believe that this supposition was considerably below the real numbers of the people.

industry of a country, even in the midst of the most unbounded system of foreign hostility.*

In one respect, the report of the minister of the interior contained authentic details, in which the government of Napoleon is worthy of universal imitation. It appeared, that during the twelve years which had elapsed since he ascended the consular throne, the sums expended on public improvements, such as roads, bridges, fortifications, harbours, public edifices, &c., amounted to the enormous sum of a thousand millions of francs, or L.40,000,000, of which seven hundred millions, or L.28,000,000, was the proportion belonging to Old France. When it is recollected that an expenditure so vast, on objects so truly imperial, amounting to nearly L.3,500,000 a-year, took place during a period of extraordinary warlike exertion, and almost unbroken maritime and territorial hostility; it must be confessed, that it demonstrates an elevation of mind, and grandeur of conception, on the part of Napoleon, which, as much as his wonderful military achievements, mark him as one of the most marvellous of mankind. It would be deserving of unqualified admiration, were it not deeply sullied by the recollection, that sums so vast could be drawn from the imperial treasury only because nearly half the expenses of government were laid on the conquered or allied states;[1] that it was the maintenance of three hundred thousand French veterans in Spain, at the expense of the wretched people of the Peninsula, and two hundred thousand in Germany, at the cost of the impoverished inhabitants of Prussia, which alone enabled the Emperor to direct so considerable a portion of his revenue to

Surprising magnitude of the sums expended by Napoleon on public improvements.

[1] See reports in Fain's Camp. de 1813, i 80, 81; and Goldsmith, Recueil, vi. 77; and Moniteur, Feb. 15, 1813.

* See note in Appendix A, chap. lxviii.

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the internal improvement of his dominions; and that France was embellished by works of utility and magnificence, and Paris adorned with the splendour of decoration, because woe unheard of desolated the Peninsula, and oppression unbearable had roused an unconquerable spirit of revenge in the German provinces.*

Cost of the public edifices at Paris.

In one particular, unconnected with military or political events, but deeply interesting to the lovers of the fine arts, this report contains details of the utmost value. The cost of all the public edifices in Paris, as well as of the great roads over the Alps, and noble harbours constructed by Napoleon at Antwerp, Cherbourg, and other places, is given so far as actually expended, with the estimates of the total cost to bring them to completion. To the traveller who recollects the unbounded admiration which these public works and edifices have awakened in his mind, it is an object of interest to ascertain the cost which they have severally occasioned; and he will find with surprise that they have in great part been reared at an expense not exceeding that of edifices of little or no excellence in his own country; even although the charges of building are not materially different

* The expenditure from 1800 to 1812 was thus classified in the report of M. Montalivet:—

	Francs.	£.
Imperial palaces	62,000,000, or	2,480,000
Fortifications	144,000,000, ...	5,760,000
Maritime harbours	117,000,000, ...	4,680,000
Roads	277,000,000, ...	11,150,000
Bridges	31,000,000, ...	1,240,000
Canals and draining	123,000,000, ...	4,920,000
Embellishment of Paris	102,000,000, ...	4,080,000
Public buildings in the provinces	149,000,000, ...	5,960,000
Total	1,005,000,000, ...	40,270,000

GOLDSMITH'S *Recueil des Traités, Actes, &c., de* Napoleon, vi. 100.

in the two countries. So true it is, that the most essential elements in architectural beauty, genius and taste in the architect, are beyond the power of mere wealth to command; that it is not money to construct beautiful buildings, but the mind to conceive them, which is generally wanting; and that it is to the pure taste and noble conceptions of the artists of southern Europe, rather than any great excellence in the materials at their command, or the wealth of which they have the disposal, that their remarkable superiority to those of this country is to be ascribed.*

Finances of the French Empire at this period.

The financial and military resources which this memorable report unfolded as being still at the disposal of the French government were immense, and strongly indicated the magnitude of the colossus which combined Europe had still to combat, even after the Russian armament had been swept away. The estimated revenue of 1812 of the whole French empire was 1,030,000,000 francs, or L.41,500,000; and the sum actually realized, 992,000,000 francs, or L.39,968,000. The expenditure, so far as drawn from the French treasury, had been 980,000,000 francs, or L.39,600,000; but, as already more than once observed, no opinion can be formed of the real cost of Napoleon's government at this period, or for six years before, as at least half of the French army was laid as a burden for all its expenses, including food, clothing, pay, and lodging, on the countries in the Peninsula, Germany, or Italy, which it occupied;[1] so that a very large sum, probably nearly a half of this ample revenue, must be added as drawn from the contributions on the allied or conquered states. Of the enormous and almost incredible amount of these

[1] Report by Montalivet. Feb. 25, 1813. Goldsmith, vii. 144, 145.

* See note in App. B, chap. lxviii.

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contributions, ample details have already been given, and more will occur in the prosecution of this work.*

With respect to the military and naval resources of the empire, the report contained information that could more implicitly be relied on. The population of the French empire, augmented as it now was by Belgium, Holland, the Hanse towns, and Roman states, amounted to forty-two millions, of which twenty-eight millions seven hundred thousand belonged to Old France. Nor were the military and naval resources of the empire on a scale inferior to the numerical amount of its inhabitants; on the contrary, they greatly exceeded them. The horses it contained were three millions and a half, and consumed as much food as thirty millions of people. The army numbered in all eight hundred thousand infantry, a hundred thousand cavalry, and a hundred thousand artillerymen and engineers; in all, a million of men in arms:† a force, if the quality, as well as number of the combatants, and their admirable state of equipment, are taken into consideration, unparalleled in any former age or country of the world. But it was altogether disproportioned to the resources, vast as they were, of the state: it was more than double of that which Rome, at its highest point of elevation, maintained out of three times the number of inhabitants, and larger

Military strength of the Empire.

* See Note in App. C, chap. lxiii.

† This force was thus distributed:—

	Men.
20 regiments of the guard,	60,000
152 do of infantry,	640,000
37 do. of light infantry,	84,000
15 do. of artillery,	68,000
30 battalions of waggon train and heavy artillery,	32,000
80 regiments of cavalry,	100,000
15 foreign battalions,	12,000
—Fain, i. 93.	996,000

than China supports out of a territory ten times, and a population, according to the lowest estimate, four times, as large as those of the French empire. In a word, it implied the permanent absorption of one in forty of the whole population in the profession of arms; whereas it has never been found by experience that an empire, how powerful soever, can for any length of time flourish with more than one in a hundred engaged in such pursuits.*

And of its Navy.

Notwithstanding the great losses which the French marine had sustained since the commencement of the revolutionary war, it had again, by the indefatigable exertions of Napoleon, been raised to a most formidable state; such a state, indeed, as clearly indicated the perseverance of the Emperor in his grand design of ultimately combating England hand to hand on her own element, and terminating the war, in his own words, by a battle of Actium. From fifteen to twenty ships of the line had for several years past been launched annually at the different dockyards of Antwerp, Brest, Cherbourg, Toulon, Flushing, Genoa, and Venice; and the naval force of the empire had by this means been increased to one hundred and four ships of the line and fifty frigates. As the commercial navy of France was entirely ruined, this large fleet was manned by means of the maritime conscription, which, levied in the principal marine departments of the empire, furnished annually twenty thousand recruits for the sea service,

* Rome, in the time of Augustus, with a population of 120,000,000, had an army of 450,000; Russia at present, with 60,000,000, has 710,000 in arms; China, with 170,000,000, a nominal force of 914,000; but more than half of this immense body are mere militia, like the Prussian *landwehr*, who are only occasionally embodied, and are not permanently withdrawn from the labours of agriculture.—See GIBBON'S *Rome*, ch. i.; BALBI'S *Géographie Universelle*, 637 and 822.

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who were sedulously trained to their duties in the roadsteads and harbours of the principal seaports, by which means nearly an hundred thousand sailors were constantly maintained in the service of the state.[1]

[1] Fain, Guerre de 1813, i. 95.

Though it was, doubtless, but a slight apprenticeship to the duties of seamanship which could thus be learned, yet the perseverance of the Emperor in this great design of gradually raising up his navy to a level with that of England, and avoiding all encounters till this was done, marks the decision and energy of his character, and indicates the serious nature of the ultimate struggle which awaited the British empire, if the prosecution of this project had not been interrupted by the disasters which occasioned his fall. And though England, with a fleet of two hundred and forty sail of the line, and eight hundred frigates and smaller vessels[2] which at that period bore the royal flag, might well disregard even these considerable efforts, yet experience has proved that, with a popular constitution, no permanent reliance can be placed on the dominant multitude possessing foresight and self-denial sufficient to keep up a naval force adequate to the exigencies of so vast an empire. And it will, probably, not be deemed by future ages the least remarkable facts of the fifty eventful years which followed the French Revolution, or the least characteristic of the influence of government on the national fortunes, that while the navy of France, through the multiplied and increasing disasters of the war, was increased by the vigour of the executive from seventy-two ships of the line at its commencement,* to one hundred and four at its termination; and while that of England rose, amidst her gigantic expenditure, during the same period,

Dangers with which it threatened the British islands.

[2] Balbi's Geog. Univ. 633. James' Naval History, vol. vi. Appx. No. 4.

* Ante, chap. vi.

from one hundred and fifty-four at the first epoch, to two hundred and forty-four at the last,[1] it sunk, during the twenty-five years of unbroken peace and unparalleled commercial prosperity which followed the termination of hostilities, to *ninety* ships of the line, or little more than a *third* of its former number, though the amount of the British trade, and the necessities of the British colonial empire, had, during the same period, more than doubled.[2] *

[1] James's Naval History, i. 404; and vi. 511.

[2] Barrow's Life of Anson, App. 424.

Remarkable failure of the powers of the conscription at this period.

But while the physical resources of France were thus immense, and such the energy with which they were wielded by its chief, there was one appalling source of weakness, hitherto little attended to, lurking in its bosom, but which the effects now fell with decisive force upon the wasted realm. Notwithstanding the prodigious consumption of men which had taken place during the wars of the Revolution, it had not hitherto been found, that the conscription was less productive in filling the ranks than it had formerly been; and the French government, not aware of the reason of this remarkable circumstance, flattered themselves that the powers of population in the empire were literally inexhaustible. But about this time, a new and alarming deficiency was observed in the produce of the Emperor's levies; and for the first time since the commencement of the war, the number of young men whom the conscription could rally round the imperial standards, proved not a half of that on which the minister of war, on apparently authentic data, had calculated, and which the experience of former years justified him in expecting.[3] This evil went on increasing to such a degree, that before the war terminated, the levies ordered by the senate were little more than nominal, and it became apparent that the powers of life in the class from

[3] Sav. vii. 237–9.

* Ante, vii. 776.

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which the conscription was drawn, had been exhausted.

Reason of this circumstance.

The reason, though not apparent at first sight, when once stated is quite satisfactory. By Napoleon's uniform system, the conscription of each year was taken from the male population who in the course of it attained a certain age, which varied from twenty-one in his earlier years to eighteen in his last. As long, therefore, as the levy fell on the class who were born before the war commenced, a fresh and undiminished harvest was yearly offered to the scythe of the conscription. But in 1811 and 1812, the young men who were conceived in 1793 for the first time became liable to be drawn, and then the effect of the immense conscription of twelve hundred thousand men in that year, and the vast consumption of life occasioned by its bloody campaign, was rendered apparent. The conscription suddenly became unproductive to an alarming degree; the destruction of the former generations told at once, with fearful force, upon the numbers of the present; for the levy had reached those youths who were begotten in the year when the first dreadful chasm in the population had taken place. The military strength of the empire was nearly exhausted; but the effect of this did not appear, as superficial observers would have supposed, in the absence of men for the cultivation of the fields, for they were still found in sufficient numbers in the elder part of the male population born before 1793; but in the experienced necessity of bringing the conscription down to persons of younger years and inferior stature, wholly unable to bear the fatigues of a campaign. Hence the practice, so usual in the latter years of the empire, of levying the conscription, not on those who arrived at the age of liability in the year when it was ordered, but who would arrive at

it in two or three years after; that is of anticipating the human supplies of future years, and assembling round the standards boys of seventeen or eighteen years of age, who before six weeks were over, for the most part whitened the fields with their bones, or encumbered the hospitals with their diseases. Unnoticed by ordinary observers, this circumstance had a material, and, in the end, a decisive effect upon the fortunes of the war; and it affords an interesting example of the way in which vaulting ambition overleaps itself, and of the impassable barrier opposed by nature to its further progress, if it should survive the generation in which it arose, and dip into the future races of mankind.[1]

[1] Sav. vii. 246, 241.

Diminution in the age and standard of height as the revolutionary wars advanced.

In another particular the effect of the continued drain of the conscription on the French population, was evinced in a matter equally curious and decisive. As the wars of the Revolution advanced, and the conscription reached the children of the generation of whom the most robust and vigorous had perished in the earlier campaigns, not only did it become necessary to fix the levy on young men of more tender years, but to lower the standard of height at which those drawn would be admitted into the ranks. In 1804 the levy was from those who had attained the age of from twenty years and three months, to twenty-one and three months; but in 1810 it was found no longer possible to restrict the levy to those who had attained this comparatively advanced age; and it was enforced against those who were from eighteen to nineteen, and the same age continued to 1813 and 1814, when it was practically brought closer to seventeen than eighteen, by the conscription being levied on those who attained the legal age in the succeeding year.* Nor was this all: the

* The way in which this was done, was by authorizing a conscription

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same necessity compelled the government to lower the standard of height for admission into the army; and so low did it latterly descend, that in 1810 it was reduced to five feet two, and in 1813 it had sunk to little more than five feet one inch.* The evil thus existing was not confined to a single generation; it trenched deep upon the hopes and the strength of the next: the children of the diminutive parents who survived the bloody wars of Napoleon, inherited the weakness of those from whom they sprung; and the appalling fact, that, from 1825 to 1833, nearly *one-half* of the persons drawn or recruited for the army, were rejected from smallness of stature or physical defects, though the standard was only five feet two inches, demonstrates how fearfully the dreadful wars from 1805 to 1813,[1]

[1] Essai sur la Stat. de la Population Française, par le Comte d'Angeville, 74, 79.

of those who should attain the legal age in the succeeding years to that in which the levy took place. Thus, the conscription of 1813 was allocated as follows:—

1. 350,000 men drawn from the conscription of 1812 and 1813, and from 1810 to 1813.
2. 180,000 men drawn from the conscription of 1814.
3. 120,000 from that of 1814.
   160,000 from that of 1815.
4. 300,000 from that of 1811 to 1815.

—See Senatus Consultum, 11th January 1813, 3d April 1813, 10th October 1813, and 15th November 1813. *Moniteur and* GOLDSMITH'S *Recueil*, vi. 19—24, 271, 517, and 546.

* The following table indicates the progressive degradation of the standard of height for the French army during the progress and from the effects of the wars of the Revolution:—

	Minimum height of Conscripts. Metres.	Feet.	Inches English.
From 1799 to 1803,	1.598 or	5	1¼
In 1804	1.544 or	5	1¼
1818	1.570 or	5	1½
1830	1.540 or	5	1⅛
1832	1.560 or	5	1¾

From 1809 to 1814 the standard was merely nominal, as the conscripts, if not labouring under some other defect, were admitted into the ranks, how diminutive soever their stature might be, and often when under five feet in height.—D'ANGEVILLE, *Statistique de la Population Française*, p. 72.

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when they were born, had operated on the vigour and population of the French empire.*

Great losses of the French in military stores in Prussia.

The extraordinary losses of the campaign of 1812, great as they had been, were materially aggravated by an accidental circumstance. A severe frost set in over all Europe on the 29th December 1812, and continued, without intermission, till the first week in March. In the north of Germany the cold was peculiarly intense; all the canals and navigable rivers of Prussia were frozen; and the whole reserve stores and artillery of the French army, with the exception of the small portion which the receding

* The average height of the conscripts in the years 1804 and 1810, in the following six departments of France, stood as follows:—

	Average height, 1804. Metres.	Average height, 1810. Metres.
Hautes Alps,	1.623	1.587
Cantal,	1.660	1.627
Creuse,	1.598	1.567
Ile et Vilaine,	1.658	1.570
Landes,	1.614	1.574
Vierne,	1.613	1.589

All under five feet two inches English.

It may truly be said that this table speaks volumes as to the cruel effect of the wars of Napoleon on the physical well-being of mankind. And the learned author from whom these extracts are made, correctly ascribes to the same cause the continued lowering of the standard in the next generation. "Les calculs de mon troisième tableau prouvent que pour avoir 1000 reserves pendant la periode de 1825 à 1833, on a du prononcer, dans toute la France, 926 *exemptions pour causes physiques de toute nature.* Ce résultat serait alarmant, si l'on ne savait que les jeunes gens des classes qui ont servi de base à nos calculs étaient nés de 1805 à 1813, epoque ou *les grandes guerres de l'empire entrainaient la population valide hors du territoire.* La longue paix enfantû par les malheureux evènemens de 1815, et le bien-être progressive du peuple qui en est resulté, nous promettent pour l'avenir des résultats plus satisfaisans."—D'ANGEVILLE, p. 84. I am indebted for these interesting details regarding the effect of the wars of Napoleon on the physical resources of the French population, and the stature of the race in that country, to the kindness of a distinguished friend, a well-known member of the English bar—H. Merivale, Esq. of the Inner Temple.

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columns could drag with their wearied array, were locked up in boats by the ice. The cavalry and artillery horses were almost destroyed; the wreck of the grand army could hardly muster thirty thousand bayonets. Meanwhile the Russian troops were rapidly advancing; the dispositions of Prussia, as will speedily appear, were more than doubtful; and it was easy to foresee, from the intense national spirit which burned beyond the Rhine, that the defection of the court of Berlin would be followed by an immediate crusade from the whole warlike and robust population of the north of Germany. In these circumstances, an extraordinary effort was necessary to provide resources against the danger; and nothing but the utmost vigour in the Emperor, and patriotic spirit in the French people, could furnish the means of preserving the national independence. The receipts of the year 1811 had fallen 27,000,000 francs, (L.1,080,000,) those of 1812, 37,000,000 of francs, (L.1,450,000,) short of their estimated amount. The taxes, both direct and indirect, had reached their maximum; the experience of the two last years having proved that an increase of taxation produced no corresponding augmentation in the receipts of the exchequer. The extinction of commercial wealth had rendered the raising supplies by loan impossible. It was with a sinking revenue, therefore, a taxation which had reached its limits, an exhausted military population, and a ruined credit, that France had to make head against the hostility of combined Europe.[1]

[1] Thib. ix. 207, 208. Fain, i. 28, 29. Sav. vi. 40, 41.

Napoleon's vigorous measures to repair these losses.

The energy with which the French people repaired these terrible disasters, and the fortitude with which the Emperor bore up against them, are worthy of the highest admiration. His first care was to restore the cavalry and artillery horses; a sufficient number of

pieces of cannon existed in the arsenals; and as the French empire contained 3,500,000 horses, it was not found a difficult matter, by offering high prices, to put on an effective footing these essential branches of the public service; though the want of skill in the riders rendered them but ill qualified to contend with the numerous and veteran cavalry of the Allies. To repair the chasms occasioned in the ranks, and make head against the hourly increasing force of the enemy in the north of Germany, 180,000 men, *in addition* to the great levy of 350,000 already ordered,[1] were placed at the disposal of the minister of war—viz. 80,000 of the first ban of the National Guards, who had already been embodied, disciplined, clothed, and put on permanent duty in the frontier fortresses, during the Russian war; 90,000 conscripts, drawn from those liable to serve in 1814, and 10,000 guards of honour. Now were seen the good effects of the sagacious foresight which had prompted Napoleon, at the commencement of the campaign of 1812, to call into active service so large a portion of the first ban of the National Guard, drawn from the classes liable to the conscription from 1807 to 1812; nearly 100,000 men of mature years and confirmed strength, ready disciplined and equipped, were in arms, in the fortresses on the Rhine, to recruit the army in Germany; and to their exertions the victories of Lutzen and Bautzen are mainly to be ascribed. Very different were the young conscripts, drawn from those liable to serve in 1814, who constituted the remainder of the infantry force added to the standards. Called into active service a year before they had arrived at the legal age, and torn from their parental homes before they had acquired either the steadiness or the strength of manhood, they were wholly unable to withstand

April 3, 1813.

[1] Ante, x.

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the iron veterans who had, in the Russian bands, survived the campaign of 1812. Great numbers of them disappeared from the ranks, or sank into the hospitals, before they reached the Elbe; and in the confusion and disorganization which pervaded the army before it even saw the enemy, was to be found too sure an indication that the empire had reached the limits of its physical strength, and approached its fall.[1]

[1] Senatus Consultum, April 3, 1813. Moniteur, April 4. Sav. vi. 41. Goldsmith, vi. 273.

To give consistency to this brave but motley array of young troops, the Emperor drew from Spain the four remaining regiments of the Imperial Guard which were still there, a legion of veteran gendarmerie, and a considerable body of Polish light horse. In addition to this, the skeletons of a hundred and fifty battalions, consisting of the most trusty and experienced officers and non-commissioned officers, were despatched from the Peninsular legions to the Rhine; and, without materially weakening the forces in Spain, they proved of inestimable importance in conferring efficiency upon the new levies. In addition to this, two extraordinary measures were adopted to repair the wide chasms in the artillery and cavalry forces. By the first, forty thousand sailors or naval gunners were drafted from the marine service, and transferred to the artillery of the land forces; while their place was supplied by the young seamen whom the maritime conscription rigorously levied from the inhabitants in the neighbourhood of the seaports. By the second, a corps of ten thousand horsemen was raised on an entirely new plan, from the flower of the population of the empire. Both officers and privates, who were alike drawn from the higher classes of the people, were to be equipped, dressed, and mounted at their own expense. In return

Levy of the gardes d'honneur, and maritime conscripts.

for such sacrifices, they obtained the pay of the chasseurs of the guard, and after twelve months service the rank of a sub-lieutenant; and when the campaign was concluded, such of their number as were most distinguished were to be formed into companies of the body-guards; a corps in an especial manner entrusted with the personal attendance on the Emperor. In this way Napoleon succeeded in obtaining at little expense, and by the prospect rather of future distinction than present advantage, a body of ten thousand horse, raised exclusively from the more opulent classes of his subjects. In this measure he had, however, a secret object of still greater importance in view, which was effectually attained. These young men were so many hostages for the fidelity of their parents and relations, occupying for the most part important situations in the country, upon whose adherence to his dynasty he could not securely rely in the crisis which was approaching. They behaved, when brought into the field, with the usual gallantry of the French character; but the youths, for the most part inexperienced, and riding on horses as raw as themselves, were little qualified for the rude encounter of the Muscovite or Cossack horsemen; the fatigues of the campaign speedily proved fatal to their unformed constitutions; and before the allied standards approached the Rhine, more than three-fourths of this noble force had sunk under the sword of the enemy, or the contagion of the hospitals.[1]

[1] Senat. Cons. April 3, 1813. Moniteur. Thib. ix. 237, 239. Sav. vi. 41, 42. Fain, i. 35, 37.

In addition to these extraordinary measures, the greatest efforts were made to bring forward the conscripts, and enlist voluntary recruits; every man capable of bearing arms was forwarded from the depôts in the interior to their respective regiments;

Force thus collected by Napoleon for the campaign.

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a large body of marines were formed into a division of infantry; and the second ban of the national guards, called into permanent duty in all the frontier provinces, replaced their comrades of the first ban, who had now taken their place as regular soldiers in the ranks of the grand army. Two thousand of the gendarmerie in the interior were distributed among several new regiments of cavalry, which were formed from the sons of the postmasters and the forest guards throughout France, and a reinforcement of seven thousand horse thus obtained for the army. The same measures were pursued with extraordinary activity in the kingdom of Italy, under the able direction of Eugene Beauharnois; and Piedmont rivalled France in the zeal with which it fulfilled or anticipated all the demands of the Emperor. The princes of the Rhenish confederacy received the most pressing orders to complete and forward to the general point of rendezvous, in the north of Germany, their respective contingents; and such was the vigour of the Emperor, and the zeal with which he was seconded in every part of his vast dominions, that by the middle of April, not only were the preparations on all sides in a great state of forwardness, but six hundred pieces of cannon, two thousand caissons, and above two hundred thousand men were converging from the Rhine and the Alps to the banks of the Elbe.[1]

[1] Jom. iv. 256, 258. Sav. vi. 41, 42. Thib. vi 238, 239. Fain, i. 36, 38.

Seizure of the property of the communes for the public treasury.

These prodigious exertions, however, entailed a vast expense upon the already exhausted French treasury, and seemed to render the resource of loans indispensable, in a country where commercial credit was extinguished, and the powers of capital unknown. On the most moderate calculation, 232,000,000 francs, L.9,240,000, required to be raised without de-

lay; and neither by increase of taxation, nor any other method, did it seem practicable to raise a third of the sum. To meet the exigencies of his situation, Napoleon fell upon an expedient, which, though it savoured much in appearance of revolutionary spoliation, was yet essentially distinguished from the measures of the Constituent Assembly and Convention, by the compensation which it provided for the parties whose property was seized. Justifying the proposal by the necessities of the public situation, the minister of finance, Count Molé, proposed that a public law should authorize the sale of all the heritable property belonging to the municipalities, public hospitals, and communes; the treasury receiving the price, and the incorporated bodies interested being inscribed, for the amount of the price received, as creditors in the books of the public funds. Landed property was to be exposed at the rate of twenty, houses of fifteen years' purchase. So considerable was the corporate property still existing in the empire, that it was calculated its sale would produce the large sum of 370,000,000 francs, or nearly L.15,000,000. To encourage intending purchasers, one-sixth of the price only was to be paid down at the purchase, another sixth in three months, and the remaining two-thirds at remote periods. The orator, in making this proposal, compared Napoleon to Charlemagne, "ordering the sale of the useless herbs in his gardens, when his hand was distributing to his people the spoil of conquered nations." But, lest any unpleasant enquiries should be instituted by a refractory legislature into the produce of these sales, or the distribution of these spoils, it was announced that "the deputies of all the provinces of the empire should come to the capital to receive *every three*

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years the accounts of the public revenues;" indicating thus, in no equivocal manner, that the legislative functions of the Chamber of Deputies were to cease, and that they were to be assembled only at the interval of years to give a formal sanction to the public expenditure. Molé concluded, after a review of the flattering condition of the empire, with these words: "If a man of the age of the Medicis, or of Louis XIV., were to revisit the earth, and at the sight of so many marvels, ask how many ages of peace and glorious reigns had been required to produce them, he would be answered, twelve years of war, and a single man."*[1]

[1] Molé's report, Feb. 5, 1813. Moniteur, and Goldsmith, vi. 141, 142. Thib. ix. 209, 210.

Failure of the financial measures, and arbitrary exaction.

A small proportion only, however, of the funds calculated upon from the sale of this corporate property, was actually realized. The whirlwind of disaster in which the French were involved at the close of the year, and the invasion of the Allies in the spring following, both prevented the completion of the sales, and the collection even of the ordinary revenue, in a great many provinces. By successive decrees of the 11th and 16th November, 1813, large additions were made to the indirect taxes, par-

* Count Molé's speech contained some details regarding the progress of the great work of forming a *cadastre*, or general valuation of the lands of the empire, to regulate the public assessments which Napoleon had so much and so justly at heart. It was begun in 1808; but such was the immensity of the labour with which the work was attended, that in 1813 little more than a fifth of the territory of the empire was completed. The progress already made, however, showed clearly the importance of the undertaking, the weight of the French direct taxes, and the frightful inequalities which, from its want, existed in the collection of the revenue. "Out of 47,000 communes," says the report, "10,000 have been measured; and of these 10,000, 6000 valued. The *cadastre* has already proved, that the land-tax does not exceed an *eighth part of the net revenue* of the properties; and, nevertheless, one proprietor pays *a third*, and another not *a fifteenth*; an incredible disproportion, which the *cadastre* is intended to rectify."—COUNT MOLÉ'S *Report*, February 5, 1813.—*Moniteur*.

ticularly on salt, and the *droits reunis;* as also thirty additional centimes were added to the direct taxes. The produce of these different sources of revenue was estimated at 109,000,000 francs, or L.4,440,000; but the burden was merely nominal: little if any of it was actually levied. All sorts of violent expedients were adopted to raise money; and by the admission even of the partizans of Napoleon, the imposition of arbitrary and illegal taxes became usual.* The overthrow of the imperial arms in Spain and Germany, and the refluence of its legions over the Rhine and the Pyrenees, at once prostrated the financial affairs of the empire; for they threw the troops upon the resources of France itself, and, by putting an end to the requisitions on foreign states, and the system of making war maintain war, at once revealed the total disproportion between its financial capabilities and its military establishment.[1]

[1] Thib. ix. 213, 214. Sav. vi. 40, 41.

The national resources of the French empire, as they were developed in these memorable reports, and evinced in these strenuous exertions, are the more worthy of attention, that this was the LAST EXPOSITION of them which was made to the world—this was the political testament of Napoleon to future ages. The disasters which immediately after crowded round his sinking empire, and the extraordinary difficulties with which he had to contend, prevented any thing of the kind being subsequently attempted; and when order and regularity again emerged from the chaos, under the restored Bourbon dynasty, France, bereft of all its revolutionary conquests, and reduced to the dimensions of 1789, possessed little more than two-

Lasting interest of this last *exposé* of the Empire by Napoleon.

* "It was at this period that the commencement of imposts, plainly illegal, took place. It was about the same period that measures were adopted, which were not less arbitrary in other departments; but the difficulties of the crisis rendered them unavoidable."—SAVARY, vi. 40.

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thirds of the territory, and not a fourth of the influence, which it had enjoyed under the Emperor. To the picture exhibited of the empire at this period, therefore, the eyes of future ages will be constantly turned, as presenting both the highest point of elevation which the fortunes of France had ever attained, and the greatest assemblage of national and military strength which the annals of modern times have exhibited.

Moral weakness of the Empire, notwithstanding its immense physical resources.

Wonderful, however, as its strength was, and worthy as the efforts made by France at this period to repair the disasters of the Russian campaign, and assert the national independence, are of the highest admiration, and clearly as they will ever rank this among the brightest eras of its long and glorious annals, to the sober eye of historic observation it was already apparent, what the event soon demonstrated, that, though overflowing with the martial passions, and not yet wholly drained of the physical strength of war, the empire was almost destitute of that durable resolution, that disinterested ardour, which, springing from a sense of moral obligation, independent of individual ambition, prepares men to discharge their duty alike in the shade of adverse as in the sunshine of prosperous fortune. The forces of the French empire, however vast and unprecedented, were stimulated by no other passions but those of temporal ambition; the power of the Emperor, immense as it was, owed its ascendency entirely to the influence of worldly success. While victory attended their efforts, the hosts of warriors who clustered round the imperial eagles were faithful to their sovereign, brave in arms, indefatigable in exertion; but it is not while "fanned by conquest's crimson wing," that the real motives of human conduct can

be made apparent. Ambition then often produces the same effects on external conduct as devotion, selfishness as patriotism, the passion for distinction as the heroism of duty. It is adversity which is the real touchstone of mortality; it is the breath of affliction which lays bare the human heart. The inhabitants of France since the Revolution have ever been unable to stand this searching ordeal; that dreadful event closed the fountain from which alone the strength to endure it could have been derived. Resplendent when glittering in the sunshine of victory, invincible when fanned by the gales of conquest, the empire of Napoleon withered and perished under the grasp of misfortune. The high resolves, the enduring constancy, the heroic self-denial of patriotic resistance, were wanting in its vast and varied inhabitants. No Saragossa there, showed that courage can supply the want of ramparts; no shepherds of Tyrol, that patriotism can inspire the rudest breasts with heroic devotion; no flames of Moscow, that the splendour of civilization can co-exist with the energy of the desert. All the springs which the world can furnish to sustain the fortunes of an empire, were in full activity, and worked with consummate ability: but one was wanting, without which, in the hour of trial, all the others are but as tinkling brass—a belief in God, a sense of duty, and a faith in immortality.

CHAPTER LXIX.

RESURRECTION OF GERMANY.

ARGUMENT.

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Immense Sensation produced in Europe by the Moscow Campaign—Unbounded transports in Prussia and Northern Germany—Cruelties inflicted on those engaged in Schill's Conspiracy—Enormous pecuniary Exactions levied by the French in Prussia—Great impression which the Moscow Campaign produced in that country—Convention of General D'York—Embarrassments of the King, and his Disavowal of the Convention—Progress of Events in Prussia—Measures of D'York to gain time—Retreat of the French Army through Lithuania to Prussia—Continued Retreat to the Oder—Abandonment of the Army by Murat—Able Measures of Eugene to arrest the evil—The Russians pass the Oder and occupy Berlin, and the French retire across the Elbe—Death of Kutusoff, and Occupation of Berlin by the Russians—Departure of Frederick William from Berlin, and great Levy in his Dominions—Universal and noble outbreak of patriotic spirit in Prussia—Extraordinary rapidity with which the Army was Recruited—Admirable Organization in Prussia, which turned this spirit to the best account—Continued Difficulties, and Indecision of the King—Manner in which Napoleon received the pacific Advances of Prussia—Treaty of Kalisch—Energetic military measures adopted by Prussia—Progress of the Negotiation between that country and France—Real Motives of the War in Hardenberg's Proclamation—Answer of Maret on the part of France—Additional Conventions at Kalisch—Ineffectual Attempts to induce Saxony to join the League against France—Failure of all attempts of the Allies to gain over Saxony—Negotiations with Austria—First Measures of Austria after the Moscow Retreat—Secret Negotiation between the Cabinet of Vienna and England—Austria begins to arm, to give weight to her Mediation—Announcement by Austria of an Armed Mediation, and arrival of Count Narbonne—Austria more decidedly inclines to the Coalition—Remonstrances of Napoleon against the Austrians, and Metternich's Reply—Negotiations with Sweden and Denmark—Treaty of Orebro between England and Sweden—Accession of Denmark to the side of Napoleon—Negotiations between the Allies and Murat—Energetic Measures of Prussia in support of the War—Fermentation on the left bank of the Elbe—Formation of the Landwehr and Landsturm in Prussia—Positions of the French on the Elbe when the Russians crossed it—Disposition and Numbers of the French Troops in the Fortresses on the Vistula and the Oder—Disposition and Strength of the Prussian Forces—Forces and Position of the Russians—Occupation of Hamburg by the Allies—Insurrection in Bremen, and

Defeat of Morand at Lunenburg—General Insurrection between the Elbe and the Weser—Advance of the Allies to the Elbe—Wittgenstein's approach to that River —Combat of Mockern, and Retreat of Eugene across the Elbe—Napoleon's Measures before setting out for the Army—His Arrival at Mayence, and great Preparations there—Napoleon's efforts to Augment his Forces at that point—Bad condition of the Cavalry and Artillery—Forces of Napoleon at this period—Inferiority of the Allies at the opening of the Campaign—Aspect of the Russian Troops which entered Dresden—Appearance of the Prussian Troops there—Noble Spirit by which they were animated—Habits of the Emperor and King at Dresden, and respect which they both paid to Religion—Confusion and Disorder on the French Line of March—Approach of the two Armies to each other—Position and Measures of the Allies—Combat at Posarna, and Death of Marshal Bessieres—Movement and Position of the French—Allied March and Plan of Attack—Battle of Lutzen—Commencement of the Action, and success of the Allies on the Right—Napoleon's Measures to Repair the Disorder—Counter-movements of Wittgenstein—Napoleon hastens to the Right to restore the Battle —Prodigious efforts of both Parties at the decisive Point—Conflict of the Berlin Volunteers and French Conscripts—Final Charge of the French Guard—Night Attack of the Allied Horse on the French Line—Aspect of the Field of Battle—Loss on both Sides, and Reflections on the Battle—Retreat of the Allies to Dresden—Beautiful Appearance of that City on the Approach of the French—Entry of Napoleon into Dresden—His Preparations for the Passage of the Elbe—A Passage is Effected at the Capital—Return of the King of Saxony to Dresden, and his final Adherence to the Cause of Napoleon—Alarming State of the Negotiations with Austria—Mission of Count Bubna to Dresden, and Stadion to Bautzen —Napoleon's Secret Proposals to Russia at this period—Forces of the opposite Armies at Bautzen—Description of their Position there—Reconnoisance of Napoleon, and Disaster of Ney's Wing on his Left—Balanced Success of the French there —Disposition of the Allied Army in their Position—General Aspect of their Position—Passage of the Spree, and Commencement of the Action—Severe Combat on the French Right—Violent Battle in the Centre—Result of the first day's Fight—Battle on the 21st—Success of the Russians on the Right—Progress of the Battle in the Centre and on the Left—Great Effects of the Movement of Ney on the Left—Pritzlez is taken by Blucher, and Ney checked—Grand Attack of Napoleon on the Allied Centre—The Allies resolve to Retreat—Sublime Spectacle when the Allied Army retreated and the French pursued—Napoleon's Proposal for a Monument on Mont Cenis to commemorate this Epoch —Admirable Conduct of the Emperor Alexander during the Battle—Loss on both Sides—Combat of Reichenbach—Death of Duroc—Mournful Scene at Night around the Tent of Napoleon—General Despondence of the French Generals—Retreat of the Allied Armies towards Leignitz—Combat and Defeat of the French at Hainau—Continuance of the Retreat to Leignitz and the Oder —Reasons which induced the Allied Sovereigns to desire an Armistice—Great Satisfaction of Napoleon at the State of Affairs—Reasons which nevertheless induced him to desire an Armistice—Important partizan Successes in the French Rear—Attack on the French Depot at Leipsic—Capture of Hamburg by the French—Progress towards an Adjustment of an Armistice—Difficulty in arranging its Terms as to the Line of Demarcation—The Line is at length fixed on Conditions of the Armistice—Perfidious Attacks on Lutzow's Corps, and

CHAP. LXIX. 1813. wound of Körner—Great talent displayed by Napoleon in this Campaign—Ruinous Effects of this Armistice on the Fortunes of Napoleon—Singular manner in which it arose out of the Austrian Alliance—Sublime Spectacle exhibited by Germany at this Period.

Immense sensation produced in Europe by the Moscow campaign.

FUTURE generations of men, living under the shadow of their own fig-trees, engrossed in the arts of peace, and far removed from the excitements and miseries of war, will hardly be able to credit the contemporary accounts of the sensation produced in Europe by the result of the Moscow campaign. The calamity was too great to be concealed; the blow too dreadful not to resound throughout the world. Napoleon himself, enamoured of powerful impressions, and strongly excited by the awful nature of the disaster he had sustained, revealed its magnitude in his twenty-ninth bulletin in its full proportions: his subsequent arrival in Paris demonstrated to the world that he regarded his army as virtually destroyed, and that all his hopes were centred in the new host which he was about to collect in the French empire. The broken bands and woful crowds which, bereft of every thing, in tattered garb, and with haggard visages, traversed the Prussian territory, rather like ghosts or suppliants than armed enemies, gave confirmation strong of the extent of the calamity. An universal thrill was felt over all Europe at this awful catastrophe, which, commencing with the flames of Moscow, and terminating with the waves of the Berezina, seemed to have been sent by a special messenger of the Almighty to break the arm of the oppressor, and strike off the fetters of a captive world. In England, especially, the sense of deliverance gave rise to unbounded transports: the anxieties, the burdens, the calamities of twenty years' warfare were forgotten; and even the least sanguine ceased to despair

in a cause in which Providence itself appeared to have at length declared against the aggressor, and the magnitude of the disaster he had sustained was such, that it seemed to be beyond the power of human exertion to repair. CHAP. LXIX. 1813.

But if these were the feelings with which the inhabitants of Europe, who had known the war only by its excitements and its burdens, regarded this portentous event, what must have been the feelings with which it was regarded in Prussia and the north of Germany? In Prussia, yet prostrated by the thunderbolt of Jena, and groaning under six years of subsequent bondage—which mourned its dead queen, its lost honour, its halved territory; and which, as the last degradation in the cup of the vanquished, had been compelled to wear the colours and serve in the ranks of the oppressor, and strive to rivet on others the same chains by which itself was enthralled; —in Germany, in which every noble heart and every intrepid arm had been long enrolled in the secret bands of the Tugendbund, and where nothing was wanting but a leader and royal standard to occasion a general and irresistible outbreak against French oppression. Ever since the abortive attempt at liberation in 1809, the severity of the imperial rule had been materially increased in the states of Northern Germany. Mutual distrust prevailed. The French authorities, aware of the profound hatred with which they were universally regarded, sought, by additional acts of cruelty, to strike terror into the vanquished. The Germans, seeing no end to their miseries, sought refuge in deeper and more widespread conspiracy; and submitted to present suffering in the anticipation of approaching vengeance.[1] Unbounded transports in Prussia and Northern Germany. [1] Capefigue, viii. 248, 249. Hist. de l'Empire, Hard. vii. 12, 15.

Abominable acts of cruelty had added a yet deeper

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hue to the general feelings of execration with which the government of Napoleon was regarded, from the never-ending weight of the military contributions. Twenty citizens of Vienna had been shot before the French armies evacuated the town, to repress the general effervescence; and eleven officers of Schill's corps, all belonging to the first families at Berlin, had been executed for their adherence to his cause: they died, after embracing each other, singing patriotic hymns. But their fate, deplorable as it was, became soon an object of envy to their companions in that heroic enterprize, whose lives had been spared; all the volunteers in the Queen's regiment, the noblest youths in Prussia, were conducted with a chain about their necks, to the great depot of galley slaves at Cherbourg, and there employed in common labour in the convict dress, with a four-and-twenty-pound bullet fastened round their ankles, amidst the common malefactors, without being permitted any communication with their parents, or their even knowing whether they were dead or alive; while the never-ending demands of Count Daru and the French military authorities, still exhibited claims to the amount of nearly a hundred millions of francs (L.4,000,000) for unpaid arrears of the war contributions of Prussia, to the account of which they refused to ascribe upwards of ninety-four millions of vouched payments, or furnishings in kind, extracted at the point of the bayonet from that unhappy country in the course of the Moscow campaign.[1] *

Cruelties to those engaged in Schill's conspiracy.

[1] Capef. Hist. de l'Empire, viii. 248, 249, Hard. Report, March 16, 1813. Fain, ii. 246.

* The eleven noble Prussians thus unworthily sacrificed to the jealous apprehensions of Napoleon, were in the first instance brought to Verdun as prisoners of war, but from thence they were speedily conducted to Wesel, where they were delivered over to a military commission, and sentenced to be shot. The judgment was pronounced at noon; but

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The pecuniary exactions which had been made from Prussia, and the requisitions in kind, which had been extracted from its unhappy inhabitants during the last year, would exceed belief, if they were not attested by contemporary and authentic documents. From these it appears that no less than 482,000 men and 80,000 horses had traversed Prussia in its whole extent, in the first six months of 1812, and that more than one-half of this immense force had been quartered for above three months in the Prussian provinces. By the convention, 24th February 1812, the furnishings made for its support were to be taken in part payment of the arrears, still amounting to nearly a hundred millions of francs, which remained unpaid of the great military contributions of 640,000,000 francs, (L.24,000,000,) levied on Prussia after the battle of Jena.* But though the French authorities, with merciless rapacity, made the new requisitions, they never could be brought to state them, in terms of the treaty, as a deduction from the old ones. The French host, like a cloud of locusts, passed over the country, devouring its whole subsistence, plundering its inhabitants, and wrenching from them, by the terrors of military execution, the whole cattle, horses, and carriages within their reach. The number of the former carried off, before September in the single year 1812, in East Prussia alone, amounted to 22,700; of the cattle to 70,000, while the carts seized were 13,349. The

Enormous pecuniary exactions levied by the French in Prussia.

before six in the morning their graves had been dug in the fosses of the citadel. When the executioners were about to bind one of the victims named Widelle to his brother, he exclaimed, "Are we not already sufficiently bound by blood, and the cause in which we are engaged, to be spared this last act of insult?"—See *Defense des Officiers de la Troupe de Schill, par M. J. N. Pirwez, leur defenseur, Liege*, 1814, p. 29.

* Ante, vi. 298.

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weekly cost of Junot's corps of 70,000 men, quartered in Lower Silesia, was 200,000 crowns, or L.50,000, and all the rest of the army in the same proportion. These enormous contributions were exclusive of the furnishings stipulated to be provided by the state, by the treaty of February 24, 1812, which were also rigidly exacted;* and of the arrears of the great contribution of 1806, the collection of which had become, from the total exhaustion of the country, altogether hopeless.[1]

[1] Exposé de la Conduite du Gouv. Fran. envers la Prusse, Schoell, Recueil, ii. 277, 279.

Great impression which the Moscow campaign produced in Prussia.

So early as the 20th December, the magnitude of the disasters which the grand army had sustained was known at Berlin; and the King, apprehensive for the fate of his troops in the general ruin, had sent full powers to General D'York, their commander, to act according to circumstances. Meanwhile the agitation in the capital daily became more violent: every successive arrival from the army, brought fresh accounts of the accumulated disasters it had undergone; and at length the appearance of the woe-stricken fugitives who entered, the precursors of the deathlike mutilated bands who followed, left no doubt that an unheard-of catastrophe had occurred.† Augereau, who commanded there, was

December 22, 1812.

* These furnishings were as follow:—200,000 quintals of rye; 24,000 of rice; 48,000 of dried vegetables; 2,000,000 bottles of brandy; 2,000,000 of beer; 400,000 quintals of wheat; 650,000 of hay; 750,000 of straw; 6,000,000 pecks of oats; 44,000 oxen; 15,000 cavalry horses; 6000 quintals of powder; 3000 of lead; 3600 waggons harnessed, with drivers; hospital and field equipage for 20,000 sick.—*See* SCHOELL, ii. 279.

† "On Sunday forenoon last I went to one of the gates, and found a crowd collected round a car, in which some wounded soldiers had just returned from Russia. No grenade or grape could have so disfigured them as I beheld them, the victims of the cold. One of them had lost the upper joints of all his ten fingers, and he showed us the stumps; another looked as if he had been in the hands of the Turks—he wanted both ears and nose. More horrible was the look of a third, whose eyes

so much alarmed by the sinister reports which these scattered fugitives diffused among the inhabitants both of the metropolis and its garrison, that he wrote to the Emperor that it would be expedient, in order to be able at once to stifle any insurrectionary movement, to establish a powerful cordon of troops in the principal towns on the Oder. In the midst of the general agitation, however, Frederick William and his able minister Hardenberg continued perfectly tranquil; and both Augereau and the French ambassador Saint Marsan wrote to the Emperor, that they had no reason to complain of their conduct,[1] and that the cabinet of Berlin would remain firm to the French alliance.[1] But the stream of events was soon too violent to be withstood, and Prussia was impelled into the career of honour and danger, despite the prudent caution of its court, by one of those circumstances which defeat all the calculations of human wisdom.

[1] Augereau to Berthier, Dec. 22, 1812, and St Marsan to Napoleon, Jan. 4 and 12, 1812, Hard. xii. 12, 13.

had been frozen, the eyelids hung down rotting, the globes of the eyes were burst, and protruding from their sockets. It was awfully hideous; but a spectacle more horrible still was to present itself. Out of the straw in the bottom of the car, I now beheld a figure creep painfully, which one could scarcely believe to be a human being, so wild and distorted were the features; the lips were rotted away, the teeth stood exposed: he pulled the cloth from before his mouth, and grinned on us like a death's head; then he burst out into a wild laughter, gave the word of command in broken French, with a voice more like the bark of a dog than any thing human, and we saw that the poor wretch was mad—mad from a frozen brain! Suddenly a cry was heard, "Henry! my Henry!" and a young girl rushed up to the car. The poor lunatic rubbed his brow at the voice, as if trying to recollect where he was, then he stretched out his arms towards the distracted girl, and lifted himself up with his whole strength; but it was too much for his exhausted frame—a shuddering fever fit came over him, and he sunk lifeless on the straw. Such are the dragon teeth of woe which the Corsican Cadmus has sown."—FORSTER *to* KÖRNER, *January* 14, 1813. *Erinnerungen aus dem Befreijungskriegen in briefen gesammelt von* FRIEDRICH FORSTER. *Stutgard*, 1840.

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It has been already noticed,* that when the retreat and overthrow of the Grand Army uncovered the right flank of Marshal Macdonald's corps, who was engaged in the blockade of Riga, he began his retreat towards the Niemen, closely followed by the Russians under General Diebitch, who harassed his flank and rear in the most distressing manner. After marching several days in this manner, Diebitch, by a skilful manœuvre, interposed a small body of troops between the Prussians and the remainder of Macdonald's corps, and immediately sent a flag of truce to inform the commander of the former, D'York, that he was entirely cut off, and proposing to enter into a convention for the safety of his corps. D'York, deeming it his first duty to secure in the general wreck the Prussian corps under his command, who were fifteen thousand strong, entered into secret negotiations with Diebitch, in order to secure the unmolested retreat and safety of these auxiliary forces; and, after repeated conferences, a convention was concluded between the two commanders at the mill of Potcherau, on the 30th December 1812, by which it was stipulated that the Prussian troops should remain for two months in a state of neutrality, even in the event of the government directing them to resume operations with the French armies; and that, if the convention was not ratified by the Emperor of Russia or the King of Prussia, the Prussian corps was to be at liberty to follow the destination which might be assigned to it. On the other hand, the Russian commander agreed to restore to the Prussian general all his stragglers, and the whole cannon and *matériel* of every kind which might fall into his hands. This convention, which was justified in General D'York's

[1] Convention of General D'York.

Dec. 30, 1812.

* Ante, viii. 614.

letter to Marshal Macdonald by the critical situation of his troops, which left him no alternative but to "lose the greater part of his troops, and the whole *matériel* and provisions of the army, or to conclude a convention which might save them both," was in reality founded on ulterior and more important views. Of their existence D'York betrayed a secret consciousness; and it was plain that he was aware he throwing either for the crown of a patriot or the scaffold of a traitor, when he used the expression, in his letter announcing the convention to Marshal Macdonald, "Whatever judgment the world may pass on my conduct gives me little uneasiness. My duty towards my troops, and the most mature reflection, have dictated this step; motives the most pure, whatever appearances may be, have alone guided me." What these motives were, was revealed in the following passage of D'York's despatch to the King of Prussia announcing the event, which was suppressed in the copy furnished to the French ambassador, "Now or never is the time for your majesty to extricate yourself from the thraldom of an ally whose intentions in regard to Prussia are veiled in impenetrable darkness, and justify the most serious alarm. That consideration has guided me: God grant it may be for the salvation of the country!"[1]

[1] Convention, Dec. 30, 1812. D'York to Macdonald, Dec. 30. Fain, ii. 202, 203. Hard. xi. 459, 460.

Never was a monarch more embarrassed by a step on the part of a lieutenant than the King of Prussia was on this occasion. His first words were—"Here is enough to give one a stroke of apoplexy!" It was not merely the extreme hazard and incalculable consequences of the event which occasioned the difficulty; in the breast of Frederick William a tempest of contending emotions and opposite considerations instantly arose, almost sufficient to overturn the

Extreme embarrassment of the King, and his disavowal of the Convention.

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strongest head. Deeply impressed with the sanctity of his existing treaties with France, and feeling, as every man of honour would, that the obligation to maintain them inviolate was only rendered the more stringent by the disasters which had overwhelmed the imperial armies; he yet could not forget the cruel indignities to which he had been subjected; his insulted queen; his halved territory; his oppressed people; and he saw clearly that the agitation in his dominions was such, that it was not improbable that the people would erelong take the matter into their own hands, and, whatever the government might do; join the Russians as soon as they advanced into the Prussian territory. In this dilemma the King remained, though with a heavy heart, faithful to his honour and the French alliance: orders were immediately despatched to supersede General D'York in his command, which was conferred on General Kleist; the former was put under arrest, and ordered to Berlin to stand his trial, while the latter was directed to conduct the Prussian contingent as rapidly as possible to the head quarters of the grand army. Meanwhile Hardenberg, desirous to turn to a good account the present extraordinary crisis, and to regain for Prussia some part of its ancient splendour in return for its fidelity to its engagements, submitted to the French ambassador at Berlin, with the approbation of the King, a proposal for a still closer union between the two states, to be consolidated by the marriage of the Prince Royal of Prussia with a princess of the family of Napoleon, and to raise the Prussian contingent in the Emperor's service to sixty thousand men.[1]

Jan. 5, 1813.

Jan. 12.

[1] St Marsan to Duc de Bassano, Jan. 5 and 12, 1813. Fain, i. 207, 212. Hard. xii. 13, 14.

There can be no doubt that these proposals on the part of the Prussian cabinet at this period were sin-

cere; and accordingly there appeared, a few days after, a proclamation in the Berlin Gazette formally condemning D'York's convention, and ordering him to be delivered over to a council of war. In truth, the court were still dazzled by the lustre of the Emperor's power; they conceived that Austria, restrained by the marriage of Marie-Louise, would remain firm in the French alliance, and that France, far from being overthrown, would soon rise more powerful than ever.* Napoleon, however, very naturally recollecting the injuries which Prussia had received at his hand, and supposing that the protestations on the King's part were entirely hypocritical, and that the convention had been concluded agreeably to his secret instructions, did not accede to these propositions; but, regarding the die as already cast, immediately on the receipt of the intelligence of D'York's defection, ordered the great levy of three hundred and fifty thousand men, which has been already mentioned;† and meanwhile the march of events in Prussia was so rapid as to defeat all human calculation, and whirl the government, willing or unwilling, into the dangers and the glories of war.[1]

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Progress of events in Prussia.

Jan. 13.

[1] Hard. xii. 14, 15. Proclamation of Jan. 19, 1813. Fain, i. 217.

D'York, whose firmness of character was equal to the hazardous part which he had to play, while his prudence was adequate to its delicacy, had no sooner received a copy of the Prussian Gazette of the 19th, containing the King's formal disavowal of the con-

Measures of D'York to gain time.

* "The King of Prussia at this time was far from regarding France as overthrown: he believed, in spite of secret assurances to the contrary, that Austria would remain firm in the French alliance. He resisted only any further pecuniary sacrifices, which had become impracticable; but promised, if he got money, to raise 50,000 or 60,000 men for the service of the Emperor, announcing at the same time, that if his country became the seat of an insurrection, it would speedily extend to all Germany."—HARDENBERG, xii. 13, 14.

† Ante, ix. 76.

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vention, and his own dismissal from the command, than he published a counter proclamation, in which he declared that the aide-de-camp, Natzmer, who was said in the Gazette to have been sent with these orders to Kleist, with directions himself to enforce them,

Jan. 27.

had not arrived either at the headquarters of that general nor at his own; and that, as he could not recognize the authenticity of a printed gazette, he would continue his command till formally superseded. In this resolution he was unanimously supported by his troops, who remained inactive under his orders within the Russian lines; and the non-appearance of the aide-de-camp with the formal orders made it probable, that the King was now at length preparing to take a decided part, and that the defection of D'York would possibly become the prelude to an abandonment by the cabinet of Berlin of the French alliance.[1]

[1] D'York's declaration, Jan. 27, 1813. Fain, i. 219.

Retreat of the French army through Lithuania and Prussia.

In truth, such had been the magnitude of the French overthrow, and the rapidity with which the Russians had advanced in their pursuit, that the north-east of Germany was almost denuded of their troops, and amidst the exulting shouts of the inhabitants, the Russian advanced guards were already appearing amongst them. Such had been the havoc which had been made in the French array, that out of six hundred thousand combatants who, from first to last, had entered the Russian territory with the grand army, only forty-two thousand had re-crossed the Niemen, of whom not nineteen thousand were native French.* Murat, whom the Emperor had left in command of the army, led back those shattered bands through Lithuania to Konigsberg and

Dec. 12.

* The details of the survivors of the wreck of the Grand Army, when compared with those who entered the Russian territory, are very curious: they are as follow:—

Dantzic; while Schwartzenberg retired by a diverging line to Pultusk, in order to regain the Austrian frontiers, so that both by position and subsequent policy, the two imperial hosts were irrevocably separated from each other. Wittgenstein, with the advanced guard of his corps, crossed the Niemen, and entered the Prussian territory in the middle of December;[1] and it was his advance—while cutting off the communication between Macdonald's corps, which was blockading Riga, and the remains of the grand army, retiring towards Dantzic—that rendered neces-

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Dec. 15. Dec. 30.

[1] Schoell, x. 183, 184. Jom. iv. 220, 221. Fain, i. 63, 64.

Troops which entered from first to last, *vide* Ante, viii. 843,			647,158
Deduct Schwartzenberg's corps	34,148		
Macdonald's ditto	32,497		
			66,645
Grand Army of Napoleon, properly so called			580,513
Recrossed the Niemen.			
1. French.			
Imperial guard	800		
Remains of the Moscow army	9,000		
Grand Jean's division	5,000		
Durutte's ditto	3,000		
Franzisko's ditto	1,000		
Total French		18,800	
2. Allies.			
Saxons	6,000		
Bavarians, including 3,000 in Thorn	7,000		
Westphalians	1,900		
Wirtemburghers	1,000		
Baden and Hessians	1,500		
Poles, without the garrisons of Zamosc and Modlin	6,000		
		23,400	
Total who escaped		42,200	42,200
Lost in the Moscow campaign			538,313

—See SCHOELL, x. 179, and PLOTHO. *Camp. de* 1813 and 1814, ii. 437, and FAIN, i. 64.

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sary the retreat of the former, and gave rise to the convention with D'York already mentioned, which led to such important results.

Continued retreat to the Oder.

The French generals were at first hopeful that they would succeed in maintaining the line of the Vistula; but the defection of the Prussians, and the just apprehensions which that occasioned as to their communications with France, joined to the exhausted and demoralized state of the troops, soon rendered it apparent that this was impossible. In truth, the activity of Wittgenstein gave them no leïsure for

Jan. 15.

preparation. On the 15th of January his vanguard crossed the Vistula, spreading every where, as he advanced, proclamations calling upon the inhabitants to take up arms, and join in the great work of liberating the world from the thraldom of the oppressor.* Wittgenstein's troops marched in two columns, the one by Konigsberg and Elbing on Berlin, the other by Friedland and Tilsit on the same capital. Pillau, with a garrison of twelve hundred men,

Feb. 7.

capitulated to these troops early in February, and they continued their march without opposition, every where received with enthusiasm as deliverers, through Old Prussia. The second column, composed of Platoff's Cossacks and some light cavalry, moved to the

Jan. 24.

left of the former, straight on Dantzic, where it

* "The Russian warriors have avenged the infamous invasion of their territory: they have annihilated the enemy who inundated it; and they are now engaged in pursuing the scattered remains of that immense army, which has been sacrificed to the insatiable thirst for conquest which characterized the tyrant. Worthy neighbours, we cross your frontiers solely in order to pursue the flying remains of the common foe,—the enemy of the human race. We have no other object but to conquer a désirable and honourable peace. We do not enter your territory as enemies, but as friends. Property shall be sacred, and the most exact discipline preserved."—WITTGENSTEIN'S *Proclamation, Jan.* 13, 1813.—SCHOELL, *Recueil*, i. p. 11, 12.

arrived on the 24th January, and immediately commenced the blockade of that important fortress. The third, under the orders of Tchichagoff, advanced through East Prussia, and arrived in the middle of January at Marienburg. The fourth, under Tormasoff's command, were with the headquarters of the Emperor Alexander, and the commander-in-chief Kutusoff, recently and worthily invested with the title of Prince Kutusoff Smolensko: it arrived at Plozk early in February, having advanced from Wilna through Lithuania. The fifth, under the direction of Milaradowitch, Sacken, and Doctoroff, followed a diverging line to the southward, moving by Grodno on Jalowke, following the footsteps of Regnier and Poniatowski, who retired towards the Upper Vistula: while Schwartzenberg, unable to contend against such an inundation of hostile forces, concluded a separate convention, in virtue of which, Regnier was allowed to retire towards Saxony, and the Austrians, in like manner, were permitted to withdraw without disturbance into Gallicia. The whole force of these five columns comprised originally a hundred and ten thousand men; but such was the reduction of numbers in the Russian main army, from the ravages which fatigue and the severity of the climate had made in their ranks, that not more than thirty-five thousand men could be assembled round the headquarters of the Emperor Alexander, which arrived at Kalisch in the end of February, and remained there till the beginning of April.[1]

Jan. 15.

Feb. 5.

Jan. 17.

Feb. 24.

[1] Jom. iv. 223, 224. Schoell, x. 185, 187. Fain, i. 64, 67.

It would have been a difficult matter even for Moreau or Turenne, at the head of the mutilated and discouraged remains of the French army, to have maintained their ground on the Vistula against a victorious though grievously reduced body of ene-

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mies, advancing over an extended line of above two hundred miles in breadth; but Murat was totally inadequate to the task. Brave as his own sword in the field, and gifted with the eagle eye which could seize with advantage the most favourable direction for a charge of horse, he was utterly destitute of the moral courage, extensive combination, and enduring patience requisite for a general-in-chief entrusted with an important command. Disaster succeeded disaster during the brief period of his direction. The advanced guard of Wittgenstein surprised Marienwerder near the Vistula on the 16th January, where Prince Eugene had his headquarters, and with such success, that the prince only succeeded in cutting his way through by desperate efforts, and with the loss of six hundred killed and wounded, and a thousand prisoners. The line of the Vistula, thus broken, and menaced by the doubtful temper of the Prussian people in rear, could no longer be maintained. Six thousand men were hastily thrown into Thorn, eight thousand into Modlin, and four thousand into Zamosc; while a motley group of stragglers, hardly a half of whom were in a condition to bear arms, crowded into Dantzic, where they sought refuge behind formidable ramparts, and were brought into some sort of order under the stern rules of its governor, Rapp. Meanwhile Murat, who had retired to Posen, in East Prussia, more than a hundred miles in the rear, despairing of the salvation of the army, and conceiving the time was come, when every one, in the wreck of the Emperor's fortunes, should look to his own interest, suddenly threw up his command, and set out by post for his own dominions in the south of Italy. Napoleon justly stigmatized this desertion of his post by the commander-in-chief at such a crisis

Retreat and abandonment of the army by Murat.

Jan. 16.

Jan. 17.

as a decisive indication of his want of moral resolution,* and gratitude to his benefactor. "I suppose," said he in a letter to Murat, "that you are among the number of those who think that the Lion is dead: if so, you will find that you are mistaken. You have done me all the mischief in your power since my departure from Wilna; your elevation to the throne has turned your head. If you wish to preserve it, conduct yourself properly."[1]

[1] Napoleon to Murat, Jan. 26, 1813. Fain, i. 65, 66. Hard. xii. 80. Thib. ix. 195.

Able measures of Eugene to arrest the evil.

Eugene, upon whom the command was thus reluctantly forced at this perilous crisis, did all that coolness and resolution could suggest to stem the torrent of disaster. His first care was to fix the headquarters at Posen, and keep them there for three weeks, in order to give an opportunity to the stragglers to come in, and communicate a certain degree of order to the retreat, which was daily more rapidly turning into a flight; but the mischief already done by the dislocation of the army was irreparable, and the forces under his command, after the loss of those left in garrison on the Vistula, were so inconsiderable, Feb. 12. hardly amounting to fifteen thousand men, that he was in the end compelled to fall back to the Oder. Nor did the garrisons left on the Vistula effect in any degree the desired object of retarding the enemy: notwithstanding the number of men, little short of thirty thousand, who were under his command in Dantzic, such was the misery and destitution of their condition, that Rapp was unable to attempt any external operations to retard the enemy. Thorn and Modlin were merely blockaded by the Russian reserves under

* "The king, your husband, abandoned the army on the 16th. He is a very brave man on the field of battle; but he is weaker than a woman or a monk when he does not see the enemy. He has no moral courage."—NAPOLEON *to his sister* CAROLINE, *Queen of Naples, 24th January* 1813. FAIN, i. 65.

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1813. Barclay de Tolly. A sufficient number were assembled before Dantzic to keep its garrison in check. Warsaw was, early in February, evacuated by the Austrians, who retired from the whole grand duchy of Lithuania, which was immediately occupied by the Russians; while the main body of their force still pressed on with unconquerable vigour, though in the depth of winter, towards the Oder. Winzingerode, with a large detachment of Russian horse, soon after overtook Regnier and his Saxon infantry at Kalisch: a sharp conflict ensued, which terminated in the overthrow of the Saxon foot, who were irrevocably separated from their horse, the former being driven back in the direction of Glogau on the Oder, while the latter were forced to an eccentric retreat by the fort of Czentoschau towards the southern parts of Poland, where they sought protection under the shelter of the retiring Austrian columns. Eugene, perceiving from these disasters that he could no longer maintain his position at Posen, broke up from thence on the 12th, having, by his resolute stand there, restored a certain degree of order to his troops, and gained time for the first columns from France and Italy to arrive on the Elbe and the Oder. On the latter stream, where he arrived on the 18th, he met the corps of General Grenier, fifteen thousand strong, which had come up from Italy. This reinforcement raised Eugene's forces to thirty thousand infantry, besides a thousand horse; and with this respectable body he hoped, with the aid of the strong line of fortresses on its banks, which were still in the hands of the French, to be able to make head against the Russians, until the arrival of the great reinforcements which Napoleon was raising in France.[1]

Feb. 7.

Feb. 13.

Feb. 12.

Feb. 18.

[1] Fain, i. 70, 72. Schoell, x. 186, 187. Jom. iv. 223, 225.

The line of the Oder, however, notwithstanding all these advantages, proved as little capable of being

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made good as that of the Vistula had been. Early in March the advanced guard of Wittgenstein's column, under the command of Prince Repnin, passed the Oder at Gustebuzé Zellin, between Stettin and Custrin; while Winzingerode at the same time crossed it near Glogau. It was no longer possible either to maintain the line of the river, thus pierced through in all directions, or to retain possession of Berlin, now in an alarming state of fermentation. Eugene accordingly evacuated that capital on the night of the 2d March, and, after throwing three thousand men into the strong fortress of Spandau, in its vicinity, withdrew with all his forces in the direction of Wittenberg, and cantoned them behind the Elbe. Supported by the strong fortresses of Torgau, Magdeburg, Wittenberg, as well as the intrenched camp of Pirna, so famous in the Seven Years' War, and the feebler ramparts of Dresden, it was hoped they might at length make a stand, the more especially as the Russians necessarily left behind a number of men during their rapid advance; and not more than twenty thousand of their troops had yet penetrated into Prussia. There, accordingly, Eugene collected his forces, and terminated his long and mournful retreat from the Niemen, a distance of nearly four hundred miles; while by drawing to his standard the whole troops in Pomerania, as well as all the Saxons and Bavarians who were within reach, he contrived to muster nearly forty thousand men for the defence of the great military barrier of the Elbe, even after deducting the garrisons left in the fortresses on the Oder.[1]

The Russians pass the Oder, and occupy Berlin, and the French retire across the Elbe.

March 2.

March 10.

[1] Jom. iv. 261, 262. Fain, i. 72, 73. Schoell, x. 186, 187.

Meanwhile the Russians, though severely weakened by their prodigious march, and the necessity of blockading so many fortresses, advanced with extraordinary vigour and expedition. While Alexander

Death of Kutusoff, and occupation of Berlin by the Russians.

CHAP. LXIX. 1813. still remained at Kalisch, Kutusoff, following on the traces of the retreating enemy, advanced his head-quarters to Buntzlau; but there that gallant veteran, whose sword had delivered Russia in the extremity of its peril, and achieved the overthrow of the mightiest armament of which history has preserved a record, terminated his eventful career. His constitution, already almost exhausted by the hardships and fatigues of the campaign, there sank under an attack of the malignant typhus fever, which, springing as usual from the effects of famine and misery, had hung upon the traces of the retreating French army, and already begun to spread out in that frightful epidemic, which proved as fatal to their ranks as the snows of Russia, and for the next four years visited and spread its ravages through every kingdom in Europe. The Emperor of Russia was much embarrassed in the choice of his successor: the claims of Barclay de Tolly, whose immortal retreat from the Niemen to Borodino had gained for him the admiration of every military man in Europe, while his generous and unabated zeal in the public service, under the orders of Kutusoff, had proved that his patriotic spirit was equal to his military ability, being balanced by the distrust which the soldiers entertained of him as a foreigner, who had not yet been rendered illustrious by any signal victory, and whose principal achievement had been that of retiring before the enemy. Moved by these considerations, Alexander, though with reluctance, relinquished his desire to reinstate him in the supreme command, and conferred it on Count Wittgenstein, whose gallant stand on the Dwina had contributed so powerfully to the success of the campaign, and whose recent exploits on the Berezina had inspired the soldiers with that confidence which brilliant triumphs, if accompanied by tolerable con-

March 6.

duct, seldom fails to produce. His first steps were eminently calculated to increase this favourable disposition. Following up the retiring French columns, he approached the Prussian capital: the Cossack advanced-guard traversed Berlin on the 4th of March, amidst the enthusiastic shouts of the inhabitants; and on the 11th the head-quarters of the whole army were transferred to that city, while Cara St Cyr, with all the troops he could collect on the Lower Elbe, threw himself into Hamburg: the whole right bank of that river was evacuated by the French troops, and Magdeburg and Wittenberg became the principal pivots on which the Viceroy's army, charged with the defence of the upper part of its course, rested. [1]

March 11.

[1] Aperçu de la Camp. de 1813, 27, 28. Jom. iv. 262. Schoell, x. 186, 187.

Departure of Frederick William from Berlin, and great levy in his dominions.

It was impossible that this rapid and uninterrupted course of success, inducing as it did the liberation of the whole Prussian monarchy from the grasp of the enemy, with the exception of a few blockaded fortresses, should not have had an immediate and powerful effect on the dispositions of the Prussian cabinet. The first indications of the disposition of Frederick William to set himself free from the fetters with which he had so long been enchained, was evinced by his sudden departure from Potsdam, where he then resided, on the night of the 23d January, for Breslau, where he arrived on the 25th. The motive of this journey, however, was not by any means to break at once with France; on the contrary, the vehement sallies against that country which were breaking out on all sides, were repressed by order of the court, and every effort made to restrain the open declaration of the national feeling, now become so excited as to be almost incapable of repression. The real object of the monarch

Jan. 23.

CHAP. LXIX. 1813. and his cabinet was, to place himself in a situation where he was no longer exposed, as at Berlin, to the danger of seizure by the French generals; and where, in a place of at least temporary security, he could pursue those measures which, by putting Prussia in a respectable posture of defence, might enable it to take advantage of the present crisis to recover a portion of its lost territories and fallen consideration in Europe. The King individually, however, still inclined to the French alliance, from a sense of personal honour; and Prince Hatzfield, who had been despatched to Paris on the first intelligence being
Jan. 11. received of D'York's convention, reiterated the offers on which the cabinet of Berlin was still inclined to draw more close the bonds of connexion with the French Emperor, and bring to his support a powerful army of sixty thousand men. But in order to support these offers, and put Prussia in a condition to stipulate advantageous terms with either party to which it might ultimately incline, warlike measures of the most decisive kind were adopted by the government. By a royal decree, dated Breslau, Feb-
Feb. 3. ruary 3, an appeal was made, on the preamble that the country was in danger, to young men of all ranks, from the age of seventeen to twenty-four, not subject to the legal conscription, to enter the army, in order to form companies of volunteers, to be annexed to the regiments of infantry and cavalry already in the service; declaring, at the same time, that no young man between these years, who had not served in the ranks in one or other of these ways, should obtain any honour, distinction, or employment from the government; while by a still more
Feb. 9. urgent appeal on the 9th of the same month, all grounds of exemption from the legal service in the

army were declared suspended during the continuance of the war. By an edict on the day following, it was declared, that though the previous decree had fixed the age from seventeen to twenty-four as that in which service was in this manner required, yet it was not thereby intended to limit the right of enrolment to those who, being above the age of twenty-four, might still be desirous to serve their country; so that in effect the whole youth of the kingdom were summoned round the royal standard.[1] CHAP. LXIX. 1813. Decrees 3d and 4th Feb. 1813. Schoell, x. 192, 193. Hard. xii. 27, 28.

But no denunciations of royal displeasure if backwardness was evinced, no exhortations to stand by their country in the hour of peril, were needed to make the Prussian youth fly to arms. Though the intentions of government were not yet authentically known, and a degree of uncertainty, in fact, at that period pervaded the councils of the cabinet of Berlin which the nation little suspected; yet many facts had occurred which conspired, with the unanimous wish of the people, to render the belief universal, that a breach with France and alliance with Russia were in contemplation. The convention of D'York, which, though formally disapproved of by the King, had not yet practically led to his being deprived of the command of his corps; the unresisted march of the Russian troops across the whole Prussian territory; the transports of joy with which they had been received in the principal cities;* the general fermentation which pervaded all ranks of the people, from an undefined sense of approaching deliverance; Universal and noble outbreak of patriotic spirit in Prussia.

* On the 10th February, the ladies of the town of Newstettin, where the Prussian general, Bulow, had his headquarters, gave a ball to the gay and adventurous young Russian general, Chernicheff. Two days afterwards, Bulow's cantonments were opened to afford a passage to the light troops of the enemy across the Oder.—Fain, i. 69.

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the direction of the King's journey from Potsdam to Breslau, where he was in the line of the Russian advance, instead of Magdeburg, where he would have been in the centre of the French power; joined to the invitation to the whole youth of the kingdom to rally round the national standard, on the solemn announcement that the country was in danger—all conspired to spread an universal belief that the disasters of Jena and Auerstadt might yet be effaced, and that the last stake for national salvation was about to be thrown. Incredible was the ardour which this conviction excited among the Prussian youth. The young men of all classes, brave, ardent, and impetuous as their ancestors in the days of Arminius and Witikind, had been excited to the very highest degree of indignation by the unbounded license and rapacity which, under the imperial banners and by the imperial authority, French cupidity had so long exercised in every part of the country. Now was the appointed time; now was the day of salvation. And nobly did the Prussian youth on that crisis discharge their duty to their country and mankind. Could old Frederick have risen from his grave, he might well have been proud of his people; and the patriots of every future age will recur to it as one of the brightest spots in the annals of history.[1]

[1] Schoell, x. 193. Hard. xii. 34, 35.

Extraordinary rapidity with which the army was recruited.

On all sides, and in every direction, there was one unanimous cry for arms. Such was the rapidity with which the volunteers crowded in, that the government functionaries, so far from being in a condition to serve out to them military weapons, were not even able for a considerable period to inscribe their names. Nine thousand enrolled themselves in Berlin alone, in the first three days; a city not, at that period, containing above a hundred and eighty

thousand inhabitants.* The same spirit prevailed in every part of the country. Universally, the villages were filled with robust multitudes crowding in to enrol their names as volunteers; the schoolhouses in the rural districts, the offices of the municipality in the burghs, were surrounded, from morning till night, with dense masses, demanding arms to save their country. The generous ardour burned with peculiar vehemence in the youth at the universities, a very numerous class in Germany, and among whom the associations of the Tugendbund and the Burchenschaft had spread far and wide the utmost enthusiasm in the cause of their country, and the most unbounded hatred of French domination.† The ministers of state—Stein, Hardenberg, Dohna, and Scharnhorst—were secretly allied to these associations, and did their utmost to emancipate the mind of the King from the bonds by which he still conceived himself tied to the alliance with Napoleon; while their agents—Professor Jahn, Ficht, Arndt, and Massenbach—more openly fanned the patriotic flame,[1] and produced that unbounded enthusiasm

[1] Hard. xii. 34, 35. Schoell, x. 193. Cond. Camp. of 1813-14.

* "No sooner was the king's proclamation known, than every man straightway hastened to clap his 'heart' on his breast; the next day not a single person was to be seen in the streets without the national symbol. Our colours, indeed, are not brilliant—white and black; but the white shall express the purity of our cause—the black our mourning for the fatherland, and our stern determination to avenge it. We shall add red when we return triumphant from the combat; from out of blood and death freedom shall grow."—VON B. to FORSTER. *Berlin, 17th March* 1813.—FORSTER, 108.

† "Germany is up; the Prussian eagle awakens in all hearts the great hope of German, at least Northern German, freedom. My muse sighs for her fatherland; let me be her worthy disciple. Yes, dearest father, I have made up my mind to be a soldier; I am ready to cast away the gifts that fortune has showered upon me here, to win myself a fatherland, were it with my blood."—THEODORE KÖRNER *to his Father. Vienna, 10th March* 1813.—*Deutche Pandora*, 87.

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which made Prussia rise as one man at the call of the fatherland.

But patriotic ardour and devotion, however important elements in military strength, are not of themselves capable of creating an army: discipline is necessary; training is required; previous organization and preparation must come to the aid of present courage and enthusiasm. In these vital particulars, without which their utmost efforts at the moment would, in all probability, have proved entirely unavailing, Prussia already stood pre-eminent; and the wisdom of her government had provided both the framework in her army, and the practical experience among her people, capable of at once turning the whole strength of the nation to warlike achievement. The admirable system has already been mentioned,* by which the Prussian cabinet, under the direction of Stein and Scharnhorst, taught wisdom in the salutary school of adversity, though restricted by the treaty of Tilsit to an army of forty-two thousand men, had contrived in reality to have a hundred and twenty thousand on foot, by limiting the period of service which each individual was bound to serve to two or three years, and maintaining a number of volunteers ready to enter the regular army on the first vacancy, who, though not formally enrolled, were already instructed in the rudiments of the military art. The young men thus selected were the flower of the nation; no rank, wealth, or station were taken as an excuse: three years' military service, beginning with the musket on the shoulder, were as indispensable to the sons of the king, as to the offspring of the humblest cottager in the land. To adapt the army to the feelings and habits of the

Admirable organization in Prussia, which turned this spirit to the best account.

* Ante, vi. 453.

elevated classes who thus, without exception, passed through its ranks, the severe laws of German discipline had been abrogated; the old system of promoting only according to seniority relaxed, in order to make way for the advancement of talent and ambition; and numerous institutions established, calculated to awaken the sentiment of honour in the breast of the soldier, and make him consider the loss of it as his greatest humiliation. Nor had less care been bestowed upon the *matériel* of the army than the composition and extension of its ranks. By purchases made in Austria, or manufactories of their own recently established, they had succeeded in procuring a hundred and fifty thousand muskets in excellent condition; the field-pieces, which had been almost entirely lost in the disastrous campaign of 1806, had been restored by melting down the bronze cannon in the fortresses, and replacing them by substitutes of iron; eight fortresses, still in the hands of the national troops, had been put in a respectable posture of defence, and a train of field artillery and caissons, adequate for a hundred and twenty thousand men, was already prepared. Add to this, that the losses of the Prussians in the last campaign had been by no means in the same proportion as those of the French, or of the contingents of the other German states; the snows of Russia had only swallowed up two batteries of horse artillery, which Napoleon had accidentally met in Russia, and forced, contrary to the treaty, to accompany him to Moscow; and D'York's convention had preserved his corps from those disasters which had proved so fatal to the other divisions of the army.[1] Thus it was that Prussia, even though reduced to half her former territory and population by the treaty of Tilsit, was able to reappear with such distinction on

[1] Hard. ix. 467, 468. and xii. 34, 35. Schoell, x. 190, 192.

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the theatre of Europe; and that the previous wisdom and foresight of her government enabled her to turn to such marvellous account the present burst of patriotic enthusiasm among her people.

Continued difficulties and indecision of the King.

But while these efforts were made by the Prussian people, in the fond belief that the part of their government was decidedly taken, and that the war of liberation was at hand, the King was still undecided to which side he should incline; and it required all the efforts of his own ministers, and all the obstinacy of Napoleon, to throw him into the arms of Russia. Not that the monarch was ignorant of the spirit which pervaded his subjects, or felt less keenly than in former years the innumerable injuries and insults he had received from France; but he had a serious dread of violating a subsisting treaty of alliance, for the rupture of which no new cause of adequate magnitude could be assigned; and he was strongly attached to that system of temporizing, which had so long been the ruling policy of Prussia, which is, perhaps, necessarily the resort of the weaker state when exposed to collision with the stronger, and which had only been abandoned, on the eve of the battle of Jena, to precipitate the state into the abyss of misfortune. His views in the beginning of February were still essentially pacific, and were directed to establish Prussia in a state of armed neutrality between France and Russia, on condition that the fortresses on the Oder should be restored to his arms, and that the former power should withdraw its forces behind the Elbe, and the latter behind the Vistula.*

Feb. 5.

* "The King has conceived the idea that nothing would contribute more powerfully to advance the great work of peace than a truce, in virtue of which the French and Russian armies should mutually retire to a certain distance, and leave the intermediate country unoccupied between them. Would the Emperor Napoleon be disposed to enter

Such a measure would have been highly advantageous to Napoleon, by enabling him to recall to his standards above fifty thousand veteran troops, now blockaded in the fortresses on the Vistula and the Oder, and to recommence the contest in Germany, if an accommodation proved impossible, with many additional chances in his favour. At the same time Hardenberg reiterated to Saint Marsan, the French ambassador, the most solemn assurances, that "the system of the King had undergone no alteration; that no overtures direct or indirect had been made to Russia; that he awaited with unequalled anxiety a reply from Paris; because, in the present posture of affairs, if the Emperor approved the steps he had taken to secure the neutrality of Silesia, and would give some pecuniary assistance to Prussia, the alliance would be contracted more closely than ever; and that nothing but despair would throw him into the arms of Russia."[1]

[1] St Marsan to Berthier, 15th Feb. 1813. Fain, i. 235, and 239. Hard. xii. 32.

Manner in which Napoleon received these advances from Prussia.

There can be no doubt that these protestations on the part of the Prussian monarch were sincere, and that it only lay with Napoleon, by giving him some pecuniary assistance, and repaying a portion of the enormous war contributions, amounting to 94,000,000 of francs, (L.3,650,000,) which had been levied on his dominions in the preceding campaign, to secure the cabinet of Berlin in the French alliance, and gain an auxiliary force of sixty thousand men to aid him in defending the course of the Elbe. It was to these points, and, above all, assistance in money, which, in the exhausted state of Prussia, was an indispen-

into such an arrangement? Would he consent to restore the fortresses on the Oder, and that of Dantzic, to the Prussian troops jointly with the Saxons, and to retire his army behind the Elbe, provided the Emperor Alexander withdrew his beyond the Vistula?"—HARDENBERG'S *Note, 15th February* 1813.—HARDENBERG, xii. 32.

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sable preliminary to any military efforts, that all the exertions of Frederick William were directed.* But Napoleon was inexorable. He was firmly convinced that these protestations of fidelity on the part of the Prussian monarch, were mere devices to gain time; that the policy of the court was determined, and even that, if it were not, such was the vehemence of the national feeling, that it would erelong force the cabinet into the Russian alliance. He deemed it, therefore, useless to dissemble any longer, and told General Krusemarck, who had been sent from Breslau to conclude the negotiation, that he was not disposed to furnish arms to his enemies; and that he would give Prussia no pecuniary assistance nor relief whatever.† This refusal, concurring with an active correspondence which at the same period was going on between Hardenberg and Kutusoff, after the arrival of the Emperor Alexander at Kalisch,

* "Tell the Emperor, that, as to pecuniary sacrifices, they are no longer in my power; but that, if he will give me money, I can raise and arm 50,000 or 60,000 men for his service. I am the natural ally of France: by changing my system of policy, I would only endanger my position, and give the Emperor grounds for treating me as an enemy. I know that there are fools who regard France as struck down; but you will soon see it present an army of 300,000 men, as brilliant as the former. I will support all the sacrifices required of me, to secure the prosperity and future welfare of my family and people."—FREDERICK WILLIAM'S *words, in* SAINT MARSAN *to* DUKE OF BASSANO, *12th January* 1813. FAIN, i. 213.

† "The refusal on the Emperor's part of any pecuniary aid to the account of his claims for war contributions; the noise made about the affair of D'York; above all, the refusal to agree to his proposal, that he should negotiate for the neutrality of Silesia, have awakened anew all the King's alarm, and persuaded him that his ruin was resolved on. It was a report he received of an intention on the part of the French to carry him off, which originated with a French officer, which occasioned his departure from Potsdam to Breslau." "If the Emperor conceives it for his interest to preserve Prussia, and will do a little for it, he will have no difficulty in gaining his point; it will be very easy to retain the King in the line he has hitherto followed."—SAINT MARSAN *to* MARET, *15th February* 1813. FAIN, i. 236, 237.

relative to the neutrality of the Prussian states, on which the King was so anxiously bent, gave great additional weight to the numerous party in his council who were inclined to the Russian alliance; and at length, with great difficulty, they obtained his consent, but only the evening before it was signed, to the TREATY OF KALISCH, the foundation-stone of that grand alliance which so soon after accomplished the overthrow of Napoleon, and deliverance of Europe.[1]

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[1] Saint Marsan to Maret, Feb. 15, 1813. Fain, i. 265, 267, Jom. iv. 261. Hard. xii. 32, 33.

By this treaty, an alliance offensive and defensive was established between the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia, for the prosecution of the war with France; and in order to carry it on with vigour, it was stipulated that the former should bring a hundred and fifty thousand men into the field, the latter eighty thousand, independent of the garrisons of the strong places. Neither of the contracting powers was to conclude either a peace or a truce without the consent of the other; they were jointly to make efforts to induce the cabinet of Vienna to join their alliance, and to lose no time in treating with England, in order that Prussia might obtain those subsidies of which she stood so much in need to complete her armaments. The treaty was to be kept secret for two months, but in the mean time, privately communicated to England, Austria, and Sweden. Such were the public articles of this important treaty; but the secret conditions were still more material to the future interests of the Prussian monarchy. By these, the Emperor of Russia engaged never to lay down his arms until Prussia was reconstituted, in all respects, statistical, financial, and geographical, as it had stood not only anterior to the war of 1806, but with such additions,[1] especially in

Treaty of Kalisch ratified, March 1.

[1] See the Treaty in Martin's Sup. iii. 234, and Schoell, xii. 248.

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the way of uniting the old provinces to Silesia, as should give it more consistence, and render it an effectual bulwark of the Russian empire.

Energetic military measures adopted by Prussia.

Frederick William, who was only brought to accede to this treaty with the utmost difficulty,* was well aware that his political existence was thenceforth wound up with the success of Russia in the German war. His first words, after agreeing to the alliance, were—"Henceforth, gentlemen, it is an affair of life and death." Great pains, accordingly, were taken to conceal the treaty from the knowledge of the French ambassador, but, notwithstanding
March 14. every effort, its existence soon transpired; and Alexander having arrived at Breslau from Kalisch in the middle of March, the terms of intimacy on which the two monarchs lived could no longer be concealed, and it was justly thought unnecessary to dissemble
March 16. any longer. Two days afterwards, accordingly, the conclusion of the treaty was intimated to the French ambassador, Saint Marsan, at Breslau, and on the same day to the minister of foreign affairs at Paris.
March 11. Shortly before a royal edict had appeared, which declared the conduct of Generals D'York and Massenbach entirely free from blame in the convention with the Russian General Diebitch; and these steps were
March 19. followed, on the 19th of the same month, by one more decisive, which pointed to the formidable national war which was about to be raised against the French in Germany. By this convention, it was stipulated between Russia and Prussia.—"1. That

* "The King of Prussia," said Napoleon, "in his private character, is a good, loyal, and honourable man; but in his political capacity, he was unavoidably forced to yield to necessity. You were always the master with him when you had force on your side and the hand uplifted."—LAS CASES, ii. 365.

they should forthwith issue a proclamation, to announce that they had no other object but to rescue Germany from the domination of France, and to invite all lesser princes to concur in that great undertaking, under pain of losing their states. 2. To establish a Central Council of Administration, composed of a delegate from each power, in order to govern provisionally the conquered districts, and divide the revenue between Russia, Prussia, and the Regency of Hanover. 3. To organize all the countries between Saxony and Holland, with the exception of the possessions of the House of Hanover and the ancient Prussian provinces, into five great sections, each with a civil and military governor at its head. And lastly, to organize in these provinces both an army of the line and a levy *en masse*.—Four days afterwards the dissolution of the confederation of the Rhine was announced by a proclamation of Prince Kutusoff, one of the last acts of his glorious career; and the Duke of Mecklenburg Schwerin gave the first example of patriotic devotion, by publicly renouncing his connexion with that league, into which he had been one of the last and most unwilling to enter.[1] March 23.

[1] Mart. xii. 564; Schoell, Recueil, iv. 335. Hist. des Trait. x. 195, 196.

When acts of hostility so decisive were in progress on both sides, and injuries so deep had been inflicted on the one hand, and were preparing on the other, it is of little moment to recapitulate what were the ostensible grounds of complaint put forth by the respective cabinets. These, as usual in diplomatic manifestoes, did not contain the real grounds of hostility; inconsiderable causes of dissension were put forward to conceal more serious ones, too deeply felt to be mentioned. Prussia, on her part, independently of the innumerable vexations and injuries inflicted

Progress of the negotiations between Prussia and France.

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on her people since the peace of Tilsit, rested on three recent grounds of complaint:—the refusal by the French government to enter into any accounting for the immense furnishings in kind, amounting to 93,000,000 of francs, made by her provinces during the last campaign, or admit them as articles of charge against the arrears of contributions, or advance any part of the pay due by France for the Prussian contingent;—the refusal on their part, also, to recognise or sanction, in any form, the neutrality of Silesia, for which the King of Prussia had so anxiously contended, and which was established by the convention 24th February 1812;—and the arbitrary assumption of command taken over Bulow's corps, which, without the consent of the king, had been placed under the orders of Marshal Victor. In reply, the French government, without denying that the accounting for which the cabinet of Berlin contended was well-founded in principle, maintained that the accounts of furnishings, for which they claimed credit, were not accurate nor sufficiently vouched;—that the exemption from the passage of troops, which the convention of 24th February 1812, secured for a part of the Silesian province, could not be construed as importing an entire neutrality;—and that the Prussians had little cause to complain of Bulow's corps having been put under Victor's orders, when, during the alliance between the two countries, his corps had previously admitted a passage through its ranks to the Russian troops on their route to the Oder. On these mutual recriminations, it seems sufficient to observe that the Prussian complaints seem well-founded on the first head, and the French on the two last; for it is clear that the cabinet of Berlin had as good cause for insisting that the enormous requisi-

tions levied on their people should be taken into account in settling the arrears of pay and war contributions, as that of the Tuileries had for representing the passage of the Russians through Bulow's corps as an infringement of the alliance, and the much sought neutrality of Silesia as an unwarranted extension of the article in the former treaty, concerning the passage of troops through that province. But it is superfluous to enter into any lengthened detail on the subject, when the ostensible grounds of complaint on both sides were so widely different from, and immeasurably inferior to, the real causes of the war. Prussia struck for the deliverance of Germany—France for the preservation of her European dominion.[1] *

[1] See Prussian Manifesto, March 16, 1813, Fain, i. 243, 249, and Moniteur, 1813, No. 95.

The real motives and reasons of the war were summed up in a clear manner in the concluding paragraph of Prince Hardenberg's declaration of war:—"The King, in his political conduct since the peace of Tilsit, has had mainly in view to secure to his people a state of tranquillity, in order to give them the means of raising themselves from the abyss of misfortune into which they had been precipitated. With that view he has submitted, with the resignation which circumstances rendered imperative, to the arbitrary exactions, the enormous burdens, the vexations without end, to which he has been subjected. The circumstances in which Prussia has been placed since the conclusion of the last campaign, are known to all the world. Reduced to its own resources—abandoned by the power to which it was bound, and from which it could not obtain even common justice—with two-thirds of its provinces exhausted, and their inhabitants reduced to despair—it was compelled to take counsel for itself, and to find in its own people the means of salvation. It is in the fidelity and patriotism of its subjects, joined to generous sympathy of a great power which took compassion on its situation, that the King could alone find the means of extricating himself from his difficulties, and regaining the state of independence which can alone secure the future prosperity of the monarchy."

Real Motives of the war in Hardenberg's proclamation.

To this it was replied by M. Maret on the part of the French government:—"As long as the chances of war were favourable to us, your court remained faithful to its engagements; but scarcely had the premature rigours of winter brought back our armies to the Niemen, than the defection of General D'York excited the most serious suspicions. The equivocal conduct of your court in such a serious conjuncture, the

Answer of Maret on the part of France.

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Two additional conventions were signed at Kalisch, immediately after the declaration of war, for the further regulation of the vast interests of insurgent Germany, with which the Russian and Prussian monarchs were now charged. By the first, Count Kotzebue and Baron Stein were appointed members of the administrative council created by the convention of Breslau, on the part of Russia, and Schoen and Rediger on that of Prussia. These functionaries were directed to proceed forthwith to Dresden, and assume the administration of the whole countries lying on the right bank of the Elbe;[1] while, by the second, minute

Additional conventions at Kalisch, April 4 and 7.

[1] Schoell, x. 198, 199, Martin's Sup. v. 566, 568, and Schoell, x. 551.

departure of the King for Breslau, the treachery of General Bulow, who opened to the enemy a passage to the Lower Oder, the publication of ordinances, calling a turbulent and factious youth to arms, the assembly at Breslau of the well-known leaders of the disturbing sects, and the principal instigators of the war of 1806, left no doubt of the intentions of your cabinet; the note of the 27th March has given us no surprise. His majesty prefers an open enemy to an ally always ready to abandon him. What can Prussia now do? It has done nothing for Europe; it has done nothing for its ancient ally; it will do nothing for peace. A power whose treaties are considered as binding only so long as they are deemed serviceable, can never be either useful or respectable. *The finger of Providence is manifest in the events of last winter;* it has produced them, to distinguish the true from the false friends of his majesty, and to give him power to reward the one and punish the other. His majesty feels for your situation, M. Baron, as a soldier and a man of honour, on being obliged to sign such a declaration."—Vide HARDENBERG'S *Note, 16th March* 1813, *and* MARET'S *Reply, 1st April* 1813. FAIN, i. 243, 260, *and* 265.

It was stated in Krusemarck's final note of 27th March 1813, that "during the last campaign, while the state exhausted all its resources to provide in the public magazines the stipulated furnishings in kind, the French armies lived at free quarters on the inhabitants. The French authorities insisted upon *both* the literal performance of the treaty, and the daily support of the troops. They carried off by main force the sacred property of the inhabitants, without giving them either any account or indemnification; and in this way Prussia has lost 70,000 *horses and above* 20,000 *chariots.*" Baron Fain does not deny these exactions, but only alleges that they were unavoidable, and that they would have been carried to the credit of the arrears of contributions due by Prussia.—See FAIN, i. 260.

directions were laid down for the provisioning, billeting, and marches of the Russian armies, as long as they should remain in the Prussian territories. CHAP. LXIX. 1813.

The open adhesion of Prussia to the Russian alliance, and the advance of their united armies in all quarters to the shores of the Elbe, had immediately the effect of rendering the insurrection universal on its right bank; but Saxony was still undecided, and though the ferment was almost as vehement in its provinces as the Prussian states, yet no symptom of approbation of it had yet been given by the government, and it was well known that the vast benefits the King had received from the French Emperor, had bound him to his interests by very different bonds from those which retained the other states of the Rhenish confederacy in their allegiance. The reputation, however, which the King of Saxony had justly acquired for justice and probity, rendered it of great importance to obtain the moral weight of his adhesion to the Germanic league, and his states lay so immediately in the theatre of war between the contending armies, that it was of the last importance to secure without delay the support of his forces in the field, and the protection of the strong fortresses which he held on the Elbe. The allied sovereigns, accordingly, from the very first spared no efforts to induce him to join their league; but nothing could shake the firmness of Frederick Augustus, and he declared he would share the fortunes of his benefactor, whatever they might be. While history must remark with admiration the fidelity of this upright monarch to his engagements,[1] which seemed to increase with the disasters which had dissolved those of so many other states, it must yet lament the unhappy combination of circumstances which thus put his private honour

Ineffectual attempts to induce Saxony to join the league against France.

[1] Schoell, x. 199, Proclamation of King of Saxony, Feb. 23, 1813. Ibid. p. 200.

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at variance with his public duty, and rendered it impossible for him to adhere to his engagements without sacrificing the interests of his country.

Failure of all attempts to gain over Saxony.

The advance of the Russian troops towards Dresden in the end of February, rendered it no longer possible for the King to remain in that capital; and he accordingly abandoned it on the 24th February, after issuing a proclamation, in which he declared his resolution never to separate his cause from that of his tried benefactor and powerful ally.* On the

April 9.

9th April, the King of Prussia addressed a letter to the King of Saxony, in which he expressed "a hope that all the German princes will seize with eagerness an opportunity which certainly will not again present itself, of shaking off the chains of France, by which they are fettered, and which have so long plunged these once flourishing countries in misery

April 16.

and ruin." Frederick Augustus, however, returned for answer, that "he was guided solely by a regard for the good of his dominions, and respect for the engagements which he had contracted;" and thenceforward all negotiations between the parties ceased, and Saxony remained permanently attached to the fortunes of Napoleon.[1]

[1] Schoell, x. 201, 202.

Negotiations with Austria.

Important as these negotiations were, they yet yielded in magnitude and interest to those which at the same period took place between the cabinets of St Petersburg, Berlin, and Vienna, with a view to detach Austria from the French alliance; and which, in their ultimate effects, came to exercise a decisive influence upon the issue of the war.

* "Faithful to our alliance, we reckon with confidence on the success which, if our wishes for peace are not heard, will await us from the aid of our powerful ally, the active succour of the confederated princes, and the approved valour of our brave soldiers."—*Proclamation of* FREDERICK AUGUSTUS, *Feb.* 23, 1813. SCHOELL, x. 200.

It may readily be believed that the unparalleled disasters of the Moscow campaign produced as powerful a sensation at Vienna as elsewhere in Europe; and that the strong party there, who had always been hostile to the French alliance, deemed the time at last arrived when Austria might regain her lost provinces, and resume her wonted station on the theatre of Europe. The earliest letters of M. Otto, the French ambassador there, accordingly, after the Moscow catastrophe was known, contained the most vivid pictures of the vehemence of the public feeling, and of the loud declarations that the power of France was irrecoverably broken; that all Germany would speedily rise to assert its independence; and that Austria would deservedly perish, if, at such a crisis, she so far forgot what was due to herself, as the ancient head of the Germanic empire, and her obvious present interests, as to adhere to the withering alliance of the French Emperor. So powerful and general was this feeling, that it required all the firmness of M. de Metternich to withstand the torrent; and he was exposed to no small obloquy by attempting to moderate it.* But his line of policy from the very first was decidedly taken. Aware that Austria, placed midway between the two, had as much to fear from the colossus of Russia as that of France, his great object was to improve the present juncture in such a way as to make it turn as much as possible to the advantage of his own country, and give her the means of maintaining her independence in the midst

First measures of Austria after the Moscow retreat.

* "In their fury against France, the war faction has never ceased to attack in every possible manner the first partizan of the French alliance, Count Metternich. Not a day passes without some new device being fallen upon to discredit him; and it is currently reported by them, that he will be replaced by M. de Stadion."—COUNT OTTO *to* MARET, 28*th Dec.* 1812. FAIN, i. 292.

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of the terrible contest which was approaching, and was likely soon to shake to its foundation every European monarchy. With this view, while he protested, with perfect good faith, that Austria would not take part against the French empire; that she was sincerely devoted to its interests; would not open a negotiation with England without its privity; and would make use of the great influence which circumstances had given her to dictate a general and durable peace—he, at the same time, made no secret of his perfect acquaintance with the magnitude of the disasters the Grand Army had undergone; of the vast league, at the head of which Austria, if so disposed, might now place herself; and of the loud clamour which was now raised by fifty millions of men for her to assume that station.[1]*

[1] M. Otto to Maret, Dec. 28, 1812, and Jan. 8, 1813. Fain, i. 290, 295.

* "'If Austria,' said Metternich to me, 'were now to take another line, she would soon have 50,000,000 of men on her side—all Germany and Italy would join her.' It is evident that he wishes to make a merit of not joining against us at a moment when they suppose us less powerful than the Russians, and when the most flattering offers—Italy, the Illyrian provinces, and the supremacy in Germany—are made to induce them to join the Russian league. Nevertheless, he does not underrate our advantages; for yesterday morning he said to me—'Russia is too deeply implicated with England to be in a condition to treat alone. You may believe what I say—we have a thousand ways of arriving at the truth, which are not open to you. Cajoled, as they imagine, by all your enemies, we easily elicit from them their most secret thoughts. We will not open any direct communication with England without your authority; and we will do so in the manner you wish, assuming the air of a power which acts spontaneously. What have you to fear? We will compromise the English ministry in the eyes of the nation, and take upon ourselves the whole blame of failure. Despite your last reverses, your position is still highly brilliant; it is not the Emperor Napoleon who has the greatest need of peace. If he could bring himself to act on the defensive, he might with ease remain two years on the Vistula: never would the Russians cross that barrier. You will easily preserve the attitude which you had assumed before the war; but it is Germany, Prussia, Poland, and above all Austria, which will suffer from such a state of things. It is natural, therefore, that we should with

The intelligence which soon after arrived of the defection of D'York, and the ambiguous attitude of Prussia, augmented the embarrassment of the cabinet of Vienna. Not only were confidential communications made from the foreign office at Berlin and M. Hardenberg; but England came forward with the most generous offers, and even tendered a subsidy of ten millions sterling, to put the imperial armies on a war footing, if the cabinet of Vienna would accede to the European league—a temptation peculiarly difficult to be withstood by a power which, from the result of repeated disastrous wars, and constant diminutions of territory, found its finances in the most deplorable condition. The intelligence from Prussia, however, and the general ferment which it produced throughout Germany, awakened new alarms in the breast of the cautious and farseeing Austrian minister, lest the Russian influence should be unduly extended during the first transports of German deliverance, and the revolutionary spirit revived in Europe in the course of the last throe of the struggle for its extinction.* He deemed it most prudent, therefore, to make separate overtures to the cabinet of London, with a view to a gen-

Secret negotiation between Austria and England.

loud cries call out for peace.'"—OTTO *to* MARET, *Jan.* 3 *and* 8, 1813. FAIN, i. 291, 295.

* "D'York's defection," said Metternich to M. Otto, "affords an instance of what I have so often directed your attention to, the *græca fides* of the Russians, and the embarrassing situation in which, in consequence, the greater part of sovereigns are placed, in respect to their troops and their subjects. Metternich appears to me to labour under the apprehension, that the defection of the Prussian troops may become the signal of a revolution, in consequence of which the Russians will profit with their ordinary astuteness by the first impression which it may create in Poland and Germany."—COUNT OTTO *to* MARET, 11*th Jan.* 1813. FAIN, i. 296, 297.

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eral pacification; and although this was done with the knowledge and approbation of the French ambassador, yet his proposals were intended to lay the foundation of separate measures; while, in order to give them the appearance of coming secretly from the Austrian cabinet, he sent M. Wessenberg, the agent employed, by the circuitous route of Copenhagen and Gottenburg, as if by stealth to conceal his motions from the knowledge of the French authorities, though at the same time his whole movements and instructions were communicated by the French ambassador at Vienna to Napoleon. Wessenberg was the bearer of a letter to Lord Castlereagh, in which the mediation of Austria was proposed to put a period to the calamities which desolated Europe; a friendly intervention was all that was yet announced, although Austria was underhand arming, and preparing to throw her weight in the field into the scale against any power which might resist her demands. So completely, however, was the double intrigue thus carrying on by the imperial cabinet concealed from those not immediately in the secret, that Wessenberg was arrested by the French authorities at Hamburg, and only allowed to proceed on his destination after his papers had been examined; a slight which gave great umbrage to the court of Vienna, and threw a sensible chill over the friendly nature of the relations between the two cabinets.[1]

[1] Otto to Maret, Jan. 21, 1813. Thib. ix. 227, 228.

Meanwhile the Emperor of Russia sent a confidential agent, M. Stakelberg, to Vienna, in order to sound the imperial cabinet on the project of an European alliance against France: this proceeding was ostensibly quite secret, while Metternich, without making known their real tenor, ostensibly revealed

Austria begins to arm, to give weight to her mediation.

his whole confidential communications to M. Otto, who daily transmitted accounts of them to Paris.* The efforts of Metternich, however, in all this maze of diplomatic intrigue, of which alone he kept the thread, and in which he made all parties believe he was confidential with them alone, were uniform and consistent—to increase the weight of Austria in the estimation of all the powers, by representing her mediation as too important to be rejected, and her aid too powerful to be withheld. To improve the great advantages, however, which circumstances had thus put at his disposal, the Austrian minister added seventy thousand men from the landwehr, or militia, Jan. 24. to the regular army: still holding out to the French ambassador, that the object of the armament was to give such weight to the Austrian intervention, as to render Russia unable to withstand it.† In order

* After listening to Stakelberg's enumeration of the great advantages gained by Russia, and its disposition to come to the aid of other powers, especially Austria, and enable it to recover its lost provinces, Metternich said—"Listen, my dear Stakelberg; you are like a man who sees the light for the first time, after having been shut up six months in a dark room: the radiance of day dazzles you. Believe me, we see more clearly. The system of the Emperor is immovable: it is to think nothing of territorial aggrandizement, which would be too dearly purchased by the expense of a single campaign: he wishes only a general peace, and anxiously desires that you should concur in it."—Otto *to* Maret, 26*th Jan.* 1813. Fain, i. 301.

† "This first advance of Russia," said Metternich to Otto, "is a great point gained. Rely upon us: we will let nothing slip, absolutely nothing; for we are not less interested in doing so than you. Every thing depends on our attitude being imposing. The Emperor has ordered 100,000 men to be added to the regular army, including the auxiliary corps. If we had added only 30,000, we should have exceeded the contingent provided by the treaty, and given Russia ground to refuse our intervention. Hitherto the war has not been *Austrian*. If it should become so in the end, it is not with 30,000 men, but the whole forces of the Austrian monarchy, that we will attack the Russians. Meanwhile they will see us without disquietude augment our armies in Gallicia, and take good care not to provoke us."—Otto *to* Maret, 26*th Jan.* 1813. Fain, i. 303.

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still farther to lull the apprehensions of Napoleon, Metternich lost no opportunity of displaying to the courts of London and St Petersburg every *apparent* proof of the cordial union subsisting between his cabinet and that of the Tuileries; reiterated the most flattering assurances to the French ambassador of the cordial union, founded on mutual interest, which subsisted between the two powers; and announced his intention of sending Prince Schwartzenberg to Paris still further to improve it; while in secret he was lending a ready ear to the overtures of both Russia and Prussia, and maintaining a correspondence, veiled in profound mystery, with Hardenberg at Breslau.[1] *

Feb. 15.

[1] Hard. xii. 64, 65. Otto to Maret, Jan. 25, and Feb. 15, 1813. Fain, i. 303, 305.

Napoleon, more clear-sighted than his ambassador, was not altogether satisfied with his diplomatic relations at Vienna; and, in particular, entertained a not unnatural jealousy of the friendly mediation of a power which, at the moment it professed such cordial feelings of attachment, was adding seventy thousand men to its troops of the line. This feeling of uneasiness was not diminished by the declaration issued by Austria in the middle of February, which announced that her intervention was to be that of

Announcement by Austria of an armed mediation, and arrival of Narbonne at Vienna.

Feb. 17.

* "Your alliance with Russia," said Metternich to Otto, "was monstrous; it had no foundation, but a most precarious basis—that of the exclusion of the English commerce. It was an alliance resulting from war, and commanded by the conqueror; it could not possibly be of long duration. Ours, on the contrary, is founded on natural and permanent grounds of mutual interest: it ought to be as eternal as the mutual necessities from which it has arisen. It was ourselves who sought it, and we had reflected well before we did so. Could we retrace our steps, we would not deviate in one iota from what we have already done. We are going to send Prince Schwartzenberg to Paris, in the double view of explaining to the Emperor our real views, and to give to Europe a decisive proof of our friendship, by sending to his court the commander of the auxiliary corps in his service."—OTTO *to* MARET, *15th Feb.* 1813. FAIN, i. 305.

an "*armed* mediation;" and called upon the nation to submit to new burdens to enable the government to maintain that station, and "transport the war from its own frontiers." The ominous nature of this declaration was not materially removed by the reiterated assurances of Metternich to the French ambassador, that it was against Russia that all these preparations were directed, and that the most earnest desire of the cabinet of Vienna was to maintain unchanged its amicable relations with France. The Emperor began to entertain serious apprehensions that Austria was only dissembling to gain time to complete her preparations; that a good understanding between her and the northern courts was already laying the foundation of a more formidable coalition than France had yet encountered; and that M. Otto had been the dupe of the superior finesse and dissimulation of Metternich. In order to get to the bottom of the affair, he recalled Otto, and sent Count Narbonne to Vienna, to endeavour to penetrate the real intentions of the Austrian cabinet. The polished manners and diplomatic talents of the new ambassador, were well calculated to gain the confidence of the aristocratic circles at the imperial capital; but he himself had a presentiment that the case was hopeless before his arrival, and said, on setting out, "when the physician pronounces the case hopeless, they send for the quack."[1]

[1] Otto to Maret, 20th March 1813. Fain, i. 311. Thib. ix. 235, 236. Hard. xii. 75, 76.

Count Narbonne arrived at Vienna on the 17th March. Schwartzenberg, on the Austrian side, did not leave that capital till the 29th, and was only to present his credentials at the Tuileries on the 13th April, two days before Napoleon set out for the army. Though the new ambassador was received with the most studied attention by the Austrian

Austria more openly inclines to the coalition.

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court, yet circumstances ere long occurred, which demonstrated by deeds, more truthful than words, that there was a secret understanding between the cabinet of Vienna and the allied powers. Intelligence of the treaty of Kalisch between Russia and Prussia was received about the same time; and Metternich, finding that the league was every day becoming more formidable, began to be more independent and resolute in his language; while the magnitude and energy of his military preparations clearly evinced that, incline to what side she might, Austria was resolved to act no subordinate part in the strife. Those preparations, and the continued retreat of the Austrian army in Gallicia, were the result of the secret understanding between the cabinet of Vienna and that of St Petersburg, which led in the end of March to an accommodation between their respective forces, of which Napoleon justly complained as highly prejudicial to his interests. By this convention it was stipulated, that the Russian corps should push out light troops on both flanks of the retreating Austrians; that the Russian general should denounce the termination of the armistice to their commander, assigning as a pretext the impossibility of leaving on his own flanks and rear the flame of insurrection, excited by the Polish army under Prince Poniatowsky; that the Russian corps should then advance with a force at least equal to that of the Austrians, and General Frimont, commanding in the absence of Prince Schwartzenberg, should retire along the right bank of the Vistula: that as soon as this retreat was concluded, a new armistice should be agreed to, without any limit in point of time, to be terminated only on a notice of fifteen days, and during which the Austrians should

March 18.

March 29.

preserve the towns of Cracow, Sandomir, and the post of Opatowin, with a *tête-du-pont* in front of each of their respective bridges; and "that the present transaction between the two imperial courts shall *remain for ever secret, and shall not be communicated, by the one party or the other, but to the King of Prussia alone.*" Shortly after, a convention was concluded between the Austrian and Saxon commanders, which provided for the passage of the Saxon troops, about five thousand in number, which had fallen back to the Gallician frontiers with Schwartzenberg's corps through the imperial territories. The latter convention was immediately and officially laid by Schwartzenberg at Paris before the cabinet of St Cloud, while the former was religiously preserved a secret; but along with the document there was presented the ominous declaration— April 8.

"His Imperial Majesty regards the present moment as that which must decide the fate of Europe, by fixing that of the intermediate powers. Neither France nor Russia run any considerable risk: it is Austria and Prussia which are really endangered. The Emperor of Austria will remain faithful to his character: he will not limit his proceedings in favour of the cause which he feels himself bound to support, that of peace, to mere words; and if the exaggerated ideas which possibly may arise in some of the coalesced cabinets should prevail over the reason and moderation which he himself will never cease to profess, his Imperial Majesty will, without hesitation, cast an imposing force into the balance *of the power which he may regard,* without respect to the immense complications of the moment, as his most natural ally."[1] April 21.

[1] Schwartzenberg's Note to Maret, 22d April 1813. Fain, i. 465, and Convention, 29th March 1813. Ibid. i. 474, 482.

Notwithstanding all the pains which were taken

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to conceal the important convention of Kalisch from the knowledge of the French diplomatists, its effects were too important to permit it to remain long a secret; and, in particular, the continued retreat of the Austrian auxiliary corps under General Frimont, and continuation of the armistice between it and the Russians, appeared the more extraordinary to Napoleon, that it occurred at the very time when he himself was setting out for Mayence to renew hostilities of a decisive character on the banks of the Elbe. It was made, accordingly, the subject of immediate and bitter complaint by Count Narbonne to Metternich, accompanied by a demand that the Austrian auxiliary corps should forthwith resume hostilities, or at all events maintain the positions assigned to it by the convention of the 12th January.* It was no easy matter for the Austrian diplomatist to evade so obvious and reasonable a demand; the more especially as Napoleon had previously announced, that in the beginning of May he was to be on the Elbe at the head of three hundred thousand men, and had urged the cabinet of Vienna to second his operations, by debouching from Bohemia at the head of a hundred thousand, and at the same time denouncing the armistice, and resuming hostilities with at least fifty thousand on the side of the Vistula. Metternich therefore contented himself simply with replying, that "if, contrary to his most ardent hopes, the return of peace should not crown his efforts, Austria, from her mediatorial attitude, and the geo-

Remonstrances of Napoleon against the Austrians, and Metternich's reply

April 7.

April 9.

* "His majesty the Emperor," said Narbonne, "will experience extreme satisfaction, if the views of Austria in favour of a general peace should be accomplished; but he has never yet heard that such a wish could annul the explicit provisions of an existing treaty. That treaty expressly provided for an auxiliary corps, under the orders of the Emperor: if it does not obey his instructions, what conclusion is he entitled to draw?"—NARBONNE *to* METTERNICH, *21st April* 1813. FAIN, i. 468.

graphical situation of her empire, could no longer take part in the war in the quality of a merely auxiliary power; and that, in consequence, the stipulations regarding succour contained in the treaty of the 14th March 1812, *had ceased to be applicable to existing circumstances.* To denounce the armistice, and resume hostilities with the Russians, in these circumstances, would be neither expedient as a measure of war nor of peace. In the former view, it is not with an army of thirty thousand men that the Emperor should appear in the field: in the latter, it would be highly unbecoming in a mediating power to be the first to revive hostilities. The Emperor is thoroughly persuaded, as his majesty the Emperor of the French has frequently admitted, that the most effectual means of supporting the part of a mediator will be by the development of the most imposing forces, all directed towards one object—a general peace. But it must be such a development as will leave no doubt that the mediating power is prepared, if her efforts fail, to appear on the scene as a principal party, and to give to its words the necessary support."[1]

[1] Narbonne to Metternich, 21st April 1813, and Metternich to Narbonne, 22d April 1813. Fain, i. 465, 474.

While the cabinet of Vienna, veiling its preparations under the specious guise of a wish to support with effect the part of a mediator, which was with some plausibility represented as in a manner forced upon it, was thus gradually but perceptibly extricating itself from the restraints of the French alliance, and preparing to appear, at no distant period, with decisive effect on the theatre of Europe, negotiations of a more conclusive character had taken place with the court of Stockholm. Russia, in the first instance, had taken the lead in these communications; and even so far back as the close of 1812, made over-

Negotiations with Sweden and Denmark.

Dec. 29, 1812.

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1813. tures with a view to obtaining the more active accession of Sweden to the cause of the confederacy, on condition of her obtaining the cession of Norway, which, since the loss of Finland, had become almost indispensable to her existence as an independent nation. The success of this important negotiation was much facilitated by the arrogance with which, at the same period, Napoleon continued to treat Bernadotte in his diplomatic intercourse; an arrogance more suitable to the victor of Wagram than the

Jan. 7. fugitive from Russia. So keenly did the old French marshal feel this treatment, that not only did he publish a report by his minister Engestroom, setting forth the ruinous consequences to Sweden of the

March 23. alliance with France; but, in the end of March, he addressed a letter to Napoleon, offering his mediation for the conclusion of a general peace, and containing expressions indicating the indignation felt at the unworthy treatment of two hundred Swedish vessels and their crews, captured by France before war had begun between the two powers, the crews of which were still detained in prison, while their cargoes had been confiscated.*

[*] Hard. xii, 45, 46. Schoell, Recueil, i. 28.

The consent of Denmark to the sacrifice of Norway, was attempted to be gained by holding out the

* In that letter Bernadotte added, relative to the Moscow campaign: "From the moment that your majesty plunged into the interior of that empire, the issue could not be doubtful; the Emperor Alexander and King of Sweden foresaw, in the end of August, its immense results; all the military combinations announced that your majesty would be made prisoner. You have escaped that danger, sire: but where is your army? The *élite* of France, Italy, and Germany no longer exist. There lie without sepulture the remains of those brave men who saved France at Fleurus, who conquered in Italy, survived the burning climate of Egypt, and chained victory to the Imperial standards at Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland."—*See the Letter in* SCHOELL'S *Recueil*, i. 28.

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prospect of an indemnity on the side of Germany; and, on this condition, it was earnestly pressed on the cabinet of Copenhagen to join its forces to those of Russia and Prussia. It was difficult to see where this indemnity was to be found; for the Hanse Towns, which lay nearest to the Danish continental territories, would, on account of their commerce, be taken, it was foreseen, under the protection of Great Britain; Westphalia, carved out of the old provinces of Prussia, was already reclaimed by its sovereign; and Mecklenburg belonged to a prince united by the ties of blood to the imperial house of Russia. In these circumstances, the negotiation was not likely to lead to any satisfactory issue, though it was prosecuted at Copenhagen with much earnestness by the agents both of the cabinets of St Petersburg and St James's; and so far did it proceed, that at length Count Moltke and Count Bernstorff were sent to Kalisch, with ample powers to signify the accession of Denmark to the European alliance, provided the fleet taken at Copenhagen, with all the Danish colonies conquered by the English during the war, were restored; Hamburg and Lubeck made over to them; six hundred thousand pounds paid as an indemnity for their losses during the bombardment of Copenhagen; and all their European possessions, particularly Norway, guaranteed to the Danish crown.[1]

Views of Denmark at this period.

[1] Hard. xii. 97, 98.

These extravagant demands were not calculated to promote the conferences, the more especially as they had a tendency to throw a chill over the negotiations with Sweden, whose forces, under the able direction of Bernadotte, were much more likely to interpose with effect in the approaching conflict in the north of Germany. It was justly determined, therefore, by the British cabinet, that they were

Treaty of Orebro with Sweden, March 3, 1813.

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altogether inadmissible; and, without attempting the hopeless task of appeasing the resentment, or satisfying the demands of the Danish government, diplomatic relations were more closely drawn with the court of Stockholm. They terminated in a treaty, by which the accession of Sweden to the Grand Alliance was openly secured. By it Sweden engaged to employ an auxiliary corps of thirty thousand men, to be placed, with the forces of Russia, in the north of Germany, under the command of the Prince Royal of Sweden; while England promised to cede Guadaloupe to Sweden, and grant her a subsidy of a million a-year, payable monthly; and received in return a promise, that for twenty years the British merchants should enjoy the right of an *entrepôt* in the harbours of Gottenberg, Carlsham, and Stralsund. The cession of Norway to Sweden was not openly recognised in this treaty; but it was indirectly sanctioned by a clause, in which, on the narrative that the existing engagements between Russia and Sweden had been communicated to the British government, provided that England "not only should oppose no obstacle to the perpetual annexation of Norway to Sweden, but should facilitate in that respect the views of the King of Sweden, not only by good offices, but by employing, if necessary, a naval co-operation, in concert with the Swedish and Russian troops." It was provided, however, that "force should not be employed to effect the union of Norway and Sweden, unless the King of Denmark had previously declined to join the alliance, on terms consistent with the existing engagements between the courts of St Petersburg and Stockholm, and that in the proposed junction every possible regard should be paid to the happiness and liberty of the people of Norway."[1]

[1] See the Treaty in Martin's Sup. v. 231, and Fain, i. 283, and in Ann. Reg. 1813. State Papers, p. 489.

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After this overt act of hostility, or rather of pacific spoliation, had been determined on, it was not to be expected that Denmark was to preserve the semblance even of pacific relations with the allied powers; and accordingly, before long, the cabinet of Copenhagen was openly arrayed in the French interest. It endeavoured, however, still to preserve relations with the northen powers, and promised to furnish twenty-five thousand men to aid their armies, while at the same time it was secretly negotiating with the French the means of delivering to them Hamburg. But Russia could not promise them any adequate compensation for the loss of Norway; and although Sweden offered to relinquish all claims on that kingdom, provided she were secured in the bishopric of Drontheim, yet the Danish government refused to accept Pomerania in exchange, and the negotiation came to nothing. The Danish troops, in consequence, marched out of Altona, and ranged themselves under the orders of Marshal Davoust, and both parties prepared to solve their differences by the sword. Thus the system of disposing of the territories of others, so long practised by Napoleon, was openly adopted by his opponents; and Mr Ponsonby, it must be confessed, had too much reason for the caustic remark which he made on the subject in the British Parliament,—"Napoleon consented to the conquest of Finland, which did not belong to him; Russia indemnified Sweden for the loss of it by the cession of Norway, to which it had no sort of title; and England offered Denmark an equivalent in Lower Saxony, still in the occupation of France."[1] It must be observed, however, to the honour of England, that it alone, in this train of aggression, abstained from

Accession of Denmark to the side of Napoleon.

[1] Hard. xii. 97, 101. Schoell, x. 204, 207. Parl. Deb.

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the spoliation of allied or neutral powers, and sought for the indemnities which it offered in the dominions of its enemies.

Negotiations between the Allies and Murat.

An important negotiation, but which did not at the time lead to the same important results, took place between the allied powers and the King of Naples. Murat, whose desertion of his post at the head of the army on the Oder, in January, had sufficiently evinced his disposition, if he could find an opportunity, of making his peace with the Allies, lent a willing ear to the insinuations of the cabinet of Vienna—that now was the time, by declaring himself openly, to secure his throne on a solid foundation; but, desirous of saving that of Napoleon, he

April 3.

wrote early in April to the Emperor, urging him, in the name of humanity, and from a due regard to his own safety and glory, to put a period to a war, disastrous at once to France and Europe, and particularly ruinous to Naples, where the Carbonari, instigated by the English, were perpetually on the verge of revolt." Neither this letter, nor others which he wrote at the same period to Marie Louise, met with any answer; but Murat, still uncertain of the line which the cabinet of Vienna were to adopt, and desirous of seeing the issue of the approaching campaign before he took a decided part, deemed it prudent in the mean time to adhere to the French alliance, though the seeds of distrust were irrevocably sown between him and his imperial brother-in-law.[1]

[1] Hard. xii. 78, 83.

Energetic measures of Prussia in support of the war.

While Europe, shaken to its centre by the dreadful catastrophe of the Moscow campaign, was thus breaking up into new alliances, and separate interests were beginning to alienate from each other the members of the great war confederacy, which had sprung from the military triumphs of the French Revolution,

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Prussia, which, placed in the front of the battle, had both drawn the sword and thrown away the scabbard, was straining every nerve to augment her military force. Already a proclamation from Prince Kutusoff had announced the dissolution of the confederacy of the Rhine, and called upon all the members of it to join in the great league formed for the deliverance of Germany.* To increase the general fervour, Frederick William at the same time instituted a new order, called that of the *Iron Cross*, to reward his subjects for the sacrifices which they were called on to make in behalf of their country; and invited all classes to pour their gold and silver ornaments into the public treasury, where they would receive iron ones, fashioned in the same form, to preserve in their families—a monument at once of past wealth and succeeding patriotism: and shortly afterwards a proclamation was issued to the former subjects of Prussia, who had been wrested from her by the treaty of Tilsit, inviting them to take up arms for the independence of Germany; and that proclamation, secretly circulated by the members of the Tugendbund, was received with avidity, and read with transport. The Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia immediately appeared in public, decorated with the new order, which was placed on the breast of the former beside the medal of 1812. The scholars of the universities, the professors, the burghers, alike took up arms; the cares of interest,

March 19.

March 12.

April 6.

* "The motto of Alexander and Frederick is, 'Honour and our country.' Every German worthy of the name should unite with us, and second with his blood, and his whole worldly goods, the efforts making for the liberation of Germany. Every one who shall prove himself a traitor to the cause of the fatherland, deserves to be annihilated by the force of public opinion, and the power of the arms taken up in its holy cause."—PROCLAMATION, 19*th March* 1813. HARD. xii. 41, 42.

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the pursuits of science, the labours of education, were forgotten. Art was turned only to warlike preparation; genius to fanning the universal ardour; industry to forging the implements of destruction. Körner gave vent to the general enthusiasm in strains of immortal verse, which were repeated by thousands and tens of thousands as they joyously marched to the points of rendezvous; while the women universally sent their precious ornaments to the public treasury, and received in return similar bijoux, beautifully worked in bronze, which soon decorated their bosoms, bearing the simple inscription,—"I gave gold for iron, 1813." In a short time none but old men and boys were to be met in the streets; not an ornament, but those of iron, were to be seen either in dress or in the shops. Thence has arisen the famous order of the Iron Cross in Prussia, and the beautiful Berlin bronze ornaments, so well-known and highly prized in every country of Europe. It must be confessed that chivalry cannot boast of a nobler fountain of honour, nor fashion of a more touching memorial of virtue.[1] *

[1] Hard. xi. 42, 43. Pizarro's letter to Madrid, Nov. 12, 1813. Ibid. xii. App. A.

* "It is impossible," said an eye-witness, "not to be electrified on beholding the ardour with which the people give vent to the national enthusiasm, so long stifled under the yoke of an ignominious policy, or overawed by the terrors of the French legions. The King's sister has sent all her ornaments to the public treasury; and at this instant, all the women, sacrificing their most precious objects, are hastening to send theirs, down to the minutest articles, for the same patriotic purpose. When I say *all* the women, I in no degree exaggerate; for I do not believe you can find a single exception, save in the most indigent class,—who do not possess a single golden ornament. All the marriage ornaments have been laid on the altar of the country, and the government has given them in exchange others of iron, with the inscription,—'I gave gold for iron, 1813.' These ornaments, so precious from the moral interest of their origin, have already acquired a certain intrinsic value from the beauty of their workmanship, which exceeds that of any other people. These iron ornaments cannot as yet be purchased; they

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As long as the French troops maintained their footing on the left bank of the Elbe, the general fermentation there was limited to a sort of passive resistance, which nevertheless proved extremely embarrassing to the French authorities. The people did not openly take up arms, or resist their present sovereigns; but they did all in their power to avoid their exactions. The peasants fled to the woods to shun the conscription; and not a few upon whom the lot had fallen, secretly in the night, by devious ways, crossed the Elbe, and joined the patriot ranks of Germany. When the Allies, however, had passed that river, and the continued advance of the Russians inspired general confidence in the firmness and constancy of the Emperor Alexander, these feelings could no longer be suppressed. Insurrections ensued in many places, particularly Bremen, and various parts of Westphalia; and the light bodies of Russian horse who traversed the sandy plains of Northern Germany were swelled by crowds of volunteers, who followed their standards, and greatly augmented the Prussian ranks. At the same time, the officers of the states in the Rhenish confederacy, who had been made prisoners in the Moscow campaign, with the consent of the government of St Petersburg, formed themselves into a legion; declared traitor to his country every German who should bear arms against his brethren; and bound themselves by a solemn oath to combat Napoleon, even unto death. The Tugendbund was the soul of this vast conspiracy, the ramifi-

Fermentation on the left bank of the Elbe.

are obtained only in exchange for gold. The streets are filled with nothing but women, old men, and children; not an unwounded man, capable of bearing arms, is to be seen. A barren land of sand, covered with pines, exhibits the astonishing spectacle of 200,000 men in arms."—PIZARRO'S LETTER, 12th *November* 1813. HARD. xii. 565, 567

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fications of which were so extensive, its proceedings so secret, and its influence so great, that it would have been in the highest degree dangerous, if it had not been directed in its principal branches by exalted wisdom, and inspired in all by devoted patriotism. A Cromwell or a Napoleon would have found in its impassioned bands the ready elements of revolutionary elevation; but none such appeared in the fatherland; and the streams of popular enthusiasm, directed by, not directing, the rulers of the land, instead of being wasted in the selfishness of individual ambition, were turned in one overwhelming flood against the enemies of the state.[1] *

[1] Hard. xii. 52, 57. Schoell, x. 191, 195.

Formation of the Landwehr and Landsturm, in Prussia.

The wisdom and foresight of the Prussian government turned to the very best account this astonishing outburst of national enthusiasm. It was not suffered to evaporate, as in Spain, in detached efforts, or ill-directed expeditions; undisciplined courage was not, as there, brought up to be slaughtered by experienced prowess; ages of corruption had not paralyzed years of enthusiasm. Previous preparation, prophetic wisdom, had prepared the fit channels for the national fervour. In addition to the great augmentation made to the regular army by the decrees of the 9th and 12th February, already mentioned,† still more decisive measures were taken, as soon as the alliance with Russia was resolved on, to draw forth the whole military power of the state.

* Some statesmen, not without reason, apprehended serious ultimate danger from the ungovernable impulses of this popular enthusiasm; but Stein rightly foresaw that it would soon be absorbed, and turned into the right channel, amidst the tumult of war. He replied to their representation, "Die kanonen und die trompeten wird das schon zurichte blasen." "The cannon and the trumpets will soon blow that right."—MAURICE ARNDT *to* FREDERICK ARNDT, 24*th April* 1813. *Deutche Pandora.*

† Ante, ix. 117.

By a royal decree of the 14th and 19th March, the LANDWEHR and LANDSTURM were every where called out; the former being a sort of militia, which was for the time put on permanent duty, and soon became nearly equal to the regular soldiers; the latter, a levy *en masse* of the whole male population capable of bearing arms. The former speedily produced a hundred and twenty thousand men, who did good service, not only in recruiting the ranks of the regular army, but by relieving them of the duty of blockading fortresses, watching prisoners, and guarding convoys, which otherwise might have occasioned a serious diminution in the forces which they could bring into the field against the enemy. This body was, in a peculiar manner, serviceable to Prussia, in consequence of the number of her important fortresses which still remained in the hands of the French. By its means, with the aid of a comparatively small body of Russians, a hundred thousand Prussian landwehr kept seventy thousand French veterans blockaded and useless in the fortresses on the Vistula and the Oder. An animated proclamation by the King, on the 19th March, roused to the highest degree the military spirit of his people. "Victory," said Frederick William, "comes from God. Show yourselves worthy of His protection, by your discipline and the exemplary discharge of your duties. Let courage, patience, fidelity, and discipline ever distinguish you. Imitate the example of your ancestors; show yourselves worthy of them, and think of your posterity. Rewards are secured for those who distinguish themselves; shame and punishment await him who neglects his duty. Your king will never quit you; the princes of his house will be with him, and combat in the midst of your ranks: the whole

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nation will join in your efforts. We have for an ally a brave people, who have achieved their independence by their valour, and have now come to give it to you. They had confidence in their sovereign—in his just cause, in his power—and God gave them victory. Imitate them; for we also combat for liberty and our country. Trust in God—courage and patriotism are inscribed on our banners."[1]

[1] Schoell, Recueil, iv. 323. Hard. xii. 42, 44.

Positions of the French on the Elbe when the Russians crossed it.

Encouraged by so many concurrent circumstances, which facilitated their progress and promised them support, the Russian and Prussian generals soon deemed it safe to cross the Elbe. The positions which the French army occupied along the course of that river, from Dresden to Hamburg, were as follow:—Davoust, with the 11th corps, occupied Dessau, and the adjoining banks of the Elbe from thence to Torgau; Victor, with the 2d corps, lay between the Elbe and the Saale; Grenier, with his as yet untouched Italians, was a little in the rear at Halle; while Regnier, with the remains of the Saxons and Durutte's division, occupied the important post of Dresden, and stretched to the foot of the Bohemian mountains; the extreme left wing, under Vandamme, with its headquarters at Bremen, still occupied Hamburg and the mouth of the Elbe. The earliest reinforcements from France, under Lauriston, drawn from the first ban of the National Guards, twenty-four thousand strong, arrived at Magdeburg in the end of March, and raised the centre of the army, grouped around that fortress, to nearly fifty thousand combatants; while twenty thousand were in the neighbourhood of Dresden, and fifteen thousand on the Lower Elbe. In addition to these imposing forces, Ney and Marmont each commanded a corps of reserve, which was forming on the Rhine,[1]

March 29.

[1] Vict. et Conq. xxii. 16, 17. Jom. iv. 262, 263. Schoell, Hist. x. 208, 209.

and Bertrand's corps was in march from Italy by the route of the Tyrol, its leading columns having already reached Augsburg in the Bavarian plains.

Forces, important from their numerical amount, though far removed from the theatre of action, and confined in strongholds where they could contribute little to the issue of the conflict, still belonged to France, in the fortresses on the Vistula and the Oder. Their number in all was little short of seventy thousand: five-and-thirty thousand were shut up in Dantzic alone; and those in Thorn, Modlin, Zamosc, and Graudentz, on the Vistula; and in Spandau, Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau, on the Oder, were at least as numerous. But their condition was so miserable, and they were composed of such disjointed wrecks of the army which had gone through the Russian campaign, that not only were they wholly unfit for operations in the field, but they bore in themselves the seeds of contagion and mortality, more terrible than the sword of the enemy. The garrison of Dantzic, composed of the wreck of above a hundred regiments, of two-and-twenty different nations, was in such a state of moral and physical debility, that, notwithstanding its imposing numerical amount, it could not perform any military operation without its walls; and all the other garrisons were in a similar condition. Typhus fever, the well-known and invariable attendant on human suffering, soon began to make frightful ravages in the ranks; and such was the fatigue of the soldiers, that though they were destitute of beds, bandages, linen, and comforts of every kind, in their hospitals, yet it was indispensably necessary to leave them to repose. There they remained accordingly, blockaded by inferior bodies of the allied troops, ravaged by pestilence and fever, till

Disposition and number of the French troops in the fortresses on the Vistula and Oder.

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famine or dejection induced them to surrender; a woful monument at once of the misery which Napoleon's ambition occasioned among his subjects, and of the extraordinary magnitude of the calamities consequent on his headstrong military policy, which had thus severed from him so large a portion of his followers, when every sabre and bayonet was required on the banks of the Elbe.[1]

[1] Fain, i. 63. Hard. xii. 113, 114.

Dispositions and strength of the Prussian forces.

The positions and forces of the Allies at this period were as follow.—In Silesia, twenty-five thousand Prussian regular troops, comprising two thousand five hundred horse, were collected under the command of General, afterwards MARSHAL BLUCHER. This was in addition to the garrisons of the fortresses, and nearly twenty thousand men, whose organization was not yet completed. The corps of D'York, which was coming up from East Prussia, was fifteen thousand strong; but six thousand sick, the sad bequest of the Moscow campaign, encumbered its ranks, so that not more than nine thousand could be relied on for immediate operations. In addition to this, Bulow, near Berlin, was at the head of ten thousand, and five thousand lay in Pomerania: so that, without drawing any of the garrisons from the fortresses, Frederick William could bring fifty thousand combatants into the field. In addition to this, there were thirty-five thousand men in such a state of forwardness in the rear, as to be able to blockade the fortresses on the Oder, still in the hands of the enemy, or to act as a reserve to the armies in the field; and this body was constantly receiving accessions of force from the new levies, both of the line and the landwehr, which were in progress in every part of the kingdom;[1] so that, when hostilities commenced in the beginning of May, Prussia would bring an accession of at least

[1] Schoell, Recueil, ii. 290, 291; and Hist. x. 209. Jom. iv. 263.

eighty thousand well disciplined troops to the Russian standard, and this force, if the campaign lasted a few months longer, might be expected to be raised to a hundred and fifty thousand.

Forces and position of the Russians.

The Russian armies at this period, from the effect of the great levies and unbounded enthusiasm of 1812, were much more considerable; but the battles and hardships of its dreadful campaign had thinned the ranks of the veteran soldiers, and the new levies, how extensive soever, were in great part drawn from provinces so remote, that they could not be expected to make their appearance on the theatre of war till a very late period of the campaign. At the advanced posts in Germany, therefore, where the contest was to commence, their forces were by no means great; and, such as they were, scattered over an immense extent of country. Count Wittgenstein himself was at the head of thirty-six thousand men, between Berlin and Magdeburg, while thirty-three thousand more, under the command of Tettenborn, Chernicheff, Woronzoff, and Milaradowitch, were scattered in detached parties along the course of the Elbe, from the neighbourhood of Dresden to the environs of Magdeburg. Twenty thousand more, under Barclay de Tolly, were engaged in the blockade of Dantzic, Zamosc, and Thorn, on the Vistula; and a great reserve, seventy thousand strong, was forming in Poland, under the orders of Sacken; but they were still far distant, and could not possibly reach the banks of the Elbe before the end of July. Thus, seventy thousand Russians were the very utmost that could be relied on for immediate operations in Saxony; and if to them we add fifty thousand Prussians, the whole allied force might be one hundred and twenty thousand strong;[1] but as thirty thousand would be

[1] Précis de la Guerre, 1813. Schoell Rec. ii. 290, 291; and Hist. x. 210, 211. Jom. iv. 263.

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required to blockade the important fortresses of Magdeburg, Wittenburg, Torgau, and Koenigstein, on the Elbe, it was doubtful whether more than ninety thousand could be relied on for offensive operations on the Saxon plains.

Occupation of Hamburg by the Allies.

The first blow of importance in this memorable campaign was struck in the neighbourhood of Hamburg. The fermentation in that important mercantile emporium had been very great during the whole Russian retreat; and it was only by extraordinary rigour and vigilance that General Cara St Cyr, who commanded the French garrison, three thousand strong, had been able to maintain his authority amidst a hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants, all but insurgent, by whom he was surrounded. After Wittgenstein, however, had established himself in Berlin, Tettenborn, an active and indefatigable partizan, was detached towards the lower Elbe with three thousand foot and three thousand Cossacks; and at his approach, General Morand, who was stationed at Neustadt, retired towards Hamburg, which latter town was evacuated by the whole French forces on the day following. On the 18th, Tettenborn, at the head of the advanced guard of his indefatigable Cossacks, approached the town amidst the acclamations and astonishment of a countless multitude of spectators. About half a mile from the city, the Russian videttes were met by the greater part of the citizens in a body, who filled all the houses, gardens, fields, and lanes around. A tremendous hurrah accompanied their progress through this dense array, while the Cossacks sang their merry national airs. At the gate of the city the magistrates appeared with its keys, while thirty maidens, clothed in white, strewed wreaths of flowers before the victors.

March 11. 12th. 18th.

Shouts of unbounded acclamation now arose from the countless multitude: the enthusiasm was such, that the very heavens seemed to be rent asunder by the sound. "Long live the Russians! Long live Alexander! Long live Old England!" burst from tens of thousands of voices; the old steeples trembled with the acclamations; the roar of artillery, and the loud clang of bells, gave vent in louder notes to the universal transports; numbers wept for joy; friends and strangers alike embraced, and wished each other joy to have lived to see such a day.

> "Men met each other with erected look,
> The steps were higher that they took;
> Friends to congratulate their friends would haste,
> And long inveterate foes saluted as they past."

The worthy Hamburgers, in the first transports at their deliverance from the burdensome yoke which they had borne for seven years, were never weary of expressing their astonishment at the handful of men, not more than six hundred strong, by whom it had been effected; and it was not a little increased when they beheld these hardy children of the desert—Calmucks and Bashkirs—disdaining the civilized luxuries of houses and beds, pile their arms, and lie down beside their steeds in the squares of the city, with no pillow but their saddles, and no covering but their cloaks.[1]

[1] W. to R., 19th March 1813. Deutche Pandora, 72. Lond. German Camp., 4, 5. Year of Liberation, 65, Vict. et Conq. xxii. 17, 18.

To these transports of joy, however, there speedily succeeded the chill of disappointment, and the terrors of disaster, when the reinforcements which Tettenborn had so confidently announced did not make their appearance, and it was known that Morand lay at Bremen, at no great distance, with three thousand men, meditating vengeance against the revolted patriots. Extraordinary efforts, ever since the arrival

Insurrection in Bremen, and defeat of Morand at Lunenburg, April 2.

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of the Russians, had been made to raise a burgher force, and put the city in a posture of defence; but the preparations were still miserably incomplete: there were no guns on the ramparts, the volunteers could hardly yet handle their muskets, and the utmost anxiety prevailed lest the French, stimulated by the thirst for plunder, and the desire of intimidating the insurrection by a blow at so great a community, should return and take a signal vengeance on the unhappy Hamburgers.' From this calamity, they were saved by an incident so extraordinary that it wears the aspect of romance. An English detachment of two hundred men from Heligoland had re-

21st Mar. cently landed at the mouth of the Weser, and made themselves masters of the batteries of Bloxen and Bremerlehe at that point. Encouraged by this event, which was magnified by report into the landing of a powerful British force in the north of Germany, the people of Lunenburg, a small fortified town twenty miles from Hamburg, on the left bank of the Elbe, rose against the French authorities, and expelled their feeble garrison. Morand instantly set out at

April 1. the head of three thousand men, and six pieces of cannon, with which he quickly overcame the resistance of the yet unarmed Lunenburgers. The gates were forced, the principal inhabitants seized, and condemned to be shot next day at noon in the

April 2. principal square of the city. On the following morning they were drawn out for execution, in number twenty-seven, and already the unhappy men, amidst the tears of their fellow-citizens, and in presence of the French general, had put on the fatal bandage, when a sudden hurrah was heard, and a violent discharge of musketry at the gates announced that succour was at hand. Alarmed by the unlooked-

for onset, the whole French troops hastened from the place where the execution was to have taken place, to the ramparts, and the prisoners were left with their eyes bandaged, and their arms bound, in the middle of the square. With speechless anxiety they and their families listened to the increasing din and tumult at the gates: for a short time the quick rattle of musketry showed that a serious action was going forward: soon the receding throng, and numbers of wounded who were brought into the square, gave hope that the Allies were prevailing, and at length a loud shout on all sides announced that the town was carried, and deliverance was at hand. Instantly the brave Russians rushed into the centre of the square; the prisoners were delivered and restored to their weeping families; while two thousand French prisoners, in addition to a thousand killed and wounded, graced the first triumph of the arms of freedom in Germany. It was Chernicheff, Benkendorff, and Doernberg, who had united their Cossacks and light troops, and, by a forced march of fifty miles in twenty-four hours, had arrived just in time to effect this marvellous rescue. Morand, mortally wounded, was thrown down at the gates, and died next day. The prisoners whom he had ordered to be shot, passed him, as he was carried along weltering in his blood, in the first moment of their deliverance.[1]

[1] Vict. et Conq. xxii. 22, 23. Schoell, Hist. x. 210, 211, Year of Liberation, 68, 79.

Immense was the effect which this moving incident produced in the north of Germany. The romantic character of the adventure; the rapid punishment of the oppressors; the sudden destruction of so considerable a body of the enemy; all contributed to swell the general enthusiasm, and soon rendered the rising as general between the Elbe and the Weser, as between the latter stream and the Oder. Mon-

General insurrection between the Elbe and the Weser.

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April 3.

brun arrived, indeed, on the day following with the division Lagrange; and Chernicheff and his partizans being in no condition to oppose such considerable forces, withdrew from Lunenburg; but this reverse was not of long duration—Lagrange's division was soon after recalled to Magdeburg, and the whole country between the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser evacuated by the enemy. The insurrection immediately became general in all that district; the whole Hanse Towns took up arms and expelled the French authorities; while all those portions of the electorate of Hanover which were evacuated by the French, immediately proclaimed their beloved sovereign the King of England, and a regency was formed of Hanoverian noblemen, with their headquarters at Hamburg, to direct the efforts of the newly recovered territory. The universal cry was for arms, to the desire for which the unnecessary cruelties of the retreating French columns, especially in the neighbourhood of Bremen, powerfully contributed. This desire met with a responsive echo in the British heart: the English government made the most extraordinary efforts to forward muskets, ammunition, and all the muniments of war, to those points on the north of Germany where they were required; and so well was their zeal seconded by the efforts of the authorities at Woolwich and the manufacturers at Birmingham, that in the short space of two months after the intentions of Prussia were first known, there were landed on the coast of Germany, for the use of the Russian, Prussian, and Swedish governments, the entire military equipments of a hundred and fifty thousand men; while the Elbe, crowded with the pendants of all nations,[1] had

[1] Lond. p. 8, and App. No. 1. Ann. Reg. 1813, 119, Vict. et Conq. xxii. 22, 23.

already resumed its place as one of the principal commercial estuaries of Europe.*

1813.

While the Hanse Towns, and the maritime portions of Hanover, the favourite thirty-second military division of the French empire, were thus gliding away from the grasp of Napoleon—both parties, having to a certain degree concentrated their forces, were preparing to strike redoubtable blows on the plains of Saxony. In the end of March, Wittgenstein broke up from Berlin and moved towards the Elbe in two columns, one, under himself in person, directing its steps towards Wittenberg—the other, under Bulow, advancing towards Dessau; at the same time Borstel, with fifteen thousand Prussians, formed the blockade of Magdeburg; and Blucher and Winzingerode, with the army of Silesia, twenty-five thousand strong, and ten thousand Russians, advanced towards Dresden from the side of Breslau. The King of Saxony, in no condition to withstand forces so considerable, entered into a convention for the evacuation of his capital; and Davoust, who commanded the French garrison, after blowing up, to the great grief of the inhabitants, an arch of their beautiful bridge over the Elbe,† retired with his

Advance of the Allies to the Elbe.

March 29.

* The military stores landed from March 18th to May 13th, 1813, in Northern Germany, were as follows:—

Field-pieces complete, with carriages and caissons	218	Linen shirts	58,000
		Gaiters	87,190
Muskets and bayonets	124,119	Sets of accoutrements	90,000
Swords	34,443	Knapsacks complete	63,457
Suits of uniform complete, with great-coats, &c.	150,000	Caps and feathers	100,000
		Pairs of stockings	69,624
Boots and shoes	175,000	Pounds of biscuits	702,000
Blankets	114,000	Do. of beef and pork	691,000

—See *Official Statement in* PRINCE HARDENBERG'S *Report, 29th Sept.* 1813, *in* LONDONDERRY'S *War in Germany*. Appendix, No. I. p. 366.

† A proclamation of the French marshal had announced, that at the signal of three guns being fired, all the inhabitants should keep their

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forces in the direction of Leipsic. On the day following, the Allies entered with drums beating and colours flying, amidst the enthusiastic acclamations of an immense crowd of spectators; for though the court of Dresden remained faithful to its engagements with Napoleon, the Saxon people, who had suffered immensely from the long-continued presence and passage of the French troops, were almost unanimously ranged on the opposite side, and their hearts beat as high as any in Germany for the deliverance of the fatherland.*[1]

March 26.

[1] Vict. et Conq. xxii. 23. Odeleben, ii. 80, 81. Témoin Oculaire, 80. Fain, i. 121.

Wittgenstein's approach to the Elbe.

Wittgenstein's approach to the Elbe was preceded by numerous proclamations, in which he called on the Saxons to join the great effort now making for the freedom of Germany. The tone of these popular addresses is well worthy of attention; they show how completely the principles of the contest had changed sides; how thoroughly military despotism had engrafted itself on democratic ambition, and that the French Revolution was henceforward to be com-

houses; some, nevertheless, attracted by curiosity, repaired to the banks to witness the work of destruction. On the train being fired, a serpentine light wound round the undermined buttress, and immediately after the whole was enveloped in smoke: a dazzling light next rose out of the cloud, followed by a burst of fire, which ascended to the heavens; the arches adjacent were soon seen to gape, rise a little, and instantly fall into the waves beneath, with a crash louder than the loudest thunder. This beautiful bridge, so well known to travellers, was begun in 1344; but it was brought to perfection in 1737 by Augustus II. It is 550 feet long, resting on seventeen buttresses and sixteen arches, with an iron balustrade and broad foot-pavement.—See *Témoin Oculaire des Evènemens à Dresde en* 1813, p. 80, 81. ODELEBEN, ii. 80, 81.

* On the 26th April, a Saxon battalion, which had surrendered in Thuringia, and to which at Altenburg its arms and artillery had been restored, defiled with drums beating and colours flying before the hotel of the King of Prussia, and was reviewed by the two allied monarchs." —*Recit de ce qui s'est passé à Dresde en* 1813, *par un Témoin Oculaire*, 112.

bated, in a great measure, with its own weapons.* They produced an extraordinary impression in the Saxon provinces. In proportion as the French troops evacuated the villages, they instantly rose and joined the invaders; every where the Tugendbund had in secret paved the way for their reception: and almost before the banners of Napoleon were out of sight, the landwehr and the landsturm were organized, and a fearful patriotic warfare was springing out of the sufferings and indignation of the people. If the French columns remeasured their steps, or the chances of war again threw the insurgent villages into the hands of the enemy, the inhabitants fled at their approach; the flour and grain were destroyed; barrels of every sort of liquor pierced and run out; the mills and boats burned and scuttled; and the proclamations of the allied sovereigns met with as ready obedience in the territories of the princes of the Rhenish confederacy as in their own dominions.[1]

[1] Fain, i. 107, 108. Schoell, Recueil, i. 352, 357.

Previous to finally withdrawing across the Elbe, Eugene, in order to oblige the enemy to concentrate

* "Germans," said he, "we open to you the Prussian ranks; you will there find the son of the labourer placed beside the son of the prince; all distinction of rank is effaced in these great ideas—the king, liberty, honour, country! Amongst us there is no distinction but that of talent, and of the ardour with which we fly to combat for the common cause. Liberty or death! These are the rallying words of the soldiers of Frederick William. Saxons! Germans! From the great era of 1812, our genealogical trees will count for nothing; the exploits of our ancestors are effaced by the degradation of their descendants. The regeneration of Germany can alone produce new noble families, and restore their lustre to those which before were illustrious. He who is not for liberty is against it; choose between our fraternal embrace and the point of our victorious swords. Rise, Saxons! Free your king from his fetters; exterminate the stranger from the land; and may you soon have a free king, and may he reign over a free people!"—WITTGENSTEIN *to the* SAXONS, *23d and 30th March* 1813. SCHOELL, *Recueil*, i. 352 and 357.

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his forces, that he might thus obtain an accurate idea of their amount, took post at Mockern, a little in front of Magdeburg, and there stood firm. Wittgenstein accordingly collected his troops, and, on the 4th April, attacked the French with great vigour between Mockern and Leitzkau. It was rather an affair of advanced posts than a regular battle; for no sooner were the French tirailleurs, who as usual behaved with the greatest gallantry, driven in, than the main body of their army began to retire. In this movement, however, they felt severely the superiority of the allied horse; two French regiments of lancers, who strove to protect the retreat, were thrown into confusion, and for the most part made prisoners; and it was only by the fortunate occurrence of nightfall that a total rout was prevented, and the troops succeeded in making good their way to Magdeburg. Next day Wittgenstein continued the pursuit, and leaving Bulow's corps to blockade that fortress, and Kleist with his Prussians before Wittenburg, took post himself at Dessau. Meanwhile Winzingerode, having merely passed through Dresden, pushed on to Halle, which he occupied in strength; upon which Eugene, to preserve his communications with Frankfort and the great road to the Rhine, concentrated his troops on the Upper Saale, leaving only a portion of his army at Magdeburg. The conduct of General Thielman, who commanded the Saxon garrison of Torgau, was at this period the subject of great anxiety. Distracted between duty to his sovereign and to his country, he did not openly join the Allies, but refused to admit Regnier with a French garrison, sent to replace him, and waited behind his formidable ramparts for the instruction of ulterior events. But,

Combat of Mockern, and retreat of Eugene across the Elbe.

April 4.

April 5.

April 7.

though the line of the Elbe was broken through at its two extremities, at Dresden and Hamburg, and doubt existed as to the fidelity of the Saxon garrisons, Eugene boldly maintained his ground in the centre, and, resting on the strong fortress of Magdeburg, still made good his post, undismayed alike by external calamity and internal defection.[1]

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[1] Fain, i. 120, 123, Schoell, Hist. x. 211. Vict. et Conq. xxii 24, 26.

What mainly contributed to support the spirits of the French soldiers amidst the multiplied disasters with which they were oppressed, was the prospect of being speedily joined by the Emperor, and the powerful reinforcements which he was bringing up from the Rhine. In effect, Napoleon, who in his address to the legislative body on the 23d March, had announced his speedy departure for the army, had recently completed all the arrangements requisite before setting out for the theatre of war. Letters patent were addressed to the Empress, conferring on her the office and dignity of Regent, with the seat of president of the council of state, and the power of pardon consequent on that exalted station; but without the right of sanctioning any decree of the senate, or proclaiming any law. On the same day, she was invested with the elevated office with great pomp, and received the homage of the principal dignitaries of the empire. It was Napoleon's intention to have set out immediately after this imposing ceremony; but the importance of the negotiation with Austria, and the incomplete state of the preparations on the Rhine and the Elbe, retarded his departure for a fortnight longer. At length, on the 15th April he bade adieu to the Empress and King of Rome, and set out for the Rhine, having previously thus explained his views of the approaching campaign to the Austrian ambassador, Prince Schwartzenberg,—

Napoleon's measures before setting out for the Army.

March 30.

April 15.

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"I set out, and I will send orders to your lieutenant-general Frimont, at the same time, to denounce the armistice. I will be in person, on the first days of May, with three hundred thousand men, on the right bank of the Elbe. Austria may increase her forces at Cracow at the same time to a hundred and fifty thousand, and assemble thirty or forty thousand in Bohemia, and the day that I arrive at Dresden we will debouch all at once on the Russians. It is thus we shall succeed in pacifying Europe." [1]

[1] Fain, i. 125, 127, and 315. Pièces Just. Thib. ix. 245.

Napoleon arrived at Mayence at midnight on the 16th, and remained there eight days. They were any thing, however, but days of rest to the indefatigable monarch; every thing immediately assumed a new aspect, and his ardent mind communicated its energy to all the subordinate authorities by whom he was surrounded. The fortifications of the fortress were repaired with extraordinary vigour during the whole of April, and crowds of labourers from the whole neighbourhood collected for that purpose: those from the left bank of the Rhine received pay; those from the right, or German side, nothing. Great, however, as were the efforts made to put this frontier fortress in a respectable posture of defence, they were as nothing compared to the exertions at the same time going on to collect and forward troops to reinforce the army. The accounts from Thuringia and the banks of the Saale were daily becoming more alarming: the Elbe had been crossed at many points; the enemy's light troops were advancing in all directions; Leipsic and Nuremburg were in their hands; Erfurth itself was menaced; terror, the forerunner of disaster, had already brought in imagination the Russians down to the Rhine. Nor was the political horizon less gloomy. Austria had as-

Arrival of Napoleon at Mayence, and great preparations there.

sumed a position more than doubtful. Even the offer which Napoleon had made to the cabinet of Vienna, to restore Silesia to the imperial crown, had been refused, on the ground that they could consent to no aggrandizement at the expense of Prussia; while the King of Saxony, distracted between a conscientious regard to his engagements, and the daily increasing enthusiasm of his subjects and troops to the allied cause, had recently repaired to Prague, where there was every reason to apprehend that his policy would be determined by that of the cabinet of Vienna.[1]

[1] Odel. i. 27. Thib. ix. 254. Schoell, x. 212.

In these critical circumstances, when every day and hour was not only of importance to withstand the allied forces actually in the field, but to prevent the accession of new and still more formidable powers to their league, the energy of Napoleon seemed to rise with the difficulties against which he had to contend, and to acquire an almost supernatural degree of vigour. In every direction officers were dispatched to hasten the march, and collect the still unformed bodies of the conscripts, who, before they were well able to handle their muskets, were hurried off to the Rhine; while the Emperor, seated on the bridge of Mayence, seemed to count the numbers of even the smallest bodies of men who were passed over, and endeavoured to inspire the young novices in arms with a portion of his own ardent and unconquerable spirit. But this searching inspection demonstrated how much was yet to be done to restore the efficiency of the French military establishment, and told but too clearly that the Grand Army had irrevocably sunk amidst the disasters of Russia. Notwithstanding the most strenuous efforts to augment that important branch of the service, the number of cavalry which crossed by the bridge of Mayence had not

Napoleon's efforts to augment his forces there.

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yet exceeded four thousand; and when it was recollected how completely the ranks of horse had been swept away during the Moscow campaign, and how powerful the Allies were in that arm, this circumstance afforded a melancholy presage as to the issue of the contest which was impending. Nor was the condition of the greater part of the infantry and artillery more encouraging. Though strong in numbers, and animated with courage, they were weak in all the other qualities which constitute the strength of an army. The youths who had been torn from their homes to recruit the armies, hurried forward to the frontier by forced marches which surpassed their strength, and emaciated by the scanty and unwholesome food which they had received on the way, presented in great part the most miserable aspect; and before they ever saw the enemy, their ranks exhibited nearly as woful an appearance as those of the veterans who had survived the horrors of the Moscow campaign. The "uniformity of ills," so well known in armies, and of such sinister presage when not surmounted by extraordinary mental vigour, or a sudden tide of success, was already visible; and though the patriotic ardour of the young conscripts carried them in a surprising manner through their difficulties, and they evinced extraordinary enthusiasm when passing the Emperor, yet it was but too evident that they were unequal to the fatigues of the approaching campaign; and that, though they might possibly prove victorious in regular battles, they would melt away under the effects of dripping bivouacs, or the horrors of military hospitals.[1]

[1] Olel. i. 17, 19. Témoin Oculaire, 300, 301. Schoell, Recueil, ii. 300.

The condition of the cavalry and artillery, with the exception of that of the guard, was still more

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deplorable. The unfortunate quadrupeds which were harnessed to the guns, or placed beneath the unskilled riders who had been pressed into the ranks, felt none of the enthusiasm which supported the human conscripts; and the accumulated evils of forced marches, bad provender, and cold beds on the ground, fell upon them with unmitigated severity. So strongly had the evils of a long line of detached carriages been felt in Russia, that they now went into the other extreme. Strict orders had been given to keep the guns, vehicles, and columns close to each other: wherever the ground permitted it, they spread the columns over the fields adjoining the road; and the cavalry, infantry, artillery, staff, and waggon train, all marched pell-mell, and often in the most frightful confusion, while the constant cry repeated by the officers, "close up, close up," occasioned a perpetual shake and agitation in the ranks. Such enormous assemblages of men in so narrow a compass, soon consumed the whole provisions which could be extracted from the inhabitants on the road-side: pillage in consequence became unavoidable in the adjoining districts with the succeeding columns; and the army, thus speedily collected together without adequate previous preparations, suffered nearly as much before arriving on the Elbe, as they had done in the preceding campaign from the march through Lithuania.[1]

Bad condition of his cavalry and artillery.

[1] Odel. i. 18, 24. Fain, i. 323, 324.

Napoleon left Mayence on the 24th, and arrived at Erfurth the succeeding day. The army, which by extraordinary efforts he had there collected, though without any adequate cavalry or artillery, was extremely formidable in point of numerical amount. His whole forces were divided into fourteen corps, besides the imperial guard and re-

Forces of Napoleon at this period.

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serve cavalry; and their total amount was little less than four hundred thousand men.* This was the force, however, upon which the Emperor had to rely for the whole campaign, and in every part of Germany. A considerable portion of it, though all collected in the depots in the interior, had not yet reached the theatre of action; and three corps were swallowed up in the garrisons of Dantzic, and on the Oder, and on the Lower Weser or Elbe. The corps, however, which were under his immediate command, or so near as to be available even at the outset of the campaign—viz. those of Ney at Weimar, of Marmont at Gotha, of Bertrand at Saalefield, and of Oudinot at Coburg, with the guards and reserve cavalry—amounted to a hundred and forty thousand effective men, independent of forty thousand under Prince Eugene, which were still in the neighbourhood of Magdeburg. The strength of this immense host, however, consisted in its infantry; it had as yet only three hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, though that number was doubled before the close of the campaign, and could only muster six thousand horse—a poor set-off to nearly thirty thousand superb cavalry, which glittered in the ranks of the enemy.[1]

[1] Jom. iv. 270, 272. Fain, i. 323, 325. Vict et Conq. xxii. 33, 34.

Inferiority of the Allies at the opening of the campaign.

Although the forces which the Allies brought into the field in the latter part of the contest, when Austria had joined the alliance, were much more considerable, and, even in its opening stages, more powerful in cavalry and veteran troops, yet at this period they were decidedly inferior in numbers to their opponents. So distant were the resources of the Russian, so incomplete as yet the preparation of

* See App. A, chap. lxix.

the Prussian monarchy, that, at the opening of the campaign, they could only collect a hundred and ten thousand regular troops, of which forty thousand were absorbed in blockading the fortresses on the Elbe and the Oder; leaving not quite seventy thousand to meet the shock of battle in the plains of Leipsic.* In these circumstances, it appeared to many a hazardous and imprudent step to cross the Elbe, of which the whole fortresses were still in the hands of the enemy, and venture into the Saxon plains in presence of Napoleon, who had the command of a force twofold more numerous; and there were not wanting those who called to mind the fatal effects of a similar advance over the same ground, previous to the battle of Jena, seven years before. But, on the other hand, the circumstances of the two armies at these two periods were essentially different. Napoleon was then at the head of a veteran and victorious—he now led on a newly raised, or beaten army; the Prussians, then advancing singly to the shock, were now supported by the experience, and animated by the presence of the Russian conquerors. Seven years of oppressive rule had united every heart, and upraised every hand, in the north of Germany; the superiority of the Allies in cavalry removed every reasonable ground for apprehending total defeat; and even though the forward movement might be attended with some peril, it was worth incurring, in the hope of determining the hesitation of the court of Dresden, and stimulating the favourable tendencies of the cabinet of Vienna. Influenced by these considerations, the advance of the Allies continued. Leaving the Viceroy, whose

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*See App. B, chap. lxix.

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troops were concentrated between Magdeburg and the Saale, to the right, Wittgenstein crossed the Elbe in force at Dessau, and concentrating his troops with those which had passed at Dresden, advanced to Leipsic, while his right wing occupied Halle and the adjoining villages; and Alexander and Frederick William, leaving the headquarters, where such important diplomatic arrangements had been concluded, at Kalisch, moved on to Dresden, and established themselves there on the 8th of April.[1]

[1] Jom. iv. 273, 274. Fain, i. 324, 325. Schoell, Recueil, ii. 290, 291.

Aspect of the Russian and Prussian troops which entered Dresden.

If the confused and motley array of worn-out veterans and youthful conscripts, which crowded the road from Mayence to Erfurth, was descriptive of the last efforts though still unbroken spirit of the French empire; the hardy warriors, savage horsemen, and enthusiastic volunteers who composed the Russian and Prussian ranks, were still more characteristic of the varied nations, from the deserts of Asia to the centre of civilized Europe, who were now roused to resist them. Unbounded was the astonishment of the citizens of Dresden when the Cossacks and Calmucks, the forerunners of Winzingerode's corps, first appeared amongst them. The uncombed beards and shaggy dress of many of these nomad warriors; their long lances and hardy steeds; and, above all, the piles of plunder which they bore between their saddles and horses' backs, at first excited no small degree of terror in the minds of the citizens, which was increased rather than diminished when they beheld these Asiatic warriors, singing oriental airs, pile their arms in the streets, strew a little straw on the pavements, and lie down to rest beside their steeds, picketed to the walls, which had accompanied them from the Volga and the Don. By degrees, however, these apprehensions wore off:

the uncouth warriors were found to be kindly and sober; a copious supply of brandy, bread, herrings, and onions, always put them in good-humour; and soon they were to be seen carrying the children in their arms for hours together, and teaching them to speak and sing in Russian. Shortly after, these rude hosts were followed by the more regular columns of the Russian army: infantry, cavalry, and artillery succeeded each other without intermission, in the finest possible state of discipline and equipment; and when the Emperor Alexander and King of Prussia, at the head of their respective divisions of guards, defiled over the bridge and entered the city, all the spectators were lost in astonishment at the aspect of the troops, which, after undergoing the fatigues of so dreadful a campaign, appeared in all the pomp and majesty of unsullied war. Garlands of flowers were every where strewed on their approach; the windows were filled with rank and beauty, and the monarchs entered the town between a double rank of damsels clothed in white, bearing baskets loaded with all the beauty of spring.[1]

April 24.

[1] Témoin Oculaire, 85, 86, 109. Odel. ii. 85, 110.

Appearance of the Prussian troops.

But if the long columns of the Russian army, and the varied appearance of their troops were descriptive of the vast extent of their empire, and the prodigious force of that enthusiasm which had brought the military force of such distant regions into the heart of Europe, still more interesting, in a moral point of view, was the aspect which the patriot bands of Prussia wore. The chasseurs of the guard, in particular, excited general attention, and conveyed a lively idea, both of the sacrifices which her people had made to deliver their country, and of the heroic spirit with which they were animated. A thousand young men, almost all of the best families, marched

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in the ranks with ardour to battle, where more than two-thirds of their number found an honoured grave. The bands of volunteers, clothed in black, were much more numerous. Many different provinces had contributed to form them; and a large proportion were composed of the young men at the universities, who now took the field under the direction of the same men, as officers, to whom they had formerly listened with reverence in the professors' chairs. Many distinguished members of the universities, in particular Jahn and Staffens, appeared with a warlike air, and surrounded by a numerous band of followers. These distinguished bands, however, though overflowing with courage, and burning to signalize themselves, scarcely appeared broke in to a discipline sufficiently strict for the arduous duties upon which they were about to enter; and many of them were still of such tender years as to be obviously unequal to the fatigues of a campaign. Numbers of these gallant youths, too young to be admitted into the ranks, and hardly able to carry a musket, followed the regiments, supplicating to be allowed to join their elder comrades. One boy of ten years was to be seen, entreating the officers of different regiments, with tears in his eyes, to receive him in the ranks of volunteers, if not as a private, at least as a drummer; while another, only nine, was reclaimed by his parents at Breslau, by advertisement in the public newspapers.[1]

[1] Tém. Oeul. 94. Odel. ii. 93, 94.

Noble spirit by which they were animated.

These noble bands took the field, under the sanction, and impressed with the liveliest feelings, of religious duty; it was from that holy spring that the spirit destined to combat, and ultimately conquer, the worldly passions of the French Revolution, took its rise. "We marched," says one of the volunteers,

the poet Körner, "in parade from Zoblen to Rogau, a Lutheran village, where the church, with great simplicity, but also with great taste, had been decorated for the convention of the volunteers. After singing a hymn of my composition, the clergyman of the parish delivered an address, full of manly vigour and public enthusiasm. Not a dry eye was to be seen in the whole assembly. After the service he pronounced the oath before us, for the cause of humanity, of fatherland, of religion, to spare neither substance nor soul—to conquer or die for the right. We swore! He then fell on his knees, and besought God for a blessing on His champions. It was a moment when the present thought of death kindled flame in every eye, and beat heroism in every heart. The oath, solemnly repeated by all, and sworn on the swords of the officers, and Luther's hymn, 'Eine feste burg ist unser Gott,' (It is a stronghold that is under God,) concluded the ceremony—upon which a thundering *vivat* burst from the congregation of champions for German freedom, while every blade leaped from its scabbard, and gleams of warlike light shone through the sanctuary. The hour was so much the more impressive, that most of us went out with the conviction that it was the last time we should ever meet."[1] With such holy rites did the champions of German freedom prepare themselves for the fight. The moral world was shaken to its foundation: again, as in the days of Michael, Duty based on religion, was arrayed against Talent destitute of God.

[1] Körner to Caroline Von Pickler, March 30, 1813. Deutche Pandora, 128.

The Emperor and King lived at Dresden with the utmost simplicity, and won the hearts of all classes by the affability of their demeanour, and the

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readiness with which they were at all times accessible to the complaints, not only of their own troops but of the Saxon people. Both appeared in public without guards, or ostentation of any sort. Alexander, in particular, frequently walked out attended only by an aide-de-camp, and seemed to take a pleasure in the crowds who thronged round him, in so much that no small difficulty was sometimes experienced in making his way through.* But it was chiefly in the respect paid by themselves and their followers to the rites of religion, that the difference appeared between the allied sovereigns and the French authorities by which they had been preceded. The day after their entry was Easter Sunday; and it was celebrated from daybreak by the soldiers of both armies with extraordinary solemnity. The whole troops appeared in their very best and neatest attire. Every where the Cossacks were to be seen buying stained eggs to present to their comrades; wherever the Russians met, from the highest to the lowest rank, they gave the salute, "Christ is risen," to which the reply was, "Yes, he is risen indeed."† The Emperor was the first to set this devout example; and having, after the preceding midnight, assisted at the solemn service of Easter in a little Greek chapel established in one of the apartments

Habits of the Emperor and King at Dresden, and religious spirit by which they were animated

He inhabited the beautiful Bruhl palace in the suburbs of the city, the shady walks of the garden of which had been for long the favourite resort of the children of the better classes. Strict orders had been given in the first instance to close the gates against these noisy intruders; but no sooner was the Emperor informed of the privation to which they had been exposed, than he gave directions to have them admitted as usual, and often walked out to divert himself with the sportive happiness of his little allies. The King of Prussia did the same at the royal palace of Racknitz, which formed his residence.—*Témoin Oculaire*, 213. ODELL. 113.

† "Christos woskres.—Istinnoe woskres."

of the Bruhl palace, he immediately addressed that expression to every one of his officers present. Divine service was performed by the chaplains, or "popes", as they are called, of all the different Russian regiments quartered in Saxony; and this was succeeded by a splendid review, in which a noble body of seven thousand cavalry, headed by the Archduke Constantine, who had just arrived from Pilnitz, paraded before the sovereigns at Dresden. Superficial readers may consider these incidents as trifles, but they are straws which show how the wind sets; and the reflecting observer will not deem it the least interesting incident in this memorable year, that the sovereigns and armies which at length delivered Europe, were bound together by the common ties which unite man to his Creator; and that, after all human powers had failed in combating the forces of the Revolution, victory was at length brought back to the arms of freedom, when they went forth to the fight with the ancient war-cry of the warriors of the Cross on their banners, "In this sign you shall conquer."[1]

Odel. ii. 111, 112. Tém. Oecul. iii.

During his stay at Erfurth, Napoleon put the last hand to the organization of his army; gave directions for strengthening the two citadels of the town, and putting them in a posture of defence; and established hospitals for six thousand men. Meanwhile Eugene, firm in his position between the confluence of the Saale and Elbe, and Magdeburg, quietly awaited the approach of the Emperor, who left Erfurth early on the morning of the 28th, mounted on horseback, and commenced the campaign. The conscripts, as the long and brilliant cortège of the Emperor passed through their ranks, gazed with delight on the hero who had filled the world with his renown; and the cheers with which he was

Confusion and disorders on the French line of march.

April 28.

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saluted were almost as loud and general as in the most brilliant period of his career. But these cheering signs died away when Napoleon had passed; and the first day's march was sufficient to convince every observer that the ancient discipline and order of the army were at an end, and that the admirable precision of the soldiers of Ulm and Austerlitz had been buried with the Grand Army in the snows of Russia. The Emperor slept that night at Eckartsberg, having passed in his journey over the field of Auerstadt, already immortalized in the annals of French glory. During the whole march, the imperial cortège was obliged to force its way, with almost brutal violence, through the dense crowd of infantry, cannon, horsemen, and waggons which encumbered the highway; pillage had already commenced on all sides; and the disorders of the troops not only inflicted on the unhappy inhabitants all the miseries of war, but evinced, even under the eyes of the Emperor, the relaxed discipline and imperfect organization of his army. Under the very windows of the hotel which he inhabited, a vast crowd of disorderly soldiers was collected, who, with loud shouts and dissonant cries, continued during the whole night to feed a huge fire, by throwing into it the furniture, beds, and property, of the wretched inhabitants, into whose houses they had broken, and who, by a single day's presence of the imperial headquarters, found themselves deprived of their whole moveable effects.[1]

[1] Odel. i. 36, 37. Fain, i. 337. Jom. iv. 275.

Approach of the two armies to each other. April 29.

The direction of Napoleon's march was determined by the important consideration of effecting a junction with the Viceroy towards the mouth of the Saale; and with this view he advanced next day to Naumberg, while Ney reached Weissenfels, after having driven back the Russian videttes, which now, for the

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first time, began to show themselves on the road. Meanwhile the Viceroy, to facilitate the junction, ascended the course of the Saale, and on the same day arrived at Merseberg, so that the two armies were now not more than twenty miles distant. Eugene's forces consisted of three corps, Victor's, Lauriston's, and Macdonald's, and mustered full forty thousand combatants, besides those left in garrison in the fortresses on the Elbe: already the thunder of their artillery was heard in the distance, and soon an aide-de-camp from the Viceroy announced the joyful intelligence to the Emperor, that his troops had passed the Saale by the bridge of Merseberg, and that a junction had been effected between the two armies. The young conscripts in Ney's corps, which formed the head of the advance, gazed with wonder on the veterans, many of them mutilated, who had survived the Moscow campaign; while they, reanimated by the sight of the dense columns which were hourly thronging to their support, forgot the horrors of the retreat, and fondly hoped that the glorious days of the Grand Army were about to return. Joyfully the united host moved towards the enemy, who occupied Halle, Naumberg, Leipsic, and all the adjacent roads, while the advanced guards proceeded on the road to Weissenfels.[1]

30th April.

[1] Fain, i. 339, 341. Jom. iv. 275. Odel. i. 39.

No sooner were the Allies aware of the approach of the enemy in such strength, than they took measures to concentrate their forces; but the situation of their troops was such as to afford the most serious ground for disquietude. Not more than eighty thousand men were scattered along the line of the Elbe, from the Bohemian mountains to the sea, without any other point of support than Dresden, a town which could not be said to be fortified. The bridges

Position and measures of the Allies

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of Meissen, Muhlberg, and Rosslau, by which they had passed, were not yet even covered by *têtes-de-pont*—Dessau alone had a tolerable bridge-head; and the reinforcements in their rear were all absorbed in blockading the fortresses on the Elbe and the Oder. Thus, it was impossible to give battle to the enemy with any thing approaching to an equality of force; yet was retreat still more hazardous, as it would weaken the moral influence which their advance had produced in Germany, and, by renewing its terrors, might revive all the vacillations of the cabinet of Vienna, and even induce it to throw its forces into the opposite scale. Nor were the chances of battle so unequal as they at first sight appeared; for though Napoleon was greatly superior upon the whole, it was by no means certain that his forces would all be concentrated upon one field; the quality of the allied troops was undoubtedly better than the conscripts by whom they were to be opposed; and, above all, the great superiority of their cavalry, which was nearly twenty-five thousand strong, while that of the French was not five thousand, both precluded the possibility of total defeat, and promised the most brilliant results in case of success.[1]

[1] Précis de la Camp. 1813. Schoell, ii. 298, 301. Fain, i. 339, 341.

Combat at Poserna, and death of Marshal Bessieres.

These considerations having induced the allied sovereigns to risk a battle, it was no sooner ascertained that Napoleon had passed the Saale, near Weissenfels, on the 30th April, than the Russian and Prussian forces were moved forward with all imaginable expedition, to prevent his advance to Leipsic, give him battle in the plains of LUTZEN, and drive him back, in case of success, into the marshes formed by the Pleisse and the Elster. The Prussian army was concentrated, on the 1st May, at Roethe: Wittgenstein, with the main body of the Russians, was at Zwenkau; while Winzingerode and Milara-

dowitch, more in advance, observed the movements of the enemy on the roads of Naumberg and Chemnitz. It was in crossing the defile of Grünebach, that the head of the French column first encountered the Allies, who were strongly posted with six guns on the heights of Poserna, on the opposite bank, to defend the great road, which, after descending into the valley of that name, and passing the village of Reppach, ascends the opposite steep to enter upon the great plains of Lutzen and Leipsic. The inferiority of Napoleon's forces in cavalry, rendered it necessary to approach this advanced guard with caution, and the French infantry moved on in squares, as at the battle of the Pyramids in Egypt. Marshal Bessieres, Duke of Istria, colonel of the Imperial Guards, was among the foremost of the horsemen who advanced to reconnoitre the enemies' position, when a cannon-shot killed the brigadier of his escort. "Inter that brave man," said the marshal; and hardly had the words passed his lips, when a second cannon-ball struck himself on the breast, and laid him dead on the spot. His body was immediately covered with a white sheet, to conceal the calamity from the soldiers; and no one spoke of the event even at the imperial headquarters—an ominous practice, which commenced during the calamities of the Moscow retreat, and was continued in this campaign, from the rapid consumption of men of the highest rank and consideration by which it was characterized. Great confusion prevailed for some time at the attack of the defile on the opposite side, from the want of precision in the movements of the troops, and three hundred men were struck down in the squares without the enemy being dislodged; but at length twenty pieces of the artillery of the Guard were brought up,

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and under cover of their fire the leading square got through, and the allied vanguard retired, leaving open to the enemy the entrance of the plain of Lutzen.* The French army occupied Lutzen and the adjacent villages, where they slept; the young guard bivouacked round the tomb of Gustavus Adolphus; sentinels were placed, to preserve from destruction during the night the trees which shaded the grave of the hero of the north.[1]

[1] Souv. de Caulaincourt, i. 163. Fain, i. 341, 343. Odel. i. 46. Jom. iv. 275, 276. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 31, 32.

Movements and position of the French.

Next morning the French troops, being aware that they were in presence of the enemy, advanced in close order towards Leipsic, ready at a moment's warning to form square, to resist the formidable cavalry to which they were opposed. General Lauriston, with his corps, the advanced guard of Eugene's army, moved on the road from Merseberg; he met with no resistance till he arrived at Lindenau, the western suburb of Leipsic; but there the streets were barricadoed, and the houses loopholed; and, as a

* Ever since the campaign of Italy, in 1796, Marshal Bessieres had, in different ranks, commanded the guard which accompanied Napoleon in his battles. He was one of his most esteemed lieutenants; and he deserved the Emperor's regard, as well by his military experience and ability, as by his talent for civil affairs and his fidelity to his interests. His body was embalmed, and arrived at the Hôtel des Invalides, at Paris, on the 20th May, where it was interred; and the Emperor wrote the following touching letter to his widow, who was inconsolable for his loss:—"My cousin: Your husband has died on the field of honour. The loss which you and yous children have sustained is doubtless great; but mine is still greater. The Duke of Istria has died the noblest death, and without suffering; he has left a reputation without spot, the best inheritance he could bequeath to his children. My protection is secured to them; they will inherit all the affection which I bore to their father."—When the author visited Paris, in May 1814, the lamps were burning night and day in the mausoleum of the deceased, by the pious care of his widow, who still daily visited and spent some time in his tomb. The King of Saxony erected a monument to Bessieres, on the spot where he fell.—*See* FAIN, i. 344, 345; *and* LAS CASES, vi. 45.

serious resistance was expected, the troops halted, and the fire of artillery commenced. Macdonald's corps followed on the same line, and neither of these were engaged in the subsequent action. On the great road from Lutzen to Leipsic, the main body of the French army, under Napoleon in person, advanced in a dense array of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and chariots, crowding the road from Weissenfels to Lindenau; and it seemed hardly possible for any efforts to restore order to the prodigious accumulation of men and carriages which were there assembled. Marmont's corps formed the vanguard of the array; next to him, Bertrand brought up his Italians from Nossen; behind them, between Naumberg and Weissenfels, came Oudinot's men; while the Imperial Guards and reserve cavalry were still further in the rear, and Ney's dense columns covered the flank of the huge array as far as Lutzen.[1]

[1] Fain, i. 248, 249. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 32, 33. Jom. iv. 276, 277.

Allied march and plan of attack.

On the other hand, the allied sovereigns, who had taken the field on the 29th April, and put themselves at the head of their respective armies, were resolved to give battle in the plains of Lutzen. Not that they were insensible of the risk which they ran in combating Napoleon at the head of superior forces, especially in the thickly studded villages of Saxony, where their magnificent cavalry would be of little avail; but political considerations of the highest importance, connected with the courts of Vienna and Dresden, forbade them to recede or act on the defensive at this particular juncture. They crossed the Elster, therefore, near Pegau, early on the morning of the 2d, and advanced with all their forces, directing their march towards Jena, and threatening the enemy's right, so as to keep up the communication with Bohemia and the forces of the

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Austrian monarchy. The plan of attack was to refuse their own right, and make no considerable effort in the centre, but endeavour to force back the enemy's right, turn it, and cut him off from the Saale, and then inundate his rear with a numerous cavalry, to which he had no corresponding force to oppose. Blucher's Prussians were in the front; next came Wittgenstein's Russians: Winzingerode's Russians, with the Russian and Prussian guards, and the cavalry of both armies, formed the reserve. In this order the troops, after having enjoyed an hour and a half's rest, advanced to the attack at one o'clock in the afternoon.[1]

[1] Précis de la Camp. 1813. Schoell, Recueil, ii. 305, 306. Lond. 20, 21. Odel, i. 47, 49.

Battle of Lutzen.

May 2.

The hostile armies thus approached each other in a very peculiar manner: for both were in open column, and actually under march; and they came into collision like two men-of-war attempting to pass each other on opposite tacks. Napoleon, aware that the enemy were not far distant, but ignorant of their intentions, and not expecting them to stand firm that day, had been on horseback since nine in the morning; and he had passed the monument of Gustavus Adolphus, when he was first roused to a sense of his situation by the sound of artillery on his extreme left at Lindenau. He immediately halted with his suite, and surveyed the distant combat with his telescope, after which he remained half an hour in meditation, directing the troops merely to continue their march, with their ranks as close as possible. Suddenly a tremendous cannonade arose in rear of his right, in the direction of Great and Little Görschen; while his telescope, still directed towards Lindenau, showed him the inhabitants peaceably posted on the roofs of the houses, and no enemy's force deployed beyond the extremity of the buildings.[1]

[1] Odel. i. 49, 50. Fain, i. 350, 351. Précis in Schoell, Recueil, ii. 305, 306.

He instantly perceived that the attack was to be expected on the other side, and Marshal Ney, observing that his corps was assailed, set off at the gallop to put himself at its head.

In truth, matters had assumed a serious aspect, from the very first, in that quarter. The French infantry there occupied the village of Gross Görschen, Klein Görschen, Rahno, and Kaia, which lie near each other, somewhat in the form of an irregular square, in the plain between Lutzen and Pegau. The plain is there traversed by the deep channel of a rivulet, called the Flossgraben, which was crossed by the whole combined army in small compact columns, and formed a support to the right after these columns had deployed. Emerging from behind the heights, where they had taken their rest entirely concealed from the enemy's view, the allied army, eighty thousand strong, moved on in four deep black columns, with a powerful artillery in front, which immediately commenced a heavy concentric fire upon Gross Görschen; which the French infantry in the village sustained with admirable intrepidity. Soon, however, it was assailed by two Prussian brigades, under General Ziethen, with such vigour, that, after a gallant resistance, Souham's division, which was charged with its defence, was driven out and pursued to some distance. The brave Prussians, burning with ardour, followed up their success with the utmost impetuosity; Klein Görschen and Rahno were also carried amidst deafening cheers: both villages were speedily wrapped in flames; black volumes of smoke enveloped the whole right of the field of battle, and aide-de-camp after aide-de-camp was dispatched to Napoleon, pressing for reinforcements, or all was lost in that quarter.[1]

Commencement of the action, and success of the Allies on the right.

[1] Lond. 22, 23. Précis, Schoell, Rec. ii. 306, 307. Odel. i. 50. Fain, i. 350, 351.

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The Emperor's resolution was instantly taken. "We have no cavalry," said he. "No matter: it will be a battle as in Egypt; the French infantry is equal to any thing, and I commit myself, without alarm, to the inherent valour of our young conscripts." Orders were immediately dispatched to Macdonald, who was on the left near Lindenau, to retrace his steps, and direct his march to the point of attack on the right; the Viceroy, gifted with the true eye of a general, had already stopped his advance on hearing the cannon to the right, and enjoined him to incline in that direction; orders were simultaneously sent to Marmont to hasten across the fields in the same direction; Bertrand was instructed to advance, as quickly as possible, on the other side; while the whole troops on the road between Lutzen and Leipsic were at once halted, and wheeled into line by a movement to the right. Napoleon himself set off with his suite in the same direction, directing his rapid course to the point where the smoke was thickest and the cannon loudest; but before these various succours could arrive, disasters wellnigh attended with fatal consequences, had ensued in that direction.[1]

Napoleon's measures to repair the disorder.

Vict. et Conq. xxii. 36, 37. Fain, i. 351, 352. Lond. 23.

Wittgenstein, overjoyed at the success of his first attack, which had answered his most sanguine expectations, resolved to support it to the utmost of his power, and direct his principal forces in that quarter, while at the same time he distracted the enemy's attention by a furious onset upon his centre. He brought up therefore his second line, and a part of his reserves, which had now become necessary; for Ney, having moved forward the divisions Brenier, Gérard, and Marchand, to the support of Souham, which advanced in squares, as at the battle of the

Counter movements of Wittgenstein.

Pyramids, had, by a brilliant charge with the bayonet, regained the lost villages, and driven back the Allies almost to the ground they occupied at the commencement of the action. A few words addressed by the Prussian generals to their men when the second line came up, restored their confidence, and they returned to the attack of the burning villages with redoubled ardour. Nothing could withstand their impetuosity. The French columns, driven out of the houses, were charged in the intervening open ground by the allied horse, and thrown into confusion. Several regiments of conscripts disbanded and fled; the plain was covered with fugitives, and dismay overspread the whole French right. Seeing his attack thus far successful, Wittgenstein brought up his reserves of the Russians and Prussians to decide the victory: these noble troops advanced in the finest order, through a driving tempest of cannon shot from the French batteries, and, pressing incessantly forward, carried the villages of Klein Görschen and Hahalali by assault, and drove the enemy beyond Kaia, the key of the French right, which became the prey of the flames, and remained burning furiously, unoccupied by either party. The French whole line, in the centre and on the right, retired five or six hundred paces, abandoning also the village of Starsiedel, which the Allies, however, were not in sufficient strength to occupy. It was now six o'clock; the battle seemed gained: the French right, driven back a mile-and-a-half, had not only been expelled from the five villages which formed its strongholds, but in great part thrown into disorder.[1] Half-an-hour's further advance would bring the Allies upon the line of Bertrand's march forward, and cut him off from the remainder of the army; while their

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[1] Fain, i. 355, 356. Précis, Schoell, Recueil, ii. 307, 309. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 38, 39. Lond. 23.

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numerous and magnificent cavalry were already forming in dense and menacing masses to sweep along the open plains, in the rear of the whole enemy's centre and left, and complete his destruction in a quarter, and by a force to which he had nothing to oppose.

Napoleon hastens to the right to restore the battle.

No sooner were these disastrous tidings brought to Napoleon, than he set out at the gallop to restore affairs by his own presence at the scene of this terrible conflict. On approaching the right wing, clearer evidence appeared at every step of the imminence of the danger. The plain was covered by conscripts flying from the dreadful fire of the Russian artillery: the columns which still held together were retreating, closely followed by the allied infantry; and the threatening clouds of their horse were preparing to deluge the field the moment that the last villages were passed. Yet, even in these circumstances of alarm, the Emperor received the most touching proofs of the devotion of his troops; the broken crowds of conscripts reformed in haste at the sight of the imperial staff, and endeavoured, by forming little knots or squares, to arrest the disorder; numbers rejoined the ranks which still held together; the wounded, which were carried past in numbers every minute increasing, never failed to salute the Emperor with the wonted acclamations—cries of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" broke from lips soon about to be silent in death, and a faint expression of joy illuminated the countenances of the dying youths when the well-known form of Napoleon flitted before their eyes. Never had the French army displayed more devoted valour—never did the generals and officers evince a more heroic spirit—and never, except perhaps at Wagram, had the Emperor exposed his per-

son more than at that awful crisis. But he was deeply impressed with the danger of his situation: orders were already given for a retreat; and when an aide-de-camp brought the intelligence, as he came up, that Ney's second attack on Kaia had failed, he received the news with a terrific exclamation—"Ha!" accompanied by a look to Berthier and Caulaincourt, which froze every heart around him with horror.[1]* CHAP. LXIX. 1813. [1] Odel. i. 51, 52. Jom. iv. 281, 282. Lond. 23. Schoell, Rec. ii. 309.

Prodigious efforts of both parties at the decisive point.

Both parties, perceiving that the decisive point of the battle was to be found in the ruins of Kaia, strove, by accumulating forces upon it, to secure to themselves so important an acquisition; like two skilful players at chess, who successively bring up all their forces to support the attack or defence, towards the close of the struggle, of often an inconsiderable piece on the board. Napoleon, placing himself at a short distance behind the village, arranged the broken remains of Ney's divisions, which had been already engaged, preceded by the division Ricard, with his aide-de-camp Count Lobau at their head, for a fresh attack. These gallant troops advanced with cool intrepidity; and being now decidedly superior in number to their opponents, they drove them back behind Kaia, and into the neighbourhood of Klein Görschen. Blucher's Prussians of the reserve, however, issued with the utmost vigour from that village; a furious combat ensued in the plain between the two; Gérard and Brenier

* "The moment was very critical: the Emperor called me to his side, and asked, where were the treasure and equipages. 'I have executed,' replied I, 'the orders of your majesty; they are at Lutzen.' 'Lose not a moment then,' said he, 'to move them back to Merseberg; it is our rallying point in the event of retreat.' The whole baggage immediately took the road for Merseberg, where I arrived at night, and found it occupied by a division of Eugene's corps, which had been detached in the utmost haste to occupy, during the alarm, that important point."—*Souvenirs de* DUMAS, iii. 499.

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both fell severely wounded at the head of their troops, the former exclaiming, "Soldiers, the moment is arrived when every Frenchman who has the feelings of honour in his bosom should conquer or die." Nor would the Prussians recede an inch; the Berlin volunteers melted away under the fire, but stood immoveable; both parties kept their ground with undaunted resolution, and as the shades of evening began to creep over the field, the flashes of the musketry on either side appeared fixed to one spot, and almost close to each other.[1]

[1] Vict. et Conq. xxii. 38, 39. Jom. iv. 282, 283. Précis in Schoell, Recueil, ii. 309, 310.

Conflict of the Berlin volunteers and French conscripts.

This obstinate conflict, however, gained for Napoleon what he alone required to wrest their hard-earned successes from the Allies—time. While the combat was raging between Kaia and Klein Görschen, the other corps of the French army came up; the Imperial Guard was now assembled close behind Kaia in reserve, with Napoleon at its head; Bertrand's forces were on the one side, Marmont's infantry issued from the willow thickets, which adjoined the Flossgraben, on the other. Seventy thousand French infantry pressed upon the Allies, who at that point had not more than forty thousand to oppose to them. As a last effort, Wittgenstein ordered the artillery of General Winzingerode to march forward, and take the enemy, combating between the villages, on their left flank, while his infantry advanced to the support of the now almost exhausted Prussians.[1] This able manœuvre had at first a surprising success; one of his divisions debouched from Eisdorf, beyond the Flossgraben streamlet, and drove back Marchand's division of Marmont's troops; while another reinforced the Prussians between the villages, and with the aid of the guns on the enemy's flank, a third time with loud shouts drove him out of Klein Gör-

schen and Kaia, and back to the Imperial Guard of Napoleon. An interesting yet melancholy incident took place in the contest for the burning villages; the volunteers of Berlin and the young conscripts of Paris met amidst the ruins; both made their first essay in arms, but both *fought with the courage of* veteran soldiers, *hand to hand, body to body, heart* to heart; these gallant youths *struggled with invin-* cible obstinacy amidst the flames, and nearly a half of each found there an untimely grave.[1] * CHAP. LXIX. 1813. Fain, i 359, 360. Guil. de Vaud Camp. de *1813, 81.* *Jom. iv. 282, 283.* *Précis in* Schoell. Recueil, ii. 311, 312.

Napoleon now saw that the decisive moment had arrived: all his reserves within reach, except the Imperial Guard, had been engaged. He forthwith drew out that formidable host, which had so often decided the fate of European fields. Sixteen battalions of the young guard were drawn up in a close column, preceded by sixty pieces of its incomparable artillery, commanded by Drouot, and followed by the whole reserve cavalry. This weighty column soon made its way through the crowd of fugitives, which lay in its line of advance. Nothing could withstand the swift and deadly fire of Drouot's guns, which seemed absolutely to be discharged as they moved along: Kaia was regained, and the Allies forced back, still facing about, and firing to Klein Görschen. The Prussian battalions were now so much reduced by eight hours' incessant fighting, that Final charge of the French Guards.

* "I had nothing," said Ney to General Mathieu Dumas after the battle, "but battalions of conscripts; but I had good reason to congratulate myself on their conduct. I doubt if I could have achieved as much with the grenadiers of the guard. I had before me the best troops of the enemy, including the whole Prussian Guard; [illegible] bravest warriors, after having twice failed, would probably have never carried the villages; but *five times* I led back those brave youths, whose docility, and perhaps inexperience, have served me better than the most veteran valour; the French infantry can never be too young."—*Souvenirs de* DUMAS, iii. 499.

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they formed little more than a line of tirailleurs, which was obliged to fall back behind that village to reform. There, however, the fight was renewed; Mortier had a horse shot under him; Dumoustier fell by his side: while on the Prussian side Scharnhorst was mortally wounded, the Prince Leopold of Hesse Homberg and Prince Mecklenberg Strelitz killed; but the Guard, enveloped by clouds of dust and smoke, still steadily advanced, and the receding sound of their artillery and light of their guns showed that the enemy was in retreat on the right. At the same time the Viceroy, who at this critical moment came up from Lindenau, fell on the extreme right of the Prince of Wirtemberg, and drew off his batteries from the flank of the columns engaged among the villages; and it was only by great exertions, and the admirable steadiness of the Prussian troops, that the Prince was able to maintain himself in his position, without prosecuting the attack which, in the first instance, had been attended with such important effects. The fire of the artillery continued with the utmost violence along the whole line till darkness closed in the scene, and several charges of the allied horse upon the French squares were followed by brilliant success; but although they retained the greater part of the ground they had won on the right and in the centre, it was evident they were overmatched at the decisive point: the Russian and Prussian guards, who were impatiently expected, had not yet come up; a reinforcement of two divisions of Russian grenadiers, under Konownitzen, which Wittgenstein hurled at the very close of the day against Ney's corps on the right, was assailed in the flank by the Viceroy at the head of Macdonald's three fresh divisions, and so rudely handled

that they were obliged to retreat, and evacuate the village of Eisdorf; while, on the extreme left of the Allies' line, Bertrand's corps was debouching by Gosserau and Pobles, and threatened early next morning to assail the disputed villages in flank. In these circumstances, the allied sovereigns gave orders for a retreat on the following morning; they themselves retired for the night to Lobstadt; the right was concentrated in and around Gross Görschen, where it sunk to sleep amidst the smoking ruins; and Napoleon dispatched couriers to Paris, Cracow, Rome, Vienna, and Constantinople, to announce that he had gained the victory.[1]

[1] Prussian Official Account. Schoell, i. 44, 48. Fain, i. 361, 362. Précis in Schoell, Rec. ii. 312, 313. Jom. iv. 283, 284. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 39, 40. Lond. 24.

Night attack of the allied horse on the French line

Strict orders had been given by the Emperor that no pursuit should be attempted: he was well aware of his inferiority in cavalry, and having observed that a considerable part of the allied horse had not been engaged, he feared some surprise during the night. To guard against such a danger, fires were directed to be kindled along the whole front of the French position, and the men were ordered to lie down in squares. It soon appeared how necessary these precautions had been. As Napoleon was riding at nine at night across part of the field of battle towards Lutzen, where headquarters were to be established, he was suddenly assailed by a fire of musketry from behind a hedge, followed by the irruption of a huge mass of horse, which advanced in close order and at a steady pace through the squares, almost to the imperial escort. Had they pushed on two hundred paces further, they would have taken the Emperor with all his suite. As it was, the alarm was so great that all his followers dispersed; Napoleon himself disappeared for some minutes, and the anxious question was asked by them all, when they

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re-assembled, "Where is the Emperor?" Some squares having now come up, and poured in a close fire on both sides, the allied horse got entangled in the darkness in a ravine, and at length the body which had made this irruption, consisting of eight squadrons, retired to their own position; and the combat at all points ceased in this sea of blood.[1]

[1] Odel. i. 57, 58. Fain, i. 366, 367. Lond. 24. Precis in Recueil by Schoell, ii. 313, 314.

Aspect of the field of battle.

At daybreak on the following morning, Napoleon left Lutzen, and, according to his usual custom, rode over the field of battle. It afforded ample subject for meditation, and evinced clearly the obstinate and nearly balanced nature of the conflict in which the French empire was now engaged. Between the villages of Kaia and Gross Görschen, the whole surface of the ground was covered with the slain, of whom above two-thirds were French. The dead on their side were about six, the wounded twelve thousand.* The youthful visages and slender figures of a great proportion of the corpses on both sides, presented at once a melancholy and an interesting spectacle; and showed at once how war had strained the military strength of both monarchies, and what ardent passions had mutually inspired their people. Many of the dead bodies were those of the Prussian landwehr and landsturm. The French gazed with astonishment on the long hair, rough mien, and coarse garments of these rural combatants, most of whom were not yet in uniform, but lay on the field in their dress from the plough; but Napoleon viewed them with very different feelings, and mused long on these decisive proofs of the universal spirit which had drawn

* Ney's corps alone lost twelve thousand men and five hundred officers killed and wounded. The number of wounded was so great, that the generals accused the young conscripts with having injured themselves to escape the fatigues and dangers of the campaign.—JOMINI, iv. 285.

forth in Prussia "the might that slumbers in a peasant's arm." The troops saluted him with their accustomed acclamations, and appeared to have lost none of their wonted enthusiasm. Nothing appeared so extraordinary to his attendants as the immense army which had in a manner sprung up out of the earth at his summons, and the admirable spirit with which it was animated.[1]

[1] Odel. i. 59, 62. Fain, i. 367, 369. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 42, 43.

Loss on both sides, and reflections on the battle.

The battle of Lutzen must always be considered as one of the most striking proofs of Napoleon's military abilities. Though the success gained was far from being decisive, the Allies having retreated next day in admirable order, without the sacrifice either of prisoners, standards, or cannon, and with a loss of only fifteen thousand men, while the French were weakened by eighteen thousand, of whom nine hundred were prisoners; yet a most important advantage had been gained by the first success in the campaign, and the restoration of the credit of their arms in the eyes of Europe, by having forced the veteran bands of Russia to retreat, with an army for the most part composed of young conscripts. Although, also, the superiority of numbers upon the whole was decidedly on the side of the French; yet this was far from being the case with the forces actually engaged, until a late period of the day. The Allies selected their own point of attack; their movements were so admirably screened from the enemy by the numerous light horse which covered their movements, that, though they bivouacked within two leagues of the French right on the night preceding, their vicinity was not even suspected; and when the attack on Gross Görschen commenced at ten o'clock on the morning of the 2d, Ney's corps alone was at hand to resist it, while the remainder

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of the army was spread over a line thirty miles in length, from the gates of Leipsic to the banks of the Saale. Surprised in this manner in a scattered line of march by the unforeseen onset of the enemy in concentrated masses on his right and centre, Napoleon ran the most imminent hazard of seeing his army pierced through the middle, and severed in twain by an enemy whose superiority in cavalry would have enabled him speedily to convert such a disaster into total ruin. Had Wittgenstein had his reserves better in hand, and followed up the capture of Klein Görschen and Kaia at the moment with adequate forces, there can be little doubt that this result would have taken place. It was the highest effort of the military art, therefore, in Napoleon, to restore the battle after such an advantage had been gained, and such a surprise incurred; to arrest the enemy's advance by obstinate resistance in the only situation where, from the proximity of the villages, it could be attempted, and prolong the combat till the concentration of his forces from both sides enabled him to assume the offensive with superior strength.*

During the action, Bulow had carried the town of Halle by assault, and taken six guns; but the

* Knowing of what vital importance success at Lutzen was to arrest the torrent of misfortune which threatened to submerge his empire, Napoleon made the most extraordinary efforts to animate the spirit of his troops. Shortly before, he had for some fault degraded from his rank the colonel of a battalion, who, being a very brave man, was much beloved by his soldiers: when the regiment was to charge under Count Lobau to regain Kaia, he rode up to the front of the battalion, and replaced him in his station, after addressing him a few words. The shouts of joy from the battalion resounded over the field: the cry spread from rank to rank, and was heard even above the roar of the artillery; and the battalion, heading a column, soon was to be seen mounting in the most gallant style a height behind Starsiedel.—See ODELEBEN, i. 55.

turn which affairs had taken on the plain of Lutzen, rendered this advantage, which otherwise might have been important, of no avail. The allied army retired slowly, and in admirable order, towards Dresden, which the main body reached on the 7th, and, passing on without halting, took the road of Silesia, where a strong intrenched position had for some time been prepared at BAUTZEN. Notwithstanding the methodical arrangements, however, and short marches of the retreat, considerable confusion soon ensued: ten thousand chariots, more than half of them loaded with wounded, retiring on a single road, necessarily occasioned great embarrassment. In many places the road was blocked up, and nothing but the unconquerable firmness of the rearguard imposed on the French, and prevented the most serious disasters. The retreat was conducted in two columns: the Russians retired by Chemnitz and Freyberg, followed by Bertrand and Oudinot; the Prussians by the great road from Leipsic to Dresden, pursued by Lauriston, Marmont, Eugene, and the Imperial Guard; while Ney moved upon Torgau and Wittenberg to menace Berlin. Ney, with his corps, which had suffered so severely in the battle, was at first left to rest some days on the field, in order to bury the dead and reform its ranks. The Emperor, however, intended, that while the bulk of his army followed the allied sovereigns into Silesia, that gallant marshal should receive a recompense for his valour, by being sent against Berlin; and thither accordingly he was soon directed. Severe combats with the rearguard took place at Etidorf, Nossen, and Wilidruf; but the French obtained no advantage, and Milaradowitch, who commanded the rearguard, after cutting the arches of the bridge of Dresden,[1] which

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Retreat of the Allies to Dresden.

April 7.

May 5.
— 6.
— 7.

[1] Lond. 25, 26. Fain, i. 370, 373. Jom. iv. 287. Odel. i. 63, 66.

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had been restored in a temporary manner, took post in force among the houses on the right bank.

Beautiful appearance of Dresden on the approach of the French.

When the French army approached Dresden, even the meanest soldiers were struck by the beauty of the spectacle which presented itself. Its lovely encircling hills, crowned with villas, gardens, and orchards, divided by the noble stream of the Elbe, which at all seasons awaken the admiration of the traveller, were then in their highest beauty, decked in the first green and flowers of spring. The ascending sun glittered with dazzling brightness on the steeples, domes, and palaces of the city; calmness and peace seemed to have marked it for their own; no sound of alarm or sign of devastation was yet perceptible in its smiling environs. But war in its most terrible form was about to prey upon this devoted capital; for six long months it was to be the scene of combats, of suffering, and of blood; and already, amidst all the luxuriance of opening nature, the symptoms, as yet brilliant and majestic, of military preparations were to be seen. In those orchards, the glitter of bayonets could be decerned; on every height of those hills, artillery was planted: two black columns of smoke announced the burning of the temporary bridges, above and below the city, which the Russians had erected, while occasional cannon shot from the right bank, still in the hands of the Allies, mingled with the clang of the bells which announced the approach of Napoleon on the left. The few remaining Cossacks swam their horses across the Elbe after the bridges were destroyed; and Dresden, wholly evacuated by the Allies, but in the deepest terror and anxiety, awaited the arrival of the conqueror.[1]

[1] Odel. i. 66. 67. Témoin Ocul. i. 120, 123. Odel. ii. 120. Fain, i. 373, 375. Personal observation.

To deprecate his wrath, which the decided favour the inhabitants had shown to the allied cause gave

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them every reason to apprehend, the magistrates waited upon Napoleon a mile and a half from the city, on the road to Freyberg. "Who are you?" said he in a quick and rude tone. "Members of the municipality," replied the trembling burgomasters. "Have you bread?" "Our resources have been entirely exhausted by the requisitions of the Russians and Prussians." "Ha! it is impossible, is it? I know no such word; get ready bread, meat, and wine. I know all you have done: you richly deserve to be treated as a conquered people; but I forgive all from regard to your king: he is the saviour of your country; you have been already punished by having had the Russians and Prussians amongst you, and being governed by Baron Stein." With these words he turned aside from the city, and, directing his horse towards the suburbs of Pirna, traversed the ramparts of the town, as far as the road which leads to Pilnitz; he there dismounted, and walked on foot, accompanied only y Caulaincourt and a page, to the banks of the river, at the point where the Russians had constructed their bridge of boats. The Viceroy soon after joined them, and the Emperor and he advanced alone to the water's edge, while the Russian guns were still occasionally firing from the opposite side. Having completed his observations, without injury, in that quarter, and made himself master by enquiry of the whole particulars attending that vicinity, he proceeded to the other side of the town, beyond Fredericstadt, where the bridge of rafts near Ubigau was still for the most part standing, not more than one-third having been consumed by the fire which the Russians had applied to it. Some light horsemen threw themselves into boats, approached the burning pile, extinguished

Entry of Napoleon into Dresden.

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the flames, and drew nearly two-thirds of the bridge in safety to the left bank. Having secured this important acquisition, his next care was to reconnoitre the banks still further down; and having discovered a place near Preisnitz, where the heights on the left bank overtopped those on the right, and a curve in the stream broke the force of the current, he gave orders for the construction of a bridge of rafts there with all possible expedition.[1]

1 Odel. i. 68, 70. Fain, i. 379, 380. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 43. 44.

Napoleon's preparations for the passage of the Elbe.

Disquieting intelligence having been received in the evening from Torgau, where the governor not only still persisted in refusing to admit a French garrison, but alleged in his vindication the express orders of his sovereign, a special messenger was dispatched to the King of Saxony to know whether he still adhered to the confederation of the Rhine, accompanied by an intimation, that, "if he did not forthwith return to his capital, he should lose his kingdom." On the following morning, Napoleon was on horseback by daybreak, urging on in person the preparations for the passage of the river under the heights of Preisnitz. The engineers had made extraordinary efforts during the night; the bridge of rafts was speedily repaired; the marines from Brest had powerfully seconded the land engineers; and two battalions of light troops had already been crossed over to the right bank, where they were spread out as videttes, both to keep off the enemy and acquire information. These preparations, however, had not escaped the notice of the Allies, who sent in the night a considerable body of troops, accompanied by fifty pieces of cannon, to the bank opposite Ubigau. Already the dropping fire of the tirailleurs was to be heard on both sides of the river, and the deep booming of the Russian cannon at intervals, showed that

a serious resistance was intended. No sooner did Napoleon see the preparations of the enemy, than he called out in a voice of thunder to General Drouot, "A hundred pieces of cannon!" and posted himself on an eminence, at a short distance in the rear, to direct their disposition. The artillery of the Guard quickly came up at the gallop, and Drouot disposed them on the heights of Preisnitz, and at the extremity of the alley of the Ostra, where they commanded the enemy's guns on the opposite bank; but such was the impatience of the Emperor for the success of the operation, which did not immediately succeed, that when he returned to him to give an account of his proceedings, he vented his displeasure upon him in a manner at once unseemly and ludicrous.* [1]

[1] Odel. i. 70, 71. Fain, i. 380, 381. Jom. iv. 287. Lucches. iii. 421.

Drouot was right, however; the guns were well

* He was in such a rage, that he took him by the ears and pulled them; but the general preserved his presence of mind, and replied calmly, but firmly, that the guns could not be better placed. Napoleon, upon this, recovered his good-humour, and the thing passed off with a laugh. Such sallies of temper were very frequent with the Emperor, especially in his latter years; but they were not of long endurance, and, when the first burst of fury was over, he usually recovered himself. Drouot, the well-known commander of the artillery of the Guard, was a very remarkable man. He always had a small Bible with him to read, which constituted his chief delight, and he avowed it openly to the persons in the imperial suite: a peculiarity not a little remarkable in that staff, and the admission of which required no small degree of moral courage. He was not without a certain shade of superstition; for, as Napoleon usually brought him forward at the most hazardous moment, and he was always at the head of his troops, his situation was full of peril; and he was careful on such occasions to array himself in his old uniform of general of artillery, as he had long worn it and never received an injury. When near the enemy he always dismounted from horseback, and advanced on foot in the middle of his guns, and, by a most extraordinary chance, neither himself nor his horse was ever wounded. His modesty was equal to his knowledge, his fidelity to his courage; and he gave a shining proof of the latter quality by accompanying Napoleon to Elba, amidst the general defection by which the more exalted objects of the Emperor's bounty were disgraced.—*See* ODEL. i. 131, 132.

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placed, and this speedily appeared in the tremendous fire which they opened upon the Russian batteries. For some time the cannonade was kept up with great vigour on both sides, and several of the enemy's balls fell close to the Emperor, whose head was struck by a splinter which one drove from a piece of wood close to him. "If it had struck me on the breast," said he, calmly, "all was over." It soon, however, appeared that the French artillery was superior, both in number and position, to that to which they were opposed; and as the object of the Russians was not to defend the passage of the river, which they well knew against such a general and army was impossible, but only to delay his crossing, they drew off their guns in the afternoon, and the passage was left unopposed. New obstacles of a still more serious nature now presented themselves; heavy rains, and the melting of the Bohemian snows, had raised a flood in the Elbe; anchors, cables, and grappling irons were wanting, and, after two days of unprofitable labour, the undertaking was abandoned. It was deemed easier to restore, in a temporary manner, the two arches which had been cut in the bridge of Dresden. By the indefatigable exertions of the French engineers, the preparations were pushed forward with such activity, that, by ten o'clock on the morning of the 11th, all was ready even for the passage of the artillery; and the whole corps of the Viceroy, Marmont, and Bertraud were crossed over. They found the opposite suburb entirely evacuated by the enemy, who were in full retreat to the great intrenched position, where they intended to give battle, at Bautzen. Such was the impatience of the Emperor for the completion of the passage,[1] that he promised a napoleon to every boat

A passage is effected at Dresden.

May 11.

[1] Odel. i. 72, 74. Fain, i. 382, 384. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 44.

which was ferried across, and during the whole of the 11th he remained seated on a stone bench on the bridge, listening to the shouts of the young conscripts as they passed over, and feasting his eyes with the long trains of artillery, which seemed to be destined to hurl to the right bank of the Elbe all the horrors of war which had hitherto devastated the left.

Return of the King of Saxony to Dresden, and his final adherence to the cause of Napoleon.

On the following day, the King of Saxony gave a clear proof of the terror which Napoleon's success had inspired, by arriving in person at Dresden, to place himself and all his resources at the disposal of the French emperor. This proceeding was in the highest degree gratifying to Napoleon, who thus not only saw secured the adherence of an important ally and valuable army, in possession of fortresses of vital consequence in the campaign, but beheld himself restored to the rank which he most coveted—that of the arbiter of the destinies, and protector of the thrones of sovereigns. So anxious was he for his arrival, that for two days before he came, the troops had been posted to a considerable distance on the road to Prague, expecting his approach. The motives which led to this resolution on the part of Frederick Augustus, were very apparent. Austria, though evidently inclining to the side of the Allies, was not yet prepared to take the field, and a considerable time must elapse before her forces could join those of the Allies; and, meanwhile, Napoleon was in possession of his capital and dominions, and if they were treated as conquered countries, the most frightful miseries awaited his subjects. Influenced by these considerations, and by that regard to rectitude and the obligation of treaties, which is so rare in crowned heads, the King of Saxony, who had for some time been forced to temporize, in expectation of seeing what

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line Austria was likely to take, and had actually ordered General Thielman, when the first inaccurate accounts of the battle of Lutzen were brought, to shut his gates against the French troops,* now adopted a decided course, and threw his crown and fortune into hazard with Napoleon. His arrival was preceded by a peremptory order to General Thielman forthwith to surrender the fortress of Torgau to Marshal Ney, who took possession of it on the 13th, and commenced the passage of the river; while the Saxon troops, fourteen thousand strong, including some regiments of excellent cavalry, were anew placed under the orders of Regnier, and formed the seventh corps of the army. General Thielman, whose communications, by his sovereign's orders, with the Allies had for some time been well known, and who was indignant at the adherence of his sovereign to the oppressor of Germany, and the contradictory orders which, within the last few days, he had received, quitted his colours, and entered into the service of the Emperor of Russia. Meanwhile, the King of Saxony was welcomed

* "I have seen, with entire satisfaction, the conduct you have pursued at Torgau, regarding the conferences proposed to you by the allied generals, as well as before you left Dresden, and it has entirely justified my confidence in you. To allow some pieces of artillery to go out of your walls for the siege of Wittenberg, (then in the hands of the French,) would be altogether contrary to my relations with Austria, which are positively determined."—KING OF SAXONY *to* GENERAL THIELMAN, *30th April* 1813. FAIN, i. 485.*

"My order, as expressed to you in my letter of the 19th April, is, that the independence of Torgau should be maintained with the utmost care, and that its gates should be opened to no one without my express order, in concert with the Emperor of Austria. I now add, to prevent misunderstanding, that, if the fortune of arms should bring back the French forces to the Elbe, you are to conduct yourself in the same manner; and, as a necessary consequence, that Torgau should not be opened to the French troops."—KING OF SAXONY *to* GENERAL THIELMAN, *5th May* 1813. FAIN, i. 486.*

with extraordinary pomp by Napoleon, at Dresden; the Imperial Guards lined the road from the chateau to the city; the cavalry, which met him near the camp of Pirna, formed his escort to the gates of the town; while Napoleon, who received him on one of the little bridges of the road leading to Perria, and attended him to his palace amidst discharges of artillery, ringing of bells, and the acclamations of the soldiers, enjoyed the satisfaction of giving the most decisive proof to Europe of the reality of his success at Lutzen, by thus restoring to his capital and throne the first of his allies who had suffered by the events of the war.[1] CHAP. LXIX. 1813.

[1] Odel. i. 76, 78. Fain, i. 388, 390. Jom. iv. 288, 289. Hard. xii. 149, 150.

But if the arrival of the King of Saxony at Dresden was thus a source of the highest gratification to Napoleon, the advices and intelligence which he brought from Prague, in regard to the intentions of Austria, were of the most disquieting kind. It was no longer doubtful that the court of Vienna was only temporizing, to gain time to complete its preparations, and there was too much reason to apprehend that its armaments would ultimately be turned to the advantage of the Allies. Prince Schwartzenberg at Paris had already let fall some hints, that an alliance which policy had formed, policy might dissolve;* the light troops of the army had intercepted some correspondence of the cabinet of Vienna with the members of the Rhenish confederacy, which breathed a hostile spirit towards France;† and the King of Saxony, fresh from

Alarming state of the negotiations with Austria.

* "Ah! the marriage," said Schwartzenberg to Maret at Paris, "the marriage! Policy has made it; but——."—*See* FAIN, i. 390, note.

† "Austria is gradually unmasking herself in all her relations with our allies. She assumes the attitude, towards Denmark, Saxony, Bavaria and Wirtemberg, Naples and Westphalia, of the friend of peace and of France, who desires nothing for her own aggrandizement. But, at the same time, she recommends to them to set on foot no useless arma-

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1813. Prague, not only confirmed these alarming advices, but communicated the intelligence that the Emperor of Austria had either contracted, or was on the eve of contracting, positive engagements with the allied powers.* Napoleon, therefore, saw that there was no time to lose in striking terror into the cabinet of Vienna: on the very day, accordingly, of the King of Saxony's arrival, he wrote to his minister at that capital, aspersing the character of Metternich, who, he said, mistook intrigue for politics; boasting of his own forces, which he stated at eleven hundred thou-

May 12. sand men, of which three hundred thousand were already on the Elbe; desiring Narbonne to allude to the intercepted letters, which gave the Emperor an ample title to desire him to demand his passports; but declaring his willingness to forget all, and renew pacific relations on reasonable terms. The letters con-

[1] Napoleon to Narbonne, May 12, 1813. Fain, i. 393, 394. Hard. xii. 155, 156.

tained an injunction, not to commit himself in regard to Silesia, and *not to mention the Bourbons*, as they were entirely forgotten in Europe—a phrase which sufficiently proved that they were any thing rather than forgotten by himself.[1]† ments—not to exhaust themselves by giving succours to France, which would serve no other purpose but to render the Emperor more untractable, and which besides would be without an object, as Austria has 150,000 men ready to cast in the balance against whichever of the two parties should wish to continue the war."—STAKELBERG, *Envoy Russe à Vienne à Salons*, 28 *May* 1813. *Rapport de* M. LE DUC DE BASSANO, 20*th Aout* 1813. *Moniteur*.

* "Before the battle of Lutzen, the Emperor of Austria had already contracted secret engagements with the Allies, and was on the eve of declaring himself. For this reason Napoleon sent Eugene into Italy to reorganize an army. Before the campaign commenced, Austria had opened negotiations with all the powers of the Rhenish confederacy."—GUICCIARD. p. 129, 131.

† "As to the Bourbons, be sure never to speak of them; no one in France or in Europe thinks of them; they are forgotten even in England."—NAPOLEON *to* NARBONNE, 12*th May* 1813. HARDENBERG, xii. 154.

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Two days afterwards, Count Bubna arrived at Dresden from the cabinet of Vienna, and at the same time M. de Stadion was dispatched from the same court to the headquarters of the allied sovereigns at Bautzen, earnestly pressing upon both an accommodation. In this attempt Metternich at this period was perfectly sincere; for he was seriously alarmed by the result of the battle of Lutzen, and dreaded nothing so much as that Russia and France would accommodate their differences by a treaty on the drum-head, and that Napoleon would be left at liberty to take vengeance at leisure on the German powers which had incurred his displeasure. M. Bubna had several long interviews with Napoleon, in the course of which he made the Emperor acquainted with the expectations of his court in regard to the concessions by France, and accession of territory to themselves, which were hoped for. These were, that Austria should have the Illyrian provinces, an increase of territory on the side of Poland, and some also on the Bavarian frontier; and that the confederation of the Rhine should be dissolved. Without committing himself either one way or other in regard to these demands, Napoleon contented himself with declaring that he would agree to an armistice, on condition that the Allies retired behind the Oder, and he himself behind the Elbe, with a view to a congress at Prague, at which England and America should be invited to attend; and M. Bubna having set out for Vienna with this ultimatum, the Emperor took his departure for his advanced guard in Silesia.[1]

Mission of Count Bubna to Dresden, and Stadion to Bautzen.

[1] Count Bubna to Stadion, May 18, 1813. Fain, i. 395, 396. Hard. xii. 155, 158. Jom. iv. 289, 292.

Before finally committing his fate to the chances of war, Napoleon made the very attempt which Metternich so much dreaded, that of opening a separate negotiation with one of the allied powers, in the hope of detaching it from the rest. On the day on

Napoleon's secret proposals to Russia at this period.

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which Bubna set out for Vienna, he secretly dispatched Caulaincourt to the headquarters of the Emperor of Russia. The object of this mission was to induce the cabinet of St Petersburg to accommodate its differences with France, at the expense of Austria; and, well knowing that the great object of its jealousy was the existence, and probable increase, of the grand duchy of Warsaw, he proposed to extend the confederation of the Rhine to the Oder; to increase Westphalia by 1,500,000 souls; and to give to Prussia, in exchange for the territory thus lost, the whole grand duchy of Warsaw and the territory of Dantzic, with the exception of the duchy of Oldenburg, by which means she would acquire an increase of between four and five millions of souls, and be restored to the rank she held before the battle of Jena. Her capital was to be Warsaw, and the great advantage held out was, that three hundred leagues, and an independent power, in possession of all the fortresses on the Vistula, would thus be interposed between France and Russia.* Alexander, however, was proof against these seductions: he received Caulaincourt, but in presence of the ministers of England, Austria, and Sweden, as well as of the King of Prussia, and expressed, in their joint name, his anxious wish for the termination of hostilities, but remained firm to

* The preamble to Caulaincourt's instructions bore:—"The Emperor's intention is to negotiate with Russia a peace which may be glorious to her, and which may make Austria pay for her bad faith, and the false policy which she pursued in exasperating France and Russia against each other. The Emperor Alexander will easily rebut these arguments, by insisting on the radical evil of the existence of the grand duchy of Warsaw; and that will naturally lead, after abundance of mystery and diplomatic reserve on both sides, to the propositions which we make, which, on condition of secresy, you are to propose as follows." Then follow the conditions stated in the text.—NAPOLEON'S *Instructions to* CAULAINCOURT, *18th May* 1813. JOMINI, iv. 296.

his engagements with the Allies, and the cause of European independence. Nothing, however, can paint Napoleon better, or evince more clearly his invariable policy to sacrifice honour, probity, and resentment to present expedience, than the tenor of these proposals. At the very time that he was making so striking a parade in the eyes of Europe, of his firm regard for, and inviolable fidelity to the King of Saxony, who had risked his crown in his cause, he was secretly proposing to Russia to despoil him of all his acquisitions, by tearing from his brow the grand-ducal crown of Poland: at the moment that he was urging the Poles, by every consideration of patriotism and honour, to abide by his banners, as the only ones which could lead to the restoration of their lost nationality, he was himself suggesting its total destruction, by incorporating the grand duchy of Warsaw with the Prussian monarchy, and making Warsaw the Prussian capital; and while he was loudly denouncing the perfidy of Prussia, in abandoning his alliance, as naturally leading to its erasure from the book of nations, he was prepared to augment it by nearly five millions of Poles, provided in so doing he threw it towards the Russian frontier, and secured the extension of Westphalia as far as the Oder to his brother Jerome.[1]

[1] Jom. iv. 297, 299. Plotho. Guerra, 1813, i. 204. Lucches. iii. 425. Hard. xii. 159.

While these important negotiations were in progress at the French headquarters, the allied sovereigns had retired to the superb position, which they had selected and fortified with care, on the heights around Bautzen. Considerable reinforcements had there reached the army: several new corps of Prussians, under Kleist, burning for the liberation of the fatherland, had arrived; and Thorn having capi-

Forces of the opposite armies at Bautzen.

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tulated, on the 17th April, in consequence of the miserable state of the garrison, two thousand strong, and the accidental explosion of the principal powder magazine, Barclay de Tolly, who commanded the besieging force, had immediately broke up from the banks of the Vistula, and marched with such diligence, that he reached the allied headquarters in Silesia on the 15th May, bringing with him a powerful reinforcement of fourteen thousand veteran soldiers. These, with other Russian detachments which had come up from the rear, amounted in all to twenty-five thousand men; and after deducting the loss at Lutzen, and the subsequent combats, made the army nearly ninety thousand strong—full ten thousand more than it had been in the last battle. But, on the other hand, the forces of Napoleon had increased in a still greater proportion; and it was already evident at the allied headquarters, that till the great reinforcements, under Sacken and Benningsen, came up from the interior of Russia, they had no chance of combating the French with any prospect of success, but by the aid of strong intrenchments. Not only were the Saxon troops, fourteen thousand strong, including three thousand excellent cavalry, now added to Napoleon's army, and their fortresses on the Elbe converted into a secure refuge in case of disaster, but the Wirtemberg contingent, eight thousand good troops, had arrived; the heavy cavalry of Latour Maubourg, the Italian horse of General Fresia, and the second division of the young guard, under Barrois, had also joined the army. Altogether, Napoleon's forces, under his own immediate command, were now raised to a hundred and fifty thousand men, of whom sixteen thousand were

April 17.

May 15.

admirable cavalry.* The Allies, therefore, were now overmatched in the proportion of nearly two to one; and it was evident that, whatever the strength of the position at Bautzen might be, it was liable to be turned and rendered untenable by an enemy having such superior forces at his command.[1]

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[1] Vict. et Conq. xxii. 48. Précis, Schoell, Rec. ii. 317. Fain, i. 398, 399. Jom. iv. 299.

The Allies had availed themselves of the ten days' respite from active operations, which they had enjoyed since the evacuation of Dresden, to strengthen the position they had selected in a very formidable manner. Their principal stronghold was placed on the famous knolls of Klein Bautzen and Kreckwitz, where Frederick the Great found an asylum after his disaster at Hochkirch, and where the strength of his position enabled him to bid defiance to the superior and victorious army of Count Daun. The ground which the allied army now occupied was an uneven surface, in the middle of a country in the hollows of which several small lakes were to be found; while its eminences terminated for the most part in little monticules or cones, forming so many citadels, where artillery could most advantageously be placed, commanding the whole open country at their feet. The position in this uneven surface, which they had chosen for their battle field, was composed of a series of heights, running from the great frontier chain of Bohemia to the neighbourhood of the little lakes of Malschwitz and the village of Klix, behind which the right was stationed in a situation difficult of access. The Spree ran along the whole front of the position, and it was difficult to approach it in that direction, as well on account of the

Description of the position of Bautzen.

* "The new arrivals, with the troops who fought at Lutzen, presented a total at the Emperor's command of 150,000 combatants."—*Vict. et Conq.* xxii. 48.

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broken nature of the ground, and the variety of ravines, with streamlets in their bottom, by which it was intersected; as of the number of villages, constituting so many forts, occupied by the Allies, contained within its limits, and the hills planted with cannon, which commanded the whole open country. The principal of these villages were Klein Bautzen, Preititz, Klix, and Kreckwitz. This was the first line of defence; but behind it, at the distance of three miles in the rear, was a second line, strengthened by intrenchments more contracted than the former, and still more capable of a protracted defence. This position, commencing at the village of Hochkirch on the one flank, extended through Bautzen, and the three villages of Baswitz, Inckowitz, and Kubchitz, and then fell back behind the marshy stream of the Kayna, terminated at the heights of Kreckwitz, which overhang the Spree.[1]

[1] Fain, i. 403, 404. Odel. i. 86. Jom. iv. 300. Précis, Schoell, ii. 320, 321.

Reconnoissance of Napoleon, and his general plan of attack.

The first design of Napoleon was to make his principal attack on the left wing of the Allies, which rested on the mountains which separate Saxony from Bohemia. After a minute reconnoissance, however, he was diverted from this design, by observing the depth and intricacy of the wooded ravines and dells which intersected the slope of the mountains in that direction, and which might altogether obstruct the advance of his cavalry and artillery in that quarter. He continued his reconnoitring, therefore, along the whole line, and at eight at night advanced to the village of Klein Wilke, almost within musket-shot of the outposts of the enemy, and then his plan of attack was formed. Orders had some time before been dispatched to Ney, who had passed the Elbe at Torgau with his own corps and that of Victor and Lauriston, to incline to his right, and, in-

stead of moving on Berlin, as originally intended, to cut across the country, and come up so as to form the extreme left of the army in the great battle which was expected near Bautzen. These orders reached Ney on the 17th, and he immediately commenced his cross march, and had already arrived in the neighbourhood of the army on the evening of the 19th. It was on his wing, which was fully sixty thousand strong, that Napoleon relied for his principal effort, and placed his chief hopes of success, in attacking the enemy's position.[1]

[1] Jom. iv. 301, 302. Fain. i. 412, 413. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 46, 47.

Ney, however, advanced in echelons, Lauriston in front, next his own corps, then Victor with the Saxons, in the close of the array. The country through which his march lay, when he approached Bautzen, was in great part covered with woods; and this led to a very serious check being experienced in that quarter. To open up the communication with Ney, Napoleon detached Bertrand's corps towards the left, which soon got involved in the woods in which the Marshal was already entangled. The Allies having received intelligence of the approach of this double body of the enemy, dispatched Kleist with his Prussians to meet the first, and Barclay with the Russian veterans to encounter the second. Various success attended these different divisions. Bertrand's Italians leisurely reposing in loose order after dinner, without any proper look-out, in a wood near Konigswartha, were surprised and totally routed by Barclay de Tolly, with the loss of two thousand prisoners and eleven pieces of cannon. The whole division dispersed, and it was only by taking refuge in the neighbouring neutral territory of Bohemia that the great bulk of them, above twenty thousand strong, escaped. During the action, the village of Konigswartha took fire, and was re-

Disaster of Bertrand, and balanced success on the French left.

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duced to ashes. D'York at the same time encountered the whole corps of Lauriston near Weissig, and being unexpectedly assailed by superior forces, he was unable to keep his ground, though his troops fought with the most determined bravery: he was worsted with the loss of above two thousand men, so that success and disaster were nearly balanced on the left of the army.[1]

[1] Odel. i. 87, 88. Fain, i. 403, 405, 412. Jom. iv. 300, 303. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 46, 47. Lond. 39.

Distribution of the French allied army in these positions.

The main position on which the Allies intended to give battle, and on the strength of which they relied to counterbalance the vast numerical superiority of the enemy, was the second line from Hochkirch to Kreckwitz. Though it was not intended to abandon the first line along the banks of the Spree without a struggle, yet this was only with a view to take off the first edge of the enemy's attack by resistance there, and it was in this concentrated position in the rear, which was strongly fortified by redoubts, that

May 20.

the real stand was to be made. The allied army, for this purpose, was a good deal scattered over the ground on which it was to combat, and on the morning of the 20th occupied the following positions:— On the left, Berg and D'York were stationed from Jenkowitz to Barchutz, with ten thousand Prussians. The plain from thence to Kreckwitz was not occupied by any infantry in the first line; it was thought to be sufficiently protected by the superb regiments of Prussian cuirassiers, which were stationed at its upper extremity in the second line, and by the heights of Kreckwitz, crowned with Blucher's guns, which commanded its whole extent. Blucher's infantry, about eighteen thousand strong, extended from Kreckwitz to Pliskowitz; and further on, beyond the little lakes, Barclay was stationed with fourteen thousand Russians near Glëina. Milaradowitch, with ten thousand Russians, was placed in front of the whole, in

Bautzen and its environs, with Kleist and five thousand Prussians near him on the heights of Berg. The second line consisted of the Russian Guards and reserve, sixteen thousand strong, who were about a mile in the rear behind the left and centre; and near them were the magnificent Russian cuirassiers, eight thousand in number, who seemed more than a match for any French horse which could be brought against them.[1]

[1] Précis, in Schoell, ii. 321, 322. Jom. i. 302, 303. Lond. 43, 44. Kausler, 869.

General aspect of the allied position.

The whole line of the Allies, which thus formed a sort of semicircle, convex to the outside, was somewhat above two leagues in length. But the chain of mountains on the Bohemian frontier, on which its left rested, required to be in part occupied itself, which rendered it necessary to extend the line above half a league further in that direction. These mountains very nearly resembled those which flanked the extreme left of the English army at the battle of Talavera; and their natural strength was much increased by batteries skilfully disposed. The marshes in the centre were a serious impediment, and the villages there were strongly intrenched, while the numerous guns, placed on the summit of the conical hills on the right centre, commanded the whole plain in that direction; but the country beyond this was open, and intersected by roads in all directions, and the Russian extreme right was therefore removed, and in a manner detached from the rest of the army, so that there was no obstacle to the enemy's passing round the flank of the Allies in that quarter; and it was easy to foresee, as well from the disposition he was making of his troops, as the known skill of the Emperor, that it was there that his principal effort would be made.[2]

[2] Lond. 42, 43. Précis in Schoell, ii. 323, 324. Odel. i. 91.

On the morning of the 20th, Napoleon made his

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disposition for the attack at all points. Wisely judging that the right wing of the Allies was the vulnerable point, he accumulated forces in that direction, so as to put at Ney's disposal nearly eighty thousand men. Lauriston, commanding the array on the left, received orders to pass the Spree, and move upon Klix, and from thence press on round the right flank of the enemy towards Wurschen and Weissenberg, so as to appear in their rear when the engagement in front was hottest. On the right, the allied positions in the mountains were to be assailed by Oudinot, near Sinkowitz; to his left, Macdonald was to throw a bridge of rafts over the Spree and assault Bautzen; half a league to his left, Marmont was directed to throw another bridge over the same river, and advance to the attack in the centre; the whole of the corps there were put under the direction of Soult, while the reserves and the guards were in the rear, on the great road leading to Bischoffswerda, behind Bautzen, ready to succour any point that might require assistance. In this way the Emperor calculated that, while the Allies along their whole front would be equally matched, and possibly hard pressed, an overwhelming force of sixty thousand men would suddenly appear in their rear, and decide the victory—an able conception, which his great superiority of numbers enabled him to carry completely into execution, and which bore a close resemblance to the famous circular sweep of Davoust, which led to such brilliant results at Ulm, and the corresponding march of Blucher from Wavre to La Belle Alliance, which proved so fatal to Napoleon at Waterloo.[1]

Plan of Napoleon's attack. May 20.

[1] Vict. et Conq. xxii. 48, 49. Jom. iv. 303, 304. Fain, i. 405.

At nine o'clock on the following morning, the Emperor was on horseback; but such was the distance which the greater part of the columns had to

march before they reached their destined point of attack, that it was near eleven o'clock before the passage of the Spree commenced. A powerful array of cannon was, in the first instance, brought up by the Emperor, and disposed along every projection which commanded the opposite bank; and the fire, as far as the eye could reach, looking from the heights near Bautzen, both to the right and left, became very violent; for the enemies' batteries answered with great spirit, and the vast extent of the line of smoke, as well as the faint sound of the distant guns, gave an awful impression of the magnitude of the forces engaged on both sides. Under cover of this cannonade, the bridges in the centre were soon established, and then a still more animating spectacle presented itself. The Emperor took his station on a commanding eminence on the banks of the Spree, near the point where Marmont's bridge was established, from whence he could see over the whole field of battle, direct the movements of the troops, and enjoy the splendid spectacle which presented itself. And never in truth had war appeared in a more imposing form, nor had the astonishing amount of the forces at the disposal of the French emperor ever been more conspicuous. On all sides, the troops, preceded by their artillery, which kept up an incessant fire on the banks of the river, advanced rapidly towards the stream: at first the plain seemed covered with a confused multitude of horses, cannon, chariots, and men, stretching as far as the eye could reach, impressive only from its immensity; but gradually the throng assumed the appearance of order. The cavalry, infantry, and artillery, separated and defiled each to their respective points of passage,[1] and the

Passages of the Spree, and commencement of the action.

[1] Fain, i. 405, 406. Odel. i. 89. Lond. 44, 45. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 48. Kausler, 870.

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marvels of military discipline appeared in their highest lustre.

Severe action on the French right.

The French artillery, however, was superior to that of the Allies on the banks of the river, and it was not there that preparations for a serious resistance had been made. Generally speaking, therefore, the passage was effected without much opposition: Bautzen, being no longer tenable as an isolated advanced post in the midst of the enemy, was evacuated by the Allies, who withdrew the troops that occupied it to the other side of the river, and taken possession of by Macdonald, who immediately caused his men to defile over its arch over the Spree; while Marmont threw four bridges across below the town, over which his whole corps was speedily transported, and Oudinot crossed without difficulty near Grubschutz, and immediately began to advance towards the heights at the foot of the Bohemian mountains, on which the left of the Allies was posted. By five o'clock in the afternoon, the river was passed at all points, and the troops were moving towards the eminences occupied by the enemy; but it was already evident, from the distance at which their principal forces were stationed, that no serious conflict would take place till the following day. On the French right, however, the action soon became extremely warm: Oudinot there pressed with indefatigable activity up the hills which form the Bohemian frontier, and which rose like an amphitheatre to bound the field of battle in that direction. The ascending line of the smoke, and flashes of the artillery among the overhanging woods, soon showed the progress he was making; while the Bohemian echoes rolled back the roar of the artillery, and the glancing of the musketry was

to be seen through the shadows of the woods, now darkened by the approaching night. Prince Wirtemberg, however, and St Priest's divisions of Milaradowitch's corps, maintained themselves with invincible resolution in these woody fastnesses; and when the Emperor Alexander, who commanded the Russians in person, saw that they were obliged to fall back, and were beginning to be overmatched, he reinforced them by three brigades of infantry and one of cavalry, under General Diebitch, which restored the combat in that quarter, and the Russians maintained themselves for the night in the villages of Preilitz, Mehltheuer, and Falkenberg, still keeping possession of the crest and commanding points of the mountains, while the French were far advanced in the valleys which furrowed their sides.[1]

[1] Kausler, 871. Fain, i. 407. Précis in Schoell, ii. 325, 326. Lond. 45.

While this obstinate conflict was going on among the hills on the allied left, a still more serious attack was made on Kleist's Prussians on the heights of Burg, and the remainder of Milaradowitch's corps, under himself in person, on the eminences in rear of Bautzen, to which the Russians had retired after the evacuation of that town. At noon, General Milaradowitch was violently assailed by Campans' division, followed by the whole of Marmont's corps, while Bonnet advanced towards Nieder Kayna, and commenced an attack on Kleist. The resistance, however, was as obstinate as the attack; and Napoleon, deeming it essential to his plan to make a great impression in that quarter, in order to withdraw attention from the grand movement he was preparing on his left, brought forward the whole of Bertrand's corps, still, notwithstanding its losses, above twenty-four thousand strong, with Latour Maubourg's formi-

Serious conflict in the centre.

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dable cuirassiers, to support Marmont and Macdonald. Above fifty thousand combatants were thus accumulated in the centre, supported by a powerful artillery; and the Allies, being not more than half the number at that point, were constrained to retire. This was done, however, in the finest order; the troops halting and facing about, by alternate companies, to fire, as they slowly withdrew towards the intrenched camp, their artillery keeping up an incessant discharge on the pursuing columns. The French centre, meanwhile, steadily advanced, and, as soon as they reached it, assaulted Kleist's troops on the heights of Burg with great gallantry. Despite all their efforts, however, the brave Prussians maintained their ground with undaunted resolution: their young ranks were thinned, but quailed not beneath the enemy's fire; and, seeing that they could not carry the position by an attack in front, the assailants attacked the village of Nieder Gurkau on its right, in order to threaten it in flank. Here, however, they experienced so vigorous a resistance from Rudiger's men of Blucher's corps, some regiments of which had been detached, under Ziethen, to occupy that important post; and the fire from Blucher's guns, on his commanding heights immediately behind, was so violent; that, after sustaining immense losses, they were obliged to desist from the attempt; and it was not till seven at night, that, by bringing up the celebrated 10th regiment of light infantry to the charge, the village was at length carried. Then the whole allied centre slowly retired over the plateau of Nadelwitz, to their intrenched camp in the rear;[1] but Blucher still retained his advanced position on the heights of Kreckwitz, from the summit of which his artillery

[1] Précis in Schoell, ii. 324, 325. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 49, 50. Fain, i. 407, 408. Kausler, 872, 873.

never ceased to thunder, as from a fiery volcano, in all directions, till utter darkness drew a veil over the field of battle.

By the Emperor's orders, the French troops bivouacked in squares on the ground they had won with so much difficulty; but, though the Spree was passed at all points, and the right and centre considerably advanced over the ground occupied in the morning by the enemy, yet the enormous losses they had sustained proved the desperate nature of the conflict in which they were engaged, and inspired the troops with melancholy presages as to the issue of the battle on the morrow. Kleist and Ziethen's Prussians in particular, though in great part young troops, who had seen fire for the first time that day, had evinced the most heroic bravery; no ground had been won from them but by the force of overwhelming numbers, and above ten thousand French or Italians lay weltering in their blood, around the heights, from which the Prussians had drawn off every gun, every chariot, every wounded man. Napoleon, however, who was aware where the decisive blow was to be struck, was little concerned for the frightful carnage in his centre; his object had been gained by ground having been won, and the enemy compelled to concentrate their forces in that quarter; and the sound of distant cannon on his extreme left, as well as the light of burning villages, which illuminated that quarter of the heavens, told how soon Ney would be in action in that direction. In effect, that marshal had crossed the Spree, near Klix; and though Barclay de Tolly still held that village, and lay in strength betwixt it and Malschwitz, yet he was entirely ignorant of the strength of the enemy to whom he was soon to be opposed, and altogether unequal to

Results of the first day's battle.

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the task of preventing the right of the Allies from being turned by the immense masses by whom he was surrounded on the following day. Napoleon, therefore, highly satisfied with the result of the first day's engagement, retired for the night to Bautzen, having first dispatched orders to Oudinot, to renew the combat by daybreak on the following morning, among the hills on the right, in order to fix the enemy's attention on that part of the line, and prevent any adequate succour being sent to avert the tremendous stroke he was to deliver on his left.[1]

[1] Kausler, 872, 874. Jom. iv. 304. Fain, i. 407, 409. Odel. i. 90. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 49, 50.

Battle on the 21st. Success of the Russians on the right.

By five o'clock on the morning of the 21st, the fire began with unwearied vigour in the wooded recesses of the Bohemian hills, and the echoes rang even to the summit of the Kunewald. The Emperor Alexander, however, had sent such considerable reinforcements during the night to that quarter, that Milaradowitch was enabled not only to repulse the attacks on his position on the heights of Mehltheuer, but to drive the enemy back to a considerable distance beyond Binowitz. Napoleon, alarmed at this unexpected turn of events on that side, immediately ordered up Macdonald's corps to the support of Oudinot; and at the same time immense masses, above forty thousand strong, were deployed in the centre, in front of Bautzen, to arrest the attention of the enemy, but still out of cannon-shot, as it was not his intention to expose his troops to the murderous fire of the allied artillery on the heights of Kreckwitz, from which they had suffered so much on the preceding day. Before Macdonald, however, could get up to his assistance, Oudinot was so hard pressed that he was unable to maintain his ground; step by step the Russian tirailleurs gained upon the Bavarian sharpshooters in the woods;[2] and at length he

[2] Kausler, 876, 877. Odel. i. 91, 92. Précis in Schoell, ii. 327, 328. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 51.

was fairly driven out of the hills, and forced to assume a defensive position in the plain at their feet, where the arrival of Macdonald enabled him to stop the progress of the enemy.

Though much disconcerted by this ill success on his right, Napoleon was only desirous to gain time, and maintain his ground in front of Bautzen in the centre, as the progress and great superiority of Ney on the left, rendered it a matter of certainty, that ere long the Allies would be turned on their right, and forced to retreat. Marmont and Bertrand's batteries, accordingly, were brought up to the foremost heights occupied by the French in that part of the field, and soon engaged in a tremendous cannonade with that of the Allies; though the latter, placed on higher ground and fully better served, maintained its superiority, and rendered any attack by the masses of infantry in that quarter too perilous to be attempted. Meanwhile, the Emperor listened anxiously for the sound of Ney's cannon on the extreme left, as that was the signal for which he waited to order a general attack in the centre to favour that decisive operation. In effect, that marshal, at the head of his own corps and those of Lauriston, had early in the morning advanced against the position of Barclay, near Gleina, while Victor's corps and Regnier's Saxons were directed, by a wider circuit, to turn his extreme right by the wood and heights of Baruth, and get entirely into the rear of the Allies. Barclay's veterans were advantageously placed on the heights of Windmuhlenberg, near Gleina; and the strength of their position, joined to the admirable fire of the artillery on its summit, long enabled these iron veterans of the Moscow campaign to make head against the superior numbers of the enemy. At

Progress of the battle in the centre and left.

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length, however, the approach of Regnier and Victor's corps turned the position in flank, and Barclay was obliged to fall back, fighting all the way, to the heights of Baruth. There Kleist was detached to his support; but his corps, reduced to little more than three thousand men by the losses of the preceding day, could not restore the action in that quarter; and at eleven o'clock, Souham, with the leading division of Ney and Lauriston's corps, made himself master of the village of Preilitz, near Klein Bautzen, behind Blucher's right, and between him and Barclay.[1]

[1] Jom. iv. 304. Précis in Schoell, ii. 328, 329. Kausler, 878, 879. Fain, i. 413, 414. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 50, 51.

Great effect of the movement of Ney on the left.

This important success promised the most momentous consequences; for not only was Preilitz directly in the rear of Blücher's position, so that the right of the Allies was now completely turned, but it communicated with Klein Bautzen, through which, or Kreckwitz, lay the sole communication of that general with the remainder of the army, so as to render it a matter of certainty that he must either follow the retrograde movement of Barclay, and uncover the whole right of the Allies, or be cut off. Ney's orders, communicated by General Jomini, his chief of the staff, were to march straight on the steeples of Hochkirch, while Lauriston moved by Baruth and Belgern in the same direction. In this instance the inspiration of genius had anticipated the orders of authority; for Napoleon's instructions, written in pencil on the morning of the 21st, were only to be at Preilitz by eleven o'clock, whereas Ney was within half a mile of it by ten. The Emperor was lying on the ground in the centre, under the shelter of a height, a little in front of Bautzen, at breakfast, when the sound of Ney's guns in that direction was heard. At the same time, a bomb burst over

his head. Without paying any attention to the latter circumstance, he immediately wrote a note in pencil to Marie Louise, to announce that the victory was gained; and instantly mounting his horse, set off at the gallop with his staff to the left, and ascending a height near Nieder Kayna, from whence he could descry the whole field of battle in the centre, directed Soult, with the four corps under his orders, to assault with the bayonet the numerous conical knolls crowned with artillery, which formed the strength of the Allies in that quarter, in order to distract their attention, and prevent them from sending succours to Blucher on their right.[1]

[1] Odel. i. 92, 93. Kausler, 878. Jom. iv. 304, 305. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 51.

Blucher, who was fully alive to the importance of the village of Preititz, immediately made a great effort to regain it. Kleist was detached with the whole remains of his corps; and several Russian regiments of infantry, with two regiments of Prussian cuirassiers, were sent in the same direction. The arrival of these fresh troops, who vied with each other in the ardour of their attack, enabled the Allies to regain the village, and drive out Souham, who was routed with great slaughter, and thrown back on the remainder of his corps in a state of utter confusion; while twenty of Blucher's guns, playing on the flank of Ney's dense columns, did dreadful execution, and caused him to swerve from the direction of the steeples of Hochkirch, and establish himself on some heights behind Klein Bautzen, from whence his artillery could reply on equal terms to that of the enemy. This check probably saved the Allies from a total rout, by causing Ney to pause and vacillate in the midst of his important advance until his reserves came up, and Victor and Regnier had arrived abreast of his men; whereby the allied

Preititz is retaken by Blucher, and Ney checked.

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sovereigns had time to take the proper measures to ward off the danger, by sending every disposable man and gun in that direction, where they had never hitherto apprehended any serious attack, and preparing for a general retreat. It was not till one o'clock in the afternoon, that Ney deemed himself in sufficient strength to resume the offensive; and by that time the season of decisive success had passed away; the chaussée through Hochkirch, in the rear of the whole allied army, could no longer be gained, and the victory at best would be barren of results.[1]

[1] Odel. i. 92, 93. Précis in Schoell, ii. 331, 332. Jom. iv. 306, 307. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 51, 52.

Napoleon, however, made a vigorous effort, by a combined attack on the centre and left of the enemy, to effect a total overthrow. Seeing the allied centre in some degree bared of troops by the powerful succours which had been sent to the right, he ordered Soult to make a general attack with the four corps under his command in the centre; while, at the same time, the terrible artillery of the guard was brought up to reply to the enemy's batteries on the heights of Kreckwitz. These orders were promptly obeyed. Marmont, Mortier, Bertrand, and Latour Maubourg, put themselves at the head of their respective corps of cavalry and infantry; while the Imperial Guard, in deep array, advanced in their rear to support the attack. Eighty thousand men, in admirable order, moved against the redoubtable heights, the guns from which had so long carried death through the French ranks; while a hundred pieces of cannon, disposed on the highest points of the ground which they traversed, kept up a vehement fire on the enemy's batteries. This grand attack soon changed the fortune of the day. Blucher, now assailed in front by Marmont, in flank by

Grand attack of Napoleon on the allied centre.

Bertrand, and in rear by Ney, was soon obliged to recall Kleist and the other reinforcements which he had sent to the assistance of Barclay de Tolly; and in consequence, Ney, whose reserves had at length come up, was enabled not only to retake Preititz without difficulty, but to spread out his light troops over the whole level ground as far as Wurschen. The allied right was thus entirely turned: and any advantage which Blucher and Barclay de Tolly might gain, would only increase the danger of their position, by drawing them on towards the Spree, while a superior force of the enemy was interposed between them and the main body of their army.[1]

[1] Jom. iv. 308, 309. Odel. i. 92, 93. Fain, i. 414, 415. Kausler, 880, 881. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 52, 53.

In these critical circumstances the allied sovereigns resolved to retreat. They might, indeed, by bringing up the reserves, and the Russian and Prussian guards, have without difficulty regained the ground they had lost on the right, and again advanced their standards to the Spree: but as long as Lauriston and Regnier were in their rear, such success would only have augmented their ultimate danger; just as a similar success on the left of the British at Waterloo would have enhanced the perils of Napoleon's position, when Blucher, with sixty thousand Prussians, was menacing the chaussée of La Belle Alliance. It had, from the outset of the campaign, also been part of their fixed policy, never to place themselves in danger of undergoing a total defeat, but to take advantage of their numerous cavalry to cover their retreat, whenever the issue of an action seemed doubtful; being well aware that the superiority of their physical resources and moral energy would thus in the end, especially if the accession of Austria were obtained,[2] secure to them the

The Allies resolve to retreat.

[2] Précis in Schoell, ii. 35. Jom. iv. 308, 309. Odel. i. 93, 94. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 52, 53.

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victory. Orders were given, therefore, to both Barclay and Blucher to retreat; and the whole allied army, arrayed in two massy columns, began to retire; the Russians by the road of Hochkirch and Lobau; the Prussians by Wurschen and Weissenberg.

Sublime spectacle when the allied army retreated.

Then was seen in its highest lustre the admirable arrangements of modern discipline, and the noble feelings with which both armies were animated. Seated on the summit of the Hohenberg, near Neider Kayna, from whence he could survey a great part of the field of battle, Napoleon calmly directed the movements of his army; and the mighty host which he commanded, now roused to the highest pitch, and moving on in perfect array, pressed at all points upon the retiring columns of the enemy. It was at once a sublime and animating spectacle, when, at the voice of this mighty wizard, a hundred and fifty thousand men, spread over a line of three leagues in length, from the Bohemian mountains on the right to the forest of Baruth on the left, suddenly started, as it were, into life, and moved majestically forward, like a mighty wave, bearing the light and smoke of the guns as sparkling foam on its crest. The greater part of this vast inundation poured into the valley of Neider Kayna in the centre, and the declining sun glanced on the forests of bayonets, and the dazzling lines of helmets, sabres, and cuirasses, with which the level space at its bottom was filled; while the heights of Kreckwitz, yet in the hands of the enemy, thundered forth a still increasing fire on all sides, like a volcano encircled by flame. Soon the receding line of fire, and the light of the burning villages, told that the consuming torrent was rapidly advancing through the valley; and at length the cannonade

ceased on the summits of Kreckwitz; and Blucher's columns, dark and massy, were seen slowly wending their way to the rear. In vain, however, the French cuirassiers, eight thousand strong, were now hurried to the front, and endeavoured by repeated charges to throw the enemy into confusion, so as to convert the retreat into a flight; the Russian cavalry was too powerful, the allied array too perfect, to permit any advantage being gained. A hundred and twenty French guns preceded the line of the pursuers, and thundered on the retiring columns of the enemy; but the Russian and Prussian artillery were equally powerful, and taking advantage of the numerous eminences which the line of retreat afforded, played with destructive effect on the advancing masses; while their numerous and magnificent cavalry repulsed every attempt to charge which the French horsemen made. Gradually the fire became less violent as the Allies receded from the field; the intrenched position was abandoned on all sides; and at length the cannonade entirely ceased, and night drew her veil over that field of carnage and of glory.[1]

[1] Fain, i. 415, 417. Kausler, 882, 883. Odel. i. 94, 95. Précis in Schoell, ii. 332, 333. Jom. iv. 309, 310. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 53, 54.

Napoleon's tent was pitched for the night near the inn of Klein-Burchwitz, in the middle of the squares of his faithful guard; while Ney established himself at Wurschen, where the allied sovereigns had had their headquarters the night before. It was from the former place that the Emperor dictated the bulletin of the battle, as well as the following decree, which all lovers of the arts, as well as admirers of patriotic virtue, must regret was prevented, by his fall, from being carried into execution:—"A monument shall be erected on Mont Cenis; on the most conspicuous face the following inscription shall be written—'The Emperor Napoleon, from the field of Wurschen, has ordered

Napoleon's proposal for a monument on Mont Cenis, to commemorate this epoch.

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the erection of this monument, in testimony of his gratitude to the people of France and Italy. This monument will transmit from age to age the remembrance of that great epoch, when, in the space of three months, twelve hundred thousand men flew to arms to protect the integrity of the French empire.'" [1]

[1] Fain, i. 417, 418. Odel. i. 97.

Admirable conduct of the Emperor Alexander during the battle.

The Emperor Alexander commanded the allied armies in person at Bautzen; the ill success at Lutzen having weakened the confidence of the soldiers in Wittgenstein, and the jealousies of the generals rendering the appointment of any inferior officer a matter of great difficulty. With the King of Prussia by his side, he took the entire direction of the movements; and displayed a judgment in council, and coolness in danger, which excited universal admiration. It was with difficulty that the entreaties of those around him could prevent him from advancing too far into the fire for the duties of a commander-in-chief; as it was, he incurred the greatest danger, and near Bautzen narrowly escaped falling into the hands of the enemy. The conduct of the retreat, in the face of the immense force which thundered in pursuit, was a model of skill and judgment; every eminence, every enclosure, every stream, which offered an opportunity of arresting the enemy, was taken advantage of with admirable ability; and such were the losses which the French sustained in pressing on the unconquerable rearguard, that, at daybreak on the following morning, the Russians still held the heights of Weissenberg, within cannon-shot of the field of battle.[2]

[2] Lond. 46. Odel. i. 97, 98. Michaud, Biog. Univ. Sup. i. 176. Fain, i. 414. Kausler, 883.

The loss of the French in the battle of Bautzen was considerably greater than that of the Allies—an unusual circumstance with a victorious army, but

which is easily explained by the carnage occasioned in Napoleon's masses by the Prussian artillery, in position on the numerous eminences which commanded the field of battle, and by the perfect order with which the retreat was conducted. The Allies lost in the two days 15,000 men killed and wounded; and the French took 1500 prisoners, most of them wounded, but neither cannon nor artillery graced their triumph; and their own loss was fully 19,000 killed and wounded on the field alone, independent of those on the previous day; insomuch that 20,000 wounded were lodged, two days after the battle, at Bautzen, and the villages in its environs; while 5000 were killed outright on the field of battle.* A

Losses on both sides in the battle.

* "Twenty-two thousand were brought into the hospitals of the Grand Army, from the 1st May to the 1st June 1813, without counting those of the enemy."—BARON LARREY, iv. 177. And this return embraced only the serious cases. So great was the number of persons slightly wounded, who were not admitted to the hospitals, that it was strongly suspected at the time that many, especially of the Italian conscripts, had intentionally wounded themselves slightly in the hand, in order to avoid, at least for a time, the dangers and fatigues of the campaign. The number so wounded was no less than two thousand six hundred and thirty-two. The Emperor strongly inclined to the same opinion, and was preparing a severe decree on the subject, when he was diverted from his design by the humane and politic Larrey, who proved, by actual experiment, that inexperienced troops, firing three deep, were extremely apt to injure the hands of the front rank; and in this report the Emperor deemed it prudent to acquiesce.—See *Souvenirs de* CAULAINCOURT, i. 170, 172; and LARREY, iv. 171, 179. But General Mathieu Dumas, who saw great numbers of these wounded at Dresden, has recorded a clear opinion, that many of these wounds were self-inflicted:—"I observed," says he, "with keen regret, many of the wounded but slightly hurt; the greater part young conscripts who had recently joined the army, and who had not been injured by the fire of the enemy, but had themselves mutilated their feet and hands. Such accidents of bad augury had also been observed during the campaign of 1809. The Emperor interrogated me closely on the subject, and as I made no concealment of the truth, he ordered an enquiry. The report of the commission, however, was opposed to my too well-founded observations; and the Emperor believed, or feigned to believe, those

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great number of the wounded were slightly hurt only in the hands and feet—an ominous circumstance which had been observed also in the campaign of 1809 on the Danube, and bespoke the anxiety of the conscripts to escape from these scenes of carnage. The Saxon peasants displayed unbounded kindness to these unhappy sufferers; without regard to side, nation, or language, they received them into their cottages, and did all in their power to mitigate their distresses; and, not contented with waiting till the sufferers were brought into their dwellings, themselves issued forth to seek them on the field. On all sides were to be seen men, women, and children, carrying litters, pushing wheelbarrows, or drawing little carts, laden with wounded men; Russians were laid beside French, Prussians beside Italians; the women tended the dying, and bandaged the wounds alike of friend and foe: all the animosity of the contest was forgotten; and at the close of one of the bloodiest battles recorded in modern times, was to be seen the glorious spectacle of Christian charity healing the wounds and assuaging the sufferings equally of the victors and the vanquished.[1]

[1] Précis in Schoell, ii. 334. Fain, 96, 97. Odel. i. 96. Lond. 49. Kausler, 884.

Combat of Reichenbach. May 22.

By daybreak on the following morning, the French army was in motion, and Napoleon, who had hardly allowed himself any rest during the night, in person directed their movements. They soon came up with the rearguard of the enemy, who had marched all night, and now stood firm on the heights behind Reichenbach, in order to gain time for the immense files of chariots, cannon, and wounded men to defile by the roads in their rear. Milaradowitch had the

who, to pay their court to him, disguised the truth on a painful but important subject.—*Souvenirs de* DUMAS, iii. 507.

command; and the veterans of the Moscow campaign were prepared to defend the position to the last extremity; while forty pieces of cannon were admirably placed on the summit, and a large body of cuirassiers on the slopes seemed intentionally situated for an opportunity to come to blows with the horsemen of the French. Struck with the strength of this position, as well as the determined countenance of the allied force which occupied it, Napoleon paused, and engaged only in a cannonade till the cavalry of the Guard came up. Reichenbach itself, in front of the allied position, occupied by the Russian light troops, was only abandoned after an obstinate conflict; and when the French columns showed themselves on the opposite side, they were torn in pieces by the point-blank discharge of the enemy's batteries from the heights behind. The Russian general sent some of his regiments of cavalry into the plain, where they were immediately charged by the red lancers of the French guard; but the latter were defeated with considerable loss. Napoleon upon this brought up Latour Maubourg, with the whole cavalry of the Guard, six thousand strong, and at the same time made dispositions for outflanking and turning the enemy. These measures were attended with the desired effect, and after several brilliant charges on both sides, the Allies retired to Gorlitz, but in the best order. Enraged at seeing his enemy thus escaping, Napoleon hastened to the advanced posts, and himself pressed on the movements of the troops, insomuch that the rays of the setting sun gleamed on the sabres and bayonets of fifty thousand men, accumulated in a front of a mile and a half in breadth, and closely advancing in pursuit. But it was all in vain. The enemy, proud of the resistance they had made against such superior

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numbers, retired in admirable order, without leaving any thing behind; guns, wounded, caissons, were alike conveyed away, and all the genius of the Emperor, which never shone forth with brighter lustre in directing the movements, could not extract one trophy from their rearguard. Napoleon could not conceal his vexation at beholding the unbroken array of the allied troops thus eluding his grasp, and the skill with which they availed themselves of every eminence to plant their guns and arrest his progress. "What!" said he, "after such a butchery, no results? no prisoners? Those fellows there will not leave us a nail; they rise from their ashes. When will this be done?"[1]

[1] Fain. i. 424, 425. Odel. i. 97, 100. Lond. 50. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 54, 55. Souv. de Caulaincourt, i. 174.

Death of Duroc.

The balls at this moment were flying thick around him, and one of the Emperor's escort fell dead at his feet. "Duroc," said he, turning to the grand marshal, who was by his side, "fortune is resolved to have one of us to-day." Some of his suite observed with a shudder, in an under breath, that it was the anniversary of the battle of Essling, and the death of Lannes.* The melancholy anticipation was not long of being realized. The enemy retired to a fresh position, behind the ravine of Makersdorf; and Napoleon, who was anxious to push on before night to Gorlitz, himself hurried to the front, to urge on the troops who were to dislodge them from the ground which they had occupied to bar the approach to it. His suite followed him, four a-breast, at a rapid trot through a hollow way, in such a cloud of dust that hardly one of the riders could s his right-hand man. Suddenly a cannon-ball glanced from a tree near the Emperor, and struck a file behind, consisting of Mortier, Caulaincourt, Kirgener, and Duroc. In the

* Ante, vii. 346.

confusion and dust, it was not at first perceived who was hurt; but a page soon arrived and whispered in his ear, that Kirgener was killed, and Duroc desperately wounded. Larrey and Ivan instantly came up, but all their efforts were unavailing; Duroc's entrails were torn out, and the dying man was carried into a cottage near Makersdorf. Napoleon, profoundly affected, dismounted, and gazed long on the battery from whence the fatal shot had issued; he then entered the cottage, and ascertained, with tears in his eyes, that there was no hope. "Duroc," said he, pressing the hand of the dying hero, "there is another world, where we shall meet again!" Memorable words, wrung by anguish even from the child of Infidelity and the Revolution! Finally, when it was announced some hours afterwards that all was over, he put into the hands of Berthier, without articulating a word, a paper, ordering the construction of a monument on the spot where he fell, with this inscription:—"Here the General Duroc, Duke of Friuli, grand marshal of the palace of the Emperor Napoleon, gloriously fell, struck by a cannon-ball, and died in the arms of the Emperor, his friend."[1]

[1] Souv. de Caul. i. 176, 179. Odel. i. 100, 101. Fain, i. 427, 429.

Napoleon pitched his tent in the neighbourhood of the cottage where Duroc lay, and seemed for the time altogether overwhelmed by his emotions. The squares of the Old Guard, respecting his feelings, arranged themselves at a distance, and even his most confidential attendants did not, for some time, venture to approach his person. Alone he sat, wrapped in his grey great-coat with his forehead resting on his hands, and his elbows on his knees, a prey to the most agonizing reflections. In vain Caulaincourt and Maret at length requested his attention to the most pressing orders. "To-morrow—every thing," was the only

Mournful scene round the tent of Napoleon.

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reply of the Emperor, as he again resumed his attitude of meditation. A mournful silence reigned around; the groups of officers at a little distance hardly articulated above their breath; gloom and depression appeared in every countenance, while the subdued hum of the soldiers preparing their repast, and the sullen murmur of the artillery waggons as they rolled in the distance, alone told that a mighty host was assembled in the neighbourhood. Slowly the moon rose over this melancholy scene; the heavens became illuminated by the flames of the adjoining villages, which had fallen a prey to the license of the soldiers; while the noble bands of the imperial guard played alternately triumphal and elegiac strains, in the vain hope of distracting the grief of their chief. Could the genius of painting portray the scene, could the soul of poetry be inspired by the feelings which all around experienced, a more striking image could not be presented of the mingled woes and animation of war, of the greatness and weakness of man, of his highest glories, and yet nothingness against the arm of his Creator.[1] *

[1] Odel. i. 101, 103. Fain, i. 427, 429. Souv. de Caul. i. 177, 179.

General despondency of the French generals.

The loss of Duroc, Kirgener, and General Bruyères, who also fell on the same day, as well as the firm countenance and admirable array of the Allies, who retired after a bloody battle, in which they had been worsted, without the loss of cannon

* Napoleon at the time, to testify his regard for Duroc, consigned two hundred napoleons in the hands of the owner of the house, jointly with the clergyman of the parish, for the purpose of erecting a monument to his memory. The monument, however, was never erected; and by an order of the Russian état-major, dated 1st April 1814, the money was reclaimed by the Allies, and not applied to its destined purpose: an unworthy proceeding—forming a striking contrast to the noble conduct of the Archduke Charles, in 1796, regarding the French tomb of General Marceau.—See *Order of* BARON ROSEN, *1st April* 1814, *in* FAIN, i. 430, and Ante, iii. 168.

or prisoners in the pursuit, and with no considerable diminution of baggage, occasioned the most gloomy presentiments in the French army. It was plain that the days of Austerlitz and Jena were past: a great victory had been gained without any result; and the victors, in the pursuit, had sustained both a greater and more serious loss than the vanquished. Little hopes remained of subduing an enemy who thus rose up with renewed vigour from every disaster: with truth might Napoleon have said with Pyrrhus—"Another such victory, and I am undone." Murmurs, regrets, expressions of despair, were heard even among the most resolute; the flames, which rose on all sides as the villages were taken possession of, at once bespoke the obstinacy of the resistance, and the determination of the inhabitants; and even the bravest sometimes exclaimed, on beholding the universal spirit with which the people were animated, "What a war! we shall all leave our remains here." Napoleon was no stranger to the feelings of despondency which were so common even around his headquarters, and he gave vent to his spleen by cutting sarcasms against his principal officers. "I see well, gentlemen," said he, "that you are no longer inclined to make war: Berthier would rather follow the chace at Grosbois; Rapp sighs after his beautiful hotel at Paris. I understand you; I am no stranger to the pleasures of the capital."[1]

[1] Rapp, Mém, 166. Fain, i. 433. Odel. i. 107.

On the 23d, the allied army continued to retreat, still in two columns, after having broken down the bridges over the Neisse: the right column moved upon Waldau, the left upon Lobau. At nine o'clock, the Saxon advanced posts appeared before Gorlitz, and, finding the bridge broken down, after some delay and warm skirmishing, forced the passage of

Retreat of the Allies towards Leignitz.

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the river, and by hastily erecting five new bridges, soon crossed over so large a force as rendered the town no longer tenable by the Allies. The Emperor arrived at Gorlitz a few hours after, and rested there the remainder of that and the whole of the next day, shut up with Caulaincourt in his cabinet, and constantly occupied with diplomatic arrangements. Meanwhile, the Allies continued their retreat, and the French pressed the pursuit in three columns: the right skirting the Bohemian mountains, and following Wittgenstein; the centre following Blucher and Barclay de Tolly on the great road to Leignitz; the left marching upon Glogau, the garrison of which, now blockaded for above three months, anxiously expected their deliverance. Although no attempt was made to defend any positions, yet the French cavalry frequently came up with that of the Allies, and some sharp encounters took place between the horse on both sides; but the dragoons of Napoleon, for the most part cased in cuirasses, or heavily armed, were no match in this desultory warfare for the nimble children of the desert; and the pursuers suffered more under the lances of the Cossacks, than the retreating cavalry did from the French sabres.[1]

[1] Fain, i. 437, 439. Odel. i. 106. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 55, 56.

Combat and defeat of the French near Hainau.

No attempt was made by the Allies to defend the passage of the Queisse, the Bober, or the Katsbach, although their rocky banks and deeply furrowed ravines offered every facility for retarding the advance of the enemy. The Emperor Alexander was making for an intrenched camp prepared near Schweidnitz, and was desirous of avoiding any serious encounter till it was reached. On the 26th, however, an opportunity occurred of striking a considerable blow, near Hainau, upon the advanced

May 26.

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column of Lauriston's corps. After the troops under Maison had passed that town, and were traversing the valley of the Theisse without having explored the surrounding heights, a signal was suddenly given by setting fire to a windmill, and before the French had time to form square, the enemy's cavalry, consisting of three strong Prussian regiments, were upon them. The French dragoons, who were at the head of the column, instantly fled back to Hainau, leaving the infantry to their fate. They were speedily broken, and the whole artillery of the column, consisting of eighteen pieces, taken, with four hundred men made prisoners, besides an equal number killed and wounded, although from the want of horses only twelve of the guns could be brought off. This affair, which cost the life of Colonel Dolfs, the Prussian commander, who gloriously fell in the midst of the enemy's squares, would have been still more decisive but for the uncontrollable impatience of the Prussian dragoons, whose ardour made them break into a charge before the proper moment had arrived; as it was, however, it was one of the most brilliant cavalry actions which occurred during the war, and may justly be placed beside the splendid charge of the heavy German dragoons on the French infantry, on the 23d of July in the preceding year, the day after the battle of Salamanca.[1] *

[1] Ante, viii. 460. Lond. 51, 52. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 56, 37. Odel. i. 106, 107. Fain, i. 440.

Napoleon was severely mortified by this check, not so much from the amount of the loss he had sustained, which, in such a host, was a matter of little importance, but from the decisive proof which it afforded, in the eyes of both armies, of the undiminished spirit and unbroken array of the allied forces. On the very day following, however, his arms had their revenge.

Continuance of the retreat to Leignitz and the Oder.

May 27.

* Ante, viii. 460.

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General Sebastiani, at the head of the cavalry of Victor's corps, which was advancing by forced marches towards Glogau to relieve the garrison, fell in near Sprottau with a Russian convoy, which was moving, unaware of the victory that had been gained, up to the main army, and captured the whole, consisting of twenty-two pieces and sixty tumbrils, with the guard of four hundred men. In other quarters, however, from being longer accustomed to the vicinity of the enemy, the Allies were better on their guard. Eight squadrons of Russian cavalry, on the same day, attacked, near Gottesberg, twelve squadrons of Napoleon's cuirassiers, and defeated them, with the loss of four hundred prisoners; a partizan corps captured a considerable park of artillery, while Woronzoff's cavalry fell in with a large body of the enemy's cavalry near Dessau, on the Elbe, put them to the rout, and made five hundred prisoners. Meanwhile, the main body of the Allies retired without further molestation by Leignitz to the neighbourhood of Schweidnitz, where the intrenched camp had been constructed, and where it was intended that a stand should be made.[1]

[1] Lond. 52, 53. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 56, 57. Odel. i. 112, 11. Fain, i. 440.

Reasons which induced the Allied Sovereigns to desire an armistice.

These partial successes, however, determined nothing; and the progress of the French arms, as well as the position of their forces, had now become such as to excite just disquietude in the breasts of the allied sovereigns. The great line of communication with Poland and the Vistula was abandoned; the blockading force before Glogau withdrew on the approach of the enemy; and the garrison, which had nearly exhausted its means of subsistence, was relieved, amidst transports of joy on both sides, on the 29th. All the allied forces were concentrated in the neighbourhood of Schweidnitz, or between Leignitz and that place; and although the intrenched

camp, resting on the former fortress, was of great strength, yet it could not be disguised that it was close to the foot of the Bohemian mountains; and that if Austria, in reliance on whose ultimate co-operation this direction had been given to the allied forces, should prove unfaithful to the cause of Europe, they would find it next to impossible to regain their communication with the Oder and the Vistula. Great reinforcements, indeed, were on their march from Russia—full fifty thousand effective men—and an equal force was in progress in Prussia; but some weeks, at the least, must elapse before the most forward of them could reach the allied head-quarters; and if the diverging march to the extremity of Upper Silesia were much longer to be pursued, the French might interpose between the allied main army and the succours on which they relied. The Russians, by the morning state on 27th May, were only thirty-five, the Prussians twenty-five thousand effective soldiers: ill success and retreat had produced its usual effect in diminishing the number of available men, and the abandonment of the line of communication with Poland, had occasioned great difficulty in turning aside the convoys from the road they were pursuing, one of which, as before mentioned, actually had already fallen into the enemy's hands.[1]

[1] Lond. 55, 56. Odel. i. 109, 110. St Cyr, Hist. Mil. iv. 50, 51.

With reason, therefore, Napoleon regarded the present state of affairs as highly auspicious to his arms, and the soldiers participated in his satisfaction from the ample supplies of every thing which they obtained in the rich agricultural districts of Upper Silesia; exhibiting a marked contrast to the extreme penury, almost amounting to famine, which they had experienced in the wasted fields of Saxony and Lusatia. Delivered by these favourable circumstances from the melancholy forebodings which the

Great satisfaction of Napoleon at this state of affairs.

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death of Duroc, and the imperfect success at Bautzen had occasioned, the Emperor recovered all his former serenity of mind: he was constantly with the advanced posts, and directed their movements with extraordinary precision; while the gaiety of his manner, which appeared in the multitude of the questions which he asked, and the French and Italian songs which he hummed as he rode along, bespoke the hopes with which he was inspired as to the issue of the campaign. A gleam of sunshine shone for a brief period upon his career, and recalled, midway between the disasters of Moscow and the overthrow of Leipsic, the triumphs of his earlier years. Again, as in former days, the allied armies were recoiling before his arms; province after province was overrun by his followers; and already one-half of the prophecy which he had uttered to the Abbé de Pradt at Warsaw had been accomplished:*—"Success will render the Russians bold: I am going to raise three hundred thousand men: I will deliver two battles between the Elbe and the Oder; and in six months I shall be on the Niemen."[1]

[1] Fain, i. 444, 445. Odel i. 110, 112. St Cyr, Hist. Mil. iv. 50, 51. Lond. 55.

Reasons which nevertheless induced Napoleon to desire an armistice.

Although, however, appearances were thus favourable at headquarters, and in the grand army under the immediate command of Napoleon, yet this was far from being the case universally; and many circumstances, both in his military and political situation, were calculated to awaken the most serious apprehensions. Though his infantry and artillery were in great strength, and had for the most part surpassed his expectations, the cavalry of the grand army was still extremely deficient; and this want both rendered it impossible to obtain decisive success in the field, and, even if an advantage was there obtained, made any attempt to follow it up more

* Ante viii. 805.

hazardous to the victorious than the vanquished party. This weakness was the more sensibly felt by Napoleon, that he had in his previous campaigns made such constant and successful use of this arm; and that the vehemence and rapidity of his operations savoured rather of the fierce sweep of Asiatic conquest, than the slow and methodical operations of European warfare. The same cause had exposed him to great inconveniences in his rear, where the allied partizans had in many places crossed the Elbe, and carried the enthusiasm of their proclamations, and the terror of their arms, far into the Westphalian plains. But, most of all, he had reason to apprehend the armed mediation of Austria. Facts more convincing than words here spoke with decisive authority as to the thunderbolt which might erelong be expected to issue from the dark cloud that overhung the Bohemian mountains. The forces which the cabinet of Vienna had already accumulated on that frontier range, little short of a hundred thousand men, enabled its ambassador, Count Stadion, who was still at the allied headquarters, to speak almost with the tone of command to the belligerent powers; while the direction which the allied armies had now taken upon Leignitz, Schweidnitz, and Upper Silesia, to the entire abandonment of their great line of communication with Poland, and their own resources, seemed to leave no doubt of a secret understanding with the Austrian government, and an intention to base their future operations on the great natural fortress of Bohemia.[1]

[1] St Cyr, Hist. Mil. iv. 50, 51. Jom. iv. 313, 314. Fain, 434, 435. Lond. 54, 55.

The accounts from the rear at this period were of so alarming a description, that it is not surprising they exercised a predominant influence on the mind of the Emperor; the more especially as the recent

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experience of the Moscow campaign had vividly impressed on his mind the dangers of a general interruption of his communications in that direction. General Bulow, who had the command of the forces around Berlin, and in front of Magdeburg, being relieved of all apprehensions for the capital, by the direction of Ney's corps to Silesia, had pushed his partizan bodies in all directions, and kept the enemy in continual apprehension for his detached parties and communications. Independent of the brilliant success of Woronzoff's cavalry near Dessau, which has been already mentioned,* General Zastroff, who commanded the Prussian landwehr, had made the greatest exertions, and not only afforded the most efficient aid to the desultory warfare beyond the Elbe, but prepared a large body of men ready to join the allied army in regular battle. General Chernicheff left the Lower Elbe, and having learned, while lying between Magdeburg and the Havel, that the Westphalian general Ochs was at Halberstadt, on the left bank of the Elbe, with a convoy of artillery, he resolved to surprise him. Having forthwith crossed the river with his indefatigable hussars and Cossacks, on the evening of the 29th May, he marched all day and night, and at five on the following morning reached the enemy, thirteen German, or nearly fifty English miles distant. The surprise was complete; and, although a desperate resistance was made, it terminated in the capture or destruction of the whole enemy's detachment, twelve hundred strong, with fourteen pieces of cannon. The ammunition waggons were all blown up by the French, to prevent their

Important partizan successes in the French rear.

May 30.

* Ante, 253.

falling into the hands of the enemy. Nor was Marshal Oudinot, who, after the battle of Bautzen, had been detached from the grand army to oppose Bulow in the neighbourhood of Magdeburg, more fortunate. The Prussian general took post at Luckau, with twelve thousand men, where he threatened the French line of communications, and strengthened himself, as well as circumstances would admit, by means of loopholes and barricades. Oudinot attacked him there on the 4th July; but such was the vigour of the Prussian defence, that though the assailants succeeded in carrying the suburbs, which they set on fire, they could not penetrate into the town, and retreated at night, leaving five hundred prisoners and three guns in the hands of the victors, besides above fifteen hundred killed and wounded during the engagement. Immediately after this success, which diffused extraordinary joy over the neighbouring territory of Prussia, Bulow was joined by Generals Borstell, Borgen, and Harps, which raised his troops to nineteen thousand men, and their united forces threatened a most powerful diversion in the rear of the enemy.[1]

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[1] Lond. 63, 65. Vict. et Conq. xxii 60. Jom. iv. 315.

This brilliant success, and the evident inferiority of the French to the Allies, both in the number and activity of their light troops, encouraged the gallant partizan leaders of the latter to attempt a still more important enterprize. Chernicheff, who had recrossed the Elbe after the affair at Halberstadt, having learned that General Arrighi was at Leipsic with five thousand men, besides an equal number of wounded, and considerable magazines, communicated with Woronzoff, who commanded the Russian blockading force that lay before Magdeburg, and they agreed to make a joint attack on that important depot. With this view, Chernicheff took up a posi-

Attack on the French depôt at Leipsic.

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tion with some parade at Bernberg, so as to withdraw the enemy's attention from the real point of attack; and Woronzoff having meanwhile advanced to Dolitch, in the neighbourhood of Leipsic, Chernicheff, by a forced march of nine German, or thirty-two English miles in one day, joined him under the walls of the town. The French were so completely taken by surprise, that they had scarcely time to assume a position at Zaucha, in front of the town, when the Russian horse were upon them. The few cavalry they had were routed in a moment; and though their infantry opposed a more formidable resistance, yet they too were broken, and driven back into the town before half of the allied force had come up. Just as they were entering into action, and the united force was advancing to complete their victory, news arrived of the armistice, which, after an examination of the documents produced by Arrighi, proved to be correct, and the Russian generals were robbed of their well-earned success, and obliged to content themselves with the six hundred prisoners they had already taken. About the same time, Captain Colon, a Prussian partizan, who had remained in Saxony after the grand allied army retreated, incessantly annoying the enemy in the remote parts of Saxony and Franconia, having heard of the expected arrival of twenty pieces of cannon, and a large train of ammunition waggons on the road between Hoff and Leipsic, formed an ambuscade, and attacked the enemy with such success, that the whole artillery was destroyed, and the ammunition blown up. Colon was afterwards joined by Major Lutzow with six hundred horse, and a great number of partizans; and their united force having established themselves in the mountains of Vogtland,[1] maintained a harassing and suc-

June 6.

June 7.

June 8.

[1] Lond. 64, 66. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 61, 62.

cessful warfare, which was only terminated by the conclusion of the armistice.

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While the operations of the Allies on the rear of the French in Saxony were thus far successful, and were exposing the enemy to losses, almost daily, even greater than those which had proved so fatal to their arms in the preceding autumn, when they lay at Moscow, a very considerable calamity was experienced, and a loss, attended with unbounded private suffering, undergone on the Lower Elbe. The battle of Lutzen, and withdrawal of the allied armies to the right bank of the Elbe, exercised an immediate and fatal influence on the situation of Hamburg. Tettenborn, Dornberg, and all the partizan corps on the left bank of the river, shortly after fell back to that city itself. Vandamme, acting under the orders of Davoust, shortly after appeared before the town, on the left bank; and several gallant attacks of Tettenborn on his forces, led only to the capture of the island of Wilhelmsberg, in the Elbe, not far distant from Hamburg. The French besieging force, however, was soon increased to ten thousand men; and with this array, which was double the strength of the whole regular force to which he was opposed, Vandamme carried the island of Wilhelmsberg, and all the islands of the river opposite to the city, which put him in a situation to commence a bombardment. This was, in consequence, begun the very next day. The dubious conduct of the Danish gun-boats in the river, for a few days suspended the fate of this unhappy city; but the court of Copenhagen, having at length taken a decided part, and joined the French Emperor, the Russian generals were unable to withstand the united forces of both, and reluctantly compelled to intimate to the Hamburg authorities that

Capture of Hamburg by the French.

May 6.

May 19.

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they must depend on their own resources. With speechless grief the patriotic citizens learned that they were to be delivered over to their merciless enemies; but the necessities of the case admitted of no alternative, and on the 30th, General Tettenborn evacuated the city, which was next day occupied by the enemy, the French entering by one gate and the Danes by the other. The French general immediately levied a contribution of 4,000,000 marks (L.250,000) on the city, which was rigidly exacted. Without doubt, the acquisition of this great and opulent commercial emporium, commanding the mouth of the Elbe, and hermetically sealing it against the enemy, was a great advantage to Napoleon, and well calculated to revive the terror of his arms in the north of Germany; and yet, so oppressive was the use which he made of his victory, and so unbounded the exasperation excited by the endless exactions to which the unfortunate Hamburgers were subjected, that it may be doubted whether he did not, in the end, lose more by this moral reaction, than by all the material resources which it placed at his command.[1]

[1] Lond. 62, 63. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 63, 64. Year of Liberation, i. 201, 261.

Progress towards the adjustment of an armistice.

When both parties had such need of a respite in military efforts to complete their preparations, and draw closer the diplomatic ties which connected, or were about to connect, them with the states from which they respectively hoped for succour, there was little difficulty in coming to an accommodation for an armistice. The first overture for such a measure came from Napoleon, who on the 18th May, when setting out for the army, had, as already mentioned,* dispatched a proposal, nominally for an armistice, but really designed to detach Russia from the coalition, and lead the Emperor

May 18.

* Ante, ix. 214.

Alexander into separate negotiations with himself. This letter arrived at the allied headquarters on the eve of the battle of Bautzen; and though it was received and considered in full council, in presence of May 19. the Austrian minister Count Stadion, and the answer determined on, yet it was deemed expedient to delay the messenger bearing the answer till the issue of arms had been tried. The result of that experiment, however, by demonstrating the vital importance to the Allies of gaining time for their great reinforcements to come up, and their present inability to cope with Napoleon, rendered them more tractable; and the messenger was dispatched with the answer from May 22. Stadion, bearing, "that the allied sovereigns were prepared to enter into the views of the Emperor Napoleon; too happy if these first overtures on his part, should be followed by others leading to an object which his august master, the Emperor of Austria, had so much at heart." Napoleon, however, who above all things desired to open a separate negotiation with the Emperor Alexander, and was not without hopes, if it were agreed to, of regaining the ascendancy of Tilsit and Erfurth, again, three days afterwards, dispatched a letter requesting a May 25. personal interview with that monarch; but this proposal, like the former one, was eluded by an answer, that Count Schomouloff was intended, on the part of Russia, to repair to the French advanced May 29. posts, which would save his imperial majesty the trouble of a journey for that purpose. Finding, therefore, that he could not succeed in this object of a separate negotiation, and feeling the necessity of yielding to the strongly expressed wishes of Austria for a general conference, Napoleon returned an answer that he agreed to the armistice;[1] and the vil-

[1] Fain. i. 400. Napoleon to Caulaincourt, May 18, 1813. Hard. xii. 161, 167. Schoell, x. 224, 225.

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lage of Pleswitz, in the circle of Streigau, was declared neuter, for the purpose of carrying the consequent arrangements into effect.

Difficulty, in arranging the armistice, as to the line of demarcation.

Even after this preliminary and important point had been agreed to, it was no easy matter to bring the opposite views of parties regarding the armistice to a definite bearing. The times were widely changed from those when Napoleon, after launching forth the thunderbolts of Marengo, Austerlitz, or Friedland, dictated the terms to the vanquished on which he was willing to admit of a cessation of hostilities. He had gained, indeed, two great battles, and Europe again beheld the allied armies receding before him. They retired, however, unbroken and undisgraced; no dislocation of masses, or cutting off of columns, had followed his victories; no troops of captives, or files of cannon, had graced his triumphs. The want of cavalry had marred his success, and rendered many of his best-conceived enterprises abortive; the superiority of the enemy in light troops had frequently converted incipient triumph into ultimate disaster. Above all, the fascination of his name on other nations was at an end: Europe no longer awaited, in breathless anxiety, to receive his mandates; Austria, dark and ambiguous, was gradually rising from the attitude of a mediator into that of a commander. But the necessities of the Allies were at least as great: their reinforcements were still far distant; the victorious French legions pressed on their rear; the march to Schweidnitz had abandoned their great line of communication with their own resources; and though they had reason to believe that Austria would join them, if Napoleon refused to make peace on reasonable terms, yet six weeks, at least, were required to enable her to complete her preparations.[1] Both parties thus felt the

[1] Hard. xii. 165, 169. Schoell, x. 225. Fain, i. 436, 446, 448.

necessity of a respite; but neither was sufficiently humbled to evince, by their conduct, their sense of this necessity; and this circumstance had wellnigh proved fatal to the negotiations.

The line of demarcation is at length fixed on.

Napoleon at first insisted on the line of the Oder as the demarcation between the two armies; but to this the Allies positively refused to agree: and the fall of Breslau, the capital of Silesia, which was occupied by the French army, without resistance, on the 30th May, rendered it less important for Napoleon to insist on that limit. At the same time, intelligence was received of the occupation of Hamburg, by the united armies of Denmark and France. He ceased to contend, therefore, for the line of the Oder, took his stand on the principle of *uti possidetis*, and insisted that his troops should retain the ground which they actually occupied; and this basis was contended for so strenuously by his plenipotentiaries, that it had wellnigh proved fatal to the negotiation; for the Russian and Prussian ministers were not less resolute that the whole of Silesia should be abandoned. The commissioners on both sides, unable to come to an agreement, had separated, and hostilities were on the point of being resumed, when the firmness of Napoleon, for the first time in his life, yielded in negotiation; and he agreed to abate so far in his demands as rendered an accommodation practicable. He brought himself to abandon Breslau, to relinquish the line of the Oder, and to draw back his army to Leignitz. Conferences were resumed at Poischwitz, near Jauer; and on the 4th June, an armistice for six weeks was signed at that place between all the contending powers.[1]

[1] Fain, i. 449, 451. Hard. xii. 168, 173. Schoell, x. 226. Martin's Recueil, xii. 582.

By this convention the line of demarcation between the hostile armies was fixed as follows:—Poischwitz,

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Leignitz, Goldberg, and Lahn, remained in the hands of the French; Landshut, Rudelstadt, Bolkershagen, Streigau, and Canth, were restored to, or continued to be possessed by the Allies. All the intermediate territory, including the fortress of Breslau, was declared neutral, and to be occupied by neither army. From the confluence of the Katsbach and Oder, the line of demarcation followed that river to the frontiers of Saxony and Prussia, and thence to the Elbe, which formed its course to its mouth. If Hamburg was only besieged, it was to be treated as one of the blockaded towns; Dantzic, Modlin, Zamosc, Stettin, and Custrin were to be re-victualled, at the sight of commissioners employed on both sides, every five days; Magdeburg, and the fortresses on the Elbe, to enjoy a circle of a league in every direction, which was to be considered as neutral. The duration of the armistice was to be six weeks from its signature, or till the 28th July; and six days' notification of the intention to break it, was to be given by either party. This convention was concluded solely by the superior authority of the allied monarchs; for their plenipotentiaries, irritated at the continued hostilities of the French troops, were on the point of breaking off the conferences, when they were overruled, and the signature ordered by their sovereigns' express directions.[1]

Considerations of the armistice. June 4.

1 Martin, xii. 582. Schoell, x. 227, 229. Fain, i. 488.

One deplorable engagement took place after the signature of the armistice was known, which Europe has had much cause to lament, and of which France has too much reason to be ashamed. Under pretence that the armistice applied to the regular troops, but not to the irregular bands who had crossed the Elbe, a considerable time after the armistice was known on both sides, and

Perfidious attack on Lutzow's corps, and wound of Körner. June 14.

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when Lutzow's corps, five hundred strong, were returning to Silesia, they were attacked by three thousand men under General Fournier, when totally unprepared, and relying on the faith of the treaty at Ketzig, near Zeitz in Saxony, and in great part cut to pieces or taken. Among the rest was the poet Körner, whose patriotic strains had rung like a trumpet to the heart of Germany, and who advanced to parley with the French general, along with Lutzow, before the attack commenced, and assure them that they were relying on the faith of the armistice. But the perfidious barbarian leader exclaiming, "The armistice is for all the world except you!" cut him down before he had even time to draw his sword. Körner's friends, by whom he was extremely beloved, instantly rushed in and rescued him and Lutzow from the hands of the enemy; and the poet was raised from the ground, weltering in his blood, to a neighbouring wood, from whence he was conveyed to a peasant's cottage, and ultimately taken in secrecy to Dr Windler's house in Leipsic, who, with generous devotion, received the sufferer under his roof at the hazard of his own life. Körner recovered the wound, but his immortal spirit quitted its worldly mansion on the 26th August 1813, when bravely combating the French army under the walls of Dresden. Such was the indignation excited by this treacherous act in Leipsic, that it was only by the presence of a very large French garrison that the people were prevented from breaking out into open insurrection; and though policy compelled the allied sovereigns at the time to suppress their resentment, and not avail themselves of the just cause thus afforded for breaking off the armistice,[1] yet it sank deep into the heart of Germany, and increased, if possible, the universal horror at French domination,

[1] Deutche Pandora, Von Friedrich Kolle, Erlebtes Von Jahr 1813. 413, Biog. Univ. Sup. Voce Körner.

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which so soon led to its total overthrow. "Armistice be it," was the universal cry; "but no peace; revenge for Körner first."[1]

Great talent displayed by Napoleon in this campaign.

No period in the career of Napoleon is more characteristic of the indomitable firmness of his character, as well as resources of his mind, than that which has now been narrated. When the magnitude of the disasters in Russia is taken into consideration, and the general defection of the north of Germany which immediately and necessarily followed, it is difficult to say which is most worthy of admiration; the moral courage of the Emperor, whom such an unheard-of catastrophe could not subdue, or the extraordinary energy which enabled him to rise superior to it, and for a brief season again chain victory to his standards. The military ability with which he combated at Lutzen—with infantry superior in number indeed, but destitute of the cavalry which was so formidable in their opponents' ranks, and for the most part but newly raised—the victorious veteran armies of Russia, and ardent volunteers of Prussia, was never surpassed. The battle of Bautzen, in the skill with which it was conceived, and the admirable precision with which the different corps and reserves were brought into action, each at the appropriate time, is worthy of being placed beside Austerlitz or Jena. If it was less decisive in its results than those immortal triumphs, and partook more of the character of a drawn battle than a decisive victory, it was from no inferiority on his part in conception or combination; but because the Allies, animated by a higher spirit, taught by past misfortune, and invigorated by recent success, *now* opposed a far more obstinate resistance to his attacks; and the want of cavalry rendered him unable, as he was wont, to follow up

European tactics and discipline with the fell sweep of Asiatic horse. Nor should due praise be withheld from the energy and patriotic spirit of France, which, unbroken by a calamity unparalleled in past history, again sent forth its conquering legions into the heart of Germany, and re-appeared with two hundred thousand victorious conscripts on the Elbe, within a few months after four hundred thousand veterans had left their bones, or sunk as captives, on the plains of Russia.

Ruinous effects of this armistice on the fortunes of Napoleon.

The armistice of Pleswitz or Poischwitz has been pronounced, by no mean authority, the greatest political fault of Napoleon's life.* By consenting to it, in the circumstances in which he was then placed, he openly yielded to the influence of Austria; inspired her with a sense of her importance which she had not previously possessed; accelerated rather than retarded the period of her declaration against him; and lost the only opportunity which fortune afforded him, after the catastrophe of Moscow, of re-establishing his affairs. It is more than probable, that, if he had pursued a bolder course, refused to treat at all with the Allies at that period, directed the weight of his forces on the Oder towards Glogau, so as to cut them off from their base and reinforcements, and thrown them back, destitute of every thing, on the Bohemian mountains, he would have succeeded in intimidating the cabinet of Vienna, and inducing it, if not to join his ranks, at least to observe real neutrality. It is difficult to see in such a case how the allied armies, cut off from their own resources, and driven up against a neutral frontier, could have avoided the Caudine forks.

Even if Austria, linked to their fortunes, as perhaps she was, by secret treaties, had admitted them

* Jom. iv. 314.

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within her dominions, and openly espoused their cause, she would have done so to much less advantage than she afterwards did at the expiration of the armistice: it is one thing to join the fortunes of a defeated and dejected, it is another, and a very different thing, to adhere to the banners of a recruited and reanimated host. Her own preparations were then incomplete: her army not prepared to take the field, and that of the Allies unable singly to maintain its ground; whereas, if hostilities were to be resumed after the armistice had expired, it might easily have been foreseen what actually occurred, that the allied forces, acting in the midst of an enthusiastic and numerous population, would be recruited in a proportion twofold greater than the French, and the apprehension of Austria allayed by the vast accession of strength arrayed round the banners of Russia and Prussia. In agreeing to an armistice by which he lost ground, and gained nothing under such circumstances, Napoleon was evidently actuated by a desire to propitiate the cabinet of Vienna, upon whose secret good-will he conceived himself, not without reason, since his marriage, entitled to rely; but nevertheless it reft from him the whole fruits of the victories of Lutzen and Bautzen, and brought upon him the disasters of the Katsbach and Leipsic—a striking proof of the truth of what he afterwards so often asserted, that that apparently brilliant marriage, by causing him to adventure upon an abyss strewed with flowers, proved his ruin; and of the mysterious manner in which due retribution is often, by Supreme direction, provided in this world for the career of iniquity, even in the unforeseen consequences of the very circumstances which appeared, at first sight, most effectually to secure its triumph.

Singular manner in which it arose out of the Austrian alliance.

The resurrection of Germany at this period to throw off the oppression of French domination, is the most glorious and animating spectacle recorded in history. Not less heart-stirring in its spirit, not less entrancing in its progress, than the immortal annals of ancient patriotism, it was spread over a larger surface, and fraught with more momentous results. Wider civilization had extended the interests of the contest; a broader basis of freedom had swelled the ranks of patriotism; a purer religion had sanctified the spirit of the victor. No trains of captives attended his steps; no sacked cities were the monuments of his ferocity; no pyramids of heads marked where his sabre had been. Nations, not citizens, now rose up for their deliverance; continents, not empires, were at stake on the battle; the world, not the shores of the Mediterranean, was the spectator of the struggle. Freedom inspired the arm of the patriot in both; but the Cross, not the Eagle, was now to be seen upon its banners, and the spirit of Christianity at once animated the resistance of the soldier, and stayed the vengeance of the conqueror. The efforts of France in 1793, were inspired by equal fervour, distinguished by equal intrepidity, followed in the end by equal triumphs; but the intermixture of worldly motives sullied the purity of the strife; the want of religion let loose the passions of vice; the lust of conquest, the selfishness of cupidity, were mingled with the ardour of patriotism; and the triumphs of the empire terminated in the ordinary atrocities of massacre, extortion, and devastation. Very different was the spectacle which the efforts of combined Europe now afforded. For the first time in the annals of mankind, the devotion of the citizen was now sustained by the constancy of the martyr;

Sublime spectacle exhibited by Germany at this period.

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the valour of the soldier ennobled by the purity of the patriot; the ardour of the victor restrained by the sanctity of the cause for which he combated; and the result proved the difference between the influence of worldly ambition and the obligations of religious duty. No massacre of Mytilene disgraced the laurels of the modern Salamis; no flames of Carthage drew tears from the modern Scipio; the smiling village and the protected fields were to be seen alike in the rear as in the front of the British host, and Moscow burned was avenged by Paris saved.

CHAPTER LXX.

FROM THE ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ TO THE RENEWAL OF THE WAR.

ARGUMENT.

Importance of personal Anecdote in the Delineation of Character—Rich materials, in this respect, which exist regarding Napoleon—General character of his Mind—Singular Combination of Good and Bad Qualities which he possessed—Clue which is afforded to his Character by his Bad Qualities—Intermixture of Great and Good ones—Sketch of the general Features of his Character—Mixed Good and Bad qualities which he possessed—It arose partly from the Vices and Irreligion of the Revolution—Inconceivable peculiarities of his Character—Despotic nature of his System of Government—Which naturally flowed from the Revolution—His often contracted Policy, and repeated injuries to his own Fortunes—His personal littlenesses—Great Military Errors which he committed—Especially in Germany in 1813—The Glories of his last Campaign in France—His marvellous Sway over the minds of his Soldiers—Examples of this Power—Distribution of the Crosses of the Legion of Honour, and instant Promotion—Frankness in which he indulged his Soldiers on these occasions—His violent Temper, but frequent Forgiveness—Extraordinary power of judging of Enemies in the Field—His Habits at the Bivouac fires—Evil Consequences which resulted from the Emperor's decided Opinion and Conduct, and his impetuous Temper and Habits—Excessive obstinacy of his Disposition—Early appearance of this peculiarity in his Character—His low opinion both of Men and Women—His extraordinary powers of Mental Exertion—Habits during a Campaign—His Travelling-carriage—And Habits on the Road—and on Horseback—His impetuosity in Travelling, and during a Campaign—Custom in Passing through columns of Troops—Receipt of Despatches on the Road—His Antechambers during a Campaign—Habits and labours in the Cabinet—Habits in writing and dictating—The Military Portfolio and its Keeper—His occasional acts of Humanity and Generosity—His generous Conduct to some English Sailors—His habits at Paris and St Cloud—His conduct at St Helena—Importance of the preceding Details—Character of Murat—His Military abilities and Civil weakness—His appearance and dress, as contrasted with that of Napoleon—His extraordinary Gallantry and conduct—Character and history of Marshal Ney—His overflowing Courage, and simple Character—His Military qualities—Inefficiency in separate command—Moral weaknesses—Character of Berthier—Diplomatic relations at this Period—First Convention between Great Britain, Russia, and Prussia—Treaty of Reich-

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enbach between these Powers—Convention of Peterwaldau and of London, regarding the issue of Paper Money—Treaty of Stockholm with Sweden—Alliance of France with Denmark—Importance of the Position which Austria now held—Views of the Cabinet of Vienna at this Period—Commencement of the Negotiation with the Belligerent Powers—Interview between Napoleon and Metternich—Remarkable Speech of the former—Metternich's answer—Napoleon's reply—Calm conduct of Metternich—Convention between Austria and France for a Mediation—Intelligence is received by both Parties of the Battle of Vittoria—Vast influence it exercised on the issue of the Negotiations—Soult is sent with extraordinary powers to Spain—Napoleon's preparations for War in Germany—His plan for the Campaign—And Measures for the defence of Dresden—Works around that Capital, and on the Elbe—Strength of his line on that River—Murmurs against these plans in the French Army—Napoleon's reply to them—His Forces at the conclusion of the Armistice—And new Measures to force on the Conscripts to the Army—Aspect of Dresden at this Period—Disposition of Napoleon's force in Germany—Deplorable condition of the Garrisons in his Rear—Preparations of the Allies during the Armistice—Plan of the Campaign fixed at Trachenberg—Reflections on the admirable Wisdom with which it was conceived—Determination of the Cabinet of Vienna to join the Allies—Doubts regarding Bernadotte—Composition of his Army—Army of Silesia—Character of Blucher—Character of General Gneisenau—The Austrian Army at Prague—Character of Prince Schwartzenberg—Total of the Allied Forces in action on the Elbe—Forces of both sides on the Bavarian and Italian Frontiers—Cordial spirit and unanimity with which the Allied Powers were animated—Slow progress of the Negotiations at Prague—Difficulties which arose regarding the Form of the Conferences—Real views of the different Powers at this Period—Napoleon's journey to Mayence to meet Marie Louise—Ultimatum of Austria to France—Napoleon's answer, which declines these Terms—Manifesto of Austria—Reply of France—Reflections on this Debate, and on the subsequent Manifesto of Austria—Early History of Prince Metternich—His character as a Statesman—His Private Honour and Patriotic Spirit—And principles of Government—His own Account of his Policy at this period—Universal Joy in the Allied Army at the junction of Austria—Last Review of Napoleon at Dresden—Interview of Napoleon with Fouché at that City—Fouché's Secret Interviews with Metternich at Prague—Arrival of Moreau in Europe—His reception at Stralsund by Bernadotte—His Journey to, and reception at Prague—Contention about the Appointment of a Commander-in-Chief to the Allies—Disinterested conduct of the Allied Generals in regard to the Command—Great influence of Wellington's Success on the Allied cause at this period.

Importance of personal anecdote in the delineation of character.

HISTORICAL narrative, how important or interesting soever the events may be which it embraces, is not the composition which gives the best insight into the character of the principal actors in the scenes it records. General causes are there wound up, too much wound up, with individual agency;

the stream of human transaction is too vast, its floods too overwhelming, to permit the salient points of private disposition to be adequately developed, even in those who have been chiefly instrumental in directing its current. It is private incident which portrays the real man; it is the habits of domestic life which are the true touchstone both of the greatness and the weakness of humanity. The common maxim, that no man is a hero to those with whom he is familiar, indicates the universal concurrence of all ages in this truth; and the characters in public life, accordingly, which are most deeply engraven on the memory of mankind, are not those by whom the most important changes in history have been wrought, but those of whom the most graphic and touching incidents have been recorded by writers of capacity sufficient to discern their value. The heroes of antiquity, after the lapse of two thousand years, still seem present to our imagination; but if we examine the elements of which the still living phantoms are composed, we shall find that, while their great and important exploits are recollected only in a sort of shadowy grandeur, it is the incidents of their private life, the generosity of their individual actions, which are really enshrined in our memory; and that it is not so much even the pictured pages of Livy, Xenophon, and Quintus Curtius, as the Lives of Plutarch, which have given them immortality. In modern times, it is the Richard III. and Henry VIII. of Shakspeare, not those of history, who recur to every mind when our kings of the olden time are thought of; it is the Johnson of Boswell, not the author of the Rambler, or the learned lexicographer, who is present to every mind; and so feeble is the impression produced by real generalities, in comparison of

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fictitious details, that even the valour of Richard Cœur de Lion, the beauty of Queen Mary, and the tyranny of Louis XI., are present to our recollection chiefly in the enchanting colours in which their characters have been drawn by the imaginative pencils of Schiller and Sir Walter Scott.

Rich materials, in this respect, which exist regarding Napoleon.

Perhaps there is no illustrious man, ancient or modern, of whom such ample details exist in these respects as of Napoleon; and though they have been disfigured, in too many instances, by the enthusiastic partiality or interested flattery of one set of writers, and the coarse invective and profound hatred of another, yet it is not impossible for an attentive observer to distinguish the true from the false, even in these exaggerated statements. An experienced draughtsman will have no difficulty in separating sketches from nature from imaginary conceptions, even of scenes which he has never himself visited; and those who have made themselves familiar with the peculiar and strongly marked traits of that wonderful man's character, will seldom be at a loss to distinguish the real from the fictitious anecdotes which have been preserved concerning him. The reader, therefore, will probably not regret, nor deem the pains misplaced, if advantage is taken of the pause in military operations which resulted from the armistice of Pleswitz, to throw together some of the most graphic and characteristic anecdotes which exist, detailed by eye-witnesses, of a man whose name will ever occupy the most conspicuous place in the annals of modern times.

General character of Napoleon's mind.

What renders the traits of Napoleon's character improbable, and at times almost incredible to an ordinary observer, is the opposite and apparently irreconcilable features of disposition to which they

point. Those who are familiar, on the other hand, with the leading principles and ruling objects of his mind, and have arrived at the secret clue which reconciles those seeming inconsistencies, will regard them as in a peculiar manner characteristic, and find additional evidence of the authenticity of anecdotes descriptive of such a character, in the very variety which appears at first sight so perplexing. He united, to a degree which was perhaps never before equalled, the ardent and impassioned temperament of southern, with the cool judgment and intellectual force of northern Europe; and it is hard to say, whether he was most distinguished by the admirable knowledge which he possessed of the grand and elevated in human conduct, and by the heart-stirring use he could at all times make of appeals to the most generous feelings of our nature, or by the total disregard of every moral obligation or disinterested virtue, which he invariably displayed when his own interest appeared to be in any degree thwarted by a due observance of them. He was not by disposition a cruel, nor by nature a bad man; that is, the wicked principles of humanity were not in any extraordinary degree developed in his character: it was by the entire absence of any moral control that he was principally distinguished.

Singular combination of good and bad qualities which he possessed.

Yet this absence did not by any means render his life a mere tissue of bad actions, nor was it inconsistent on many occasions with noble deeds, humane feelings, and beneficent intentions. He was too clear-sighted not to perceive that such conduct was, in the general case, the most judicious; he knew well that vindictive cruelty usually defeats its own object; and that the only solid foundation for the attachment of subjects to a sovereign, is to be found in a sedulous

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protection of their interests. But the grand and peculiar characteristic of his mind was, that all this was done, not because he felt it to be right, but because he saw it to be expedient: his ruling principle was interest invariably followed, not duty sedulously performed; and accordingly, whenever he perceived, or thought he perceived, a conflict between these rules of conduct, he never hesitated an instant to give the preference to the selfish considerations—or rather, his mind was so entirely governed by their influence, that he never experienced, on such occasions, any mental conflict at all. He often said, that Corneille was the only man who understood the art of government, and that, if he had lived in his age, he would have made him a privy councillor;[1] and the reason was, that while he thoroughly understood, and has nobly expressed, the most elevated sentiments, he always assigned the superior place to reasons of state policy,—in other words, considerations of real or supposed expedience.

[1] Las Cases.

Clue which is afforded to his character by his bad qualities.

This distinction, which never perhaps was so clearly defined in any human being before his time, furnishes the true key to the otherwise inexplicable character of Napoleon; and demonstrates that there is much truth, both in the obloquy which has been thrown upon him by his enemies, and the eulogies which have been pronounced on him by his admirers. If we contemplate him in one view, never was any character recorded in history more worthy of universal detestation. We behold a single individual, for the purposes of his own ambition, consigning whole generations of men to an untimely grave, desolating every country of Europe by the whirlwind of conquest, and earning the support and attachment of his own subjects, by turning them loose to plunder

and oppress all mankind. In the prosecution of these objects we see him deterred by no difficulties, daunted by no dangers, bound by no treaties, restrained by no pity; regardless alike of private honour and public faith; prodigal at once of the blood of his people and the property of his enemies; indifferent equally to the execrations of other nations, and the progressive exhaustion of his own. We perceive a system of government at home based upon force, and resting upon selfishness, which supported religion only because it was useful, and spoke of justice only because it passed current with men; which at once extinguished freedom and developed talent; which dried up the generous feelings by letting them wither in obscurity, and ruled mankind by selfish—by affording them unbounded—gratification. We see a man of consummate abilities, wielding unlimited powers for the purposes of individual advancement; straining national resources for the fostering of general corruption; destroying the hopes of future generations in the indulgence of the present; constantly speaking of disinterested virtue, and never practising it; perpetually appealing to the generous affections, and ever guided by the selfish; everlastingly condemning want of truth in others, yet daily promulgating falsehoods among his subjects, with as little hesitation as he discharged grape-shot among his enemies.

If we regard him in another view, however, we shall be led to form a very different estimate of his character. Never were talents of the highest, genius of the most exalted kind, more profusely bestowed upon a human being, or worked out to greater purposes of good or of evil. Gifted at once with a clear intellect, a vivid imagination, and a profound judgment—burning with the fervent passions and poetic

And his good and great qualities.

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glow of Italy, and yet guided by the highest reasoning and reflecting powers; at once an enthusiastic student of the exact sciences, and a powerful mover of the generous affections; embued with the soul of eloquence, the glow of poetry, and the fire of imagination, he yet knew how to make them all subservient to the directions of sagacious reason, and the dictates of extensive observation. He was not merely illustrious on account of his vast military achievements, but from his varied and often salutary civil efforts. He was not a great man, because he was a great general: he was a great general, because he was a great man. The prodigious capacity and power of attention which he brought to bear on the direction of his campaigns, and which produced such astonishing results, were but a part of the general talents which he possessed, and which were not less conspicuous in every other department, whether of government or abstract thought. It was hard to say whether he was greatest in laying down strategetical plans for the general conduct of a campaign, or in seizing the proper direction of an attack on the field of battle, or in calculating the exact moment when his reserves could be most effectually employed. And those who are struck with astonishment at the immense information and just discrimination which he displayed at the council-board, and the varied and important public improvements which he set on foot in every part of his dominions, will form a most inadequate conception of his mind, unless they are at the same time familiar with the luminous and profound views which he threw out on the philosophy of politics, in the solitude of St Helena. Never was evinced a clearer proof of the truth which a practical acquaintance with men must

probably have impressed upon every observer, that talent of the highest order is susceptible of any application; and that accident or Supreme direction alone determines whether their possessor is to become a Homer, a Bacon, or a Napoleon.

His general character.

It would require the observation of a Thucydides, directing the pencil of a Tacitus, to portray by a few touches such a character; and modern idiom even in their hands would probably have proved inadequate to the task. Equal to Alexander in military achievement, superior to Justinian in legal reformation, sometimes second only to Bacon in political sagacity, he possessed at the same time the inexhaustible resources of Hannibal, and the administrative powers of Cæsar. Enduring of fatigue, patient of hardship, unwearied in application, no difficulties could deter, no dangers daunt, no obstacles impede him; a constitution of iron, a mind, the ardour of which rendered him almost insensible to physical suffering, enabled him to brave alike the sun of Egypt and the snows of Russia; indefatigable in previous preparation, he was calm and collected in the moment of danger; often on horseback for eighteen hours together, and dictating almost the whole night to his secretaries, he found a brief period for slumber during the roar of the battle, when the enemy's balls were falling around him.*

* At the battle of Bautzen, Napoleon, who was extremely fatigued by the exertions of the two preceding days, and almost entire want of rest during the night, more than once fell asleep when seated on an eminence overlooking the field, which the enemy's cannon balls frequently reached. He said, nature had her rights, which could not be violated with impunity, and that he felt more cool to give fresh orders, or consider the reports he received, when awakening in this manner from a transient slumber.—Odel. i. 90, 91, and Las Cases, ii. 409. Fain, i. 411.

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Nor was peace a period of repose to his genius, nor the splendour of courts a season merely of relaxation. Though not insensible to their attractions, though often indulging for a moment in their vices, he was never the slave of their pleasures; female charms exerted only a transient sway over his passions, and never clouded his reason; and when surrounded by the pomp of a king of kings, he was unceasingly employed in conducting the thread of interminable negotiations, or stimulating the progress of beneficent undertakings. "Has tantas viri virtutes ingentia vitia æquabant: inhumana crudelitas, perfidia plus quàm Punica; nihil veri, nihil sancti, nullus deorum metus, nullum jusjurandum, nulla religio." Brave without being chivalrous; sometimes humane, seldom generous; vehement in anger, yet often forgiving on reflection; implacable in political hatred, but not insensible to hostile esteem; inexorable in general measures, yet susceptible of individual pity; wound up in his own elevation, yet ever identifying it with the glory of France; regardless alike of crime or suffering in the path of ambition, yet not addicted to either if uncalled for by private interest or state policy—he could at once call his conscripts food for cannon, and boast that he could afford to spend ten thousand of them a-day, and yet bind up the wounds of individual suffering, or sacrifice his carriages to wounded valour. In one respect only he was altogether implacable, and that was towards persons whose services to himself threatened to interfere with the supremacy of his achievements, or whose enmity had proved an impediment to his ambition. He never forgave Moreau the victory of Hohenlinden, which saved France; nor Kellerman the charge at Marengo,

Mixed good and bad qualities of his character.

which fixed himself on the consular throne; nor Wellington the determined opposition which at last destroyed him. Generosity with him was often admirably assumed, but self-forgetfulness was never really felt; where the object of the acting had ceased, egotism never failed to reappear in undiminished ascendency, and dispelled in a moment the pleasing illusion. He was capable of the heroic but politic self-denial of Alexander, which, by pouring the untasted cup on the sands of Arabia, assuaged the thirst of a whole army; but the designless magnanimity which put the draught to the lips of the Macedonian hero, when the physician was reading the denouncing letter, was beyond his reach. He could imitate Themistocles in surrendering himself, as he himself said, to "the greatest, the most powerful, and the most persevering of his enemies;" but he would never, like him, have swallowed poison to avoid being called on to elevate himself at the expense of his country. The man who shunned death at Waterloo, after he had himself told his army that "the hour had arrived when it behoved every Frenchman who loved his country to conquer or die," had no hesitation in bequeathing a legacy in his testament to the assassin who had attempted the life of the Duke of Wellington. He condemned the execution of Louis because it was a political error; but he hesitated not to murder the Duke d'Enghien because it seemed a political advantage. He loudly denounced the alleged perfidy of the English attack on a neutral power at Copenhagen; but he scrupled not to seize the whole fortresses and royal family of Spain, in defiance of a strict alliance, when it gave him a throne; and his character cannot be so well summed up as in the words which profound reflection has enabled genius

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to ascribe to Satan. "He was the perfection of intellect without moral principle." *

It arose partly from the vices and irreligion of the Revolution.

Great part, however, of the selfishness which formed so important a feature, and damning a blot, in the character of Napoleon, is to be ascribed not so much to himself as to the age in which he lived, and the people whom he was called upon to rule. Born and bred in the most corrupted society of Europe, during the irreligious fanaticism, general license, and universal egotism of the Revolution, he saw no other way of governing his subjects, but by constantly appealing to their selfishness; and was led to believe, from what he saw around him, that it was the prime mover and universal spring of mankind. That it is so in the long run at all times, and among all people, to a great degree, no one experienced in the ways of men will probably doubt; but religious truth reveals the simultaneous agency of higher principles, and historical observation loudly proclaims that many of the most important changes in human annals have been brought about in direct opposition to its dictates. It was ignorance or oblivion of those counteracting agencies which was the grand error of Napoleon's life, and beyond all doubt brought about his fall. The Revolution misled him by establishing the fatal principle, that no other test is to be applied to human actions but success; the prevailing irreligion of the age misled

* An expression of my highly esteemed friend the Rev. Robert Montgomery, rector of St Jude's, Glasgow, whose genius as a poet conveys an inadequate idea of his eloquence as a preacher, and fervour as a minister of religion, in a depraved manufacturing community, where Christian zeal has so wide a field for exertion: and who has unconsciously but graphically portrayed, in the character of the Prince of Darkness, in his noble poem of "Satan, or, Intellect without God," much of what historic truth must ascribe to the ruling principles and leading characters of the Revolution.

him by spreading the belief, that worldly prosperity is at once the chief good in life, and the only rational object of human pursuit. To rouse exertion by the language of virtue, and direct it to the purposes of vice, was the grand principle of the Revolution, and the immediate cause of its triumphs; the Emperor felt that he had at no time a chance of success, but by yielding to its impulse; and at all times he could almost command events by wielding it for his advantage. Instead, therefore, of considering Napoleon as an individual man, and striving to reconcile the opposite qualities of his character, or harshly condemning its darker features, it is more consonant both to historic truth and impartial justice, to regard him as the personification of the principles which at that period were predominant in his country—as the INCARNATION OF THE REVOLUTION; and perhaps no Avatar, sent on such a mission, could be embued with fewer vices. In this view, we may look upon the contest in which he was engaged as the same in sublunary affairs with that awful struggle darkly shadowed forth in Revelation, to which the pencil of Milton has given the form and pressure of terrestrial reality; and may view his fall as demonstrating the same Supreme direction of events, which, permitting for a season, for inscrutable purposes, the agency of sin, doomed to final ruin the Prince of the Morning.

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Yet, even after making every allowance for the demoralizing influence of these circumstances, there are some peculiarities in the character of Napoleon which are almost inexplicable, and which demonstrate the justice of Johnson's observation, that no man ever rose from an inferior station to the government of mankind, in whom great and commanding

Inconceivable peculiarities of his character.

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qualities were not blended with certain meannesses that would be inconceivable in ordinary men. Great as was his penetration, profound the sagacity of his political reflection, he yet deliberately based his throne upon the systematic oppression of all other nations by one; and seriously believed that he needed not disquiet himself about the results, so long as, under the stimulus of glory and victory, he let loose his own subjects to plunder and insult every people over whom they ruled. He could survey past events with an eye seldom equalled in the justice of its observation, yet he throughout life acted upon the principle, that falsehood was not only no crime, but no error; that mankind could be permanently misled by the reiterated assertions of bought mendacity, and truth finally extirpated by the ruled bayonets of despotic power. That salient energy, that living principle, which had hitherto always enabled Europe at length to dispel the illusions which had benighted, or throw off the oppression which had crushed it, never appears to have entered into his calculations: that Retributive Justice, which so often, in this world, dooms enormous sin to work out its own punishment, never crossed his imagination. Though he committed, in the course of his career, many great crimes, and still more evident faults, he appeared to the very last to have been altogether insensible both to the one and the other; and repeatedly said at St Helena, that, with the exception of the invasion of Spain, he never fell into a political mistake, and on no one occasion was ever guilty of a political delinquency. His conduct and language regarding himself would lead us to suspect at times that he had been born without a conscience, or that its voice had been entirely extinguished by the

effects of early education, did not his measures on various occasions prove that he was not insensible to humane and elevated sentiments, and his language on all, afford decisive evidence that no man was better qualified to detect the slightest deviation from rectitude in the conduct of his opponents.

The despotic nature of his system of government.

Though his capacity in forming political designs, and even more so in carrying them into effect, was seldom surpassed, yet in his general views of policy he was far from being guided by enlarged principles, and still further from acting consistently in the measures requisite for their execution. Self, there as elsewhere, formed the ruling principle and great blot in his character. Universal empire was the avowed object to which his life was devoted; but, supposing such a design practicable, he adopted the means of all others the least fitted to carry it into effect. The magnanimous yet wise policy of consulting the interests, and bending to the prejudices of the conquered states, by which the Romans obtained the empire of the world in ancient, and the English the supremacy in Hindostan in modern times, never entered into his imagination. To concentrate the world in Europe, Europe in France, France in Paris, and Paris in himself, was the perpetual object of his ambition. Nor was it only over the bodies and properties of men that he proposed to establish this extraordinary dominion: chains still more durable, because less immediately galling, were prepared by him for their minds and thoughts. He laboured assiduously to transfer the seat of the papal power to Paris, in order to gain possession of the vast influence which it still possessed over the faithful in every part of Europe; while, by a deep-laid and comprehensive system of secular education,

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he strove to mould according to his will, that far more powerful portion of the people in his own country, who looked only to temporal advancement, and were swayed by nothing but temporal ambition. Thus, while he professed, and perhaps believed himself to be the man of the age, and the child of the Revolution, he ran directly contrary to the tenets of its supporters; or rather, he worked with perfect sagacity, to its natural result and termination, a system which, based exclusively on the selfish passions, was liable to be destroyed by their gratification, and which, subverting the influence of moral principle, left no other regulator for mankind but the government of force.

His despotism naturally flowed from the Revolution.

The oppressive government, and centralized despotism of Napoleon, therefore, were so far from being a deviation from his character, or a divergence from the principles of the Revolution, that they were the obvious completion of both, and the natural termination of intellect set free from the restraints of principle. The previous convulsion had prepared the field for his dominion, and left him no other means of maintaining it but that which he adopted: the destruction of property had terminated the sway of aristocracy; the ruin of religion subverted the authority of conscience; the vices of democracy rendered intolerable the government of numbers. The character which he figured for himself, and the mission on which he often declared he was sent—that of closing the gulf of the Revolution—were in fact nothing but the direction of its principles to their inevitable end; the subjection of mankind to private selfishness and public slavery. And although, in the later years of his life, after the European alliance, founded upon religion and directed by aristocracy,

had accomplished his overthrow, he again reverted to the language of democracy, and sought refuge in the arms of liberalism from the indignation of experience; yet this was a forced and unnatural union, suggested by interest, brought about by misfortune, and which could not, in any event, have subsisted longer than the mutual necessities which gave it birth. CHAP. LXX. 1813.

But although we may discover in the vices by which Napoleon was surrounded, and on the impulse of which he was elevated to greatness, as well as in the necessities of his situation when placed there, an apology for the principles of his government, none can be found for the narrow views on which his policy was often based, and the littlenesses by which his private life was sometimes disfigured. In the prosecution of his favourite design of universal dominion, he neither displayed the enlargement of a great nor the views of a benevolent mind. When he had the power to remodel the European commonwealth almost at pleasure, and distribute its different governments according to the physical necessities or durable interests of their inhabitants, he appears to have been in general directed by no other principles but temporary convenience, national vanity, or family aggrandizement. Conceding to him the merit of unconquerable perseverance in the war against England, whose overthrow was indispensable to the completion of his designs, and admitting that he evinced extraordinary ability in the military and naval enterprises which he set on foot for her subjugation; there is nothing in his foreign policy on continental Europe which evinced enlarged capacity, or bespoke aptitude for universal dominion. The fatal preponderance of self marred every thing

His often contracted policy.

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which he attempted out of the pale of France itself. He conceived and executed the noble design of levelling the inhospitable ridges of the Alps; yet instead of forming, as he might have done, the whole Italian peninsula into the vast monarchy which nature has so clearly intended, and antiquity had so well prefigured, he cut it in the most arbitrary manner into shreds and patches, to form appanages for his family, or gratify the Parisians by the subjection of Rome to their government; and thereby lost the great moral support which he might have derived from the revived national spirit of the Italian people. He boasted, with justice, that he had realized the dream of Louis XIV., and that under his sway there were no longer any Pyrenees: yet he subsequently marred, by selfish aggrandizement, that great enterprize; converted an obsequious ally into a mortal enemy; substituted popular hatred for courtly subservience; and re-erected the Pyrenees, bristling with hostile bayonets, and reeking with the blood of slaughtered nations.

And repeated injuries to his own fortunes.

He repeatedly had the destiny of the German empire in his hands, and by the lustre of his victories had not only obliterated the feeling of Gothic nationality, but converted the confederation of the Rhine into the firmest outwork of his empire; yet he voluntarily threw away that splendid acquisition; cut up the fatherland into kingdoms for his brothers, or strange offshoots of the great empire; irritated Prussia beyond forgiveness, at once by insult and injury; alienated the affections, without weakening the strength, of Austria; and purchased the applause of France, by the merciless severity of requisitions which drained away the resources, and exasperated the hearts of Germany. He more than once touched

on the still vibrating chord of Polish nationality, and by a word might have added two hundred thousand Sarmatian lances to his standards; but he did not venture on the bold step of re-establishing the throne of Sobieski; and by the half-measure of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, permanently excited the jealousy of Russia, without winning the support of Poland. No one felt more strongly, or has more clearly expressed, the necessity of providing, by a firm European alliance, against the encroachments of the Muscovite army, or made greater efforts to resist them; but he himself gave them their strongest development: for, by unheard-of treachery on his own part, he converted the hereditary religious hatred of the Ottomans into their ally; while by intolerable arrogance he not only stilled the long-established jealousy of Sweden, but threw his own lieutenant, its ruler, into their arms. He was desirous of planting his family on all the adjoining thrones, and boasted that his dynasty would soon be the oldest in Europe; and yet he rendered his government unbearable even to his own brothers; made the eldest resign his crown of thorns in Spain; drove the second to seek refuge in Great Britain, to avoid his persecution; compelled a third, by his arrogance, to abdicate the throne of Holland; and precipitated a fourth into sensuality at Cashel to forget his indignities. No one was more sensible of the sway of religion over the human mind, or more desirous of securing its co-operation as an instrument of government; yet he voluntarily threw away, in later years, the immense advantages which his earlier and wiser policy had given him in that respect; converted the Pope from a warm ally into a mortal enemy, for the gratification of calling Rome the second city of his

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empire; and exhibited the scandal to all Christendom of the head of the Roman Church, bereft of his dominions and detained in captivity, praying for the triumph of heretical arms for his deliverance. The grand object of his life was the destruction of the influence and overthrow of the maritime power of England, and yet no one ever contributed so much to its extension; for, by the rigours of the continental system, he made all the people of Europe sigh for the return of unrestrained enjoyment from her commerce; while, by the vexations of his domination, he arrayed all its forces in dense and burning battalions under her sway. The children of this world may be wiser in their generation than the children of light, but it is during that generation only.

His personal littlenesses.

These flagrant errors may be traced, in a great degree, to the insensibility to moral reaction, and Supreme superintendence, which formed such a striking feature in the character of Napoleon; but there are other peculiarities which will not admit of the same explanation, and which demonstrate that he had the full share of the littleness as well as the greatness of mortality. With unconquerable perseverance and merciless rigour, he enforced the continental system, during the greater part of his reign, in all the countries subject to his authority; yet he himself was the first to set the example of evading his own decrees, for the sake of temporary profit to himself; and while he was shooting in the maritime departments wretched shopkeepers who smuggled a pound of sugar, and heading a crusade of western Europe against Russia to enforce its observance, he himself was daily amassing treasure in the vaults of the Tuileries, by selling licenses to deal in contraband goods, to an extent which defeated the whole object

of his policy in that vital particular. He was well aware of the support which the fidelity of his marshals and chief dignitaries gave to his empire, and his extraordinary knowledge of the human heart gave him unbounded sway over the affections of his soldiers; yet he alienated the attachment of all in authority, but a few devoted personal followers, by the occasional rudeness of his manner, and the repeated fits of ill-humour with which he received any ill success, or the slightest deviation from his commands. Great as he was, he evinced an unpardonable littleness in the envy which he felt at celebrity in others, and the tenacity with which he clung to the externals of power in himself. He outshone the military glories of Sylla, but he could not, like him, have laid down his power, and returned to the walks of private life; his exploits were greater than those of Cæsar, but he could never have refused the proffered crown even when he enjoyed its power. When seated on the throne of Charlemagne, he was afraid of the talents of Madame de Staël, and envious of the beauty of Madame Recamier; and the Emperor who had borne with noble equanimity a fall from the greatest throne in Europe, often found his serenity overturned at St Helena, by the English sentinels addressing him, in obedience to their orders, by the title of general.

Great military errors which he committed.

If the military capacity of the Emperor on most occasions was without an equal in modern times, his recklessness and obstinacy at others were not less remarkable; and accordingly, if history can hardly find a parallel to the achievements which he effected, it can produce none to the disasters in which they terminated. He repeatedly committed faults as a general, for the least considerable of which he would have

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made his lieutenants lose their heads. The imprudence of delivering a pitched battle with inferior forces at Aspern, with the Danube traversed only by two bridges, shaking under the swoln torrent, in his rear, was equalled only by that of risking his crown at Leipsic, in a situation where, while combating a greatly superior force in front, he had no line of retreat but a single chaussée, traversing an otherwise impassable morass a mile and a half broad; and the gross violation of all military principle in both, is strongly illustrated by his own observation, that the first duty of a commander is never to fight with a strait or defile in his rear.* His imprudence in lingering so long at Moscow, surrounded by a hostile population and superior cavalry, was soon, if possible, outdone by that of relinquishing, without any adequate cause, the Kalouga road; and when the Russians were actually abandoning it, throwing back his army on the wasted line of the Smolensko advance. The unheard-of calamities of that campaign itself are mainly to be ascribed to his extreme imprudence, in advancing, contrary to the advice of his most experienced generals, to Moscow from Witepsk, without either force adequate to subdue Russia, or any sufficient preparation for retreat in the event of disaster; and the simultaneous loss of Spain was chiefly owing to the uncalled-for temerity of rushing into the Russian contest, while the Peninsula, a devouring ulcer, was still unsubdued in his rear.

When hard pressed by the troops of coalesced Europe in Germany, and unable to array an ade-

* "The first requisite of a field of battle *is to have no defiles in its rear.* The injudicious choice of the field of battle at Waterloo by Wellington, rendered all retreat impossible."—IX. *Book of* NAPOLEON'S *Memoirs*, 207.

quate force to combat them, he sacrificed his best troops in his empire, a hundred thousand strong, in the fortresses on the Elbe and the Vistula; and when reduced to fifty thousand combatants on the plains of Champagne, he lost, by his obstinate adhesion to the fortresses on the Rhine, a force which would have enabled him to drive the invader beyond that barrier stream. In these, and many similar instances, especially in the later stages of his career, it was evident that Napoleon was either infatuated by his long-continued and extraordinary success; or, what is more probable, that his vision as a general was obliterated by his necessities as an emperor, and that his favourite maxim, that the first movement in retreat was the commencement of ruin, rendered him insensible to all the present dangers of his situation.* And, perhaps, it is well for the liberty of Europe that these numerous and glaring errors were committed by the French emperor in his warlike career; for such was the profound ability which on other occasions he exhibited in his designs, and the matchless skill with which on all he carried them into execution, that if it had been otherwise—if his prudence had been equal to his genius, or his foresight to his combination—and if revolutionary passion in France had not compelled him frequently to sacrifice ultimate safety to present dazzling of the multitude—it is doubtful whether he would not have attained universal dominion, and the independence of nations been permanently crushed, as in ancient times, under the yoke of military power.

CHAP. LXX. 1813. Especially in Germany in 1813.

* This, accordingly, was the opinion of his ablest marshals:—"Napoleon," says Marshal St Cyr, "did wrong, knowing better than any one in the world that he was doing so; but overruled by a fatality which he felt it impossible to resist."—St Cyr, *Histoire Militaire*, iii. 4.

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The glories of his last campaign in France.

It is pleasing, where so many and such serious faults have been committed, to have some redeeming actions to record; and they, in Napoleon's case, are of such a kind, and occurred at such a time, as almost to demonstrate that it was the pressure of political considerations, the experienced necessity of keeping in constant excitement the passions of the Revolution, which drove him so often into blameable actions. His last campaign in France exhibits, if the military operations of the general and enduring fortitude of the Emperor are at once taken into consideration, a model of heroic courage and military ability. Disdaining to submit even to the forces of combined Europe, but feebly seconded by a large portion of his subjects; heading an array depressed by unparalleled disasters, and an empire exhausted by unexampled efforts—he found, in his own genius, a counterpoise to these accumulated difficulties; and by the depth of his combinations, the vigour of his execution, the skilful use of an interior line of communication, and the incomparable rapidity which he infused into his followers, long held the fate of Europe balanced, even against forces four times superior, and a moral energy, roused by long previous oppression and recent victory, which it seemed impossible to resist. It is on that memorable campaign, and the immortal one which early laid the foundation of his fortunes on the Italian plains, that his great fame as a general will ultimately rest; for in both he was destitute of the advantages of numbers, which in the intermediate periods he in general possessed, and found, in his individual resources, a power which, in the first instance conquered, and in the last all but conquered, the most rigorous fortune. And, if sound political judgment must condemn the pride which made him

so obstinately refuse the conditions offered to him at Chatillon, and throw all, even in that extremity, upon the hazard of war; yet it must be admitted that there was something magnanimous in his resolution to run every hazard, rather than sit down on a degraded throne; and to those who weigh well the peculiarities of his situation, wielding a revolutionary sceptre, and supported by revolutionary passion, it will probably appear that he had, in reality, no other alternative; and that submission would have led him, by a process slower indeed, but equally certain, to destruction.

His marvellous sway over the minds of his soldiers.

Perhaps no general, in ancient or modern times, ever possessed so unbounded a sway over the minds of his soldiers, or had created among the inferior ranks of the army such a devotion, it might almost be said idolatry, towards his person. This was very far, indeed, from being the case among the marshals and superior officers—a great proportion of whom were in secret alienated from him by the occasional rudeness of his manner, his frequent sallies of temper, the interminable wars in which he plunged them, and the rigour with which he exacted success, as the sole condition of obtaining favour, or even justice, at headquarters. As little was it occasioned, as was so often the case with the captains of antiquity, by the generous self-denial with which the Emperor shared the bed, and partook the fare, of the common soldiers; occasionally, indeed, he visited the bivouacs, and during the Moscow retreat he relinquished his carriages to the wounded, and marched on foot in the middle of his staff; but these were the exceptions, not the rule; and, in general, the personal comforts of the Emperor, during a campaign, were studied with the most scrupulous attention, and attained to

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a degrée that almost appears inconceivable. His carriage, in which he always travelled, except when in presence of the enemy, was roomy and luxurious: a portable library of choice authors was at hand to amuse his leisure moments; his table, served up with the utmost nicety, exhibited always the best cookery. Porcelain and gold plate of the finest description were constantly made use of, and the same etiquette and distinctions were observed in his campaign tent, or temporary lodging, as at the palace of St Cloud.[1] It was the pains which he took to seek out and distinguish merit and talent among the private men, or inferior ranks of the army, joined to the incomparable talent which he possessed of exciting the enthusiasm of the French soldiers by warlike theatrical exhibitions, or brief heart-stirring appeals in his proclamations, which constituted the real secret of his success; and if the use of proper words, in proper places, be the soul of eloquence, never did human being possess the art in higher perfection than Napoleon.

[1] Odel. i. 159, 160, 194, 196.

Examples of this power.

Various instances of the skilful use of this method of electrifying his troops have already been given in this history; but it was always done so admirably, and generally with such effect, as to call for particular attention. The distribution of the eagles to the regiments, of the crosses of the legion of honour to the most deserving, and the instant promotion of extraordinary merit on the field of battle, were the usual occasions on which these heart-stirring exhibitions took place. They were in general arranged after the following manner:—On the day fixed for the distribution of the eagles, the Emperor, followed by a splendid staff, entered the square of the regiment, which was drawn up on three sides

facing inwards; the fourth being occupied by his suite. At the word given, all the officers fell out, and approached the Emperor. He was alone, on horseback, in his ordinary dark-green surtout, on the dun-coloured stallion which was his favourite charger during his campaigns. The simplicity of his attire offered a striking contrast to the dazzling brilliancy of the uniforms of his attendants. Berthier then approached the Emperor on foot; the drums beat, and he took the eagle, with which he advanced to his side. Napoleon then raised his left hand towards the eagle, holding the reins, according to his usual custom, with his right. He then said in a deep and impressive voice—"Soldiers of the —th regiment, I entrust to you the French eagle: it will serve as your rallying point; you swear never to abandon it until death! You swear never to permit an affront upon the honour of France! You swear to prefer death to dishonour! You swear!" the last words were pronounced in a solemn tone, with inconceivable energy. The officers raised their swords, and the men repeated—"We swear!" with unbounded enthusiasm. The eagle was then delivered to the colonel of the regiment. With such impressive solemnities were the eagles presented to three regiments at once on the plains of Leipsic on the 15th October, the very day before the fortunes of France were overthrown on that memorable field.[1]

[1] Odel. i. 173, 174.

Distribution of crosses of the Legion of Honour, and instant promotion.

The distribution of the decorations of the legion of honour, and the promotion of distinguished soldiers, furnished other occasions of which the Emperor eagerly availed himself to renew these enthusiastic impressions, and spread abroad the belief, which in truth was well founded, that the career of distinction was open alike to all of whatever grade, and

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that a private soldier might reach the marshal's baton through the portals of the bivouac. It may readily be conceived that these theatrical exhibitions were got up by no small amount of careful preparation; that the apparent recognition by the Emperor of a veteran of Arcola or the Pyramids was in general the result of previous enquiry; and that a minute report by the officers of the regiment, was the basis on which the seeming extempore rewards or promotions of the Great Chief were in reality founded. Still they were admirably calculated to rouse the emulation, and excite the ambition of the soldiers of a great military republic, of which the Emperor was the chief; and they were, above all, founded on a perfect knowledge of the temperament, at once vehement and excitable, of the French soldier. When a regiment had performed, or was about to perform any shining action, the men were drawn up, and the aspirants from each of its battalions were led up to the Emperor in front of the line; and the lieutenant-colonels presented the names and services of each on little tablets to him, and the selection was made. On these occasions, a freedom of speech was indulged to the soldiers, which savoured strongly of a military republic, and offered a wide contrast to the studied servilities in the ordinary case of imperial etiquette.

Frankness in which he indulged his soldiers on these occasions.

Frequently officers, and even private soldiers, whose claims had been unsuccessful, remonstrated in firm though respectful terms with the Emperor, and, if they had reason on their side, their efforts were not unfrequently successful. "Sire, I have deserved the cross!" was the usual commencement of the remonstrance. "How so?" replied the Emperor, smiling;—the battles in which the aspirant had been

present, and the services he had performed, were then recounted; and if the officers present confirmed the statement, the request was at once granted. Napoleon was far from being displeased at the military frankness with which these requests were sometimes urged, and which would not have been for an instant tolerated in a civil functionary: the vehemence with which he himself addressed his officers, seemed to provoke and justify a similar style in the reply—"F—," said he once to Sebastiani, contrasting the limited exploits of his horse with those of Latour Maubourg's cuirassiers, "act like them: you command a troop of blackguards, not soldiers." "I do not command blackguards, Sire," said Sebastiani in a firm but respectful tone; at the same time representing rapidly the reason which prevented his troops from achieving more. Macdonald supported him, and together they succeeded in reducing the Emperor to silence; but his indignation broke out in violent invectives against all Sebastiani's officers, as their regiment defiled before him, while he loaded those of Latour Maubourg with eulogiums.[1]

[1] Odel. i. 169, 171.

Such was the violence of the Emperor's temper, especially in the later periods of his career, that he not unfrequently struck the generals or high functionaries who were near him.* This infirmity was

His violent temper, but frequent forgiveness.

* "Napoleon was subject to terrible fits of passion and ill-humour. When he was at a loss for a good reason to oppose to those who contradicted him, he gave vent to his indignation by a short dry answer; and if any farther resistance was made, he proceeded to rude extremities. To avoid the scandal of such scenes, which my character was little fitted to bear, I cut the matter short, by taking a grave and respectful leave. During the campaign at Moscow, I had a quarrel with him which lasted three days, and I had actually resigned my situation, and petitioned for a command in Spain. He sent for me, however, at the end, and said, 'I won't send you to be killed in Spain; you know we are

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well known to those who were habitually about his person—in particular, Berthier, Caulaincourt, and Duroc; and, to avoid the scandal of such scenes, they usually endeavoured to remove the bystanders, and not unfrequently took an opportunity of throwing the victim of the Emperor's wrath in his way some time after, when his humour had subsided, when he was often forgiven. It was a common saying accordingly among those who knew him best, that though fearfully violent, he was not rancorous in his disposition;* and numerous instances occur in his life of his total oblivion of passing subjects of anger. But if his durable interests, or those of his empire, had been affected, either by services which eclipsed his own, or by disasters which could not be retrieved, he was altogether inexorable, and retained an Italian's jealousy or hatred to the hour of his death.[1]

[1] Odel. i. 141, 171, 172. De Pradt, Varsovie, 44. Caul. i. 317, 318.

Extraordinary power of judging of enemies in the field.

By long experience, joined to great natural quickness and precision of eye, he had acquired the power of judging, with extraordinary accuracy, both of the amount of the enemy's force opposed to him in the field, and of the probable result of movements, even the most complicated, going forward in the opposite armies. The roar of artillery, the smoke and rattle of musketry, even the falling of balls around him, were alike unable to divert his steady gaze, or disturb his accurate judgment. Never was he known to be mistaken in the estimate which he formed on the distance, or approach of the fire of the enemy. Even on the farthest extremity of the horizon, if his

two lovers, who can't live without each other.'"—CAULAINCOURT, i. 318, 319.

* "Croyez moi il n'est pas mechant disaient ses officiers superieurs à son égard quoique ce penchant a une colère excessive était connu."—ODEL. i. 171.

telescope could reach the hostile columns, he observed every movement, anticipated every necessity, and, from the slightest indications, drew correct conclusions as to the designs which were in contemplation. No sooner had he ascended a height, from whence a whole field of battle could be surveyed, than he looked around him for a few minutes with his telescope, and immediately formed a clear conception of the position, forces, and intentions of the whole hostile array. In this way he could, with surprising accuracy, calculate in a few minutes, according to what he could see of their formation, and the extent of ground which they occupied, the numerical force of armies of sixty or eighty thousand men; and if their troops were at all scattered, he knew at once how long it would require for them to concentrate, and how many hours must elapse before they could make their attack. On one occasion, in the autumn of 1813, some of Napoleon's generals expressed an opinion that he might expect an attack on the side of Bohemia. "From what I can see," said he, calmly closing his telescope, "the enemy have there two corps of sixty thousand men; they will require more than one day to concentrate and be ready to attack; we may pursue our march."[1]

[1] Odel. i. 165, 166.

His habits at the bivouac fires.

When circumstances obliged the Emperor to remain for some hours, either in the morning or evening, in the open air, the first care of the chasseurs in attendance was to make ready a good fire. This fire was always alimented by an extraordinary quantity of wood, and for this purpose, large logs or pieces of furniture were heaped upon it. Berthier alone remained near his person, all the others keeping at a respectful distance, as they would have done from the Emperor's table. While waiting there, the

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Emperor walked about alone, with his hands behind his back, till he heard the guns or other signals of which he was in expectation. When he began to get tired he took large doses of snuff, or amused himself by pushing the flints or pebbles under his feet about, or thrusting wood into the fire. He could not remain a moment quiet without doing something; and if news of an exciting or disquieting kind was received, he not unfrequently poured the whole snuff out of the snuff-box into the hollow of his hand, and shovelled it all at once up his nostrils.[1]

[1] Odel. i. 164, 165.

Evil consequences which resulted from the Emperor's decided opinion and conduct.

This power of judging by his eye of the distance, numbers, and designs of the enemy, was of peculiar value to Napoleon in the campaign of 1813, in consequence of the great deficiency of light troops on his own part, as well as the extraordinary skill and dexterity of the numerous bands of them in the service of the enemy. The peasantry, too, even in Saxony, were all hostile, and communicated intelligence as readily to the Allies as they withheld it from him; so that he could obtain little information, either from his own troops, or the inhabitants of the country in which the operations were conducted. His turn of mind was essentially mathematical, and he applied the ordinary rules of geometry and trigonometry, with surprising quickness and accuracy, to the march and distance of troops, by a sort of intuitive mental operation, without the aid of either diagrams or calculations. Nevertheless, this turn of mind, though of immense service in the field, and in presence of the enemy, was not without its inconvenience; and it contributed to bring about some of the greatest disasters in which the detached corps of his army, at the later periods of the war, were involved. The Emperor, being accustomed to consider

every thing with geometrical precision, and to estimate human strength and capacity at its highest average, calculated upon the march of his different corps as he would have done on the result of an arithmetical calculation, and was as much surprised when the one failed him, as he would have been if the other had done so. Knowing, by experience, that men could march, when in good spirits, ten leagues a-day, and often combat after it, he too often reckoned on their being always able to do so, and took not the smallest account of the exhaustion arising from bodily fatigue, want of shoes, mental depression, or scanty rations.[1] * CHAP. LXX. 1813. [1] Odel. i. 129, 130.

Indefatigable himself in the pains which he took to provide subsistence for his troops, and accurately calculating the period when the supplies ordered should arrive at their several points of destination, he invariably acted on the supposition that they had done so; and was deaf to all representations that the The bad effects of his impetuous temper and habits.

* "The precision with which he was accustomed to see the marches he ordered executed by his generals, led him to believe that it was easy to provide for the wants of an army. His dictatorial tone appeared to him as sufficient to procure bread and meat, as it was to assemble his corps at a given point. He was too much occupied with his mathematical or geographical calculations to pay much attention to the tedious operation of providing for his troops. He detested that part of the service, as continually thwarting his projects. Daru, from the fear of irritating him, did not, on such matters, frequently venture to represent the greatness of the danger. Napoleon thought he had sufficiently provided for that department, by ordering that a great quantity of provisions should be sent from France. Every one knew how these supplies were intercepted, by the negligence or cupidity of inferior agents, but no one had the courage to tell him so; or possibly they allowed the evil to go on, that necessity might at length divert him from his system of continual warfare. For long the private soldier had become a merchandise of no value."—Odeleben, i. 13.

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troops were starving, because he had given directions sufficient, if executed, to have prevented such a calamity. He never took into consideration the many cases in which the commissariat were physically unable to execute his orders, especially for the feeding of the enormous multitudes which were latterly assembled under his banners, or the still more numerous ones in which their faithful performance was eluded by the negligence or cupidity of inferior functionaries. Thus he was constantly exacting from his officers and soldiers services which they were altogether unable to perform; and gave vent to the most violent sallies of ill-humour against his generals, which alienated them not a little from his person, when in consequence battles were lost, or corps failed to reach the prescribed point at the appointed time. Yet such was the terror produced by the vehemence of his temper, and such the experienced benefit of falling in with his opinions to the personal interests of those around him, especially in his later years, that few had the moral courage necessary to withstand the ebullition consequent on the disclosure of unexpected and unpleasant truths, and fewer still the virtue to resist the prospects of fortune and promotion, consequent on chiming in with his opinions. His conceptions were so vivid, his temper so ardent, his mind so vehement, that he became, after his accession to the empire, almost incapable of bearing contradiction, or hearing painful truths; and to such a length did this arrive, that his generals ceased to report their losses to headquarters, for fear of being deprived of their commands; or the details, if transmitted, produced no impression, and he prescribed attacks to them,[1] on the supposition that their effec-

[1] De Pradt, Ambassade à Varsovie, 8, 9, and 94. Dumas, Souv. iii 502, 503.

tive men were double of those actually present with the eagles.*

This vehement and untractable character of Napoleon's mind, which exercised so great an influence at every period over his fortunes, long sustaining them in critical circumstances by the force of indomitable resolution, and involving him in the end, from the effects of obstinacy, in unheard-of calamities, was in some measure, doubtless, owing to the impatience of control, which is, in every instance, and in the most reasonable men, the consequence of the enjoyment of long continued power; but it arose, also, in a great degree from original temper, and characterized more or less every period of his career. His genius was vast, but it was after the manner of the Orientals, rather than the Europeans; he followed neither the dictates of truth, nor the lessons of experience,

Excessive obstinacy of his disposition.

* "I had received orders," says General Mathieu Dumas, "to assemble the municipality of Dresden, and to exact from them large supplies of provisions; but the passage, and above all the disorders following the retreat of the allied army, had so completely exhausted that unfortunate city, that my requisitions, my efforts, and my menaces were alike incapable of making them good, but with the utmost difficulty. Despite its natural fertility, that country was exhausted; and yet it was necessary to put the army immediately in a condition to pursue the enemy, and march for several days. The Emperor showed, with great injustice, much ill-humour because I could not conquer impossibilities; he never admitted any obstacle of time, or the nature of things, as a bar to his will; he was resolute to attack the enemy and push on, and insisted for the supplies. 'I wish to make of Dresden,' said he, 'with its double *tête-de-pont*, the centre and pivot of my army; but I must have resources for my troops during their marches and operations beyond the Elbe. Do you understand me?' I answered respectfully, but firmly, that I did not see how it was possible for Dresden to become such a depôt. I went too far doubtless, for the Emperor addressed to me some severe expressions, and sent for Duroc. 'You commit the same fault perpetually,' said Berthier to me when the scene was over; 'you insist upon answering the Emperor.'" Dumas was never forgiven; he was dismissed from his employment at headquarters, and left in a subordinate situation at Dresden.—See *Souvenirs de* DUMAS, iii. 503.

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but the vivid pictures and vehement suggestions of his own fervent imagination. Such was the intensity of these impressions, that they made him entirely forget reality; he reasoned and acted upon them, after the manner of insane persons, as if they had been actual existences. Ideas with him instantly led to desire; his incipient thought was already a passion; and his chief endeavours afterwards were directed to conquering the difficulties or overcoming the obstacles which opposed its execution. Thence the complaint, so commonly made against him, especially in his later years, that he had an instinctive aversion to truth, and that no one could secure his favour but by anticipating and confirming his preconceived opinions. It was not that he had a repugnance towards truth in the abstract, but that he resisted every thing which deranged or unsettled the existing current of his ideas. From the same cause, he never was known to change his opinion on any subject; nor did he ever admit, except in one or two flagrant instances, such as the attack on Spain, that he had done wrong or committed a mistake in his life. His ideas were conceived in the vivid imagination of the East, and much more frequently founded on abstract conceptions than practical observation; but they were developed with the strictness of geometrical demonstration, and engraven on his mind in characters more durable and unalterable than the sculptures on Egyptian granite.[1]

[1] De Pradt, Introd. à l'Amb. à Varsovie, p. xiii. 94.

Early appearance of this peculiarity in his character.

It was very early in life that Napoleon secluded himself as it were from other men, and became impressed with the lofty objects to which he appeared to be destined. He himself has told us, that it was after the storming of the bridge of Lodi in 1796, that he first conceived he was to do great things;[2] and we

[2] Las Cases, i. 71.

have the authority of Duroc for the assertion, that even at that early period he kept his generals as much at a distance as he afterwards did in the court of the Tuileries. Shortly after his entry into Milan, in the same year, some one hinted to him, that with his vast reputation it would be no difficult matter to establish himself permanently in that duchy. "There is a finer throne than that vacant," replied the future successor of Charlemagne. "There are two tottering thrones which I am about to prop up," said he in 1794, when out of employment after the siege of Toulon—"those of Constantinople and Persia." To overthrow the Turkish empire, and establish himself on the throne of Constantine, was the real object of his expedition to Acre in 1799; and even after he had seized the consular sceptre, he still looked to the east as the appropriate scene of his glory, and the only theatre of great achievements. "There has been nothing to be done in Europe for two hundred years," said he in 1804, "it is in the east only that great things are to be done." All his ideas of universal empire in the west tended to, and were designed as preparations for that one favourite object of oriental ambition; it was to prepare the way for its accomplishment, that he pursued England with such persevering hostility, and incurred all the hazards of the Peninsular contest; and his secret design in advancing to Moscow was less to plant his standards on the walls of the Kremlin, than to prepare the way for the seizure of Constantinople, and follow in the footsteps of Cyrus and Alexander.[1]

[1] De Pradt, Varsovie. 17, 18. Odel. i. 11.

He had a very low opinion of human nature; an opinion which will be probably shared with him to the end of time by all persons in authority who are witnesses to the baseness and servility with which

His low opinion both of men and women.

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they are surrounded. "Tacitus," said he, "wrote romances; Gibbon is a declaimer; Machiavel is the only author really worth reading."[1] It must be admitted, he put in practice many of the maxims of the Florentine sage, and doubtless saw enough around him to justify the view he took of mankind. His opinion of women was still lower; he never could be persuaded to converse with them seriously on any subject, or regard them as anything but playthings or objects of pleasure;* he felt, with Bacon, their value to young men as mistresses, to old as nurses; but utterly denied their utility even to middle life as companions.† It was his favourite position that the Orientals understood much better how to dispose of the female sex than the Europeans; that the harem was the true scene both of their respectability and their usefulness, and that if it were not for the object of having a family no man of sense would ever marry. His well-known answer to Madame de Staël, when asked by that celebrated wit, "Whom do you consider the greatest woman that ever existed?" "She that had the greatest number of children," was not a mere

[1] De Pradt, Varsovie, 17.

* "Love," said Napoleon, "is the occupation of an idle man; the amusement of a busy one; and the shipwreck of a sovereign."—Las Cases, ii. 15.

† The Emperor, who knew men so well, was ignorant of women. He had not lived with them, and did not understand them; he disclaimed so futile a study. His sensations, entirely physical in regard to them, admitted no influence from liveliness, intelligence, or talent; he had an aversion to their being learned or celebrated, or emerging from their ordinary domestic sphere. He placed them in the social order, at the lowest scale, and never could admit that they should have any influence over the will. A woman was in his eyes an agreeable piece of creation, a pretty plaything, an amusing *passe-temps*, but nothing more. Attempts have been made to give a romantic character to his ephemeral amours; but the truth is, that he never was the weakest in these *liaisons;* he never felt the delirium when the intoxicated heart gives more than is sought of it. "Love," said he, "is a foolish pre-occupation, and nothing more, be assured of that."—Caulaincourt, i. 158.

casual repartee, but the felicitous expression of his deliberate opinion.[1] His amorous propensities, nevertheless, were violent, and his infidelities frequent; but none of his fancies ever influenced his conduct, or affected his judgment in other matters, and they were generally of very short duration. There was a brusquerie and precipitation in his manner towards women, both in public and private, which his greatest admirers admit to have been repugnant to every feeling of female delicacy. He had hardly any conversation to address to them in the saloons of St Cloud, and still less in the privacy where his passing intrigues were carried on; he thought—and often found—that they should yield as fast as a beleaguered fortress did to the assault of his grenadiers. He never got the better, as hardly any one ever does, of the want of the society of elegant women early in life; and on occasion of his marriage with Marie Louise in 1810, he accosted her rather as a grisette who had been won by a three weeks' fidelity, than the daughter of the Cæsars who had been the prize of a hundred victories.[2]*

[1] Las Cases, v. 242.

[2] De Pradt, Varsovie, 17. Capefigue, Histoire de Nap. viii. 352.

No words can convey an adequate idea of the indefatigable activity of the Emperor, or of his extraordinary power of undergoing mental and bodily fatigue. He brought to the labours of the cabinet a degree of industry, vigour, and penetration, which was altogether astonishing. Those who were most in his confidence, were never weary of expressing their admiration at the acuteness, decision, and rich flow of ideas which distinguished his thoughts

His extraordinary powers of mental exertion.

* He jumped into the carriage, when she drove up to the post-town where he met her, in his great-coat wet with rain; embraced her with the ardour of one-and-twenty; ordered the postilions to drive at the gallop to Compeigne, where he asserted the conjugal rights before any marriage ceremony had been performed.—See BAUSSET, *Mémoires de Napoleon*, ii. 45, 46, *and* CAPEFIGUE, *Histoire de Napoleon*, viii. 352, 353.

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when engaged in business. When he received despatches, the first step was to call in the officer who brought them, and question him minutely as to all the particulars not specified in the writing; and not unfrequently his secretaries, or the officers in attendance, had to undergo similar interrogatories as to the places and distances which were the theatre of action. Having acquired the requisite information, he at once took his decision, and it was only on very particular occasions that he adjourned the consideration of any thing to the day following. No one better understood or more thoroughly practised De Witt's celebrated maxim, the justice of which is probably well known to all engaged extensively in active life, that the great secret of getting through business is to take up every thing in its order, and do only one thing at a time. During a campaign, he set no bounds to the fatigue which he underwent. Often, after reading despatches, or dictating orders to one set of secretaries during the whole day, he would commence with another relay at night, and with the exception of a few hours' sleep on his sofa, keep them hard at work till the following morning. The fervour of his imagination, the vehemence of his conceptions, seemed to render him insensible to the fatigues of the moment, which were felt as altogether overwhelming by his attendants, less wrapt up than him in the intense anticipation of the future.[1]

[1] Las Cases, vi. 213. Odel. i.4. 181, 182.

His habits during a campaign.

If, in the course of a campaign, he met a courier on the road, he generally stopped, got out of his carriage, and called Berthier or Caulaincourt, who sat down on the ground to write what the Emperor dictated. Frequently then, the officers around him were sent in different directions, so that hardly any

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remained in attendance on his person.[1] When he expected some intelligence from his generals, and it was supposed that a battle was in contemplation, he was generally in the most anxious state of disquietude; and not unfrequently in the middle of the night called out aloud, "Call D'Albe, (his principal secretary;) let every one arise." He then began to work at one or two in the morning; having gone to bed the night before, according to his invariable custom, at nine o'clock, as soon as he had dined. Three or four hours' sleep was all that he either allowed himself or required; during the campaign of 1813, there was only one night—that, when he rested at Gorlitz, after the conclusion of the armistice, that he slept ten hours without wakening. Often Caulaincourt or Duroc were up with him hard at work all night. On such occasions, his favourite mameluke, Rustan, brought him frequently strong coffee, and he walked about from dark till sunrise, speaking and dictating without intermission in his apartment, which was always well lighted, wrapped up in his night-gown, with a silk handkerchief tied like a turban round his head. But these stretches were only made under the pressure of necessity; generally he retired to rest at eight or nine, and slept till two; then rose and dictated for a couple of hours; then rested, or more frequently meditated for two hours alone; after which he dressed, and a warm bath prepared him for the labours of the succeeding day.[2]

[1] Las Cases, i. 357.

June 10, 1813.

[2] Odel. i. 183, 185. Bausset, ii. 213.

His travelling carriage was a perfect curiosity, and singularly characteristic of the prevailing temper of his disposition. It was divided into two unequal compartments separated by a small low partition on which the elbows could rest, while it pre-

His travelling carriage, and habits on the road.

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vented either from encroaching on the other: the smaller was for Berthier, the larger, the lion's share, for himself. The Emperor could recline in a *dormeuse* in front of his seat; but no such accommodation was afforded to his companion. In the interior of the carriage were a number of drawers, of which Napoleon had the key, in which were placed despatches not yet read; and a small library of books. A large lamp behind threw a bright light in the interior, so that he could read without intermission all night. He paid great attention to his portable library, and had prepared a list of duodecimo editions of above five hundred volumes, which he intended to be his constant travelling companions; but the disasters of the latter years of his reign prevented this design from being carried into complete execution.[1]

[1] Personal observat. Odel. i. 184, 185.

His habits on horseback.

Napoleon was extremely fond of exercise on horseback, and both a daring and indefatigable rider; but he was far from being a good horseman. He generally rode entire horses, and as he frequently had them little under command, those near him were sometimes thrown from their saddles by the effects of his awkwardness. Eight or ten horses for his private use accompanied the carriage, but the favourite was a beautiful Arab bay, with a black tail and mane. When he mounted on horseback to survey a country, two officers of his suite preceded him, and his own steed followed at a quick trot those which went before it. He usually held the reins in his *right* hand, and incessantly agitated the bit in the horse's mouth: peculiarities contrary to all the rules of the *manège*, but not a little characteristic of the incessant fervour of his mind. His restlessness of disposition was such, that he could not sit still, even when carried at the gallop on horseback. The officers who rode

before had come by long habit to know so well what he wanted, that he had rarely to direct their course, but his own horse followed mechanically the direction which they took. He was passionately fond of riding across the country, through fields or woods, and over heaths; and in a difficult path where riding was hazardous, and the whole party was obliged to dismount and lead their horses, the Emperor was always in spirits. If he came to any place where a disaster had been incurred, or which was associated with painful recollections, he pushed on at the gallop, and fell into a perfect fury, if any thing then checked his progress. On one occasion, in the autumn of 1813, he had occasion to pass a place where seventy caissons, of great importance to the army, had been blown up the day before by the Cossacks. On seeing the ground covered with the fragments, he immediately set off at the gallop, to get over it as fast as possible; and a little dog having followed his horse barking, he was seized with such a fit of fury, that he drew one of his pistols, fired at the animal, and, having missed, dashed the pistol itself at it, still hastening on with breathless speed, while Rustan, who was no stranger to such scenes, quietly fell behind and picked up the weapon thus thrown away by his infuriated master.[1]

[1] Odel. i. 186, 189.

His impetuous habits in travelling, and during a campaign.

The unceasing restlessness and indefatigable activity of his disposition were strongly evinced in the irregular hours during which different things were done, and the rigorous manner in which, nevertheless, instant obedience was enforced to his commands. Often the march of headquarters was delayed for some hours, or half a day, beyond the time fixed, while the Emperor was dictating or reading despatches; and at the last word he would call out—

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"The carriage—to horse!" These words acted like an electric shock to his attendants, who straightway mounted, the carriage was instantly at the door, and the whole set off at the gallop. Caulaincourt generally rode on the right of the carriage, General Guyot on the left; and the officers on service, pages, attendants, and grooms, with the led horses, rattled on as hard as they could drive, followed by a squadron of the guards on horseback. The whole pushed on at a quick trot, or the gallop, often for a day or a night without halting; and where the road was narrow, or a defile or copse was to be traversed, the vehemence with which they rode drove them against each other, at the imminent hazard of their legs and necks. If the Emperor halted to make an observation, he immediately mounted one of the led horses, and four chasseurs, with fixed bayonets on their carbines, formed a square round him, which advanced, always keeping him in its centre. If a distant object was to be examined, a page brought up the telescope, a very fine one being always at hand; the maps were frequently called for, and spread out on the ground, and the Emperor, lying down upon them, was soon as completely absorbed in his plans as if he had been in his cabinet at St Cloud.[1]

[1] Odel. i. 163, 164.

Custom in passing through the troops.

When the Emperor passed through a division of the guards, all the bands of the regiments came to the front, the troops fell back, and formed line on either side, and great pomp was observed; the cortège passing through slowly, and saluting the officers. But no such ceremony was observed in traversing the ordinary corps of the army; and the passage through them was often forced at the gallop, under circumstances almost amounting to violence. The imperial suite, like a whirlwind, swept through

the columns, too fast for the men either to fall into the ranks or present arms; and before the astonished crowd could find time to gaze on their beloved chief, the cortège was disappearing in the distance. Room, however, was always cleared; the outriders loudly called out to make way; and at the magic words—"The Emperor!" infantry, cavalry, and artillery were pell-mell hurried to the side, often in frightful confusion, and with fractures of legs and arms. Loud cheers never failed, to the very last, to greet his passage through the divisions of the guards, by whom he was enthusiastically beloved, and whose wants were sedulously attended to; but though the young conscripts, in the beginning of the campaign of 1813, were prodigal of the same acclamations, yet hardship, disaster, and suffering, sensibly cooled their ardour, and before its close the imperial suite often traversed long columns of the army, without a single cheer announcing its presence.[1]

[1] Odel i. 174, 175.

When despatches overtook the Emperor, as they often did, on the road, Duroc, or Caulaincourt, who rode at the side of the carriage, received and opened the bag, and presented the letters to the Emperor without stopping. Directly a number of envelopes were seen falling from the windows of the imperial carriage; and it was evident, from the rate at which they were tossed over, that the letters were devoured with the rapidity of lightning. The useless despatches and covers were cut to pieces, and thrown out in the same way; often in such quantities, as to strew the track of the wheels with little fragments which, trodden under foot by the horses, or crushed under the wheels of the succeeding carriages, made a white line along the road. Napoleon generally cut these despatches to pieces with his own hands, or, if not so

Receipt of despatches on the road.

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employed, worked incessantly with the window-sash or carriage-door: he could not remain a moment at rest. If there were no despatches or morning states to read, he had recourse to the Paris journals, or the last publications of the day, with which the drawers of the carriage were always stored; but they generally shared the fate of the unimportant despatches, being thrown out of the windows after a few pages had been cut up. In such numbers were these discarded literary novelties thus tossed overboard, that the officers of the suite generally contrived to collect no inconsiderable stores of diverting trifles, by picking them up on the traces of his carriage. The Emperor was insatiable for something new, and opened with avidity every fresh publication; but his taste was for solid and well-informed writings, not amusing trifles; and he had an incredible tact in discovering, from a few pages, whether there was any thing worth reading in a book, so that, in his hands, the ephemeral literature of the day disappeared almost as fast as it was introduced.[1]

[1] Bausset, ii. 214. Odel. i. 145, 146.

Antechambers of Napoleon during a campaign.

The antechambers of Napoleon during a campaign—whether in his tent, in the field, or in the apartments of farm-houses, or even cottages, which were dignified for the time with the appellation of "the palace"—presented the most extraordinary spectacle. No one could form an idea of the fatigue there undergone by the whole attendants, from the grand esquire Caulaincourt to the lowest of the valets. Duroc and he were themselves indefatigable, and, by unwearied exertion and extraordinary activity, had introduced the utmost degree of regularity into the imperial household; but it was no easy matter for the strength of any others in attendance to stand the rigorous services which were exacted.

Persons of illustrious birth or the highest rank—such as Count Narbonne or Caulaincourt—were obliged to wait there night after night, sleeping on straw or stretched out on chairs, ready at any moment to be called in by the Emperor. Now and then the scene was enlivened by a young and handsome actress in the last Parisian costume, who, amidst the din of war and the smoke of the bivouacs, waited to be called in to divert the Emperor for a few minutes amidst his more serious cases.[1] Frequently he roused his attendants eight or ten times in the night when despatches requiring instant attention were received. All who were there on service slept habitually on straw, wrapt up in their cloaks, ready, at a moment's warning, either to mount on horseback and ride twenty or thirty miles without halting, or to take their turn, the moment the Emperor's voice was heard, in the not less fatiguing duty of answering his despatches, or writing to his dictation. So crowded was his antechamber in general with attendants, that it was not inaptly compared, by those inhabiting it, to the inside of the wooden horse of Troy. The faithful Rustan, whom he had brought from Egypt, usually slept near the door: he dressed and undressed the Emperor; and when he rode out, was constantly at hand to bring the telescope, or provide the cloaks or umbrellas which might be required for protection from the weather.[2]

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[1] Odel. i. 146.

[2] Odel. i. 134, 135. Bausset, ii. 167.

His habits and labours in the cabinet.

The true scene of Napoleon's glory, and the most characteristic of the ruling passion of his mind, was his cabinet. This apartment was never wanting even in the worst accommodation; the ingenuity of his attendants supplied every defect; and if no room could be got, his tent was always at hand, which was arranged for the purpose in the middle of the

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squares of the Old Guard. Although this important apartment was overloaded with maps, military states, and despatches, the most remarkable and uniform regularity was observed in its arrangement; and it was so managed, that, though the Emperor so often moved his headquarters, every thing was in the same place one day as another. In the middle stood a large table, on which was extended the best map of the theatre of war;* and on it were stuck pins, with heads of different colours, to represent his own and the hostile columns. It was the duty of the director of the topographic bureau, to have the map with these pins laid down the moment that headquarters arrived at any place; and almost always the first thing which Napoleon did, was to call for the map when he arrived; for he held to it more strongly than any other want of his existence. During the whole night the map was surrounded by twenty or thirty wax candles constantly burning, and a fine compass stood in the middle of them. So frequently did the Emperor call for the map when out on horseback, that Caulaincourt had a portable one, which he kept constantly tied to his button across his breast; and he often was required to unfold it ten or fifteen times in the course of a forenoon.[1]

[1] Odel. i. 135, 137.

His habits of writing and dictating.

At the corners of the cabinet were four lesser tables, at which the secretaries of Napoleon were engaged in writing; and sometimes Napoleon himself and the chief of the topographic department, were to be seen there likewise. The Emperor usually dictated walking about in his green surtout and great boots, with his hat upon his head, precisely as

* For the campaign in Saxony in 1813, he made use of the admirable map of Petri, of which he had felt the value in the campaign of 1806; and occasionally of that of Blackenberg.—ODELEBEN, i. 137.

he was interred in the grave at St Helena. As his ideas flowed with extraordinary rapidity, and he spoke as rapidly as he thought, it was no easy matter for his secretaries to keep pace with his allocution. To facilitate the expression, a certain number of hieroglyphic symbols were established by him to signify certain things; and they were not a little curious, as affording an index to the light in which these things were regarded by him. Thus, the tail of a dragon signified the French army; a whip, the corps of Davoust; *a thorn, the British empire; a sponge, the commercial towns.* It was the duty of the secretaries afterwards to decipher this chaos, and extend it in proper sentences, which was often a work of no small difficulty; but the Emperor had a singular facility in making it out, as the symbols had been established by himself. Often there were two despatches to which answers were to be dictated at the same time—one from Spain, and another from a distant quarter of Germany; but the complication and variety of objects to be considered, made no confusion, on such occasions, in the steadiness of his mental gaze. The moment that a despatch was read, and its bearer questioned, an answer to it was commenced; and, not unfrequently, while the secretary in one corner was making out orders of the most important kind for the war in Spain, the one that sat in another was drawing a diplomatic note; a third busy with the orders for twenty brigades; and the fourth with an A B C for the King of Rome.* Nothing

* It is frequently said, from several secretaries being engaged in the room at once, that Napoleon could dictate to three clerks at a time. This, however, is a mistake, as all those who have really been so hard pressed as to require to attempt it will readily believe. It is quite possible to dictate a serious paper to one secretary, and write a letter with your own hand, or dictate short notes, requiring little attention, at the

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could exceed the distinctness with which the threads of all these varied subjects were preserved in his mind; and although the orders which he gave for the direction of distant operations were often unfortunate or erroneous, from the impetuosity of his mind leading him to decide without sufficient information, and their effect was still more frequently marred by the neglect or incapacity of inferior functionaries; yet they were always founded on an able and lucid conception on his part: and the very errors they contained, which sometimes were of the most serious kind, generally arose from the intensity of that conception rendering him blind to the opposite set of considerations.[1]

[1] Odel. i. 139, 141.

The military portfolio and its keeper.

One of the most important officers in the military household of Napoleon, was the keeper of the portfolio—a functionary who supplied the place of the whole tribe of registrars, keepers of archives, and state-paper officers, in ordinary governments; and who, though a simple Swiss porter, in the rank of a superior domestic, was intrusted with the keeping of papers of inestimable value. His duty was of the simplest, but at the same, for a long continuance, of the most exhausting kind: it was to be constantly at his post, and thoroughly acquainted with the place, arrangement, and look of all the papers under his charge: night and day he required to be at the door

same time; the eye giving the sense of what is written, while the memory retains the import of what has been dictated: but it is altogether impossible to dictate at the same time two serious papers on different subjects, much less three. Nevertheless, a man with an active mind may frequently be seen in a room with three secretaries, and keeping them all constantly employed, but in such a case the real mental strain is with one only; the others are making out letters from hints furnished, or writing routine despatches of little moment, or copying what is put into their hands, with possibly the addition of a sentence at the beginning and end.

of the cabinet; no excuse but severe illness could be taken for even a minute's absence. The Emperor had, with great pains, collected a magnificent set of maps, the finest probably in existence, which was his constant companion in the campaigns of Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, and Aspern; but it was lost during the Moscow retreat, and its place was never afterwards adequately supplied. The collection, however, though of a secondary character, which was made for the campaign of 1813, was very considerable, and two officers of approved talent and fidelity were constantly in charge of it, and at hand. So peremptory were the orders of the Emperor that they should be constantly near his person with their portfolios, that they were never more than a few yards distant either from his cabinet, his carriage, or his charger; and, being well aware of the importance of their functions, and the numerous occasions on which they were required to produce their treasures, they rode over, without ceremony, every thing that came in their way. With such minute attention to details were the operations of this wonderful man conducted; and so vast the variety of information which required to be taken into account in the formation of designs, which, to a superficial observer, appeared to emanate from the conceptions of original genius.[1]

[1] Odel. i. 142, 144.

Napoleon's occasional acts of humanity and generosity.

Although no man in modern times has occasioned such a destruction of the human species, Napoleon was often susceptible of pity for individual suffering; and as he rode, according to his constant custom, over the fields of his victories after the carnage had ceased, he frequently made some of his suite stop to stanch the wounds, or alleviate the sufferings of the maimed, of whatever nation. On one occasion in Silesia, when riding in this manner over a field

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strewed with the wounded and the slain, he made his own surgeon dismount to bind up the wounds of a Russian who still gave some signs of life: "If he is saved," said he, "there will be one the less to hate me as the cause of his death."[1] At a fire in Verdun in 1805, some English sailors exerted themselves strenuously to extinguish the flames: no sooner had this come to the knowledge of Napoleon, than he ordered them to be sent home to their own country, with money to carry them from his privy purse. After the battle of Bautzen, he had occasion to pass through the town of Bischoffswerda, which had become a prey to the flames during the preceding contest. The smouldering ruins, and starving inhabitants, striving to rescue some of their effects from the devastation, presented a most melancholy spectacle, with which the Emperor was deeply affected; and having ascertained that the fire had been occasioned by the wantonness of his own soldiers, he promised to give the sufferers indemnification, and actually fixed 100,000 francs (L.4000) for that purpose; but having failed to provide the requisite funds from the military chest, the payment of this sum fell as a burden on the King of Saxony.[2] When he arrived at Buntzlau in Silesia, where his old antagonist Kutusoff had breathed his last, he enquired if any monument existed to his memory, and being informed that there was none, he ordered one to be raised at his own expense: an honourable design, which the misfortunes of the close of the campaign prevented from being carried into execution.[3]

[1] Odel. i. 81.

[2] Odel. i. 85. Fain, i. 401.

[3] Fain, i. 441.

Heroic conduct, whether in his own troops or those of his enemies, seldom failed to arrest his attention. On one occasion, at Boulogne, he received intelligence of a young English sailor who had

escaped from his place of confinement in the interior of France, and made his way to the coast near that town, where he had secretly constructed a skiff of branches and the bark of trees, with which he was about when seized to brave the tempests of the Channel, in hopes of making his way to one of the English cruisers, and regaining his native country. Struck with the hardihood of the project, Napoleon ordered the young man to be brought into his presence, and himself questioned him as to his motives for undertaking so perilous an adventure; for the bark seemed incapable of bearing the weight of a human being. The sailor persisted in his having intended to embark in it, and besought the Emperor to permit him to carry his design into execution. "Doubtless," replied Napoleon, "you must have some mistress to revisit, since you are so desirous to regain your country?" "No," replied the young man, "I only wish to see my mother, who is old and infirm." "And you shall see her," rejoined the Emperor; and immediately gave orders that the young man should be equipped anew, and sent with a flag of truce on board the first cruiser with the British flag, adding a small sum for his mother, who, must, he added, be no common person, to have so affectionate a son.[1]

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His generous conduct to an English sailor.

[1] Las Cases, vii. 78, 79.

Although the campaigns were the great scene of Napoleon's activity, yet peace was very far indeed from being a season of repose to his mind. He was then incessantly engaged in the maze of diplomatic negotiations, projects of domestic improvements, or discussions in the council of state, which filled up every leisure moment of the forenoon. He rose early, and was engaged in his cabinet with his secretary till breakfast, which never lasted above half-an-

His habits at Paris and St Cloud.

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hour. He then attended a parade of his troops, received audiences of ambassadors, and transacted other official business till three o'clock, when he generally repaired to the council of state, or rode out till dinner, which was always at six. When engaged in business, or at the council-board, his activity, as in his campaigns, was incessant; he could not rest a moment idle: at the head of the table of the council of state, he was constantly cutting the chair on which he sat with his penknife;* and on his favourite desks at St Cloud, Fontainbleau, and the Elysée Bourbon, where all his great designs were matured, the deep and innumerable indentations of his penknife are still to be seen.† If he could get nothing else to work with, he bit his own nails to the quick, till the blood came. Dinner occupied exactly forty minutes: the Emperor conversed a great deal, unless his mind was much pre-occupied, but never indulged in the slightest convivial excess. Coffee succeeded at twenty minutes to seven, unless some special occasion required a longer stay at table; and the remainder of the evening, till eleven, when he retired to rest, was engaged in discussions and conversation with a circle of officers, ambassadors, scientific or literary men, artists of celebrity, or civil functionaries. In their society he took the greatest delight. On such occasions, he provoked discussion on serious and interesting topics, not unfrequently morals, political philosophy, and history; and never failed to astonish his auditors by the extent of his information, and the original views which he started on

* "I sat down in the arm-chair, all lacerated and cut up with the penknife, on which the Emperor used to rest."—*Souvenirs de* CAULAINCOURT, ii. 14.

† The author has repeatedly seen them.—See also CAULAINCOURT, ii. 14.

every subject that came under discussion. A little talent or knowledge, doubtless, goes a great way with an Emperor; and suspicions might have been entertained that the accounts transmitted to us by his contemporaries of the ability of his conversation were exaggerated, did not ample and decisive evidence of it remain in the memorials of St Helena, and the luminous speeches, superior to any other at the council-board, which are recorded by Thibaudeau and Pelet in their interesting works on the Council of State during the Consulate and Empire.[1]

Opinions de Napoleon, dans le Conseil d'Etat, par Pelet. Paris, 1838; and Thib. sur le Consulat. Paris, 1815.

In domestic life, Napoleon was exempt from the habitual influence of most of the vices which so often consume the time and destroy the usefulness of persons in his exalted station. Though not a faithful, he was a kind husband: and his transient amours neither estranged him from the Empress, nor afforded any ground for public scandal. In early life, he indulged for a brief season in the dream of romantic love; and though his marriage with Josephine was suggested by motives of ambition, her attractions soon acquired a powerful hold of his heart: his letters to her during the Italian campaigns breathe the ardour of devoted attachment; and to the end of his life, even after her divorce, she possessed a large share of his affection, and he in secret believed that her destiny was in some mysterious way interwoven with his own. Female blandishments never either absorbed his time, nor clouded his judgment. He was subject to terrible fits of jealousy, for which the levities and extravagance of Josephine afforded too much foundation: but he was not unforgiving in his disposition; and, though his moody temperament was wrought up on such occasions to the most violent

His habits as a husband and a father.

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pitch of wrath, yet he was not inaccessible to returning reason or forgiveness. His divorce of her was suggested by the ruling principles of his life—state policy and ambition—and the pain which it cost him was greater than could have been expected from one who was habitually guided by views of a general nature; while its ultimate disastrous effects afforded a signal proof that durable advantage, even in this world, is not to be purchased by harsh or iniquitous measures.[2] Though the Empress Marie Louise was little more than an amiable nonentity, and she proved herself in the end altogether unworthy of being his wife, yet he was kind and considerate to her during the few years that she shared his fortunes: and towards the King of Rome he invariably felt the warmest affection—parental feelings, indeed, strong in almost all but the utterly selfish, were peculiarly warm in his bosom. The education and progress of his son occupied a large share of his attention, even on the most momentous occasions of his life;* and one of the bitterest pangs which he felt during his exile at St Helena, was owing to his separation from that beloved infant, with whom his affections and prospective glories had been indissolubly wound up.

[2] Bausset, ii. 7, 8.

[1] Las Cases. O'Meara.

His conduct at St Helena.

To complete the character of this extraordinary man, it only remains to add, that his conduct at the time of his fall, and during his exile at St Helena, exhibited the same mixture of grandeur and littleness, of selfishness and magnanimity, which characterized every other period of his life. History has not a more splendid scene to record than his heroic though unsuccessful campaign in France in 1814; but he

* See in particular his conduct on receiving the portrait of the King of Rome the evening before the battle of Borodino.—*Ante*, viii. 690.

lost its whole fruit by the want of moral courage to prosecute his movement upon St Dizier, and was content at last to abdicate his throne, and retire to a little appanage assigned him by the conquerors in the island of Elba. His triumphant return from thence to Paris in the succeeding year, seemed to have outdone all that romance had figured of the marvellous; and his genius never shone forth with brighter lustre than in the preparations which he made during the Hundred Days to renew the war, as well as in the conduct of the short and decisive campaign which followed; but, although he himself has repeatedly admitted that he should have died at Waterloo,* yet he had no hesitation in flying from his faithful guards on that fatal field, and purchasing his personal safety by surrendering to a British man-of-war. He bore his exile in St Helena in general with praiseworthy equanimity, and his conversations in that sequestered isle will be admired to the end of the world, as extraordinary proofs of the vigour of his genius and depth of his thoughts; yet even there, the pettishness of a little stood in striking contrast to the grandeur of an exalted mind: he fretted at restraints which, had he been in the place of the Allies, would possibly have been cut short by the scaffold; and the general who had been recounting the greatest achievements in modern history, and the prophet who was piercing with his eye the depths of futurity, often found his serenity disturbed, and his reflection destroyed, by the appearance of an English uniform attending him in his rides, or the omission in some one of his attendants to salute him with the title of Emperor.

* "I should have died, if not at Moscow, at latest at Waterloo."—LAS CASES, vii. 70, 71.

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Importance of the preceding details.

The preceding detail, long and minute as it is, will probably be regarded by many as not the least interesting part of this history; and by all deemed to give a truer insight into the character of Napoleon, than the public actions, embracing so great interests and fraught with such momentous consequences, which are scattered through its volumes. They could not have been introduced earlier, for the events had not then occurred to which many of them refer; nor later, for not an instant is there left for reflection amidst the crash which attended his fall. It is during this armistice alone, where the stream of events presents

"The torrent's smoothness ere it dash below,"

that an opportunity occurred for collecting details concerning the character and habits of a man, who, for good or for evil, has for ever imprinted his name and deeds on the records of history.

Character of Murat.

MURAT, King of Naples, Napoleon's brother-in-law, was also so remarkable a character during the whole wars of the Revolution, that some account of his peculiarities seems desirable. So early as the battles of Millesimo and Montenotte, in 1796, he was Napoleon's adjutant, and by his intrepidity and daring contributed not a little to the triumph of that memorable campaign. It was by these qualities, as well as his handsome figure and dashing manners, that he laid the foundation of the reputation which gained for him the attention of the Emperor's sister, and by winning her hand led to his brilliant fortunes, and elevation to the throne of Naples. Nor was his merit in many respects inferior to his fortune. His piercing coup-d'œil; his skill in judging of the positions of the enemy; his chivalrous demeanour when

leading his troops into battle; his calm intrepidity in the midst of the most appalling dangers; his tall figure and noble carriage, as well as incomparable seat on the splendid chargers which he always bestrode, gave him the air of a hero of romance, not less than the character of a first-rate cavalry officer. At the head of his gallant cuirassiers he feared no danger, never paused to number his enemies; but with matchless hardihood threw himself into the midst of the hostile array, where he hardly ever failed to achieve the most dazzling exploits. In Napoleon's earlier campaigns at Austerlitz,* Jena,† and Eylau,‡ Murat was always at the head of so immense a body of horse as to render success almost a matter of certainty; and it was to the weight of this formidable phalanx, generally eighteen or twenty thousand strong, that the Emperor mainly trusted for the gaining, as well as completion, of his victories.§ But Murat's genius and daring in the field were equally conspicuous when he had no such superiority to insure the advantage. Napoleon's sense of these qualities induced him to

* Ante, v. 484. † Ib. v. 755. ‡ Ib. vi. 76.

‖ "My decided opinion," said Napoleon, "is, that cavalry, if led by equally brave and resolute men, must always break infantry." An opinion contrary to that generally received, but supported by not a few of the most memorable facts recorded by history in all ages, and which, coming from such a commander, who so well knew the value both of infantry and artillery, is well worthy of the most serious consideration. —See Las Cases, vii. 184. It was by his cavalry that Hannibal conquered at the Ticino and Cannæ, and Napoleon at Austerlitz and Jena; the Asiatic horse arrested Richard Cœur de Lion in Palestine; the Parthians destroyed Crassus and Julian in Asia, and Napoleon himself at Moscow; the genius of Cyrus sunk under, that of Alexander the Great recoiled before, the fortunes of Darius perished amidst, the Scythian cavalry; Hyder's horse all-but drove the English into the Madras surf, and the English dragoons decided the fate of India at Assaye; a charge of French horsemen at Marengo placed Napoleon on the consular throne; another of the English light dragoons, on the flank of the Old Guard, hurled him to the rock of St Helena.

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overlook his desertion of his post after the Russian retreat, and subsequent advances towards the Allies ;* and his heroic courage never appeared with brighter lustre than when he threw a last radiance over the victories of the empire at Dresden, and stemmed the torrent of disaster at Leipsic.[1]

[1] Odel. i. 198, 199.

His military abilities and civil weakness.

Napoleon had the highest opinion of Murat's military abilities, and frequently consulted him upon the disposition of the troops, the lying of the ground, and the probable effect of any movements which were in contemplation. On these occasions, Murat, who had a great degree of military frankness in his manner, and whose near relationship to the Emperor enabled him to take liberties on which no other would have ventured, spoke with remarkable decision and independence; and not unfrequently Caulaincourt, on whom known fidelity and tried services had conferred an almost equal privilege, united with him in combating the most favourite projects of their chief. The habitual good-humour of the King of Naples, and his constant disposition to make merry even in the most serious discussions, carried him in general safely through these dangerous shoals. But it was in such military discussions that the confidence of the Emperor, and with reason, terminated; the moment that diplomacy or civil transactions came on the tapis, Murat turned aside, or left the council-room, from conscious incapacity or insurmountable aversion. "He was a Paladin," said Napoleon, "in the field, but in the cabinet destitute either of decision or judgment. He loved, I may rather say adored me: he was my right arm; but without me he was nothing. In battle, he was perhaps the bravest man in the world; left to himself, he was an *imbecile* without judgment."[2]

[2] O'Meara, ii. 96. Odel. i. 198, 200.

* Ante, ix. p. 122.

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The external appearance of Napoleon formed a striking contrast to that of his royal brother-in-law. When they rode together along the front of the troops, Murat attracted universal attention by his commanding figure, his superb theatrical costume, the splendid trapping and beautiful figure of his horse, and the imposing military dignity of his air. This dazzling display contrasted strangely, but characteristically, with the three-cornered hat, dark surtout, leather breeches, huge boots, corpulent figure, and careless seat on horseback, which have become immortal in the representations of Napoleon. The imposing aspect of Murat was, however, weakened, rather than heightened, by the rich and fantastic dress which he wore. Dark whiskers on his face contrasted with piercing blue eyes; his abundant black locks spread over the neck of a splendid Polish dress, open above the shoulders; the collar was richly adorned with gold brocade, and from a splendid girdle of the same material hung a light sabre, straight in the blade, after the manner of the ancient Roman, with the hilt set in diamonds. Wide pantaloons, of a purple or scarlet colour, richly embroidered with gold, and boots of yellow leather, completed this singular costume, which resembled rather the gorgeous trappings of the melodrama, than the comparatively simple uniform of modern times.[1]

His appearance and dress, as contrasted with that of Napoleon.

[1] Odel. i. 201.

But its greatest distinction was a large three-cornered hat, surmounted by a profusion of magnificent white ostrich feathers, rising from a broad gold band, which enclosed besides a superb heron plume. His noble charger was set off with gorgeous bridle and stirrups, richly gilt after the Turkish fashion, and enveloped in trappings of azure blue, the tint of the Italian sky, which also was the prevailing colour of

His extraordinary gallantry of conduct.

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his liveries. Above this fantastic but dazzling attire, he wore, in cold weather, a magnificent pelisse of dark-green velvet, lined and fringed with the richest sables. When he rode beside Napoleon, habited after his simple fashion, in this theatrical costume, it appeared a living image of splendid folly contrasting with the naked majesty of thought. It was only in his own person, however, that Napoleon was thus simple; his aides-de-camp and suite were arrayed in brilliant uniforms, and every thing studiously attended to which could set off their lustre in the eyes of the army or people. And with whatever sentiments the fantastic magnificence of the King of Naples might be regarded on peaceful parades, they yielded to an involuntary feeling of respect when his white plume was seen, like that of Alexander the Great, ever foremost in the ranks of war, plunging into the thickest of the hostile ranks, regardless of the shower of cannon-balls for which it formed a never-failing mark; or when he was beheld returning from a charge, his sabre dripping wet with the blood of the Cossacks whom, in the impetuosity of overflowing courage, he had challenged and slain in single combat.[1]*

[1] Odel. i. 201, 203. O'Meara, ii 96. Las Cas.

Character and history of Ney.

NEY is another hero whose deeds shone forth with such lustre during the whole Revolutionary war, that a separate delineation of his character seems called for. Born on the 10th January, 1769, in the same year as Wellington and Napoleon, in an humble station, the son of a common soldier who had served in

* Such was his passion for danger, that he used to challenge the Cossacks to single combat, and when he had vanquished them, he would give them their liberty, often accompanied by a gold chain, which he took from round his neck, or one of the richly jewelled watches which he always had on his person.—See O'MEARA, ii. 96; *and* SEGUR, *Campagne de Russie*, ii.

the Seven Years' War, and who afterwards became a cooper, he raised himself to be a leading marshal of the empire, Prince of Moskwa, and won, by universal consent, the epithet of the bravest of the brave. He was no common man who, even during the turbulence of the Revolution, rose in such a manner and acquired such an appellation. In early youth, at the age of fifteen, Ney had a presentiment, as most men reserved for ultimate greatness have, that he was destined to distinction; and in spite of all the tears of his mother, and remonstrances of his father, who had made him a miner, and wished him to remain in that humble sphere, he entered the army at Metz, on the 1st February 1787, as a private dragoon. His military air, address on horseback, and skill in the management of his sabre, attracted the notice of his comrades, and procured for him the dangerous honour of being selected to challenge the fencing-master of another regiment in the garrison, who had given a real or supposed insult to his corps. The commission was accepted with joy by the young soldier, the ground chosen, and the sabres crossed, when the whole party were seized by their officers; and as duelling was then punished with death, it was with no small difficulty, and by the intervention of a long captivity only, that he was saved from the scaffold.[1]

[1] Ney's Memoirs, i. 3, 4.

No sooner, however, was he liberated from prison, than the long-suspended duel was renewed in a secret place; and Ney, victorious, inflicted such a wound upon his adversary in the hand, that it disabled him from continuing his profession, and soon reduced him to poverty. Ney having afterwards risen to greatness, did not forget the adventure, nor the calamitous consequences with which it had been attended

His overflowing courage and simple character.

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to his opponent; he sought him out, and settled a pension on his old antagonist. Like all men of real elevation of mind, he not only was no ways ashamed of, but took a pride in recounting the circumstances of his early life; and when some young officers, after he was made marshal, were descanting on their descent, and the rich appointments which they enjoyed from their families, he said, "Gentlemen, I was less fortunate than you; I got nothing from my family, and I esteemed myself rich at Metz when I had two loaves of bread on the table." When he was made marshal, a splendid party were assembled at his hotel, among whom were the chief dignitaries of the empire. Amidst them all he made his way to an old captain, who stood behind the crowd at a respectful distance. "Do you recollect, captain," said he, "the time when you said to me, when I gave in my report, 'Go on, Ney, I am content with you; you will make your way?'" "Perfectly," replied his old commander; "one does not easily forget having commanded a marshal of France." His father, who tenderly loved him, lived to see his highest elevation, and was never informed of his tragic fate; the weeds of his family alone informed him in 1815 that some mournful event had taken place: he never again pronounced his name, and died twelve years after, at the age of a hundred, without ever having been informed of his end.[1]

[1] Mémoires du Marshal Ney, i. 3, 10.

His military character.

The distinctive characteristic of Ney was his perfect calmness and self-possession in the midst of danger, and the invincible energy with which he pursued his object, notwithstanding the most formidable obstacles with which he was opposed. Showers of grape-shot, the onset of cuirassiers, even the terrible charge of the English bayonets, were alike

unable to deter his resolution, or disturb his steady gaze. When one of his officers asked him, if on such occasions he never felt fear; "I never had time," was his simple reply. This extraordinary self-possession in danger, accompanied as it was in his case with the practised eye which discerns the exact moment of attack, and measures with accuracy the probable resistance that may be anticipated, rendered him an invaluable auxiliary to a commander-in-chief; and when Napoleon, after his glorious march across the Dnieper, near Krasnoi, in 1812, said, "I have three hundred millions in the vaults of the Tuileries: I would willingly give them all to save Marshal Ney;"* he only expressed a sentiment which long experience of his vast services had suggested, and which the unexampled heroism with which he had headed the rearguard during the whole of that calamitous retreat had amply confirmed. It was when danger was greatest, and success most doubtful, that his courage was most conspicuous and his coolness most valuable; and if these qualities could have ensured success, Napoleon would have found victory in the last attack, headed by this heroic marshal, at Waterloo.[1]

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[1] Mém. du Ney, i. 19, 21. Art. Ney, Nouv. Biog. des Contemp.

Nevertheless, Ney was far from being either a general of the first order, or a man of character capable of withstanding the severest trials. "He was the bravest of men," said Napoleon; "there terminate all his faculties." Notwithstanding his great experience, he never was able to comprehend, in complicated cases, the true spirit of his instructions, and was indebted for many of his most important successes to the admirable sagacity with which his

Inefficiency in separate command.

* Fain, ii. 324. Guerre de 1812. Ante, viii. 791.

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chief of the staff, General Jomini, divined the Emperor's projects, and put his chief on the right course for their execution. It was the able counsels of this accomplished general that enabled Ney to complete the investment of Mack at Ulm, and his prompt succour which extricated him from impending ruin at Jena.* The diverging directions which he gave to his corps had wellnigh proved fatal to the French army in the mud of Pultusk;† and a clearer perception of the vital importance of the movement with which he was entrusted, might have re-established the throne of Napoleon on the field of Bautzen.‡ In separate command he seldom achieved any thing worthy of his reputation, and, when placed under any other general than the Emperor, his unseasonable jealousy and overbearing temper were often attended with the most injurious results.§

Moral weaknesses.

But these errors, serious as they were, affected his intellectual powers only; his subsequent vacillation on a political crisis, and unpardonable violation of his fidelity at Fontainbleau, and of his oath during the Hundred Days, have imprinted a darker stain on his memory, and prove that if his physical courage was above, his moral firmness was below the ordinary average of human beings. Yet, even in that melancholy catastrophe, the reflecting observer will discover the grounds for individual forgiveness and general condemnation; he will contrast the weakness, under worldly temptation, of the brightest characters of the Revolution, with the glorious fidelity, under severer trials, of La Vendée, Saragossa, Moscow, and Tyrol; and conclude, that if the white

* Ante, v. 400, 753. † Ante, vi. 41. ‡ Ante, ix. p. 239. § Ante, vii. 873.

plume of Murat was sullied by defection, and the glorious forehead of Ney stained by treason, we are to ascribe these grievous blots to the vices of the age in which they lived, rather than their own individual weakness; and conclude that the utmost efforts of worldly greatness fall short of the constancy in misfortune which religion inspires, or the superiority to temptation which virtue can bestow. CHAP. LXX. 1813.

Inferior to both these characters in the dazzling qualities of a hero, BERTHIER was nevertheless too important a person in the military and civil administration of Napoleon to be passed over without special notice. He was so constantly the companion of the Emperor, and all the orders from headquarters emanated so uniformly from his pen, that it was at one period imagined that his abilities had contributed not a little to the imperial triumphs; but this impression, which never existed among those who knew them both personally, was entirely dispelled by the incapacity evinced by the major-general on occasion of the commencement of the campaign of 1809 in Germany, which brought the empire to within a hair's breadth of destruction.* Nevertheless, though totally destitute of the vigour and decision requisite to form a great commander, he was not without merit, and possessed some qualities of incalculable value to the Emperor. He was the essence of order itself. Unwearied in application, methodical in habit, indefatigable in exertion, he was constantly ready to reduce into the proper form the slight hints of the Emperor. The precision, order, and regularity which he displayed in the discharge of these important duties, could not be surpassed. Night and day he was alike ready to commence the work Character of Berthier.

* Ante, vii. 248.

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of redaction; no amount of writing could fatigue, no rapidity of travelling disarrange, no pressure of despatches perplex him. "This," said Napoleon, "was the great merit of Berthier; and it was of inestimable importance to me. No other could possibly have replaced him." The constant habit of associating with the Emperor, with whom, during a campaign, he dined and travelled in the carriage every day, necessarily gave him a considerable degree of influence, and the pretensions of his manner indicated that he assumed more than he possessed. "That was quite natural," said Napoleon; "nothing is so imperious as weakness which feels itself supported by strength. Look at women." Like almost all the creatures of his bounty, he deserted the Emperor in the hour of his distress, and made his peace with the Bourbons at Fontainbleau; but he did not survive long to enjoy the fruits of his defection, having perished in an ignoble manner by a fall from a window, in the year following, in the streets of Manheim.[1]

[1] Las Cases, i. 357. Biog. des Cont., par Michaud, art. Berthier.

Diplomatic relations in the commencement of 1813.

Great were the efforts made by the English cabinet to turn to the best account the unhoped-for flood of good fortune which set in during the first months of 1813. It was hard to say whether the alacrity of the nation in submitting, in the twentieth year of the war, to fresh burdens; or the boundless generosity with which supplies of every sort were sent to the insurgent nations of Germany; or the efforts made to strengthen the victorious army of Wellington in Spain; or the diplomatic activity which hushed separate interests, and reconciled jarring pretensions, in the conclusion of the alliances of cabinets, was most worthy of admiration. Lofty and commanding, indeed, was the position of Great Britain in thus

finding the continental states, after so long a contest, ranging themselves around her standard, and the jealousies of rival governments merged in the common sense of the necessity, at all hazards, of throwing off the tyranny which previously she alone had uniformly and successfully opposed. But many serious obstacles were to be overcome before this consummation could be effected; and diplomatic difficulties of no ordinary kind awaited the statesman whose perseverance at length smoothed them all away, and cemented, out of such discordant materials, the glorious fabric of the Grand Alliance.

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The decided step taken by Prussia in seceding from the French alliance, and uniting her fate to that of Russia by the treaty of Kalisch, at once and without any formal convention re-established amicable relations between the cabinet of Berlin and that of London; and long before any diplomatic connection had been resumed between them, immense supplies of arms, ammunition, and warlike stores of every description, had been forwarded from the Thames to the mouth of the Elbe, from whence they were disseminated through the whole Prussian dominions.* To accelerate the conclusion of a regular treaty, Sir Charles Stewart, now the Marquis of Londonderry, was sent by the British government to the north of Germany early in April, and arrived in Berlin on the 22d of that month. Finding the King of Prussia at Dresden, he instantly pushed on to that city; and there it was at once agreed upon, that England, in addition to the immense supplies of arms and military stores which she was furnishing with such profusion, should advance

First Convention between Great Britain, Russia, and Prussia. April 28.

April 26.

* Vide List of these Stores, Ante, ix. 175.

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two millions sterling to sustain the operations of the Prince-Royal of Sweden in the north of Germany; and a like sum to enable Russia and Prussia to keep up the vast armaments which they had on foot in the centre of Saxony; besides five hundred thousand pounds with which the British government charged itself as the cost of the Russian fleet. In return for these liberal advances, Russia agreed to maintain two hundred, and Prussia one hundred thousand men in the field, exclusive of garrisons; and on this basis matters remained till the conclusion of the armistice of Pleswitz.[1]

[1] Lond. 5, 13. Hard. xii. 180, 182.

Treaty of Reichenbach between these powers.

No sooner, however, were the allied sovereigns delivered, by that convention, from the pressure of impending hostilities, than they turned their attention to drawing closer their diplomatic relations with Great Britain; and as both Sir Charles Stewart and Earl Cathcart, the English ambassador at the court of St Petersburg, were at the allied headquarters, a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, was soon concluded. By this treaty, signed at Reichenbach June 14. on June 14, the foundation was laid of the Grand Alliance which effected the deliverance of Europe. It was stipulated that England should pay to Prussia, for the six remaining months of the year, a subsidy of L.666,666, in consideration of which the latter power was to keep in the field an army of 80,000 men. Two separate and important articles were inserted in the secret treaty. By the first of these, the British government engaged "to contribute its efforts to the aggrandizement of Prussia, if the success of the allied arms would admit of it, in such geographical and statistical proportions as should at least restore it to the situation in which it stood prior to 1806;"[2] while, by the second, the King of Prussia

[2] See the Treaty in Martin's Sup. xii. 571; and Ann. Reg. 1813; State Paper, 357; and Secret Articles in Schoell, x. 255.

agreed to cede to the Electorate of Hanover a part of his possessions in Lower Saxony and Westphalia, to the extent of 300,000 souls, including, in particular, the bishopric of Hildesheim.

By another and relative treaty, signed the day after between Russia and Great Britain, it was stipulated that Great Britain should pay to its Emperor, till January 1, 1814, a subsidy of L.1,333,334, by monthly portions, in return for which he was to maintain 160,000 men in the field, independent of the garrisons of strong places. In addition to this, England took upon herself the maintenance of the Russian fleet, which had been in the harbours of Great Britain ever since the convention of Cintra in 1808,* with its crews, a burden estimated at L.500,000 yearly. And as these subsidies, great as they were, appeared to be inadequate to the daily increasing cost of the enormous armaments which the Allies had on foot, or in preparation; and, in particular, the want of specie, which was every where most severely felt, it was stipulated that an issue of paper, to the extent of five millions sterling, should take place in the Prussian states, guaranteed by the three powers, of which two thirds were to be at the disposal of Russia, and one-third at that of Prussia; the ultimate liquidation of the notes, which were payable to bearer, being fixed for the 1st July 1815, or six months after the conclusion of a definitive treaty of peace, and undertaken in the proportion of three-sixths by England, two-sixths by Russia, and one-sixth by Prussia. And although the treaty, by its letter, was to continue only during the year 1813, yet the high contracting parties, both in this and the Prussian treaty,[1] agreed to concert anew on the aid they

[1] Ann. Reg. 1813, 355. State Papers, Martin, xii. 568. Schoell, x. 255, 256.

* Ante, vii. 768.

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were to afford each other in the event of the war being prolonged beyond that period; and, in particular, "reciprocally engaged not to negotiate separately with their common enemies, nor to sign any peace, truce, or convention whatsoever, otherwise than by mutual consent."

Convention of Peterswaldau, July 6.

A supplementary treaty was signed between Great Britain and Russia, at Peterswaldau, on July 6, for the regulation of the German legion in the service of Russia. It was stipulated that the expense of this legion, which was to be raised to ten thousand men, should be undertaken by the British government, and, in return, should be placed at their disposal, and officered according to their recommendation. The estimated expense of each man was taken at L.10, 15s. overhead, including pay and provisions; a curious and valuable fact, as indicating the wide difference between the cost of military armaments on the continent and in this country, where the charges per head are nearly three times as great.[1]

[1] Martin, Sup. xii. 573. Schoell, x. 256. Ann. Reg. 1813; State Papers, 357, 359.

Convention of London regarding the issue of paper money. Sept. 30.

So excessive did the want of specie become in Germany, in the autumnal months of this year, from the enormous demands of the multitudes of armed men who were assembled within a narrow space on its surface, that England was again obliged to interpose its inexhaustible public credit to supply the deficiency. By a supplementary convention, signed at London on the 30th September, the government of Great Britain engaged to propose to Parliament a measure whereby bills of credit in favour of the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia should be issued by the English exchequer, to the extent of L.2,500,000, or 15,000,000 Prussian thalers; one million to be put monthly into circulation, and payable in specie one month after the ratification of a general peace, at

offices in such towns in the north of Germany as the British government, in concert with the courts of St Petersburg and Berlin, should point out; with an option to the holders, instead of receiving payment in specie then, to fund them in a stock bearing six *per cent.* A similar treaty was, on the same day, signed with Prussia, which power obtained one-third of the proposed sum; the other two-thirds being at the disposal of Russia. These stipulations were immediately carried into effect by the British government; the issue took place, and had the effect of instantly providing the requisite supply of circulating medium in Germany and Russia, which passed at par with specie through all the north of Europe. A memorable instance of the wonderful effect of national credit on human transactions, and of the inexhaustible resources of a country which was thus able, at the close of a war of twenty years' duration, not only to furnish subsidies of vast amount to the continental states, but to guarantee the circulation of their own dominions, and cause its notes of hand to pass like gold through vast empires, extending from the Elbe to the wall of China, which, but a few months before, had been arrayed in inveterate hostility against it.[1]

[1] See Convention in Martin's Sup. xii. 577; and Schoell, x. 261, 262; and Ann. Reg. 1813. State Papers, 361.

With Sweden also, a treaty already alluded to had been concluded at an earlier period, which in the end was attended with the most important consequences to the deliverance of Europe. By this treaty, signed at Stockholm on the 3d March 1813, it was provided that the King of Sweden should employ a body of thirty thousand men, in concert with the Russian troops, in such operations as should be agreed on, in the north of Germany; in consideration of which the British government agreed to pay yearly the sum of L.1,000,000, by monthly

Treaty of Stockholm with Sweden, March 3, 1813.

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instalments. Great Britain engaged to cede the island of Guadaloupe in the West Indies to Sweden, and Sweden promised to give the British subjects the right of entrepot in the three harbours of Gottenberg, Carlsham, and Stralsund. Finally, the British government acceded to the convention already concluded between the cabinets of St Petersburg and Stockholm for the cession of Norway in perpetuity to the Swedish crown, and engaged, if necessary, to employ their naval co-operation along with the Swedish or Russian forces. This last article has been severely condemned by the French writers, as an adoption by the Allies, of Napoleon's system of transferring kingdoms and spoliating crowns; but, in answer to this, it is enough to observe that though Russia, prior to Napoleon's invasion, had been in amity with the cabinet of Denmark, yet that power had adhered to his standard when the war of 1812 commenced; and against England the Danish court had been in a state of violent hostility ever since 1807. Having thus made their election to cast in their fortunes with the Emperor Napoleon, they had no right to complain if they underwent the fate of war from his and their own enemies.[1]

[1] Ann. Reg. 1813; State Papers, 356, Martin's Sup. xii. 556. Schoell, x. 207.

Alliance of France and Denmark, July 10.

While the Allies were thus strengthening themselves by alliance for the great struggle in which they were engaged, Napoleon, on his part, had only one additional ally whom he gained, and that was Denmark, with whom a treaty, offensive and defensive, was concluded on the 10th July, at Dresden. The English government had made an ill-concerted attempt some time previously to compel the court of Copenhagen to join the Grand Alliance, and for this purpose a squadron appeared before Copenhagen, and demanded a categorical answer within forty-

May 31.

eight hours, under the pain of bombardment. This measure, which, if supported by an adequate force, might have been attended with the happiest effects, failed from the want of any military or naval force capable of carrying it into execution; and, shortly after, the treaty, offensive and defensive, was signed between France and Denmark. By this treaty, it was stipulated that France should declare war against Sweden, and Denmark against Russia, within twenty hours after the denunciation of the armistice, concur with all their forces to the common object, and mutually guarantee each other's possessions. This treaty secured to the French troops a considerable support at the mouth of the Elbe, and the aid of twenty thousand good troops—a succour of no inconsiderable importance, considering the advanced position of Marshal Davoust at Hamburg, and the importance of providing a counterpoise to the Crown Prince of Sweden in the north of Germany.[1]

July 10.

[1] See treaty in Martin's Sup. i. 589. Jom. iv. 315. Fain, ii. 15.

Austria, however, was the important power which, in reality, held the balance between the hostile parties, and whose forces, hourly accumulating behind the Bohemian hills, threatened to pour down with irresistible force upon whatever party ventured to dispute its will. In physical strength, the Allies and Napoleon, as the indecisive result of the late battles proved, were very nearly matched. France, Bavaria, and the Confederation of the Rhine, supported by Italy on the one flank, and Denmark on the other, were superior in number of inhabitants and resources to Russia, Prussia, and Sweden; while the land forces of England were wholly absorbed in the Mediterranean and Peninsular contests. It was Austria, therefore, with her hundred and fifty thousand men, in the central salient bastion of Bohemia,

Importance of the position which Austria now held.

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which in reality held the balance; and it was hard for an ordinary observer to say to which side she was likely to incline; for, if the direction of the allied armies to Upper Silesia, and their abandonment of their natural line of communication with the Oder and the Vistula, indicated a reliance upon the secret favour of the cabinet of Vienna, the family alliance between Napoleon and the House of Hapsburg might be expected to lead to an opposite inclination; and it was difficult to imagine that the Emperor of Austria would be inclined in the end to push matters to such extremities as to endanger the throne of his own daughter.[1]

[1] Hard. xii. 177, 179. Jom. iv. 316, 317.

Views of the Austrian Cabinet at this period.

In truth, however, the views of Austria at this period were sufficiently matured; and it was only the extreme circumspection with which she carried them into execution that occasioned any doubt as to their tendency. Metternich, who at that period had come to acquire that direction of the cabinet of Vienna which he has ever since enjoyed, was too clear-sighted not to perceive the extraordinary advantages which fortune had now thrown in his way: and he was determined, if possible, to render them the means of regaining the lost possessions, and restoring the tarnished lustre of the Austrian crown. He was too well aware of the insatiable ambition by which Napoleon was actuated, as well as the warlike influences from within to which he was subject, to place the slightest reliance on the promises of moderation now so prodigally lavished by him; and he saw little proof of such a disposition in the determination openly avowed to avenge the defection of Prussia by entire extinction, and thereby render himself the undisputed master of Germany. By his advice, therefore, the bait thrown out of resto-

ring Silesia to the House of Hapsburg was refused; and the cabinet of Vienna came under engagements, conditional indeed, but sufficiently explicit to authorize the King of Prussia to announce publicly in his proclamation of 7th May,—"that in a few hours *another power* would join itself to the cause of the Allies." And although the unforeseen issue of the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen suspended this declaration, and threw Saxony, which was all but engaged in a similar policy, into the arms of France, yet, in truth, there was no variation of purpose on the part of the cabinet of Vienna; on the contrary, they were only the more determined, on account of the near balance of the contending parties, to turn to the best account their all-important functions as armed mediators. Not only the Illyrian provinces, but Lombardy and the Tyrol, were now openly talked of as restorations to be demanded; and the restitution of the Papal dominions, and dissolution of the Confederacy of the Rhine, as concessions to be strongly contended for. Still Austria was most anxious, if she possibly could, to avoid drawing the sword: and would greatly have preferred gaining these advantages by the weight of her armed mediation, than submitting them to the doubtful fortune of arms. But she was determined to appeal to that issue if her objects could not be otherwise gained; and these views were clearly evinced in the choice she made of ambassadors to send to the headquarters of the opposite parties; for Stadion, the avowed enemy of the French emperor, was despatched to those of the Allies,[1] and Count Bubna, the declared advocate of peace, to those of Napoleon; while the Emperor Francis himself repaired to the castle of Getschen in Bohemia, to be near the thea-

May 7.

[1] Hard. xii. 177, 179. Jom. iv. 316. Schoell, x. 241.

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tre of the important diplomatic negotiations, by which, to all appearance, the fate of Europe would be determined.[1]

Commencement of the negotiations with the belligerent powers.

Little progress was made during the first three weeks of the armistice in the work of negotiation. Difficulties arose from the very outset as to the form in which, and the parties by whom, they should be conducted. The allied sovereigns were desirous that their plenipotentiaries should not treat directly with those of France; but that both parties should address themselves to Austria as the mediating power; and this proposition was strongly supported by Prince Metternich on the part of the cabinet of Vienna. To solve this difficulty, he came in person to Getschen, and an active correspondence there took place between him and Maret on the part of the French emperor. In the course of these letters, Maret strongly insisted for a categorical answer to the question, whether France was to regard Austria as still its ally under the treaty of 14th March 1812? To this Metternich replied, that the duties of a mediator were noways inconsistent with those of an ally under the existing treaty; and therefore, that he at once agreed to a convention, to supply whatever was wanting in the original treaty, and strongly urged all the powers to send plenipotentiaries to Getschen to conclude a general pacification. It was at length agreed that, to preserve the independence essential to the due discharge of the duties of a mediator, the alliance should not be considered as broken, but only *suspended*;—an equivocal expression, which Napoleon justly considered as equivalent to its entire dissolution.[1]

June 15.

[1] Maret to Metternich, 15th June 1813. Metternich to Maret, 28th June 1813. Fain, ii. 121, 139.

The next point upon which difficulties arose was the form in which the negotiations should be con-

ducted; and upon this matter the variance was such, that Metternich repaired to Dresden in person, in order to arrange the basis of the proposed mediations with the Emperor, and discussions of the highest interest and importance took place between them. They were prolonged till past midnight, and have been preserved by Baron Fain, his private secretary, and bear all the stamp of originality and truth.[1]

[1] Fain, ii. 34.

Interview between Napoleon and Metternich, June 28.

Remarkable speech of the former.

"You are welcome, Metternich," said Napoleon, as soon as he was introduced, "but wherefore so late? We have lost nearly a month, and your mediation, from its long inactivity, has become almost hostile. It appears that it no longer suits your cabinet to guarantee the integrity of the French empire: be it so; but why had you not the candour to make me acquainted with that determination at an earlier period? It might have modified my plans, perhaps prevented me from continuing the war. When you allowed me to exhaust myself by new efforts, you doubtless little calculated on such rapid events as have ensued. I have gained, nevertheless, two battles; my enemies, severely weakened, were beginning to waken from their illusions, when suddenly you glided amongst us, and speaking to me of armistice and mediation, you spoke to them of alliance and war. But for your pernicious intervention, peace would have been at this moment concluded between the Allies and myself. What have hitherto been the fruits of your intervention? I know of none except the treaties of Reichenbach between Russia, Prussia, and Great Britain. They speak of the accession of a third power to these conventions; but you have Stadion on the spot, and must be better informed on these particulars than I am. You cannot deny, that

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since she has assumed the office of mediator, Austria has not only ceased to be my ally, but become my enemy. You were about to declare yourselves so when the battle of Lutzen intervened, and by showing you the necessity of augmenting your forces, made you desirous of gaining time. You have your two hundred thousand men ready screened by the Bohemian hills; Schwartzenberg commands them; at this very moment he is concentrating them in my rear; and it is because you conceive yourself in a condition to dictate the law that you have come to pay this visit. I see through you, Metternich; your cabinet wishes to profit by my embarrassments, and augment them as much as possible, in order to recover a portion of what you have lost. The only difficulty you have is, whether you can gain your object without fighting, or whether you must throw yourselves boldly among the combatants; you do not know well which of these lines to adopt, and possibly you have come here to seek more light on the subject—Well, what do you want? let us treat."[1]

[1] Fain, ii. 36, 38. Hard. xii. 191, 192.

Metternich's reply.

To this vehement attack, which embodied more truth than he was willing to admit, Metternich replied, with studied address. "The sole advantage which the Emperor, my master, proposes, or wishes to derive from the present state of affairs, is, the influence which a spirit of moderation, and a respect for the rights and possessions of independent states, cannot fail to acquire from those who are animated with similar sentiments. Austria wishes to establish a state of things which, by a wise distribution of power, may place the guarantee of peace under the protection of an association of independent states." "Speak more clearly," interrupted the Emperor; "come at once to the point; but do not forget that I am a

soldier who would rather break than bend. I have offered you Illyria to remain neutral; will that suffice? My army is amply sufficient to bring back the Russians and Prussians to reason: all that I ask of you is, to withdraw from the strife." "Ah! sire," said Metternich, eagerly, "why should your majesty enter singly into the strife: why should you not double your forces? You may do so, sire! It depends only on you to add our forces to your own. Yes, matters have come to that point that we can no longer remain neutral: we must be either for you or against you." CHAP. LXX. 1813.

At these words the Emperor conducted Metternich into a cabinet apart, the tables of which were covered with maps, and for some time their conversation could not be overheard. In a little, however, the voice of Napoleon was again audible above its ordinary pitch. "What! not only Illyria, but the half of Italy, and the return of the Pope to Rome, and Poland, and the abandonment of Spain, Holland, the confederation of the Rhine, and Switzerland! And this is what you call the spirit of moderation! You are intent only on profiting by every chance which offers; you alternately transport your alliance from one camp to the other, in order to be always a sharer in the spoil, and you yet speak to me of your respect for the rights of independent states! You would have Italy; Russia, Poland; Sweden, Norway; Prussia, Saxony; and England, Holland and Belgium: in fine, peace is only a pretext; you are all intent on dismembering the French empire! And Austria thinks she has only to declare herself, to crown such an enterprize! You pretend here, with a stroke of the pen, to make the ramparts of Dantzic, Custrin, Glogau, Magdeburg, Wesel, Mayence, Antwerp, Alex- Napoleon's reply.

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andria, Mantua—in fine, all the strong places of Europe, sink before you, of which I did not obtain possession but by the force of victories! And I, obedient to your policy, am to evacuate Europe, of which I still hold the half; recall my legions across the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees; subscribe a treaty which would be nothing but a vast capitulation; and place myself at the mercy of those of whom I am at this moment the conqueror! And it is when my standards still float at the mouths of the Vistula and on the banks of the Oder; when my victorious army is at the gates of Berlin and Breslau; when in person I am at the head of three hundred thousand men; that Austria, without striking a blow, without drawing a sword, expects to make me subscribe such conditions! And it is my father-in-law that has matured such a project; it is he that sends you on such a mission! In what position would he place me in regard to the French people? Does he suppose that a dishonoured and mutilated throne can be a refuge in France for his son-in-law and grandson? *Ah! Metternich, how much has England given you to make war upon me?*" [1] *

[1] Fain, ii. 41, 42. Hard. xii. 193, 194.

Calm conduct of Metternich.

This violent apostrophe was delivered while Napoleon, strongly excited, was striding up and down the apartment; and at the last insulting expression, which nothing in the character or conduct of the Austrian diplomatist could for an instant justify,

* The authenticity and accuracy of this remarkable conversation and anecdote formerly rested only on Baron Fain's account of the scene, which, although worthy of all credit from the character of the writer, might be supposed to be a little influenced by his evident partiality for the French hero, in whose service he was; but it is now entirely confirmed, in every particular, by the corroborating testimony of Capefigue, who derived his information from Metternich himself.—See CAPEFIGUE, *Histoire de l'Europe pendant l'Empire*, x. 141.

the Emperor let his hat, which he held in his hand, fall to the ground. Metternich turned pale, but without making the movement to raise it which his politeness would at any other moment have dictated,[1] suffered him to pass and repass it several times, and at length the Emperor kicked it aside himself.[1] CHAP. LXX. 1813. [1] Fain, ii. 43.

After a pause of some minutes' duration, during which not a word passed on either side, Napoleon became more tractable, and, reverting to fair words, contended only for a congress, which should continue its sittings even during hostilities, in case they should recommence. A convention in consequence was agreed upon, by which it was stipulated that the congress should meet at Prague, at latest on the 5th July, and that Austria should procure the prolongation of the armistice to the 10th August. The convention set out with the Emperor of Austria's offer of his mediation, which was accepted by the Emperor Napoleon, "for a general or continental peace." By this means, Metternich gained a great advantage over Napoleon, inasmuch as he drove him out of his favourite project of a convention of separate powers to treat for peace, and won him over to the acceptance of Austria's mediation, which he had so much at heart, and which was so obviously calculated to augment the influence of that country in the approaching negotiations.[2] Convention between Austria and France for a mediation. June 30. June 30. [1] Fain, i. 44, 46. Hard. xii. 194, 196.

Nothing definitive, however, was as yet settled as to the intentions of Austria: she had gained her object of interposing her mediation between the belligerent powers; but it was uncertain to which side she would ultimately incline, and Metternich had openly avowed, that if the French emperor would accede to the terms which she proposed, he would throw his whole two hundred thousand men Intelligence is received by both parties of the battle of Vittoria. June 30.

CHAP. LXX. 1813. into the scale in his favour. But at this decisive moment, big with the fate of Europe and of the world, the star of England prevailed, and Wellington, with irresistible force, cast his sword into the balance. On June 30. the morning of the 30th June, on the evening of which day the convention with Austria was signed, Napoleon received by express the details of the BATTLE OF VITTORIA, by which a deathblow had been given to the French power in the Peninsula, and his armies had been swept as by a whirlwind from the north and west of Spain. It was not difficult to see, therefore, to what cause his ready accession to the convention had been owing. Metternich had no sooner July 1. regained the Emperor of Austria's headquarters, than he also received the same important intelligence, July 6. which was followed a few days after by the most complete proof of the decisive nature of the victory, in the announcement that, six days after the battle was fought—viz. on the 27th June—not one man of the seventy thousand who there combated under the standards of Joseph remained on the Spanish territory.[1]

[1] Hard. xii. 196. Fain, ii. 64. Lond. 88. Thib. ix. 323.

Vast influence which it exercised on the issue of the negotiations.

Great and decisive was the influence which this immense achievement exercised on the conferences at Prague. "Metternich," says Fain, "could not fail to learn the details of this victory from the mouths of the English themselves, the moment he returned to Bohemia; and we shall soon see the *fatal influence* which it exercised on the progress of the negotiations." "The impression of Lord Wellington's success," says Lord Londonderry, "was strong and universal, and produced ultimately, in my opinion, the recommencement of hostilities." Nor is it surprising that the English and French diplomatists then on the spot, should thus concur as to the

influence of this great victory on the issue of the negotiations. The Peninsular contest was now decided: it was no longer a consummate general maintaining with inferior means a painful defensive conflict, but a victorious chief at the head of the military force of three nations, who, after expelling the enemy from the soil which they had polluted, was preparing to cross the frontier, and carry his triumphant standards into the heart of France. A hundred thousand men, assembled round the standards of Wellington, awaited only the fall of the frontier fortresses to descend like a torrent from the Pyrenees, and inundate the valley of the Garonne. The charm of Napoleon's invincibility was at an end; disaster had overtaken his arms alike in the south as in the north of Europe; no snows existed to extenuate the last calamity; and the only question Austria had to consider was, whether she should voluntarily ally herself to a sinking empire and a falling cause.[1]

[1] Fain, ii. Lond. 88.

Fully impressed with the magnitude of the disaster, Napoleon took immediate and vigorous steps to arrest it. Aware that the disunion among his generals had been one great cause of the loss of the Peninsula, he immediately sent for the ablest of his marshals, Soult, and dispatched him to the theatre of war in the Pyrenees, with full powers as "lieutenant of the Emperor," and instructions to defend the passes of those mountains to the last extremity; while, at the same time, orders were dispatched to Suchet to evacuate Valencia, and fall back behind the Ebro into Catalonia. Thus, on all sides, the vast fabric of French power in Spain was crumbling into ruins; a single deathblow on the decisive point had sufficed to lay the huge edifice,[2] painfully raised

Soult is sent with extraordinary powers to Spain.

July 2.

[2] Fain, ii. 81. Hard. xii. 198, 199.

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during five successive years, and by fifty victories, in the dust.

1813.

From this moment all prospect of peace was abandoned: the views of both parties were mainly directed to war, and the negotiations at Prague were used but as a cover, on both sides, to gain time for completing their preparations. On the 5th July, only four days after the disastrous intelligence from Spain had been received, Marshal St Cyr set out on a special commission from the Emperor to inspect the whole frontier passes into Bohemia, and report upon the forces necessary to guard them, and the amount of the enemy's troops which were collected within the mountain screen. Meanwhile, the Emperor in all directions made the most vigorous preparations for the resumption of hostilities. Making Dresden his headquarters, he was incessantly occupied in inspections of the fortifications of that city and the adjoining forts, reviewing the numerous *corps d'armée* which were now assembled in its vicinity, or corresponding with the different marshals who were stationed so as to maintain the line of that river from the Bohemian mountains to the sea. One day he went by Torgau to Wittemberg, reviewing troops and inspecting the fortifications at both places; the next he set out by Dessau for Magdeburg, and thence returned by Leipsic to Dresden. On another occasion he minutely inspected the fortifications of Koenigstein, and the famous intrenched camp of Pirna, of which the mouldering lines were renovated and strengthened. Such was his activity, that he not unfrequently made a circuit of seventeen or eighteen leagues on horseback, or in his carriage, in a single afternoon. When not himself inspecting the envi-

Napoleon's preparations for war.

July 5.

July 7.

July 9.

rons of Dresden, he was constantly poring over the map, with his battalions of many-coloured pins placed in almost every conceivable situation, sometimes in the Bohemian passes, sometimes in the Saxon plains; so that it was hardly possible that hostilities should take place on any ground with which he was not acquainted, or under any combination which he had not considered.[1]

[1] Odel. i. 221, 224. Fain, ii. 20, 21. St. Cyr, Hist. Mil. iv. 51.

His plans of the campaign, and measures for the defence of Dresden.

These minute investigations were preliminary to a design which Napoleon had profoundly conceived, and which he most ably carried into execution, of making Dresden the centre and pivot of his defensive line on the Elbe, and of taking his last stand there for the empire of Germany. The situation of the ground in its environs was eminently favourable to such a design. The Elbe, in issuing from Bohemia, makes its way into the Saxon plains between two huge rocks, which restrain the course of the river and master its direction. Their summits overlook the whole valley in which the river flows: that on the right bank is named the Lilienstein, that on the left the Koenigstein. These two immense piles of stone may be regarded as the advanced sentinels of Dresden. On the Koenigstein was already placed a fortress of the same name, which was altogether impregnable to open force, and at its foot stands the camp of Pirna, to which the wars of the Great Frederick had given immortality. On the opposite rock, the Lilienstein, works were established which communicated by two bridges with the opposite fortress, and the two together were intended to command the defile, and cover an intrenched camp for sixty thousand men. The lines of defence at this point extended from Gieshubel across to Stolpen, the ancient citadel of which, built on the flat summit

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of the basalt, was strengthened with additional works; and the bridges which they commanded served as a communication, not only between the opposite fortresses, but between the armies on the right and left bank in Silesia and Lusatia. The traveller in the places now described, will recognise the well-known features of those magic scenes, where, amidst awful precipices, sable forests, sounding cataracts, and spacious streams, he regains in the heart of Germany the images and the enchantment of Alpine solitude.[1]

[1] Témoin Oculaire. Odel. ii. 141. Fain, ii. 20, 23. Personal observation.

Works around Dresden, and on the Elbe.

Nor was it only at the great mountain-gate from Bohemia into Saxony that the care of the Emperor was bestowed; Dresden itself was the object of his anxious solicitude. Being but imperfectly fortified, the gaps in its walls were filled up by ditches and palisades, which completed the circuit: the mouldering masonry of the old bastions was repaired, their ditches cleaned out and filled with water; while five large redoubts, connected together by strong palisades, were constructed further out, the fire from which intersected the whole intervening space, and rendered it impossible to approach the town till part of them, at least, was taken. The value of these redoubts was strongly felt in the campaign which followed; they saved the French army from a death-blow within a few days after the resumption of hostilities; and so anxious was the Emperor for their completion, that fifteen thousand peasants, conscribed from all parts of Saxony, were, during the armistice, employed constantly on them night and day. All the fortresses lower down the river were, in like manner, put in the best possible state of defence; cannon mounted on all their embrasures, and stores and provisions for a long siege laid in by convoys

from France, and requisitions from all the adjoining country. Hamburg, in particular, which formed the last of this iron chain stretched along the Elbe, was strengthened with additional works, its old rampart repaired and its ditches cleaned out; while, under the able direction of General Haxo and Colonel Ponthon, new outworks were formed to a considerable distance round the walls, which carried the axe of desolation through the charming gardens and villas which had so long constituted the delight of that luxurious people. But their tears and entreaties were alike unavailing; the rising redoubt ploughed equally through the scenes of festivity and the abode of joy; the disconsolate owners, turned adrift on the world, were ridiculed when they sought indemnification: while the methodical genius of Marshal Davoust, always fully alive when money was to be extorted from a suffering people, contrived, during the six months of his occupation, to extract such immense sums from this industrious community, as would have been reckoned impossible by the generals of any other nation, and passed as fabulous in any other age but that which saw the arts of extortion brought to perfection by the generals of the French Revolution.[1]*

[1] Odel. i. 226. Fain, ii. 24.

* Davoust levied a contribution of 40,000,000 francs, or L.1,600,000, on the city of Hamburg; and as the magistrates were utterly unable to produce such a sum, he took possession of the bank, and carried off the whole specie which it contained, amounting to more than half the sum, and levied the remainder without mercy from the inhabitants. Hamburg at this period contained about 107,000 inhabitants, being a little more than a third of the number at present in Glasgow; and taking into view the difference between the value of money in the two countries, it may safely be affirmed, that this burden was not less in amount than four millions sterling would be upon Glasgow at the present time. Some idea may be formed from this fact, of the enormous amount of the contributions levied by the French generals on the coun-

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By these means, though at the expense of an enormous amount of human suffering, a very strong line of defence was obtained on the Elbe. From the rocks of Koenigstein to the fields of Hamburg, a line of fortresses extended, some of the first order, others of inferior strength, but all calculated to impede the motions of the enemy, and afford to Napoleon the inappreciable advantage of transferring the seat of his operations at pleasure from one bank to the other. Koenigstein, Dresden, Torgau, Wittemberg, Magdeburg, Hamburg, formed a line of formidable fortresses on the Elbe, of all of which he was master; while Merseberg, Erfurth, and Wurtzburg composed his chain of fortified posts to the Rhine. Erfurth, in particular, which lay in the centre of and commanded the main communication with France, was the object of his principal solicitude: large stores of provisions were already accumulated within its walls, and its rocky citadels assumed the aspect of formidable forts. The active genius of Napoleon, revolving the possible events of the campaign,[1] was preparing against all the changes which

Strength of this line of the Elbe.

[1] Bout. Camp. de 1813, 5, 6. Nap. in Montholon, ii. 40. Fain, ii. 23, 24. Jom. iv. 363, 364.

tries which they occupied, and which excited every where such unbounded exasperation against them. This, however, was but a small part of the losses sustained by the inhabitants; for Davoust seized the merchandise, shipping, and movable property of every description that could be brought to sale, and disposed of them for the purposes of his army, insomuch that the total loss sustained by the inhabitants was estimated at four millions sterling. From the bank alone there was taken no less than 7,500,000 marks, or above L.1,200,000. So sensible were the French government of these enormous spoliations, that by a treaty in 1816 they agreed to pay to Hamburg L.500,000 by way of indemnity; which, however, did not amount to more than an eighth part of the actual amount of their losses. So dreadfully did it suffer from these exactions, that its population in 1814 was reduced to 67,000 souls, instead of 107,000, which it contained when it was united to the French empire.—*See* MALTE BRUN, *Lib.* 124, *voce* Hamburg, *and* CAPEFIGUE, x. 271.

might occur; and while he was closing with iron gates the passes of the Bohemian mountains, and adding to the fortifications on the whole line of the Elbe, he was alternately preparing for a desperate defensive warfare on the Saxon plains, meditating a hostile eruption into the sands of Prussia, and taking measures for an eventual retreat to the banks of the Rhine. CHAP. LXX. 1813.

The magnitude and vigour, however, of the Emperor's preparations on the Elbe, clearly evinced to both his generals and soldiers his determination to make that river the base of a desperate defensive struggle, and gave rise to much discussion, and many sinister presentiments in the army. Defensive warfare does not suit the genius of the French soldiers, and it accordingly has rarely, if ever, succeeded with them. Murmurs loud and long arose on all sides against the proposed plan of operations. "Austria," it was said, "by opening the gates of Bohemia to the allied forces, will enable them to take the whole line of the Elbe in reverse. Is the Emperor about to expose himself to be cut off from France? Instead of so hazardous a project, would it not be more prudent to collect our garrisons from the Oder and the Elbe, leave those on the Vistula to their fate, and, with all the troops which can be collected, retire to a defensive position on the Saale, and if necessary to the Rhine? Serious losses indeed will be incurred by such a system, and a cloud be thrown over the star of the empire; but can it any longer be maintained in its former brilliancy, and is it not better to lose a part than endanger the whole?"[1] Murmurs against those plans in the French army.

These representations came from too respectable quarters, and were in themselves too much founded in common sense, to permit the Emperor entirely to Napoleon's reply.

[1] Fain, ii. 25, 26.

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disregard them; and therefore he laboured, in conversation with his marshals, to explain the grounds connected with the peculiarity of his situation, and the general interests of his empire, on which his plan of operations was based—"It is quite true," said he, "that you should not lightly hazard your line of communications—every tyro in the military art knows that; but at the same time, when great interests are wound up with the maintenance of a particular position, it must often be maintained at all hazards: we must have courage to apply the torch to our vessels. What would the defensive system which you advocate reduce us to?—losses greater than would result from the loss of ten pitched battles. We now require a complete triumph. The question is no longer the abandonment of such or such a position: our political superiority is at stake; the enemy would reduce it, and on it our existence depends. Are you afraid I shall be too much in the air in the heart of Germany? Was I not in a position still more hazardous at Marengo, Austerlitz, and Wagram? From Arcola to this day, all the important steps I have taken have been hazards of that description, and in so doing I have only followed the example of other illustrious conquerors.* If the enemy debouche from Bohemia in my rear, it will be precisely in order to compel the retrograde movement which you would have me voluntarily under-

* "Did Alexander, Hannibal, or Cæsar, occupy themselves about their line of retreat, when the moment had come to combat for the empire of the world? And what would have happened if Alexander had been beaten on the Indus, or Hannibal at Cannæ, or Cæsar on the promontory of Dyrrachium? In the campaign of 1805 I was about to have Prussia in my rear; I was engaged in the depths of Moravia; retreat across Germany was impossible; but nevertheless I conquered at Austerlitz. In 1806, when my columns entered the Thuringian

take. I am not in the air in Germany, when I rest on all the strong places of the Elbe. CHAP. LXX. 1813.

"Dresden is the pivot on which all my operations will turn. From Berlin to Prague, the enemy is disseminated over an immense circle, of which I occupy the centre; his corps must make immense detours to concentrate, whereas mine, moving on an interior line of communication, will not have half the ground to go over. Wherever I am not in person, my generals must learn to wait for me, without committing any thing to hazard. Do you suppose it likely that the Allies will be able, for any length of time, to maintain the unity requisite for such extended operations? And may not I reasonably expect, sooner or later, to surprise them in some false movements? They will throw detached parties between the Elbe and the Rhine. I expect it—I am prepared for it. Independent of the garrisons of the fortresses on that line—Mayence, Wesel, Erfurth, Wurtzburg—Augereau is collecting a corps of observation on the Maine. Should they have the audacity to interpose in force between our fortified lines on the Elbe and the Rhine, I will straightway enter into Bohemia; and it is I who will threaten their rear. A few Cossacks, it is true, may insult our departments bordering on the Rhine; but the National Guard will suffice to repel them, and the transference of the seat of war to the gates of Mayence would be attended with consequences of a very different description.

forests, Austria was marching on my communications, and Spain was about to cross the Pyrenees; but I conquered at Jena. In 1809, when I had to contend with the waves of the Danube, Hungary and Tyrol were insurgent on either flank, and Prussia was preparing to descend to Franconia, and the English menaced Antwerp; but still I conquered at Wagram."—NAPOLEON *in* MONTHOLON, ii. 11; and LAS CASES, iii. 128, 129.

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It is very natural that the Saxons should be desirous to remove the war from their territory; but is it our interest as Frenchmen to re-echo their complaints? It is in the Saxon plains that the fate of Germany is about to be decided. I repeat it; the position which I occupy presents such advantages, that the enemy, even though victorious in ten battles, could hardly force me back to the Rhine: while a single victory, gained by me, by bringing our eagles to the capitals of the enemy, and delivering our garrisons on the Oder and the Vistula, would speedily bring the Allies to terms. I have calculated every thing; fortune must now decide the event. However good my reasons may be, I know that I shall be judged of according to the event; it is the rigorous law of history.[1]

[1] Fain, ii. 29, 31.

Forces of Napoleon at the conclusion of the armistice.

It was not surprising that the Emperor entertained such an opinion on his chances of success in the position which he held at Dresden, for the forces which he had accumulated for its defence were immense. By vast efforts, the conscripts and reserves had been so completely brought up to the Elbe, that the army ready to recommence hostilities was raised to four hundred thousand men, of whom nearly three hundred and fifty thousand were effective, and present with the eagles.* This immense force carried with

* These numbers are ascertained in an authentic manner, and on the best possible evidence—the confidential correspondence of Napoleon himself at that period with the marshals commanding his armies. On the 17th August 1813, he wrote to Marshal St Cyr,—"The army of Buntzlau, in Silesia, is 130,000 or 140,000 strong, independent of the Guard, which is 50,000. Poniatowsky, Kellerman, St Cyr, and Vandamme, have 70,000 opposite to Gabel in Bohemia. The Duke of Reggio is at the head of 80,000 men near Magdeburg, besides 10,000 in that fortress. The Prince of Echmuhl is at the head of 25,000 French and 15,000 Danes at Hamburg; in Torgau and Wittemberg are 20,000. It is clear that 400,000 *men, resting on such a chain of fortresses as those of the Elbe,* and which may, at pleasure, debouche by

them no less than twelve hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, of which two hundred were the redoubted artillery of the Guard, in the finest possible condition. The caissons were all replenished, vast military stores collected, and the *matériel* of the army, generally speaking, in good, that of the Guard in the most admirable, order. The cavalry was the only arm which was deficient: that of the reserve, under Murat, was only thirty thousand; the light horse attached to the different corps, fifteen thousand men. Nor was money wanting; the vaults of the Tuileries had poured forth their vast treasures with seasonable profusion; the whole corps of the army had received their pay, and ample funds existed to carry on the prodigious fortifications which were every where in progress to render the line of the Elbe impregnable to the forces of combined Europe.[1]

[1] Fain, ii. 56, 226, 227. Jom. iv. 361. Bout. Camp. de 1813, 4, 5.

It was by unheard-of exertions, and wringing out of the country its last resources, however, that so vast a force had been concentrated for the defensive struggle in the heart of Germany. Aware of the decisive nature of the contest which was approaching, the Emperor spared no efforts, either of his own or his lieutenants, to bring up every sabre and bayonet into the field. The frequent desertion of the conscripts, and numerous acts of license and pillage which attended their line of march, induced him to prepare an entirely new set of regulations, which were rigidly enforced, for restraining these disorders,

New measures of the Emperor to hasten the conscripts to the army.

Dresden, Torgau, Wittemberg, and Magdeburg, are not to be turned." —See NAPOLEON *to* ST CYR, 17*th August* 1813; *to* DAVOUST, 13*th August* 1813; *and to* OUDINOT, 13*th August* 1813; ST CYR, *Histoire Militaire*, iv. 355, 358, 360, 367. *Pièces Just.* Jomini accordingly states, "The active army in Germany consisted, at the resumption of hostilities, of 400,000 men, with 1250 pieces of cannon." JOMINI, *Vie de Napoleon*, iv. 361.

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and forcing on the refractory or reluctant levies to the scene of action. Every conscript, from the moment he was clothed and armed, was considered as disposable, and treated accordingly. The moment he was drawn, the young soldier was hurried off to the depôt, arrayed in uniform, armed, and that very day his military instruction commenced. As soon as a hundred were assembled, they were marched off, under the orders of a captain, to the headquarters of their regiment, and taught the manual and platoon exercise while walking along the road. Other companies were directed to the same line, and, as fast as they met, united together, so as to form a battalion of march; and these battalions again joined, so as to form a regiment of march. Before crossing the Rhine, these troops were formed into columns of march, over the formation and organization of which the veteran Marshal Kellerman, stationed at Mayence, presided. The most rigorous discipline was enforced upon these moving columns; and though it was inadequate to prevent dreadful disorders, consequent on the passage of such a multitude of young men just emancipated from the restraints of parental discipline, yet it augmented to a surprising degree the number of efficient soldiers who made their appearance round the eagles of the regiments. All these columns of march were directed to Dresden, where the Emperor received daily returns of the accessions of strength which his army was receiving; so that he knew the exact force on which he could rely. No sooner was this return made than the column of march was dissolved, and the conscripts of each regiment, under the direction of its own officers, took the route for the regimental headquarters.[1] With such rapidity were the military

[1] Fain, ii. 52, 53. Odel. i. 209.

formations and discipline thus acquired, that a regiment was reviewed by the Emperor, and made a respectable appearance, on the 20th July at Dresden, which had only been embodied in France on the 27th May. CHAP. LXX. 1813.

The concourse of so prodigious a number of soldiers at Dresden, as well as the continued residence of Napoleon, who, during the armistice, constantly had made it his headquarters, entirely altered the aspect of that charming city. If you cast your eyes on its palisadoed trenches—on the girdle of redoubts which encircled its walls, on the hosts of pioneers who cut their way through its smiling gardens, on the formidable batteries which arose, as if by magic, around its environs, and the innumerable camps which covered its lovely hills—it was hardly possible to conceive whither the peaceful Saxon capital had fled. Nothing was to be seen on every side but long columns of troops, trains of artillery, and endless files of chariots; while the rich and varied uniforms of officers on horseback, riding to and fro, bespoke the incessant activity of the chief by whom the immense multitude was ruled and directed. But in the interior of the city things still wore a pacific aspect. The multitude of French officers, indeed, and civil functionaries, who were there established, had given an entirely foreign air to the capital. German sign-boards were generally displaced by French; Parisian costumes and articles of ornament were to be seen on every side; the theatres were filled with actors and actresses from the Theâtre Français, or Opera Comique; the hotel-keepers and sellers of military maps reaped a rich harvest; and, what was not less characteristic of French habits, the multitude of ladies of pleasure, who resorted thither from Aspect of Dresden at this period.

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all quarters, was so great, and the gains they made so immense, that, despite the well-known extravagance and improvidence of that class, their expenditure could not keep pace with their receipts, and numbers, in a few weeks, realized fortunes which rendered them independent for the rest of their lives.* Extravagance, profusion, and licentiousness, universally prevailed; and even the proverbial honesty of the Saxon character was fast giving way under the accumulated temptations which the presence of such prodigious bodies of foreign troops necessarily induced. But the progress of this moral gangrene was concealed under a still splendid exterior. The listless, indolent groups of officers who thronged the coffee-houses, lounged through the shops, or adorned the theatres; the multitudes of superb liveries which were to be seen in the streets; the splendid equipages which were driving in every direction; and the crowds of richly dressed functionaries, who every morning attended at the levees in the palace—bespoke the mighty monarch, still, from his central capital, giving the law to the half of Europe.[1]

[1] Fain, ii. 57, 58. Témoin Oeul. Odel. ii. 148, 149.

Disposition of Napoleon's force in Germany.

This vast force, which, by such extraordinary efforts, Napoleon had collected together, was disposed after the following manner. Twenty-five thousand Bavarians, stationed at Munich, observed the threatening masses of the Austrians, of equal strength, who were collecting in the neighbourhood of Lintz; twenty thousand conscripts, for the most part almost entirely inexperienced, were collected, under Augereau, at Wurtzburg and Bamberg; Davoust occupied Ham-

* "Ce fut l'age d'or des femmes livrées à la debauche. On en vit plusieurs s'enrichir au point de se constituer des rentes, ou de payer comptant en napoleons des maisons qu'elles achetaient." — *Témoin Oculaire*, 148. ODEL. ii. 148.

burg, at the extreme left, with twenty-five thousand French, and fifteen thousand Danes; Oudinot, with eighty thousand, was stationed in front of Torgau, on the road to Berlin, to watch Bernadotte, who, with ninety thousand men, covered that capital; while two hundred and thirty thousand, divided into eleven corps, or forty-three divisions of infantry, and eighteen divisions, or four hundred and twenty-nine squadrons of cavalry, were under the immediate orders of the Emperor, and cantoned from Dresden to Liegnitz, with a corps, under St Cyr, to observe the passes into the Bohemian mountains. This was independent of thirty-five thousand men, of various nations, who were assembled, under Rapp, at Dantzic, and the garrisons on the Elbe and Oder, in all eighty thousand combatants. But they were out of the sphere of operations, and could only be reckoned available by withdrawing an equal force of the enemy from the field.[1]

[1] Jom. iv. 361, 362. Fain, ii. 226, 228.

Deplorable condition of the garrisons in his rear.

The situation, meanwhile, of the garrisons, who were in a manner lost to France amidst the inundation of hostile nations by which they were surrounded, was such, that it was impossible to expect that they could much longer hold out for the French crown. The stores which Dantzic contained were immense; but such was the situation of its defenders, that they were hardly able to make any use of them. A hundred and twenty thousand stand of arms, twelve millions of francs in specie, and five-and-twenty millions' worth in grain and military clothing, constituted a prize to the conqueror, which it was alike impossible to abandon, and hopeless, in the end, to defend, from the condition of the garrison, notwithstanding its still formidable numbers. Five-and-

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thirty thousand men, composed of two-and-twenty different nations, had there taken refuge after the calamities of the retreat; but they were not only in part mutilated by the severity of the cold, but almost all so extenuated in body and depressed in mind, from the unexampled horrors from which they had escaped, as to be incapable of any active exertion. They brought with them, moreover, in common with those who took refuge in Thorn, Wittemberg, Torgau, and all the fortresses which opened their gates to the fugitives of the Grand Army after the Moscow campaign, the seeds of a dreadful typhus fever, the invariable attendant on wide-spread suffering, whether from civil or military causes; and which, spreading with frightful rapidity, from the crowded quarters in which they were huddled together, and the total want of hospital stores, linen, or medicines for their use, soon cut off nearly a half of the whole soldiers assembled. Thorn had already succumbed, from these causes rather than from the artillery of Barclay de Tolly, who, with the Russian reserve, had
April 17. been entrusted with its siege, and compelled it to capitulate, with eighteen hundred men, before a practicable breach was made; Spandau, with a garrison of three thousand, and immense military stores,
April 24. was surrendered on the same terms on the 24th; and Czentoschau in Poland, with nine hundred men, on the 22d. Dantzic, indeed, still held out, and with the whole fortresses on the Oder, Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau, as well as Modlin and Zamosc on the Vistula, yet hoisted the tricolor flag;[1] but their garrisons, weakened by disease and misery, were long unable to undertake any offensive operation, and nothing but the continued blockade of the landwehr,

[1] Hard. xii. 113, 114. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 27, 28.

by which they were invested, was requisite to make the fifty thousand veterans they contained, surrender eventually to the allied arms.

If Napoleon made good use of his time in reinforcing and strengthening his army during the interval afforded by the armistice, the Allies, on their part, were not idle; and such was the activity which they employed, and the enthusiastic spirit with which their people were animated, that they gained much more during that interval than their opponents; and it is to this accession of strength, more perhaps than any other cause, that the extraordinary and decisive success, which they so soon afterwards obtained, is to be ascribed.

Preparations of the Allies during the armistice.

The first care of the allied sovereigns, after the conclusion of the armistice, was the arrangement of a general plan of operations for the conduct of the campaign; and in this important part of their duty, they displayed equal judgment and ability. The general principle laid down was, "that the allied forces should always be directed in strength to the quarter where the principal forces of the enemy were assembled." As a consequence of this, the detached corps which were destined to act on the rear of the enemy, should always move as directly as possible upon his line of communications. "The greater part of the allied forces were to be accumulated in the salient angle *of Bohemia*, which appeared eminently calculated to enable them to turn with facility in whatever direction their services were required. In pursuance of these plans, the following operations were agreed on. Part of the allied forces, fifty thousand strong, were to be left in Silesia to check the operations of the enemy in that quarter, but with orders not to hazard a battle. One hundred

Plan of the campaign fixed at Trachenberg. July 12.

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thousand Russians and Prussians were directed to move, some days before the expiration of the armistice, by the roads of Landshut and Glatz to Jung-Buntzlau, and Budyn in Bohemia, to join as rapidly as possible the Austrian army, and augment the allied force in that quarter to two hundred, or two hundred and twenty thousand men. The army of the Prince-Royal of Sweden, leaving a corps of twenty thousand men to observe the French in Hamburg, was to assemble, in number about ninety thousand men, in the environs of Treinenbrutzau, before the expiration of the armistice, pass the Elbe between Torgau and Magdeburg, and thence move on Leipsic. The remainder of the allied force in Silesia, estimated at fifty thousand men, was to approach the Elbe, taking care to avoid a general action, and strive to pass that river between Torgau and Dresden, so as to unite to the army of the Prince-Royal of Sweden, which by that means would be raised to one hundred and twenty thousand combatants.[1]

[1] See the Protocol in Lond. 372. and St Cyr, Hist. Mil. iv. 347. Plotho, i. 386.

"In the event of circumstances rendering it indispensable to reinforce the allied army in Bohemia, before the army of Silesia could effect its junction with that of the Prince-Royal of Sweden, then the army of Silesia was to march forthwith into Bohemia. The Austrian army, *united to the allied forces*, shall debouche from Bohemia either into Saxony, Silesia, or towards the Danube, as circumstances may require. Should the Emperor Napoleon, in order to anticipate the allied army in Bohemia, march against it, in the first instance the army of the Prince-Royal shall endeavour, by forced marches, to throw itself upon his rear and communications. On the other hand, if the Emperor Napoleon should direct his attack against the army of the Prince-Royal, the

grand allied army is immediately to follow from Bohemia, to fall upon his communications, and give him battle. The general principle is, that the whole allied armies shall, from the outset, assume the offensive; and the camp of the enemy shall be their place of rendezvous. The Russian army of reserve, under General Benningsen, shall forthwith advance from the Vistula, and move by Kalisch upon the Oder, in the direction of Glogau, in order to be at hand, to act according to the same principles, and assist in the general attack upon the enemy if he remains in Silesia, or oppose his progress if he should attempt an incursion into Poland.[1]"

[1] St Cyr, iv. 348. Lond. 372.

Such was the memorable plan of operations drawn up at Trachenberg, signed by the Allied Sovereigns and the Prince-Royal of Sweden, on the part of Russia, Prussia, and Sweden, and conditionally, in the event of her mediation failing, by Austria. History, perhaps, affords no previous example of operations so vast, diffused over so wide a circle, and carried on by armies drawn from such remote and apparently unconnected empires, being combined with such judgment, and executed with such ability and perseverance. They required for their direction a rare degree of unanimity and prudence on the part of all the principal commanders, and could not prove successful unless carried into effect with the utmost zeal and unanimity on the part of the officers and soldiers of all the different nations employed. Dangers of the most formidable kind awaited the combined armies, if any false step was committed; for they acted on the circumference of an immense circle, with a great river, wholly in the hands of the enemy, flowing through its centre; and in the middle lay Napoleon, resting on six fortresses, and at the head

Reflections on the admirable wisdom in which they were conceived.

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of three hundred and fifty thousand effective men. At no earlier period of the war would it have been practicable to have combined the armies of three monarchies in concentric attacks against an enemy of such strength, possessing such a position, and led by such a commander; but times were now widely changed from what they had ever previously been: experienced evil had allayed the jealousies of cabinets—universal suffering had roused the spirit of the people—and repeated defeats had given wisdom to the generals who led them. Like Charles XII., Napoleon had taught his enemies how to beat him; and a disaster greater than Pultowa awaited him from the lessons which he had given them.

Determination of the cabinet of Vienna to join the Allies.

The determination of the cabinet of Vienna had been definitively taken at this period to join their forces to those of Russia and Prussia, if Napoleon refused the sweeping reductions in his empire which Metternich had proposed at the Dresden conference. It is proved by authentic state papers, that the motive which induced that astute diplomatist to propose the direct mediation of Austria in the end of June, and to urge the extension of the armistice till the 10th August, was to gain time for the landwehr and Hungarian insurrection to be brought up from the distant provinces of the monarchy, to make head against the immense forces which Napoleon had so unexpectedly brought into action on the Elbe.*

* In a military report by Prince Schwartzenberg to the Emperor Francis, dated 28th June, it was stated as a reason for prolonging the armistice—"The Bohemian army would be not more than entirely complete on the 20th June. The vast and unexpected preparations of France, render an increased armament on the part of Austria necessary. Every unappropriated regiment of the line, the landwehr, and Hungarian insurrection, must be called out and put into activity. Even if the difficulty of clothing and arming them is got over, it is impossible

Metternich now declared, "that the Emperor Francis' determination was to support the cause for which the Emperor Alexander had made such noble efforts." Agreeably to this determination, the Austrian government was a party to the operations agreed on at Trachenberg; and Bohemia was, with her approbation, made the great salient bastion from which the forces of the coalition were to issue forth against the enemy. And, on the 27th July, when all hope of a pacific accommodation had vanished, and it had become evident, that, with both parties, the renewal of hostilities was only a matter of prudence and time, the Emperor Francis permitted the signature of Austria to be affixed to the secret article of the treaty of Reichenbach, which had been expressly reserved for his sanction by Count Stadion, and in

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to bring them to Znaim and Presburg, from the south eastern provinces, before the 14th August, and the other troops in roportion. Besides the troops raised in Bavaria, 66,000 under the Viceroy have crossed the Tagliamento, and large reserves are collecting at Wurtzburg and Fulda. As these measures menace Vienna, it is necessary to assemble a force at Klagenfurth, and near the capital, to counterbalance them. All this must be done without any detachments from the Bohemian army. Carriages cannot be got to supply Russia with the provisions she requires from Bohemia; and as the extension of the French line on the Elbe may render it desirable that part of the allied force should move into that province, it is most desirable that there should be sufficient time for supplying such a force, and that in the mean time the wants of the Allies should be supplied from Gallicia."—"Count Metternich's first and principal object in the negotiations at Dresden, in the end of June, was to urge the prolongation of the armistice till the 10th August, for the reasons stated in Prince Schwartzenberg's report. He was desirous also that Count Stadion should accompany the Emperor to Trachenberg, who was to be instructed to use his utmost to strengthen and decide the Prince-Royal to co-operate with the Allies. Count Metternich now declared that the Emperor Francis' determination was to support the cause for which the Emperor Alexander had made such noble efforts."—*Heads of the Arrangement touching the Armistice and Negotiations.* LONDONDERRY'S *War in Germany*, App. No. iii. p. 368.

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which it was stipulated, that "in the event of Austria taking a part in the war, she should receive L.500,000 in bills upon London, and the like sum in military stores and equipments; that she should bring two hundred thousand men into the field, and be restored to the condition in which she was in 1803, or, at any rate, at the peace of Presburg, and that the Pope should be restored to his dominions." This clause had been drawn up under Stadion's eyes in the treaty between Russia, Prussia, and Great Britain, but without the direct authority of Austria; and the Emperor Francis long hesitated to sanction it; but at length, when all hope of peace had disappeared, he gave his consent on the 27th July, and thereby incorporated Austria with the Grand Alliance.[1]

[1] Hard. xii. 184. Heads of arrangement touching armistice and negotiations. Lond. 368, Appendix, No. iii. Schoell, x. 257.

Doubts regarding Bernadotte.

But although the accession of Austria to the league against France, though not yet announced to the world, and still veiled under the dubious guise of armed mediation, removed the greatest source of disquietude from the allied sovereigns; yet they were not without serious uneasiness in another quarter. Although Bernadotte had not hitherto failed in any of his engagements, and his interests were evidently wound up with the maintenance of the Russian power in the north of Europe, from which he was likely to derive such substantial advantages; yet it was more than doubtful how he would act when the contest was removed to Germany, and when he was brought into conflict with his countrymen, his comrades, and his old commander. In truth, nothing could be more heterogeneous than the composition of his moral qualities, or strange than the political combinations in which he was at this time involved. A Frenchman by birth, he was now en-

gaged in a war of life or death against France; a republican by principle, he was now deeply involved in a coalition of sovereigns against the child of the Revolution; a soldier of fortune under Napoleon, he now headed a powerful army against him; the heir to the throne of Sweden by election, he was now called on to shed the best blood of his people in a contest seemingly foreign to their immediate interests. His character, able indeed and energetic, but vain, declamatory, and overbearing, afforded but little security against his conduct being influenced by some of the contending feelings arising out of so strange a combination; and yet the important position assigned him by the conferences of Trachenberg, and to which he was well entitled both by his military talents and political station, rendered it of the last importance that the Allies should be able to rely on his steady and sincere co-operation. When the military maps, indeed, were laid out before him, and the Prince-Royal had his scented white pocket-handkerchief in his hand, he descanted with equal animation and eloquence on the great military measures which were in contemplation; but, as was well observed at the time by one who knew him well.* "He clothed himself in a pelisse of war, but his under garments were made of Swedish objects and peace;" his zeal was always greatest in proportion as it appeared to be least necessary. A celebrated French actress, who had lately taken her departure from Stralsund for Vandamme's headquarters, gave rise to various surmises as to the Prince's secret communications with the French Emperor. His aversion to the Austrian alliance was openly express-

* Lord Londonderry.

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ed; he publicly aspired to the chief command in the armies of the confederacy; it was only by the most sedulous attention of the crowned heads at Trachenberg that he was rendered more tractable, and by the able and courageous efforts of Sir Charles Stewart, now Marquis of Londonderry, and General Pozzo di Borgo, who were attached on the part of the British and Russian governments to his headquarters, that he was retained during the campaign in a course suitable to the great objects of the alliance.[1]

[1] Lond. 77, 79. Hard. xii. 181, 182.

Composition of his army.

Whatever, however, his secret inclinations may have been, Bernadotte faithfully discharged his obligations with respect to the troops which he brought into the field. They amounted to twenty-four thousand infantry, and four thousand cavalry—a very large force for a monarchy which did not, at that period, contain, after the loss of Finland, two millions and a half of inhabitants; and its composition being drawn almost entirely from the rural population, where the want of labourers was strongly felt, while it rendered the troops more respectable, necessarily imposed upon the commander the duty of economizing, as much as possible, blood so valuable to the nation. Their leaders, Adlercrentz, Lowensheim, and others, were not only men of tried ability and valour, but ardently devoted to the cause of European independence; and although the rustic air and uncombed locks of these Scandinavian warriors appeared to some disadvantage beside the Russian or Prussian Guards, yet they were robust, fully clothed, and well armed, and they evinced by their conduct in the campaign, that they had not degenerated in the elements of military spirit from their ancestors in the days of Gustavus Adolphus and Charles XII. In addition to this, Bernadotte had under his command twenty-five

thousand Hanoverian levies, in part composed of the veterans who had combated in former days under the British standard, and who now, clothed and equipped by British liberality, and headed by the gallant Walmoden, had already attained a surprising degree of efficiency, and burned with anxiety to avenge their country's wrongs in the blood of the enemy. Thirty-five thousand Prussians, in great part landwehr, under Bulow and Tauenzein, in the highest state of enthusiastic excitement; twelve thousand Russian veterans, under Woronzoff and Winzingerode; and six thousand German troops, paid by England, but in the Russian service, formed, after all deductions to the rear were taken into account, an army of nearly ninety thousand effective men in the north of Germany, independent of a detached corps of twenty thousand which watched Hamburg; and this force, although heterogeneous, and drawn together from many different nations, was animated in common by the best spirit, and effected most important achievements in the course of the campaign.[1]

[1] Hard. Etat des Forces Alliés, Lond. 379; and 74, 82.

The most experienced and powerful of all the divisions of the allied forces, however, was that which was still cantoned in Silesia, and which, being composed of the veterans who had survived the Moscow campaign, and the Prussians who had withstood the shock of France at Lutzen and Bautzen, might be relied upon for any emergencies, how trying soever. During the armistice, this noble force was raised to no less than a hundred and sixty thousand men; having been swelled to that amount, during the breathing-time afforded by the armistice, by the incredible exertions of the Prussian government, the unbounded spirit of the Prussian people, and the great reinforcement, sixty thousand strong, which joined the Russian army after

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the fall of Thorn, and some lesser fortresses on the Vistula. This immense force was at this period cantoned beween Schweidnitz and the Oder; but a few days before the commencement of hostilities, one half of it, including the whole Russian and Prussian guards, in conformity with the plan laid down in the conferences of Trachenberg, moved into Bohemia and joined the grand Austrian army there, leaving only eighty thousand under the command of the gallant Blucher to maintain the war in Silesia. But this force, which embraced fifty thousand veteran Russians under Langeron, Sacken, and St Priest, and thirty thousand Prussians under Kleist, in the very highest state of discipline and equipment, and which possessed, besides, three hundred and fifty-six pieces of cannon, was animated with an invincible spirit; and its commanders exhibited that rare combination of military audacity with scientific calculation, which constitutes the mainspring of success in war.[1]

[1] Bouterlin, Camp. de 1813, 3, 4. Lond. 379. Schoell, x. 270.

Character of Blucher. His early history.

BLUCHER, the commander-in-chief of this noble army, was a veteran now far advanced in years, but who retained, under the grey hairs of age, the whole fire and impetuosity of youth. He was born at Rostock in Mecklenburg, on the 16th December 1742, so that in 1813 he was upwards of seventy years of age. Descended of an old and respectable family of landed proprietors, he first entered the army as cornet in a troop of hussars, in the service of the King of Sweden, in 1757. His education, during the troubles of the Seven Years' War, had been neglected, a want which he never afterwards entirely recovered; but his vigour of character soon made him distinguished, and threw him into a more honourable career than with the then unwarlike troops of Scandinavia. Made prisoner in 1760, in a skirmish, by the Prussian

hussars, he immediately entered the service of the Great Frederick, and took an active part in the remaining years of that memorable contest, particularly at the battle of Kunnersdorf, in 1761. The long period which followed the treaty of peace in 1763, threw the young lieutenant into the usual follies and vices of idle military life; and between the sports of the field, the gambling-house, or still worse places of dissipation, he had little leisure to improve himself in the military art. He was engaged in the contest with Poland in 1772; but his impetuous temper having led him into an unjustifiable act towards a Catholic priest, whom he had arrested and threatened with military execution, he was dismissed from the service by Frederick with these characteristic words, "Captain Blucher has got his congé, and may go to the devil!" His career, however, was not destined to be thus terminated. He shortly afterwards married, and was engaged for fourteen years in agricultural pursuits, by which his fortune was greatly augmented.[1]

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[1] Biog. Univ. lviii. 375, 378.

His passion for war, however, was not extinguished by this rural retirement. In 1786, he again entered the Prussian army in his old regiment of hussars; four years afterwards he was promoted to the rank of colonel, and, in 1792, distinguished himself by his intrepidity in the invasion of Champagne by the Duke of Brunswick. In the campaign of 1794, he was actively engaged in the combat of Kaiserslautern. It was not till 1806, however, that he was called to a theatre worthy of his talents. He was engaged in the disastrous affair of the battle of Auerstadt; and although the cavalry which he commanded were overthrown in a charge by the terrible artillery of the French in that battle, yet he amply re-

First exploits in arms.

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deemed his credit by the activity with which he gathered together the scattered remains of the army after the disaster, and the heroic courage with which he defended himself at the assault of Lubeck. Taken prisoner there, he was sent to Hamburg, where he consoled himself, amidst the humiliation of his country, by visions of its future resurrection and glory.* He afterwards was a member of the Secret Society of the Tugendbund, awaiting in silence the moment of deliverance. Called to the head of the army in 1813, he evinced the ardour of the sentiments with which he was inspired by the following proclamation to the Saxons:—"The God of armies has in the east of Europe pronounced a terrible sentence; and the angel of death has, by the sword, cold, and famine, cut of 500,000 of the strangers who, in the presumption of their prosperity, sought to subjugate it. We go where the finger of Providence directs us, to combat for the security of ancient thrones, for the present independence of nations, and to usher in the Aurora of a brighter day."[1]

Schoell, iv. 336. Biog. Univ. lviii. 375, 382.

A true Goth by temperament and complexion, with light flowing hair scattered over his bald forehead, blue eyes, huge mustaches, and an aquiline countenance, he realized the image of those northern warriors who combated under Armenius with the legions of Rome, or arrested on the Elbe the bloody torrent of Charlemagne's conquests. Originally a hussar officer, he always retained the ardent character which suits that branch of the military service: the habits then acquired never afterwards deserted him; and in the close of his career on the field of Ligny, when commander-in-chief of eighty thousand men, he headed a charge of dragoons against the

* Ante, v. 820.

French cuirassiers, with as much alacrity as he would have done at twenty-five, and wellnigh perished in the shock. Impetuous and unruly in his desires, he was through life an ardent votary of pleasure; and the attractions of wine, women, and play, chiefly filled up, during intervals of rest, the passions of a mind to which, by nature and habit, violent excitement had become indispensable. But it was the necessity of strong sensation, not selfishness of disposition, which was the cause of these irregularities; and though he indulged them at times to the close of life, and might be seen at Paris, in 1814, rising from copious libations of champagne to indulge in the excitement of *rouge et noir*, he was yet ever ready to exchange these unworthy pursuits for the more honourable and yet stronger excitement of the field. CHAP. LXX. 1813.

Vehement, irascible, and often imprudent, he was yet an ardent patriot: a true German in his heart, his whole soul was wound up in the welfare of the fatherland; alone, of all his contemporaries, he distinctly predicted, amidst the disasters of 1806, the future deliverance of his country;* deeply implicated in the Tugendbund, he waited only, during the succeeding years of bondage, the moment of retribution; and when Frederick William at length raised the standard of independence, he was the first to draw his sword in its behalf. He could not be said to be a great general, though few commanders have achieved more important or glorious victories; the ardour of his disposition, and overflowing impetuosity of his courage, induced him, like Murat, to court danger wherever it was to be

* Ante, v. 820.

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found, rather than avert disaster from wherever it threatened. He preferred seeking "the bubble reputation at the cannon's mouth," to waiting by patience and combination the tardier honours of the general. But he possessed, at the same time, the rapid glance, quick decision, and moral courage, which constitute such important elements in the character of a commander: like Suwarrow, he always struck home to the centre of the enemy's force, and never wasted his strength on their extremities. He was unrivalled in the tenacity with which he clung to his projects, and the vigour with which he repaired, in an incredibly short space of time, the most serious disasters; and many of the movements which he executed, particularly the passage of the Elbe, the battle of the Katzbach, and the cross march from Ligny to Waterloo, were not only characterized by military genius of the highest order, but produced the most decisive effect upon the issue of the war.

Of General Gneisenau; his birth and early history.

What was wanting in prudence and circumspection for the ordinary duties of a general in the commander-in-chief, was amply compensated by the admirable talents and scientific acquirements of his chief of the staff, General GNEISENAU. This most able man, though much younger than Blucher, was endowed with all the foresight, accuracy, and comprehensive views which are, in the long run, indispensable for the successful conduct of a great army. He was born at Schilda, near Torgau, on the 28th October 1760, so that he was twenty years younger than Blucher, and was now fifty-three years of age. From his earliest years he evinced the strongest turn for military affairs; but his impetuous turn of mind, as is often the case in Germany, broke out at the university, and he was obliged to leave

the college of Erfurth on account of a duel with a tradesman, and soon after entered the Austrian service under Marshal Wurmser. But here he got involved in another duel, and was obliged to leave that service; and his father, on account of these repeated scrapes, having forbid him his house, he became desperate, and engaged in the troops which the Margrave of Anspach, in 1780, sent out to America. These misfortunes cooled down his impetuous disposition; repentant letters from America reconciled him to his father; and in three years this second prodigal returned to his country and paternal home, where he soon entered the Prussian service as a captain of fusiliers. In 1793 and 1794 he was engaged with distinction in the Polish war; in 1796 he married, and from that time devoted himself, with the most intense ardour, to the study of the military art. In the war of 1806 he was engaged in the bloody skirmish, at the outset of the campaign, in which Prince Louis fell; and after the prostration of Prussia, maintained himself with the most heroic resolution in Colberg, till the peace of Tilsit overtook him, still unconquered, within its walls. He then entered the civil service of government; but under pretence of discontent passed over to England, where he was engaged in secret political transactions, in which capacity he made frequent journeys in 1813 to Vienna, St Petersburg, and Stockholm. No sooner had the disasters of Moscow broken out than he renewed his conferences with the English government, and immediately embarking for Germany, repaired to Breslau, where he was appointed quartermaster-general of Blucher's corps. He then laboured assiduously with Stein and Scharnhorst at the organization of the Tugendbund, which

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spread so far the elements of resistance to France. It was under his direction that the retreat of the Prussians was conducted with so much skill from Lutzen to Breslau; and so highly were his abilities now appreciated, that on the resumption of hostilities he was made chief of the staff to Blucher, in room of Scharnhorst, who had died of his wounds received at Lutzen, which office he held till the final termination of the war by the battle of Waterloo.[1]

[1] Biog. Univ. Sup. lxv. 436, 437.

His character as a general.

Thoroughly acquainted with the seat of war, a perfect master of strategy, and invariably accurate in his estimate of distances and the march of troops, he infused a degree of correctness and precision into the movements of the army of Silesia, which enabled it to inflict the most terrible blows upon the enemy, without sustaining any serious losses itself. Europe was astonished at the admirable skill with which, during that whole campaign, the movements of this important army were conducted; yielding ground, where Napoleon pressed on them in person with superior forces; returning again to the offensive the moment that the eagles of the Imperial Guard were seen receding in the distance; sacrificing on every occasion the lustre of separate achievements to the promotion of general objects; and sedulously following out, amidst the intricacies of their own movements, the leading plan of operations agreed on by the allied sovereigns. Without detracting from the great services of Marshal Blucher in that eventful contest, it may safely be affirmed, that the chief merit of it, at least so far as the general conduct of the campaign is concerned, as well as of the contest in France in 1814, and in the guidance of the Prussian force in 1815, is due to General Gneisenau; and what is very remarkable, in combating

the modern Hannibal, the Marcellus of the Allies was found under the grey locks of the Prussian veteran, and the Fabius in the more youthful breast of his gifted lieutenant.

Striking concord which existed between him and Blucher.

No jealousy whatever marred the cordial co-operation of these illustrious chiefs: a sure sign, considering the delicate situation which the veteran held under the guidance of his comparatively youthful Mentor, that they were both great men. "When we wished to beat the French," said Blucher, "I rode out with Gneisenau; and we went to see how these carls (Kerls) were placed. Then I would say to him—'What would you think if we were to move in such and such a way?' and in less than an hour the orders were given." The destruction of the French army on the Katzbach; the passage of the Elbe, and the battle of Mockern, near Leipsic, were in great measure owing to his judicious counsels. He had a great part, also, in the bold advance towards Paris in 1814, which brought about the fall of Napoleon; and never was more rejoiced than when his unlooked-for return stilled the discord among the Allies at the Congress of Vienna, and gave him another opportunity of striking a blow at the power of France. He directed the retreat at Ligny, after Blucher was disabled by the fall of his horse, and had the principal share in the decisive cross march on the 18th to Waterloo, which, with the valour of the English army, terminated the contest.[1]

[1] Biog. Univ. lxv. 437.

The Austrian army at Prague.

The grand Austrian army, under the command of Prince Schwartzenberg, cantoned in the neighbourhood of Prague, consisted of a hundred and twenty thousand men, great part of whom were in an incomparable state of discipline and efficiency. It was divided into four corps, commanded by Count Colloredo, General Chastellar, and afterwards General

CHAP. LXX. 1813. Meerfeldt, General Giulay, and Count Klenau: while Prince Hesse Homberg was at the head of the reserve, and General Bubna of the detached corps. Parts of this force, however—in particular, the infantry of Klenau's corps—were newly raised, and hardly as yet capable of withstanding the shock of Napoleon's legions; and, though the artillerymen were scientific and expert, the horses for the guns and waggon train were greatly inferior to those of the Russians, and little adequate to the fatigues of a protracted and active campaign. Very different, however, was the aspect of the cavalry. In this force were included twenty thousand admirable horse: the cuirassiers and hussars of the guard, in particular, outshone any in Europe in the splendour of their appearance, the quality of their horses, and the brilliancy of their appointments; and their achievements on the field of Leipsic were worthy of their high renown and martial aspect. When the elite of this immense force was reviewed in the neighbourhood of Prague by the Aug 19. Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia in the middle of August, immediately after the resumption of hostilities, to the number of seventy-seven thousand infantry, and eight thousand horse, with three hundred and eighty pieces of cannon, it presented an array rarely paralleled in Europe, and formed a military spectacle of unrivalled sublimity. The cuirassiers on this interesting occasion were presented with new standards; and when the three sovereigns nailed, in unison, their colours to the poles in token of their firm alliance, it seemed as if no power on earth could resist a league of potentates, one only of whom could summon up so noble an array.[1]

[1] Lond. 106. Plotho, ii. App. No. iv. Fain, ii. 231.

PRINCE SCHWARTZENBERG, who commanded the Austrian force, and afterwards obtained the general direction of the allied armies, though far from being

a general of the highest order, was nevertheless in many respects well qualified for the arduous duties with which he was entrusted. It was no easy matter, as he himself said, to command an army when kings and emperors were at headquarters; and probably there was no man in all the imperial service who could have discharged that arduous and delicate duty so well as himself. Without possessing any great force of mind, or decision of character, he was yet admirably calculated, by the suavity of his manners, the prudence of his disposition, and the amenity of his temper, to allay the jealousies, and keep together the often discordant powers of the alliance. Descended of a noble family; habituated from his youth to the very highest society; and personally known both as a diplomatist and a commander to most of the leading persons at the headquarters of the Allies; he possessed at the same time the prudent temper and conciliatory disposition which, in dealing with such exalted personages, was fitted to prevent any serious dissensions arising among them, and yet preserve, upon the whole, the even tenor of his own intentions. His combinations were judicious, often able and comprehensive; but he wanted the decision requisite for carrying them into execution; and more than once, particularly at Dresden in 1813, and in Champagne in 1814, when he had brought Napoleon, by his well conceived measures, to the very brink of destruction, he failed in effecting his object by want of vigour at the decisive moment in carrying them into execution. For the bold measures which in the end hurled the French emperor from the throne, we are indebted to the indomitable moral courage of Lord Castlereagh, and the noble decision of the Emperor Alexander: Schwartzenberg's measures were of a

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Prince Schwartzenberg, his character.

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more temporizing and prudent character; and he more than once seriously endangered the allied cause by his ready recurrence to the favourite Austrian step of a retreat. Yet justice must observe, that the powers even of the generalissimo of the allied armies were far from being of an unlimited character; the Aulic Council, now transported to the very theatre of action, exercised a secret and sometimes prejudicial control over its operations; diplomacy often interposed its obstructions, and asserted its supremacy in the most critical moments; and even when he was most unfettered, the power of individual direction was generally as much restricted as the responsibility of the generalissimo was increased, by the nature of a contest which had never less than two, sometimes three, of the greatest crowned heads in Europe, at the military headquarters.[1]

[1] Fain, ii. 242. Sir R. Wilson, Power of Russia, 39. Lond. 97.

Resumé of the Allied forces in action on the Elbe.

The grand army of Bohemia, after eighty thousand of the Russians and Prussians had joined it, formed a mass of above two hundred and twenty thousand combatants, of whom forty thousand were admirable horse, with seven hundred pieces of cannon, which, from the salient bastion of Bohemia, threatened the rear and communications of the French emperor on the Elbe. This, with eighty thousand pressing on him from Silesia, and ninety thousand from the north, composed a force of nearly four hundred thousand men, ready for instant operation in the field, all acting under one direction, in a concentric circle, upon one central point. The forces, therefore, at the outset of the campaign, were very nearly balanced; and Napoleon's central position astride on the Elbe, and with six fortresses on that river in his hands, might seem more than sufficient to counterbalance all the enthusiasm which

animated the enemy's troops. But this was by no means the whole of the military array which the allied sovereigns had at their disposal; and it was evident that, if the contest were protracted for any time, the forces of the coalition would acquire a decisive preponderance against him. The military force of France was exhausted; not two thousand troops remained even in the barracks of Paris, a force scarcely equal to the daily service of the metropolis; and the depôts in the interior had sent off their last man.* On the other hand, vast reinforcements might ere-long be expected within the allied lines. Bennigsen was organizing a large army of seventy thousand Russians in the interior of Poland, which, it was calculated, would join the allied forces on the Elbe in the first week of September; the last reserve, it is true, of the Muscovite empire, but to which Napoleon had nothing additional on his side to oppose: twenty thousand men watched the combined force of Danes and French conscripts which Davoust commanded at Hamburg; and the total amount of Russian and Prussian forces, which blockaded the fortresses that still held out for Napoleon on the Oder and the Vistula, amounted to the enormous number of one hundred thousand men. Thus the total allied force accumulated in Poland and the north of Germany, was nearly six hundred thousand men;[1] and although only two-thirds of this immense force, or four hundred thousand combatants, could be relied on for the shock of war on the Elbe, yet the remainder would in the end prove available, when the eighty thousand French veterans, who

[1] Plotho, ii. App. iii. Schoell, x 268, 271. Hard. xii 220.

* "Paris and the neighbouring departments had not at that period more than 2000 troops, veterans and gendarmes included."—*Recueil des Lettres Interceptées en* 1813, p. 13; and FAIN, ii. 356.

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were now shut up in the fortresses on the Oder and Vistula, had yielded to the pangs of hunger, or the ravages of disease.

Forces on both sides on the Bavarian and Italian frontiers.

Immense as the forces were which were thus arrayed against each other on the banks of the Elbe, they did not compose the whole of those which were drawn forth by the contending parties in this gigantic conflict. Five-and-twenty thousand Austrians, in addition, were assembled, under the Prince de Reuss, at Lintz on the Danube, to observe the motions of Wrede, who was at the head of twenty-six thousand Bavarians in the neighbourhood of Munich; while Hiller, with fifty thousand excellent troops, and one hundred and ninety-eight guns, was prepared to cross the Isonzo, and renew the conflict on the Italian plains with the Viceroy, who had arrayed sixty thousand combatants on the banks of the Tagliamento and the Adige. In addition to this, an army of reserve was forming between Vienna and Presburg, under the Grand Duke Ferdinand of Wirtemberg, which was to be raised to sixty thousand men from the distant resources of Hungary and Transylvania, which had not yet arrived at the theatre of war; making a total of seven hundred and thirty thousand combatants who obeyed the orders of the conference of Trachenberg. If to this be added a hundred and twenty thousand men who, at this period, were preparing, under the standards of Wellington, to cross the Pyrenees, where Soult, with eighty thousand, was intrenched to resist them, and forty-five thousand allied troops in Catalonia, who pressed on an equal force under Marshal Suchet—the general result will be, that NINE HUNDRED THOUSAND men in arms encircled the French empire, which was still defended by SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND who followed

the fortunes of the Revolution.* But if the central situation of the French is considered, and the advantages which they derived from unity of command and comparative homogeneity of race, as well as the talents and reputation of their chief, it can hardly be said that Napoleon was overmatched in the field, save from the effects of the unbounded enthusiasm and exasperation which his own oppression had excited among his enemies.[1]

[1] Plotho, ii. App. iii. Hard. xii. 219, 220. Schoell, x. 270, 272. Jom. iv. 360, 361.

Cordial spirit of unanimity with which the Allied Powers were animated.

The whole of the allied armies in Germany were animated by the highest spirit, and inspired with the most touching cordiality. The feeling of depression by which the Russians were animated when, in the outset of the campaign, they found themselves far advanced in Europe, and engaged in a fresh war, which seemed foreign to the real interests of their country, had given place to an universal and enthusiastic desire to share with their Prussian brethren in the deliverance of the fatherland. Common danger had awakened brotherly feelings; common injuries a joint desire of vengeance; valour on both sides, mutual respect. Those who had stood side by side on the fields of Lutzen and Bautzen, felt confident against the world in arms. The universal animation with which the war was embraced by all classes in Germany, had excited a corresponding enthusiasm in the Russian warriors; the generous flame had spread to every breast; and such was the warlike spirit with which they were animated, that it was with no small difficulty, and only by the per-

* See App. A., Chap. LXX., where the whole particulars of this immense force are given from the official states, published by the German author Plotho, and the nearest approximation that can be formed to those of the French, amidst the incessant efforts they have made to diminish their real numbers in a campaign so prolific in disasters to their arms.

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sonal exertions of the allied sovereigns, that they could be prevented from breaking into open hostilities on the expiration of the original period assigned for the armistice. The Emperor Alexander and King of Prussia set the example of this touching fraternity: constantly living together on terms of the closest intimacy, they had not a thought nor a wish but in common; their suites formed one large family; and when they reviewed their respective troops, they always appeared in the uniform of each other's guards, and with the military orders hanging on their breasts, which were shared by them with the humblest of their soldiers.[1]

[1] Lond. 75, 76. Capef. x. 159, 160.

Slow progress of the negotiations at Prague.

When preparations on so vast and unprecedented a scale had been made on both sides for the resumption of hostilities, it becomes almost ludicrous to follow out the diplomatic evasions, trifling disputes, and studied procrastination, of the congress of Prague. Official intimation was sent to the French emperor on the 11th July, by M. Metternich, that the allied sovereigns had agreed to the prolongation of the armistice, and had sent their plenipotentiaries to that city; viz. M. d'Anstett on the part of Russia, and M. de Humboldt on that of Prussia, while Metternich himself represented Austria: and these high functionaries all arrived there on the 15th. Instead, however, of straightway complying with this intimation, and sending his own plenipotentiaries to commence business, Napoleon, when every hour was precious, commenced an altercation with the Prussian and Russian governments upon the choice they had made of plenipotentiaries at the congress; objecting to M. d'Anstett that he was a French emigrant, and to M. de Humboldt that he was not of adequate rank to meet either with Count Narbonne or

July 12.

M. Caulaincourt. These objections came with a peculiarly bad grace from the plenipotentiaries of the revolutionary dynasty; and certainly Humboldt, the illustrious naturalist, was on a level with M. Maret or Caulaincourt, neither of whom had any pretensions to family, and they were accordingly, after much angry correspondence, finally overruled, and the negotiations carried on with the existing diplomatists.[1]

August 7, 1813. [1] Metternich to Maret, July 12, 1813. Fain, ii. 152.

No sooner, however, was this difficulty surmounted, and Narbonne and Caulaincourt both arrived at Prague, where they were not installed till the 28th, sixteen days after the arrival of the allied diplomatists, than a new and still more serious cause of dissension arose regarding the *form* in which the negotiations should be conducted. Metternich contended, that they should proceed after the manner of the congress of Teschen in 1779; that is, that the negotiations should be conducted by means of written notes, addressed, not by the belligerent parties to each other, but by both to the mediating power, and by it transmitted to the plenipotentiary of the power for whom they were respectively intended. To this proposition the allied diplomatists at once gave their consent; but the French strenuously contended for the course pursued at the congress of Utrecht, where both parties sent their notes directly to each other, and the communications were carried on, partly in writing, and partly verbally. It is evident that the former method was calculated to increase the importance and influence of the mediating power, by enabling it to keep in its hands the thread of the whole negotiations; and it is equally plain, that when parties are really in earnest, and time, as in this instance, presses, it is far more expedient to proceed at once to personal intercourse and verbal conferences, than

Anstett to Metternich, August 7, 1813. Capef. x. 150.

Difficulties which arose respecting the form of the conference.

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to adopt the circuitous form of written communications addressed to a third party. Austria, therefore, by contending for the latter course, clearly evinced her desire to procrastinate; but it is equally plain, that if France had been sincere in the desire of an accommodation, she would have preferred the commencement of negotiations in any conceivable method, to the prolongation of unmeaning discussions about its form.. In this dispute about the mode of conducting the conferences, the whole short remainder of the period assigned for the prolongation of the armistice was consumed; and the 10th August, the fatal period fixed for its termination, passed without either any commencement having been effected of a negotiation, or any proposal made for its longer continuance.[1]

[1] See Official Corresp. in Fain, ii. 200; and Capef. x. 155, 156.

Real views of the different powers at this period.

It is incorrect, however, to say that neither party in this armistice wished for a termination of hostilities. Both parties, in reality, desired it: but both were alike aware, that the terms on which they were willing to come to an accommodation, were such as there was no prospect of attaining. Austria was not only willing, but anxious to mediate with efficacy, and bring about a general accommodation; but then it was on condition that she obtained the Illyrian provinces, and a share of Italy for herself, and the renunciation by France of the confederation of the Rhine and the kingdom of Italy, for the cause of European independence. Russia and Prussia were ready to terminate hostilities; but it was on condition that Prussia was restored and augmented, Poland dissolved, and the Hanse towns restored to freedom. France was prepared to renounce some of her acquisitions, and sheathe for a time at least the sword of conquest; but she could contemplate no greater abasement than the restitution of the Illyrian

provinces to Austria, of her lost provinces to Prussia, and the dissolution of the grand duchy of Warsaw, to soothe Russia; and still clung to the Rhenish confederacy, the Swiss supremacy, the kingdom of Italy, the Peninsular and the Westphalian thrones, and the extension of the French frontier over Holland and the Hanse towns. Thus, though all parties were willing to negotiate, none were sufficiently lowered in their pretensions to render an understanding practicable; the victories of twenty years could not be obliterated by a single disaster, how great soever; and, as in the conferences between the Gauls and Romans of old, the sword required to be thrown in to restore the balance.[1]

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[1] Capef. x. 153, 154. Fain, ii. 92, 93.

Napoleon himself gave the clearest sense of the hopelessness of all attempts at a pacification, by a step which at once dissolved all the hopes which had been entertained at Dresden of a speedy termination of hostilities. On the 26th July, three days before the French plenipotentiaries, Caulaincourt and Narbonne, had come to Prague, though a fortnight after those of the Allies had been in that city, and seven weeks after the commencement of the armistice, Napoleon set out from Dresden for Mayence, to inspect the fortifications in progress at that place, and to meet the Empress Marie Louise, who, by his directions, had come to meet him in that frontier city. He remained with her for six days, during which the most active military preparations were going forward, and every thing announced the speedy resumption of hostilities. What the communications were which passed between him and the Empress Regent during this momentous period is now known by the best possible evidence, that of the Empress herself. "Associated," said she to the senate, "in

Napoleon's journey to Mayence, to meet Marie Louise.

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that short interview, with the most secret thoughts of the Emperor, I then perceived with what sentiments he would be inspired if seated on a dishonoured throne, and under a crown without glory." In these words were truly revealed the most secret feelings of Napoleon. Seated on a revolutionary throne, and the head of a military republic, he was compelled to advance without intermission; unbroken success was to him not merely essential to popularity, but the price of existence. He was much pressed at Mayence by the Empress and senate to make peace on any terms; but his answer, in three words, conveyed the whole secret of his policy during the remainder of his reign, "*Tout ou rien.*" The Emperor spent six days at that place, inspecting the fortifications and reviewing the troops, which were incessantly urged on to swell the roll of Augereau's corps, and on the 3d August returned to Dresden, where the increased vigour of his military preparations at all points, and the prodigious concourse of troops who incessantly poured into that capital, soon dispelled the hopes which had till then been entertained of a general peace.[1]

[1] Fain, ii. 23, 24. Odel. i. 228, 231. Capef. x. 153, 154. Lond. 108, note.

Ultimatum of Austria to France.

The day after Napoleon returned from Mayence he wrote a confidential letter to the Emperor of Austria, a copy of which was communicated to Metternich, desiring to know, in a categorical manner, how the cabinet of Vienna proposed that peace should be arranged, and whether, in the event of hostilities, she would make common cause with France. This led to more substantial overtures; and on the 7th August Metternich transmitted the ultimatum of his cabinet, which was as follows:— "The dissolution of the grand duchy of Warsaw, which was to be divided between Russia, Austria,

and Prussia, reserving Dantzic for the latter power; the re-establishment of Hamburg and the Hanse Towns in their independence; the reconstruction of Prussia in its ancient possessions, with a frontier on the Elbe; the cession to Austria of all the Illyrian provinces, including Trieste." These were the cardinal points; but the Austrian diplomatist stated as minor questions, which would require to be adjusted in a general pacification, the independence of Holland, of Spain, and of the Pontifical States.[1]

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[1] Fain, ii. 93, 94. Hard. xii. 205, 206.

Napoleon spent the 9th in deliberating, and on the 10th returned an answer, consenting to the dissolution of the grand duchy of Warsaw, but insisting that Dantzic should be a free city, its fortifications demolished, and the King of Saxony indemnified by the cession of the territories included in Saxony, belonging to Silesia and Bohemia. He agreed to cede the Illyrian provinces to Austria, with Fiume, but refused to give up Trieste; the confederation of the Rhine was to be extended to the Oder, and the integrity of the Danish dominions guaranteed. These terms were dispatched in duplicate to Prague, where they arrived early on the morning of the 11th; but after twelve o'clock on the preceding night, which was the termination of the armistice. They were not such, however, as Austria could agree to; and the armistice having now expired without any accommodation having been come to, the Russian and Prussian plenipotentiaries, at midnight on the 10th, addressed official intimations to Metternich, that their powers were at an end, and the congress dissolved; on the 11th the Austrian minister announced these communications to Caulaincourt and Narbonne, and on the day following Austria declared war against France.

Napoleon's answer, which declines these terms.

Aug. 10.

Aug. 11.

Aug. 12.

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Austrian manifesto.

The grounds stated in this official instrument, on the part of the cabinet of Vienna, for joining the Allies, and coming to a rupture with France, were as follow:—"The progress of events at the congress, left no room for doubt that the French government was insincere in its professions of a desire for peace. The delay in the arrival of the French plenipotentiaries, under pretexts which the great objects to be discussed at the congress might well have reduced to silence; the insufficiency of their instructions on points of form, which occasioned the loss of much precious time, when a few days only remained for the most important of all negotiations: all these circumstances combined, demonstrated too clearly that peace, such as Austria and the allied sovereigns desired, was foreign to the views of France; that she accepted the form of a congress, in order to avoid the reproach of being the cause of the prolongation of war, but with a secret desire to elude its effects, or in the wish to separate Austria from the other powers already united with her in principles, before treaties had consecrated their union for the cause of peace and the happiness of the world. Austria comes out of this negotiation, the result of which has deceived her most cherished hopes, with the consciousness of the good faith which has animated her throughout. More zealous than ever for the noble end which she has proposed, she does not take up arms but to attain it, in concert with the powers which are animated by the same sentiments. Ever disposed to aid in the establishment of an order of things, which, by a wise division of power, may place the preservation of peace under the shield of an association of independent states, she will neglect no occasion for arriving at such a result;[1] and the knowledge she

[1] Fain, ii. 212, 216. Declaration of Austria.

has acquired of the courts now become her allies, gives her a certain assurance that they will sincerely co-operate in so salutary a purpose."

To this it was replied on the part of the French emperor:—"Ever since the month of February, the hostile dispositions of the cabinet of Vienna have been known to all Europe. Denmark, Saxony, Bavaria, Wirtemberg, have documents in their archives which prove that Austria, under pretence of the interest which she took in her ally, and of the love of peace, nourished a secret jealousy of France. The undersigned will not go over the system of protestations, so prodigally made on the one hand, and of insinuations, covertly spread on the other, which the cabinet of Vienna has adopted, and which, when fully developed, has prostituted what has hitherto been reckoned most sacred among men—a mediation, a congress, and the words of peace. If Austria desire hostility, what need had she of a false language, or of enveloping France with a tissue of deceitful snares which met her on every side? If the mediator really wished for peace, would he have pretended that transactions so complicated could be adjusted in the space of fifteen or twenty days? Is it an indication of a pacific disposition to propose to dictate peace to France in less time than it would require to conclude the capitulation of a besieged town? The peace of Teschen was only concluded after four months of negotiation. Six weeks were consumed at Sistow before the conferences on the forms were concluded; the negotiations for the peace of Vienna lasted two months, though the greater part of the Austrian states were in the hands of France. Can it be seriously proposed to reconcile the differences, and adjust the interests, of France, Austria, Russia,

Reply of France, Aug. 18.

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Prussia, Denmark, Saxony, and so many other states, watch in hand, in fifteen days? But for the fatal intervention of Austria, peace at this moment would have been concluded between Russia, France, and Prussia. Austria, the enemy of France, and covering her ambition under the mask of a mediator, complicated every thing, and rendered reconciliation impossible. But Austria, in an open and avowed state of hostility, is in a position at once more sincere and more simple; Europe is nearer peace; there is a complication the less. If Austria is really desirous of an accommodation, let her name a place which may be neutralized, and set apart for a congress, where plenipotentiaries of all the powers, great and small, may assemble, and the negotiations may proceed with the gravity and deliberation suited to the magnitude of the interests at issue, without the continuance of hostilities." To this last proposal Metternich replied, that the proposal for a congress should forthwith be communicated by the three allied powers to their other allies; but before their answers could be received the struggle recommenced, and all thoughts of peace were drowned in the roar and whirl of war.[1]

Aug. 21.

[1] Maret's declaration, Aug. 18, 1813, and Metternich's note, Aug. 21, Fain, ii. 217, 222.

It may safely be affirmed that France had the better in this debate; and that, though both parties were insincere in their proposals for peace at that time, the reasons which Napoleon's diplomatists adduced for questioning the pacific intentions of the cabinet of Vienna, were more weighty than those which Metternich advanced to substantiate a similar charge against them. But, as usual with state papers of this description, they were very far from revealing the real motives which actuated either party; and were put forward with hardly any other view, on either side,

Reflections on this debate, and on the subsequent manifesto of Austria.

than to effect that grand object of diplomacy, the concealing of the real thoughts of the parties. The true motives which actuated Austria at this momentous crisis, are much more sincerely, and therefore powerfully put forth in the Austrian manifesto, on the ground of war against France, drawn by Gentz, which was shortly afterwards published by the cabinet of Vienna, and will be found in the Appendix to this chapter.* Napoleon gave the most decisive proof that he felt he had been struck between wind and water by this manifesto, by omitting in his publication of it in the Moniteur the most material passages which it contained, which will be found in italics in the document given in the Appendix.[1] And so reasonable were the terms of Austria's ultimatum, already given, that we have Lord Londonderry's authority for the fact, that in a private conversation between Caulaincourt and Metternich, the former admitted, that if he were Napoleon he would at once accept them, but that he had no power to do so, and that they must be referred to the Emperor.[2]

[1] Compare manifesto in Hard. xii. 211. and in Moniteur, Sept. 21, 1813.

[2] Lond. 97.

Early histories of Prince Metternich.

PRINCE METTERNICH, who bore so distinguished a part in this memorable negotiation, and in whose hands the question of peace or war was in a manner definitively placed, was a statesman, who for above a quarter of a century exercised so great an influence on the history of Europe, that any history might justly be regarded as defective that did not delineate the leading features of his character and biography. He was the son of a public functionary, who, at an early period of the revolutionary war, bore a distinguished part in the administration of the Flemish provinces, and was born in 1773, at his father's

* App. C. ii. to Chap. lxx.

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hereditary seat near Johannisberg, on the banks of the Rhine. Educated at Strasburg, he early improved his information regarding public affairs, by travels in Germany, Holland, and Great Britain; and soon after entered the diplomatic line, and served at the congress of Rastadt, in 1799. His great abilities, however, soon attracted notice at a court, which, justly impressed with the vast importance of diplomatic talent, never fails, despite its aristocratic prepossessions, to seek for it wherever it is to be found, even in the humblest ranks of the state; and he was employed on missions of importance to St Petersburg in 1804, and Berlin in 1805. At both these capitals he sedulously studied, not only the national resources, but the temperament and habits of the people; and as his elegant and polished manners gave him an easy access to the highest circles, he soon became personally acquainted with the most influential persons at the northern cabinets. After the peace of Presburg, in 1805, he was appointed ambassador at Paris; and in that delicate situation, though representing a vanquished monarch, he succeeded, at the early age of thirty-three, in conciliating all who came in contact with him, by the urbanity of his manners, and the admirable skill with which he maintained a difficult and yet important position. In 1809, he was appointed chancellor of state upon the resignation of Count Stadion, under whose auspices he had risen to eminence, and whose known hostility to France rendered it necessary for him to retire upon the peace of Schoenbrunn; and for more than thirty years from that period he exercised, almost without control, the highest authority in the Austrian dominions.[1]

[1] Hard. xii. 60, 61. Biog. Univ. art. Metternich, Sup.

No diplomatist, even in that age of intellectual giants,

excelled, perhaps hardly any equalled Metternich, in the calm and sagacious survey which he took of existing events, in the prophetic skill with which he divined their probable tendency, and the admirable tact with which, without exciting unnecessary jealousy, he contrived to render them conducive to the interests of the country with whose direction he was entrusted. An easy and graceful address, a coolness which nothing could disturb, an inexhaustible flow of brilliant conversation, a fascinating power of delicate flattery, while they rendered him the charm of the highest society wherever he went, concealed powers of the first order, and a sagacity in discerning the probable tendency of events which never was surpassed. He had not the moral courage which rendered Lord Castlereagh superior to the storms of fortune, nor the heroic sense of duty which made Wellington indifferent to them, nor the ardent genius which enabled Napoleon to direct their fury; his talent, and there it was unrivalled, consisted in gaining possession of the current, and directing it to his purposes. *Laissez venir* was his ruling principle at all periods of his life; but this seeming *insouciance* was not the result of listlessness or indifference, but of a close observation of the course of events, a strong sense of the danger of directly opposing it, and a conscious power of ultimately obtaining its direction. He was well aware of the tide in the affairs of men which every age has so clearly evinced, and trusted, in combating the revolutionary torrent, chiefly to its speedy tendency, like all violent passions, to wear itself out. No man was more fixed in his opinions, or more convinced of the necessity of upholding those conservative principles, both in internal government and external relations, which the

His character as a statesman.

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French Revolution had wellnigh subverted; but none, at the same time, saw more clearly the necessity of awaiting the proper time for action, or disguising formed determinations till the proper season for executing them had arrived. A perfect master of dissimulation, he was able to act for years in opposition to his real tenets, without letting his secret designs be perceived, or even suspected; and such was the power which he possessed of disguising his intentions, that down to the very last moment, in the congress of Prague, he succeeded in concealing them even from the penetrating eye of Napoleon.

His private honour and patriotic spirit.

Talents of this description might have been in the last degree dangerous in the hands of an ambitious and unprincipled man; but in Metternich's case they were restrained by influences of a higher description, which in a great measure secured their right direction. Though abundantly unscrupulous in diplomatic evasion in state affairs, and generally acting on the principle, that in public negotiations, as in love, oaths and protestations are the weapons which both parties may make use of at pleasure, he was yet of unsullied honour in private life, and whatever he said on the honour of a gentleman, might with confidence be relied on. Though long vested with almost unlimited power, and often placed in hostility with the aspiring spirit especially of Italian liberalism, he had nothing cruel or vindictive in his disposition: blood was hardly ever shed under his administration, and secondary punishment, though sometimes severe, inflicted only so far as was deemed necessary to preserve the consistency of a despotic frame of government. Above all, his spirit was essentially patriotic: his ruses and subterfuges, and they were many, were all

directed to the extrication of his country from difficulty, or the augmentation of its territory or resources; and under his long administration it was raised from the lowest point of depression to an unexampled height of felicity and glory. Admitting that much of this is to be ascribed to the reaction in Europe against French oppression, which was commencing when he was called to the helm of affairs, and soon produced a general effervescence which was irresistible, still much also must be confessed to be owing to the skilfulness of the pilot who weathered the storm—who yielded to it when its force was irresistible, and gained the mastery of its direction when the gales were setting in his own favour. CHAP. LXX. 1813.

"Every thing for the people: nothing by them," which Napoleon described as the true secret of government,* was the means by which his conduct was uniformly regulated in domestic administration. He had the strongest aversion to those changes which are forced on government by the people, but clearly saw the propriety of disarming their leaders of the most dangerous weapons which they wielded, by a paternal system of domestic administration, and a sedulous attention to their material interests. He rigorously prohibited the importation of literary works having a democratic or infidel tendency, and exercised in this respect a vexatious and perhaps unnecessary strictness over travellers; the press at Vienna was subjected to the usual censorship of absolute governments; and public thought confined within those channels which the Romish Church and Aulic Council deemed advisable. But within And principles of government.

* Ante, vi. 360.

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these limits no minister ever attended with more anxiety and success to the interests of the people: public instruction has been rendered universal; the hereditary states exhibit in their uniform wellbeing the blessed effects of a paternal administration; the provinces of Lombardy have almost forgot, in the substantial blessings of German government, the visionary dreams of Italian independence; and the Austrian monarchy as a whole, exhibits, with a few exceptions, an example of general felicity, which may well put more popular governments to the blush for the vast capacities for exertion which they have misapplied, and the boundless means of general happiness which they have abused.[1]

[1] Personal observation. Capef. viii. 341.

His own account of his policy at this period.

The principles on which Metternich's policy, from the time when he was raised to the supreme direction of affairs in 1809, till the rupture of the congress of Prague in 1813, were well described by himself to Sir Charles Stewart. He found the finances of the monarchy insolvent; its military strength weakened; its public spirit crushed by misfortune. His first care was to arrange and bring about the marriage of the archduchess Marie Louise, in order to raise his country one step from the abyss into which it had fallen: never intending, however, when the national existence and power were again secured, to make any permanent change on the policy of the state. This policy, for the three years which followed the peace of Schoenbrunn, was attended with the happiest effects; insomuch that, when Austria was again called to appear on the theatre of Europe, she found herself speedily at the head of a force which recalled the most prosperous days of the monarchy. His object throughout was to re-establish the influence and power of his country, and through it give peace to the world:

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and on this principle he resolutely resisted all the entreaties with which he was beset, to join Austria to the alliance after the disasters of the Russian campaign, till the period had arrived when his preparations were complete, and matters had arrived at such a crisis, that she could interpose with decisive effect. But that his policy was essentially pacific, and that he had no desire to augment Austria when restored to her suitable place in Europe at the expense of less powerful states, is decisively proved by the fact, that ever since the peace of Vienna in 1814, and fall of Napoleon, she has remained at rest, and no projects of ambition have either agitated her councils, or disturbed the peace of Europe.[1]

[1] Lond. 104, 105. See also Capefigue, viii.

Unbounded was the joy diffused through the Russian and Prussian troops by the accession of Austria to the alliance. To outstrip the slow arrival by couriers of the long wished-for intelligence, bonfires were prepared on the summits of the Bohemian mountains; and at midnight on the 10th, their resplendent light told the breathless host in Silesia that two hundred thousand gallant allies were about to join their standard. The Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia, with their respective troops, were assembled in anxious expectation at Trachenberg, in a large barn, awaiting the agreed on signal, when, a little after midnight on the night of the 10th, loud shouts on the outside announced that the flames were seen; and soon the sovereigns themselves, hastening to the door, beheld the blazing lights, prophetic of the fall of Napoleon, on the summits of the mountains. Such was the joy which pervaded the deeply agitated assembly, that they all embraced, many with tears of rapture. Sponta-

Universal joy in the allied army at the junction of Austria.

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neous salvos of artillery, and *feux-de-joie* of musketry, resounded through the whole Russian and Prussian lines. Joy beamed in every countenance: confidence had possessed itself of every heart. With lightsome steps the great body of the forces in Silesia obeyed next morning the order to march into Bohemia. Innumerable columns of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, soon thronged the passes in the mountains; and before the six days' delay allowed for the commencement of hostilities, after the termination of the armistice, had expired, eighty thousand Russian and
Aug. 16. Prussian veterans were grouped round the walls of Prague. The Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia arrived soon after in that city, where they were received with the utmost cordiality and magnificence by the Emperor of Austria; and a review of the
Aug. 19. principal forces of the latter on the 19th August, when ninety-one battalions of infantry, and fifty squadrons of cavalry, in all nearly ninety thousand men, defiled before their majesties, conveyed a vivid image of the vast accession of strength which their cause had received by this fortunate alliance. It was a gratifying spectacle to the English diplomatists—Lord Aberdeen, Lord Cathcart, and Sir Charles Stewart, who had so powerfully contributed to bringing about this felicitous union—to behold the persevering efforts of their country, after twenty years of constancy and warfare, at length crowned by the formation of a league which promised speedily to effect the deliverance of Europe; and their patriotic pride was not a little increased by the accounts which arrived next day of the defeat of Soult with immense loss, after a series of desperate battles in the Pyrenees, and the expulsion of his army, after a second irruption, from the whole Spanish territory.[1]

[1] Lond. 105, 106, 109. Fain. ii. 95, 96. Capef. x. 175, 176.

It had long been fondly hoped at Dresden, that the 15th August, the day of the fête of Napoleon, on which, according to the custom of Catholic countries, his birthday was held, would be the day on which the signature of the preliminaries of peace would be celebrated. As the armistice drew near to its termination, however, these hopes were gradually dispelled; and at length an imperial order, that the fête should take place on the 10th, clearly revealed the presentiment, that on the 15th the approaching resumption of hostilities would render such a display as was desired for the occasion impossible. A grand review, however, took place on the former day, with all the circumstance of military pomp, at which the King of Saxony, his brothers and nephews, and all the principal marshals and dignitaries of the empire, assisted. Napoleon, followed by this splendid cortège, passed the line, which was drawn up in the great plain of Ostra-Gehege, near Dresden, at the gallop; and afterwards the whole troops, who were collected at Dresden and its environs, defiled before him. The multitude of uniforms, costumes, and nations, which were then assembled, strongly bespoke the heart-stirring nature of the contest which had thus roused the world against itself in arms: the old guard, twenty thousand strong, of whom five thousand were splendid cavaliers, presented a magnificent spectacle, and it seemed as if nothing could withstand the hero who had such a force still at his disposal. A grand banquet followed, at which the whole soldiers of the guard were entertained, and in the evening fireworks and illuminations recalled for a moment the triumphant days of the empire. But though the splendour of these rejoicings for a while diverted the attention and distracted the cares of the soldiers and

Last review of Napoleon at Dresden, August 10.

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citizens, they afforded no respite to the cares and anxiety of their chief; serious and thoughtful, he beheld the vast array defile before him, and immediately after the review terminated, shut himself up in his cabinet to resume the labours of diplomacy, which then wore so threatening an aspect. Melancholy forebodings filled every breast: it was universally believed that Austria had joined the alliance; no glowing order of the day, no heart-stirring proclamation, dispelled these fears, or called the troops to fresh victories; and next morning the rolling of the drums, which, in every direction called the troops to their rallying points, the aides-de-camp hurrying to and fro, the clatter of artillery and waggons through the streets, and the long columns of bayonets and lances which defiled through the gates, told but too plainly that war was again about to rekindle its flames. This review deserves to be noticed; it was the LAST that Napoleon ever held of the Grand Army; disaster afterwards succeeded disaster too rapidly for the animating pageantry of military magnificence.[1]

[1] Fain, ii. 91, 92.

Interview of Napoleon with Fouché at Dresden.

Shortly before the recommencement of hostilities, Napoleon summoned an old veteran of the revolution and the empire to Dresden, whose selfish ambition and capacity for intrigue were too dangerous to be allowed to remain in his rear in the disgrace into which he had fallen. Fouché forthwith obeyed the summons, and on his way from Paris had an interview with Augereau at Mayence, who strongly expressed, with military energy, his conviction, that the obstinacy of Napoleon would speedily prove his ruin.* The Emperor received him with cold civility:

* "I received," said Augereau to Fouché, "letters from headquarters immediately after the battle of Bautzen, and it appears that that horrible butchery led to no result; no prisoners, no cannon.

after the first compliments were over, they entered on the state of affairs; and Fouché had the boldness to tell him that he was fearful that five hundred thousand soldiers, supported by an insurgent population in rear, would compel him to abandon Germany. Napoleon immediately resumed his warlike air. "It is distressing," said he, "that a general discouragement has seized even upon the bravest minds. The question is no longer the abandonment of this or that province; our political supremacy, and with it our very existence, is at stake. If my physical power is great, my moral power is still greater: let us beware how we break the charm. Wherefore all these alarms? Let events take their course. Austria wishes to take advantage of my embarrassments to recover great advantages; but she will never consent to my total destruction, in order to surrender herself without a shield to the jaws of Russia. This is my policy; I expect that you are to serve me with all your power. I have named you Governor-general of Illyria; and it is you, in all probability, who will have to put the finishing hand with Austria. Set off; go by Prague; set on your well-known threads of secret negotiation, and thence travel by Gratz to Laybach. Lose no time, for poor Junot, whom you are to succeed, is decidedly mad. In

In a country extremely intersected with inclosures, we have found the enemy prepared or intrenched at every point; we suffered severely at the subsequent combat of Reichenbach. Observe that, in that short campaign, one bullet has carried off Bessieres on this side of the Elbe, and another, Duroc at Reichenbach. What a war! we shall all be destroyed; what would he do at Dresden? He will not make peace; you know him better than I do. He will get himself surrounded by 500,000 men. No one can doubt that Austria will follow the example of Prussia. If he continues obstinate, and is not killed, which he will not be, we shall all be destroyed."—See *Mémoires de* FOUCHE, ii. 171, 172.

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my hands, Illyria is an advanced guard in the heart of Austria, a sentinel to keep the cabinet of Vienna right." Fouché made a profound obeisance, and straightway set out. He was well aware that he was sent into honourable banishment; but he was too prudent to remonstrate against his destination. Before he arrived in his province, Junot had displayed evident marks of insanity; the vexations consequent on the public reproaches addressed to him by the Emperor in Russia, joined to the rigours of its climate, and domestic embarrassments, had combined to destroy his understanding; and after Fouché's arrival he was sent back to France, where, in a fortnight after, he died in the house in which he had been born, having, in a paroxysm of madness, thrown himself from a window. Napoleon's early companions in arms were fast falling around him. Bessieres, Duroc, and Junot, perished within a few months of each other; the stars which shone forth in the firmament eighteen years before on the Italian plains, in the first years of the Revolution, were rapidly sinking into the shades of night.[1] *

July 29.

[1] Fouché, ii. 198, 215. Capef. x. 184, 185. D'Abrantes, xvi. 278, 321.

* Napoleon was deeply affected by the death of Junot; when he received the intelligence he exclaimed, "Voila encore un de mes braves de moins! Junot! O mon Dieu!" Shortly before his death Junot wrote a letter to the Emperor, which, amidst much excitement arising from commencing insanity, contained expressions strongly descriptive of the feelings entertained by his early companions in arms at that period. "I, who love you with the adoration of the savage for the sun—I, who live only in you—even I implore you to terminate this eternal war. Let us have peace. I would wish to repose my worn-out head, my pain-racked limbs in my house, in the midst of my family, of my children, of my friends. I desire to enjoy that which I have purchased with what is more precious than all the treasures of the Indies—with my blood—the blood of an honourable man, of a good Frenchman. I ask tranquillity—purchased by twenty-two years of active service, and seventeen wounds, by which the blood has flowed, first for my country, then for your glory."—D'Abrantes, xvi. 323.

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The astute chief of the police, in passing through Prague, however, immediately commenced his usual system of underhand intrigue and selfish foresight. He saw clearly that it was all over with Napoleon, and deeming the opportunity favourable for setting on foot the threads of a negotiation, which might give him the means of escape in the general ruin, he opened to Metternich in that city his ideas on the important part which the senate would come to play in the event of his fall. "Europe," said he, "rising *en masse* against Napoleon, cannot fail to occasion his overthrow: we must look to the future. A regency, with the Empress at its head, and Austria as its support, seems to afford the fairest chance of success; the members of the Bonaparte family must be pensioned and sent to travel; a regency, composed of the leading men of all parties, including Talleyrand, Fouché, and M. de Montmorency, would soon arrange matters; the imperial generals might be easily appeased by great appointments, and France reduced to the limits of the Rhine." Metternich, without committing himself, received the plan proposed as a memorial, observing only "that all would depend on the chances of war." But this project on the part of the veteran regicide and revolutionist of Nantes, deserves to be recorded as the first germ of the vast conspiracy which, in the end, precipitated Napoleon from the throne.[1]

Fouché's secret interviews with Metternich.

[1] Fouché, ii. 209, 210. Capef. x. 185, 186.

While Napoleon was thus providing, in the honourable exile of his old minister of police, for the security of his empire during the chances of war, another illustrious chief of the Revolution was again reappearing on the theatre, and destined shortly to close his brilliant career in the ranks of his enemies. MOREAU, ever since his trial and condemnation by

Arrival of Moreau in Europe.

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the First Consul in 1804, had lived in retirement in America, beholding the contest which still raged in Europe, as the shipwrecked mariner does the waves of the ocean from which he has just escaped. But the Emperor of Russia, who entertained the highest opinion of the republican general, deeming it not unlikely that he might be induced to lend the aid of his great military talents, to support the cause of European freedom, had some time previously opened a correspondence with him at New York; the result of which was, that it was agreed as the basis of his co-operation, "that France should be maintained in the limits which it had acquired under the republic; that she should be allowed to choose her own government by the intervention of the senate and political bodies; and that as soon as the imperial tyranny was overturned, the interests of the country should become paramount to those of the imperial family." In pursuance of these principles, it was agreed that Moreau and Bernadotte should appear together on the banks of the Rhine, make an appeal to the exhausted army with the tricolor flag, and strive to overturn the tyranny which the 18th Brumaire had established. No sooner were these preliminaries agreed on, than Moreau embarked at New York, on board the American ship Hannibal, and after a passage of thirty days, arrived at Gottenburg on the 27th July, from whence he immediately set out for Stralsund to have an interview with Bernadotte.[1]

[1] Capef. x. 169, 170. Lab. Chute de Napoleon, i. 294.

His reception at Stralsund by Bernadotte.

Moreau's arrival on the shores of the Baltic was felt, as Marshal Essen, the Swedish commander, expressed it, "as a reinforcement of a hundred thousand men." He was received at Stralsund with the highest military honours by Bernadotte, who, amidst

[*] Ante, iv. 785.

the thunders of artillery and the cheers of an immense concourse of spectators, conducted him to his headquarters. But though the meeting between the hero of Hohenlinden and the old republican of the Sambre and Meuse was extremely cordial, yet they experienced considerable embarrassment when they came to consult on the ulterior measures to be pursued in France, in the event of Napoleon being dethroned. Moreau, whose republican ideas had undergone no change by his residence in America, was clear for reverting to the constitution of 1792; and perhaps indulged the secret hope, that in such an event he might be called to an elevated place in its councils; Bernadotte, whose democratic principles had been singularly modified by the experience he had had of the sweets of royalty, inclined to a monarchical constitution; and nursed the expectation that the choice of the French people, as well as of the allied sovereigns, might fall on himself. But though the seeds of future and most serious discord might thus be perceived germinating in the very outset of their deliberations, yet common hatred of Napoleon kept them united in all objects of present policy; and after concerting, for three days, with perfect unanimity the plan of military operations, Moreau set out for the allied headquarters in Bohemia.[1]

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[1] Lab. i. 294, 295. Capef. x. 170, 171.

Moreau's progress from Stralsund to Prague was a continued triumph. Such was the greatness of his reputation, and the enthusiasm excited in the north of Germany by his joining the allied cause, that his journey resembled rather the progress of a beloved sovereign than that of a foreign, and at one period hostile general. The innkeepers refused to accept any thing from him for their entertainment; the postmasters hastened to offer him their best horses, and

His journey to and reception at Prague.

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to afford no small countenance to the favourite idea of Moreau, that it was possible to form a legion of thirty thousand men out of the French prisoners in Russia, who were reported to be ready to combat Napoleon, and that this force would form the nucleus of a host which would divide, under his command, with the Emperor the military forces of the French empire.[1]

[1] Jom. iv. 368, 369. Lab. i. 296, 297. Capef. x. 172, 173.

Contention about the appointment of a commander-in-chief to the Allies.

But how gratifying soever the arrival of such distinguished French officers at the allied headquarters might be, they led to a division on a point of vital importance, which, if not terminated by the magnanimous self-denial of the party principally concerned, might, at the very outset, have proved fatal to the whole alliance. That one generalissimo was indispensable to give unity to the operations of so many different armies, when combating such a commander as Napoleon, was sufficiently evident; but who that generalissimo was to be, was by no means equally apparent. This point was canvassed with the utmost anxiety at the allied headquarters for some days before hostilities were resumed, and no small heat was evinced on both sides in the discussion. The Emperor Alexander openly and eagerly aspired to the supreme command, in which he was supported by the King of Prussia. His colossal power and great reputation, the unexampled sacrifices which he had made in combating the French emperor, as well as the unparalleled successes with which his efforts had been crowned; his personal courage and tried energy of character—all conspired to give weight to his claim, which was strongly recommended by both Moreau and Jomini. It seemed difficult, indeed, to conceive on what grounds it could be resisted; the more especially as the Archduke Charles,

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the only general in the allied armies whose experience or exploits could render him a fit competitor for the situation, was kept at a distance by the unhappy dissensions which for some years had prevailed in the Imperial family of Austria. The command, in truth, would have been unanimously conferred upon the Emperor by the allied powers, had it not been for the arrival of Moreau, and the high place immediately assigned him in the Russian military councils. The Austrians, not unnaturally, felt apprehensive of being placed, in some degree, under the command of a French general, from whose hostility they had suffered so much; and it was soon painfully evident that, on this account, no cordial co-operation on their part could be hoped for, if the Emperor Alexander were invested with the supreme command. In these circumstances, that generous and noble prince, though not without a severe pang, relinquished his claim to that elevated situation; and, from deference to Austria, it was conferred on Prince Schwartzenberg, who remained generalissimo down to the capture of Paris. But though another was placed at the nominal head of affairs, it was impossible to deprive the Emperor Alexander of the weight which he possessed as the head of the largest and most experienced portion of the allied forces; such was the jealousy of the Russian soldiers at the idea of foreign interference, that Schwartzenberg's orders were, for a considerable time, privately sent to Barclay de Tolly, and by him transmitted, in his own name, to the corps of his army.[1] It was often difficult to say, amidst the confusion of emperors, kings, and generals, at head-quarters, who really held the supreme command; every one was willing to share in the credit of successful measures, but none would admit the respon-

[1] Lab. i. 297. Lond. 101, 102. Capef. x. 190, 191. Jom. iv. 375, 376.

sibility of reverses; and nothing but the common danger to which they were exposed, and the fervent spirit by which they were animated, prevented the alliance from falling to pieces, from the want of a real head, in the very outset of its operations.

Disinterested conduct of the Allied Generals in regard to the command.

Nor was it only by the Emperor Alexander that disinterested generosity was displayed, on the trying occasion of arranging the commands and distributing the corps of the multifarious host which was assembled round the allied standards. Princes, generals, diplomatists, officers and soldiers, vied with each other in the alacrity with which they laid aside, not only national enmities, but individual rivalry, and bent all their energies, without a thought of self, on forwarding the great objects of the confederacy. Alexander, discarding all thought of the supreme command, divided his force in nearly equal proportions between the three grand armies, and subjected them to the command of Schwartzenberg, who had invaded his dominions; of Blucher, who had hitherto been unfortunate in war; and of Bernadotte, who had taken so active a share in the first Polish war. Tauenzein and Bulow obeyed without a murmur the commands of the Prince-Royal of Sweden, whose sword had cut so deep into the vitals of Prussia at Jena and Lubeck; Langeron and Sacken cheerfully acted under the command of the veteran Prussian Blucher, as yet unknown to successful fame: Russia, the mainstay and soul of the alliance, whose triumphant arms had changed the face of Europe, had not the command of one of the great armies; while Austria, the last to enter into the confederacy, and so recently in alliance with Napoleon, was entrusted with the general direction of the whole. On contrasting this remarkable unanimity and disinterest-

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edness, with the woful dissensions which had paralysed the efforts, and marred the fortunes of all former coalitions, or the grasping ambition and ceaseless jealousies which at that very time brought disaster upon Napoleon's lieutenants in Spain, we perceive that it is sometimes well for nations, as well as for individuals, to be in affliction; that selfishness and corruption spring from the temptations of prosperity, as generosity and patriotism are nursed amidst the storms of adversity; and that the mixed condition of good and evil, is part of the system which the mercy of Providence has provided in this world, against the consequences of the blended principles of virtue and wickedness which have descended to us from our first parents.

Great influence of Wellington's success on the allied cause at this period.

It is a singular, and to an Englishman highly gratifying circumstance to observe, in how remarkable and marked a manner the achievements of Wellington and his gallant army in Spain, operated at all the most critical periods of the struggle, in animating the exertions, or terminating the irresolution of the other powers which co-operated in the contest. When Russia, in silence, was taking measures to withstand the dreadful irruption which she foresaw awaited her from the power of France, and hesitated whether even her resources were adequate to the encounter, she beheld, in the defence of the lines of Torres Vedras, at once an example and a proof of the efficacy of a wise defensive system; when the negotiations between her and France were approaching a crisis, in May 1812, she was encouraged by the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz to persevere in resistance; on the eve of the battle of Borodino, she made her lines resound with the thunder of artillery for the joyous intelligence of the victory of

Salamanca; during the circular march to Taroutino, she received support amidst the flames of Moscow from the fall of Madrid. Nor did the glorious events of the Peninsula in 1813, occur less opportunely to exercise a decisive influence on the fortunes of Europe: the intelligence of the overthrow of Vittoria arrived just in time to determine the vacillation, and add the strength of Austria to the alliance; that of the defeat of Soult in the Pyrenees, to embolden the counsels and invigorate the arm of the allied army on the resumption of hostilities, after the armistice of Prague. Whether these remarkable coincidences were the result of accidental occurrence, or formed part of the fixed design of Providence for the deliverance at the appointed season of an oppressed world, it is not given to mortal eye to discover; but this much may with confidence be asserted, that they afford a memorable example of the all-important truth, applicable alike to nations and individuals, that the only sure foundation for final success is to be found in the fearless discharge of duty: that human eye cannot scan, nor human foresight discover, the mysterious threads by which an overruling power works out ultimate reward for strenuous, or ultimate retribution for ignoble conduct: and that, whatever may be the horrors of the wilderness through which they pass, ultimate salvation is decreed for that people, who, following the pillar of fire by night, and the pillar of cloud by day, resolutely persevere through every difficulty in the appointed path of virtue.

CHAPTER LXXI.

DELIVERANCE OF GERMANY.

ARGUMENT.

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Spirit of the French Revolution—Causes of the vast Strength of the Passions it developed—Moral reaction which stops this unbridled Career—Causes of the extraordinary Fall of the Revolutionary Power—First Operation of the Allies—Napoleon enters Bohemia—He turns aside into Silesia notwithstanding all St Cyr's efforts—Retreat of Macdonald in that province—Napoleon advances against Blucher, who falls back—Advance of the Allies upon Dresden—They approach that City—Important advantage gained by this Movement—Napoleon returns towards Dresden—Reasons for that Movement—His Instructions to Vandamme, who is despatched to Pirna—Entrance of the French Guards into Dresden—Arrival of the Emperor after them—Formidable Attack on the City by the Allies—Awful Aspect of the Allied Columns as they attacked Dresden—Success in the outset of the Allies—Sally at each Flank by Napoleon, which repels the Attack—State of both Parties during the Night—Napoleon's Dispositions on the day following—Positions of the Allied Troops at that Period—Battle of the Twenty-seventh August—Total Defeat of the Austrian left by Murat—Operations on the French left—Wound of Moreau—Singular Manner in which he came by his Death—Council of War among the Allies, when it is resolved to retreat—Extraordinary Difficulties on the Line of March in the Rear—Aspect of the Field of Battle—Napoleon sets out in Pursuit—Great Ability displayed by him in this Battle—Result of the Action on both Sides—Glaring Errors of the Austrian Commander on this occasion—Great Divisions at the Allied Headquarters—Movements of Vandamme against Ostermann—Great Interests dependent on the Contest between them—Battle of Culm, and heroic Resistance of the Russians—Vandamme remains firm on the next day—Dispositions of the Russians to attack him—Second Battle of Culm—Dreadful Struggle in the Defile of Tilnitz in the French Rear—Napoleon's Views at this Period for an Attack on Berlin—Manner in which he received the Accounts of the Disaster at Culm—Reflections on the real Causes of Vandamme's Destruction—Failure of all Attempts to exculpate Napoleon on this Point—Napoleon's Operations in Silesia at this Period—His Instructions to Macdonald, and his Movements—Simultaneous Advance of Blucher against Macdonald—Battle of the Katzbach—Defeat of Souham on the French left—Continuation of the Battle on the Right and Centre—Great Successes of the Allies, on the following Day—Disaster of Puthod's Division—Results of the Battle—Reflections on the Conduct of the

Generals on both sides—Operations against Bernadotte—Napoleon's great Anxiety for success over him—Advance of Oudinot against him, and Preparations for a Battle—Battle of Gross Beeren—Defeat of the French Centre there—Results of the Battle—Its subsequent Effects—Vast moral Influence of these Successes of the Allies—Defensive Measures of Napoleon for the Protection of Saxony—He advances in person against Blucher—Ney's Movements at the same time against Bernadotte—Battle of Dennewitz—Arrival of Ney with his Centre on the Field—The Arrival of Bernadotte with the Swedish Reserve decides the Victory—Operations of Davoust and Walmoden on the Lower Elbe—Walmoden destroys the French division Pecheux—Reasons which now led to a Change of the Seat of War by Napoleon—Deplorable Condition of the French in Torgau, Dresden, and the Fortresses on the Elbe—Dreadful Effect of their distresses on the Condition of the French Army—Situation of the Allies—Their Plans at this Period—Movements of Blucher across the Elbe, in conformity with their Plan of Operations—Movements of Bernadotte and Schwartzenberg—Napoleon's Views at this Period—His admirable military Ideas expressed to St Cyr—He afterwards alters his Plan—Sets out to join Ney, and leaves St Cyr at Dresden—Where he is soon surrounded by the Enemy—Napoleon advances against Blucher, who joins Bernadotte—Their united Armies march to the West, and pass Napoleon, who prepares to cross the Elbe, and invade Prussia—False Counter-movement of Bernadotte towards the Elbe—Advance of the Grand Allied Army towards Leipsic—Napoleon's Project for carrying the War into Prussia—His Interviews with his Marshals, and Reasons for his advancing to Berlin—The Defection of Bavaria overturns this Project—Fearful Dangers with which Napoleon was now environed—Universal Joy with which the French Army received the Orders to move towards Leipsic—Description of that Town and its Environs—Napoleon's Preparatory Inspection of the Field of Battle—Positions of the French Army around Leipsic, and their Position and Force to the North of that Town—Positions of the Grand Allied Army—Their Positions to the South of Leipsic—Forces and Position of the Allies to the North of that Town—Schwartzenberg's Proclamation to his Troops, and feelings of the Soldiers on both sides—Commencement of the Battle, and early Success of the Allies—Napoleon prepares a Grand Attack upon the Enemy's Centre.—Schwartzenberg's Measures to support it—Desperate Cavalry Action in the Centre—Latour Maubourg's vehement Charge to the East of Wachau—Which is defeated by Alexander in person—Arrival of the Austrian Reserves on the Field—Napoleon's last effort—Last Attack of Meerfeldt—Which is Repulsed, and he is made Prisoner—Operation of Giulay at Lindenau—Battle of the Möckern between Blucher and Ney—Defeat of the latter by Blucher—General result of this day's Battle.—Napoleon's Conferences with Meerfeldt, whom he sends back with Secret Proposals to the Allies—Mournful Night at Napoleon's Headquarters—The Allies defer the Attack till the Eighteenth—Dangerous State of Affairs to Napoleon to the North of Leipsic—Vigorous efforts of Sir Charles Stewart to bring up Bernadotte—Changes in Napoleon's Position during the Night—Dispositions of Prince Schwartzenberg for the Attack—Commencement of the Battle, and Success of the Allies on their left—Desperate Conflict at Probstheyda in the Centre—Second Attack there is repulsed by Napoleon in Person—Operations on the Allied Right—The Grand Allied Army withdraws its Columns of Attack, and opens a concentric fire of all

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their Cannon—Operations of Blucher and Bernadotte against Ney—Defection of the Saxons, and Defeat of the French Centre and Right to the North of Leipsic—Napoleon makes an effort on that side, which is Defeated—Close of the Battle, and Commencement of Napoleon's Retreat—Night Council held by Napoleon on the Field—Dreadful state of Leipsic during the Night—French Dispositions for a Retreat on the following Morning—Preparations of the Allies for the Assault on Leipsic—Last Interview of Napoleon with the King of Saxony—And his Departure from Leipsic—Which is Carried on all sides after a Vigorous Resistance—Blowing up of the Bridge over the Elster, and Surrender of the French Rearguard—Entrance of the Allied Sovereigns into Leipsic—Commencement of Napoleon's Retreat towards the Rhine—Movements of the Allied Troops after the Battle—Funeral of Prince Poniatowski—March of the French Army to Weissenfels—Pursuit of the Allies to Freyberg—Napoleon Arrives at Erfurth—Where Murat leaves him—Stay of the French Army at Erfurth—Reorganization of the French Army—Their continued Retreat, and Pursuit of the Allies—March of Wrede and the Bavarians to the Rhine—Forces with which Napoleon advanced against him—Description of the Field of Battle at Hanau—Advantages and Weakness of Wrede's Position there—Commencement of the Action, and forcing of the Passage by the French—Position and Danger of Napoleon during the Action—Capture and Recapture of Hanau on the Thirty-first—Results of the Battle, and Passage of the Rhine by the French—Reflections on this Battle—Combat of Hocheim, and Approach of the Allied Armies to the Rhine—Enthusiasm of the German Troops when they approached that River—Final overthrow of the Kingdom of Westphalia—Operations against Davoust on the Lower Elbe—Concluding Operations against the Danes, and Armistice with them—Operations of St Cyr and Tolstoy before Dresden—The Blockade of which is resumed after the Battle of Leipsic—Miserable condition and Difficulties of St Cyr—Who at length Surrenders—Terms of the Capitulation, which are violated by the Allied Generals—Reflections on the Breach of Convention on their Part—Lord Londonderry prevents a similar Capitulation being granted to Davoust—Fall of Stettin—Siege and Fall of Torgau—Operations before Dantzic during 1813—Operations there till the Commencement of the regular Siege in October—Continuation of the Siege, and Fall of the Place—Capitulation of Zamosc and Modlin on the Vistula, and general Results of the Campaign—Insurrection in Holland in favour of the Stadtholder and House of Orange—The French Yoke is universally thrown off—And they are expelled from the Country—Operations in Italy during the Campaign—Forces and Positions of the contending Armies—The Austrians commence the Campaign, and gain considerable Successes—Able Measures, and Obstinate Resistance of the Viceroy—General results of the Campaign—Which throws the French behind the Adige—Reflections on this memorable Campaign—And on the military ability displayed by Napoleon in it—His gross and inexcusable faults—Great talents shown in it by the Allied Generals—Memorable example of Moral Retribution which it affords.

THE French Revolution was not so much a revolt against the government and institutions, as the mora-

lity and faith of former times. It professed to offer new motives of action, new rewards of courage, new inducements to exertion to emancipated man. The old restraints of precept, duty, religion, were to be abolished. The rule of action was to be, not what is right but what is agreeable; not what duty enjoins but what passion desires; not what is promised, ultimate reward in another world, but what was attended in this with immediate gratification. Sedulously fanning the passions, it invariably neglected the conscience; often using the language of virtue, it as uniformly directed the actions of vice. The incalculable influence of generous affection—the elevating influence of noble sentiments, was neither overlooked nor underrated by its leaders; on the contrary, they entered largely into their policy for the government of the world. They were considered as the appropriate, and often the most efficacious means of rousing mankind; as instruments never to be despised, but on the contrary largely used for effecting the purposes of democratic elevation or selfish ambition. But it never for an instant entered into their contemplation, that these sentiments were to occasion any restraint upon their conduct; that the limitations which they so loudly proclaimed should be imposed on the power of others, should be affixed to their own; or that they should ever be called to forego present objects of ambition or gratification from an abstract sense of what is right, or a submissive obedience to the Divine commands. Hence its long-continued and astonishing success. While it readily attracted the active and enterprising by the brilliant prizes which it offered, and the agreeable relaxation from restraint which it held forth, it enlisted at the same time the unwary and unforeseeing even in the

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opposite ranks, by the generous sentiments which it breathed, and the perpetual appeals to noble feelings which it made; and thus with almost superhuman address it combined in its ranks the energy of the passions and the sacrifices of the affections, the selfishness of matured and far-seeing sin, and the generosity of deluded and inexperienced virtue.

Cause of the vast strength of the Revolutionary passions.

The vehement passions which the prospect of unrestrained indulgence, whether of pleasure, gain, or power, never fails to excite, the ardent desires which it awakens, the universal energy which it calls forth—are for a time irresistible; and if experience and suffering were not at hand to correct these excesses, and restore the moral equilibrium of nature, it is hard to say how the career of iniquity could be stopped, save by a special interposition of avenging power, or the mutual destruction of the wicked by each other. All the passions of the Revolution, in its different stages, were the passions of sin; the strength it displayed was no other than the energy which, anterior even to human creation, was arrayed against the rule of Omnipotence. The insatiable thirst for power which characterized its earlier stages; the unbounded desire for sensual gratification which succeeded its disappointment; the lust of rapine which sent its armies forth to regenerate by plundering all mankind; the passion for glory, which sacrificed the peace and blood of nations to the splendour or the power of one ruling people—were so many directions which, according to the circumstances of different periods, the same ruling principle, the *thirst for illicit gratification*, successively took. The sober efforts of industry—the simple path of duty—the heroic self-denial of virtue—were insupportable to men thus violently excited; nothing short of the

spoils of the world could gratify passions excited by the prospect of all its indulgences. When Satan strove to tempt our Saviour, and reserved for the trial his strongest allurements, he led him up to an exceeding high mountain, and showed him all the kingdoms of the earth, and offered to give him them all if he would fall down and worship him. Memorable words! indicating at once the continued agency of the great adversary of mankind on individual conduct, and the pre-eminent strength of the temptations to achieve his conquests which were to be drawn from the social or national passions.

"Experience," says Dr Johnson, "is the great test of truth, and is perpetually contradicting the theories of men." It is by the ultimate consequences of their actions that the eternal distinction between virtue and vice is made apparent, and the reality of Divine superintendence brought home to the universal conviction of men. There is a limit to human wickedness; and duty, supported by religion, generally in the end proves more than a match for passion resting on infidelity. More than two thousand years ago, the royal bard thus sung in words of inspired felicity, "Lo, these are the ungodly, these prosper in the world, and these have riches in possession: and I said, Then have I cleansed my heart in vain, and washed mine hands in innocency. All the day long have I been punished: and chastened every morning. Yea, and I had almost said even as they; but lo, then I should have condemned the generation of thy children. Then thought I to understand this: but it was too hard for me, until I went into the sanctuary of God: then understood I the end of these men; namely, how thou dost set them in slippery places: and castest them down, and destroyest them. Oh, how

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suddenly do they consume: perish, and come to a fearful end! Yea, even like as a dream when one awaketh: so shalt thou make their image to vanish out of the city." Of whom were these words spoken? Of those in the days of David or of Napoleon? Twenty years of almost unbroken prosperity had reared up and consolidated the mighty fabric of the French empire, and no power on earth seemed capable of overthrowing it. Despite the catastrophe of the Moscow campaign, the genius of the Emperor had again brought victory to the tricolor standards. The triumph of Lutzen and Bautzen had steadied the wavering fidelity of his allies, and reanimated the spirit of his people; and four hundred thousand brave men were arrayed around his eagles on the Elbe, to assert and maintain the dominion of the world. Never, save on the Niemen, had Napoleon seen himself at the head of such a force: Never had Europe beheld such a host assembled over its whole breadth, for the subjugation of its independence. Within two months from the resumption of hostilities the colossal structure was overthrown; the French armies were swept as by a whirlwind from the German plains; Spain was rejoicing in her freedom; the liberated nations of Europe were returning thanks for their deliverance; and in six months more the empire of Napoleon was at an end; the mighty conqueror was cast away in mimic sovereignty on a petty island, and the glories of the Revolution were numbered among the things that have been.

Psalm lxxiii. 12—19.

Causes of this extraordinary change.

The way in which this extraordinary retribution was brought about, now appears traced in colours of imperishable light. It was the same false and vicious principle, pushed to its necessary consequences, which produced the internal calamities and external

disasters of the Revolution. By promising and affording unbounded gratification to the passions and desires, without any regard to the mode in which it was to be obtained, that great convulsion arrayed an astonishing force of energy and talent on its side; and if these indulgences could have been obtained without involving the ruin or destruction of others, it is hard to say where the career of selfish ambition would have stopped. But honest industry, laborious exertion, virtuous self-denial alone, can purchase innocuous enjoyments; all summary and short-hand modes of obtaining them without such efforts, necessarily involve the injury of others. Robbery and plunder, accordingly, veiled under the successive and specious names of liberty, patriotism, and glory, constituted from first to last its invariable method of action. It began with the spoliation of the church and the emigrant noblesse; the fundholders and capitalists were the next objects of attack; the blood of the people was then drained off in merciless streams; and when all domestic sources were exhausted, and the armies raised by these infernal methods, let loose to pillage and oppress all the adjoining states, had failed in extorting the requisite supplies, even the commons of the poor and the hospitals of the sick were at last confiscated under the imperial government. With those who were enriched by these iniquitous methods, indeed, this system was in the highest degree popular; but in all cases of robbery, there are two parties to be considered—the robber and the victim of his violence. The long continuance and wide extent of this iniquity at length produced an universal spirit of exasperation; resistance was commenced almost by instinct, and persisted in when it appeared hopeless. From the ice of Kamschatka to the Pillars of Hercules;

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from the North Cape to the shores of Calabria—all nations were now convulsed in the effort to shake off the tyranny of France: a crusade greater than had been collected either by the despotism of Asia in ancient, or the fervour of Europe in more modern times, was raised for the deliverance of mankind; and sixteen hundred thousand men on the two sides appeared in arms in Germany, Spain, and Italy, to decide the desperate conflict between the antagonist principles of Vice striving for a liberation from all restraints, human and divine, and Religion enjoining the authority of duty and obedience to the commands of God. The world had never beheld such a contest: if we would seek a parallel to it, we must go back to those awful images of the strife of the heavenly powers, darkly shadowed forth in Scripture, to which the genius of Milton has given poetic and terrestrial immortality.

First operations of the Allies.

The armistice was denounced on the 11th, but, by its conditions, six days more were to elapse before hostilities could be resumed. It was an object, however, for the Allies to have their preparations complete for action the moment that the prescribed period arrived; and accordingly, on the 12th, the Russian and Prussian troops, in pursuance of the concerted plan of operations, began to defile in great strength by their left into Bohemia. The junction with the Austrian troops in the plains of Jung-Buntzlau, raised the allied force in that province to two hundred and twenty thousand men; but though this host was in the highest degree formidable, both from its numbers and the admirable quality of the troops of which the greater part of it was composed, yet a considerable part of the Austrians were new levies, as yet unused to war; and the variety of nations of which it was composed, as well as the want of any

previous habit of co-operation among each other, or uncontrolled direction in its head, rendered the success of any important operations undertaken in the outset of the campaign very doubtful. Hostilities were commenced by the Allies on the side of Silesia before the six days had expired. Taking advantage of some trifling infractions of the armistice by the French troops, the allied generals on the 14th sent August 14. a corps to take possession of Breslau, which lay in the neutral territory between the two armies, and was likely immediately to fall into the enemy's hands on the resumption of hostilities; on the day following, August 15. Blucher advanced in great force across the neutral territory, and every where drove in the French videttes; and the French troops, surprised in their cantonments, hastened to fall behind the Bober.[1]

[1] Bout. 5, 6. Jom. iv. 369, 370. Fain, ii. 237, 238.

No sooner was the Emperor informed of the resumption of hostilities on the Silesian frontier, than he set out from Dresden, and the first night slept at Gorlitz. As he was stepping into his carriage, Aug. 17. two persons from different quarters arrived; Narbonne from Prague, with the account of the final rupture of the negotiations, and Murat from Naples, with the offer of his redoubtable sword. Napoleon had a conference of an hour in duration with the former, whom he despatched with the proposal for the continuance of negotiations during hostilities, which, as already mentioned, proved ineffectual;* and then set out, with the King of Naples, in his carriage. Though well aware of the vacillation which Murat had evinced in command of the army in Poland, and of the opening which he had made towards negotiation with the allied powers, the Emperor had the magnanimity to forgive it all; and he was again in-

Napoleon enters Bohemia,

* Ante, ix. p. 404.

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vested with the command of the cavalry, in which service he was, in truth, unrivalled. Uncertain on which side the principal attacks of the Allies were likely to be directed, and having himself no fixed plan of operations, Napoleon established his guard and reserve cavalry at Gorlitz and Zittau, watching the movements of his adversaries, and prepared to strike whenever they made a false movement, or afforded him an opportunity of falling upon them with advantage. Fifty thousand men, in three columns, crossed the mountain frontier of Bohemia, and established themselves in the Austrian territories at Gabel, Rombourg, and Reichemberg; while the feeble Austrian detachments, which were stationed at that point under Count Neipperg, fell back, still skilfully screening their rear, on the road to Prague.[1]

[1] Fain, ii. 239, 240. Odel. i. 239, 241.

He turns aside into Silesia, notwithstanding all St Cyr's efforts.

Napoleon's movements at this time were based upon the idea, to which he obstinately adhered till it had wellnigh proved his ruin, that the great effort of the Allies would be made on the side of Silesia, and that it was there that the first decisive strokes of the campaign were to be struck. He persevered in this belief, even after he had become acquainted, by his irruption into Bohemia, with the march of the grand Russian and Prussian army into that province, and their concentration under the immediate eye of the allied sovereigns round the walls of Prague. All the efforts of Marshal St Cyr to convince him that this was the quarter from which danger was to be apprehended; that so great an accumulation of force in Bohemia would not have been made without some serious design; and that the French would soon find their quarters straitened in the neighbourhood of Torgau and Dresden, were in vain.* Deaf to these

* "The movement which your Majesty has commenced into Bohemia, upon Gabel, and which you appear to design to push still farther on,

arguments, and uninfluenced even by the obvious confirmation which they received from the march of the Russians and Prussians in such force into Bohemia, Napoleon persisted in believing that it was on the Bober and the Katzbach, now comparatively stripped of troops, that he should commence operations; and assuring St Cyr, who was left at Pirna with thirty thousand men, in command of the passes leading from Bohemia to Dresden, that he had nothing to fear; that Vandamme would come to his assistance if the enemy threatened him in considerable force; and that, if necessary, he himself would return with his guard and assemble a hundred and sixty thousand men round the walls of that city; he ordered the whole troops under his immediate command to wheel to the left, and defile towards Silesia.[1]*

Aug. 20. [1] Odel. i. 241, 242. St Cyr to Napoleon, 20th Aug. 1813. Napoleon to St Cyr, Aug. 20, 1813. St Cyr, iv. 367, 372.

appears to me one of those happy inspirations of which your genius is so fruitful. The reunion of the three sovereigns at Prague, of the Austrian army, and a considerable part of the Russian and Prussian, do not leave a doubt of the intentions of the enemy. They have always desired to operate on that side; they desire it still, notwithstanding the movements of your Majesty. So great an army is not assembled without a purpose: their object is to execute a change of front along their whole line, the left in front moving upon Wittemberg, and to straiten Dresden and Torgau so much by intrenching themselves around them, even if they should not succeed in taking these fortresses, as to render all egress almost impossible, while, with their right, they make head against your Majesty on the Elbe."—ST CYR *to* NAPOLEON, *August* 21, 1813. ST CYR, *Histoire Militaire*, iv. 372; *Pièces Justificatifs*.

* "Should the Russian and Austrian forces united march upon Dresden by the left bank, the general Vandamme will come to its relief; you will then have under your order 60,000 men in the camp of Dresden on the two banks. The troops in the camp at Zittau, become disposable in that event, will also hasten there; they will arrive in four days, and raise your force to 100,000. I will come with my Guard, 50,000 strong; and in four days we shall have from 160,000 to 180,000 men round its walls. It is of no consequence though they cut me off from France: the essential point is, that I should not be cut off from Dresden and the Elbe. The army of Silesia, which is from 130,000 to 140,000 men, without the Guard, may be reinforced by that *corps*

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Retreat of Macdonald in Silesia.

Meanwhile Blucher was vigorously pressing on the French army in Silesia, which, not being in sufficient strength to resist his formidable masses, was every where falling back before him. Lauriston was pushed by the Russians under Langeron; Ney, by the corps of Sacken; Marmont and Macdonald by the Prussians, under Blucher and D'York. Such was the vigour of the pursuit, that ground was rapidly lost by the French in every direction. Ney

Aug. 17. fell back on the night of the 17th from Leignitz to Hanau; next day the Katzbach was passed at all

Aug. 18. points; on the 18th, Blucher established his head-quarters at Goldberg, while Sacken occupied Leignitz. Still the Allies pressed on: Langeron on the left passed the Bober at Zobten, after routing a detachment which occupied that point; in the centre, Blucher, with his brave Prussians, obliged also Lauriston to recross it; while Ney, in like manner, was

Aug. 19. obliged to evacuate Buntzlau, and fall back across the same stream. Thus, at all points, the French force in Silesia was giving way before the enemy; and it was of sinister augury that the gallant generals at its head did not feel themselves strong enough to withstand his advance:[1] for it was an army which Napoleon estimated at a hundred thou-

[1] Bout. viii. 10. Fain, ii. 243, 244 Jom. iv. 370.

d'élite, and raised to 180,000. They will debouche against Wittgenstein, Blucher, and Sacken, who, at this moment, are marching against our troops at Buntzlau: as soon as I have destroyed or disabled them, I will be in a situation to restore the equilibrium by marching upon Berlin, or taking the Austrians in rear in Bohemia. All that is not as yet clear; but one thing is sufficiently clear, that you cannot turn 400,000 men, posted under cover of a chain of fortified places, and who can debouche at pleasure by Dresden, Torgau, Wittemberg, or Magdeburg. All you have to do is, to dispute the ground, gain time, and preserve Dresden, and to maintain active and constant communications with General Vandamme."—NAPOLEON *to* ST CYR, *17th August* 1813; ST CYR, iv. 365; *Pièces Just.*

sand men, which was thus receding without striking a blow.* CHAP. LXXI. 1813.

But the arrival of the heads of the columns of guards and cavalry, commanded by Napoleon in person, which were directed with all possible expedition to the left, through the Bohemian mountains towards Buntzlau, soon changed the state of affairs in this quarter. No sooner did they appear than the retreat of Ney's army was stopped; and the soldiers, with joy, received orders to wheel about and march against the enemy. The indefatigable activity of the Emperor communicated itself to the troops: all vied with each other in pressing forward to what it was hoped would prove a decisive victory; and infantry, cavalry, and artillery, with the imperial guard at their head, poured in an impetuous, yet regulated, torrent down the valleys of the Bohemian mountains, and inundated the Silesian plains. Such was Napoleon's anxiety to press forward, that he outstripped even the cavalry of the guard, and arrived at Laubau, in advance of Gorlitz, with hardly any of his attendants around him. By daybreak on the following morning he was on the banks of the Bober, and entered Lowenberg with the advanced guards; the bridge which the Prussians had broken down was restored under the fire of artillery; Lauriston, in face of the enemy, recrossed the river, and advanced, with a constant running fire in front, to the gates of Goldberg. Blucher continuing his retreat on the following day, the Katzbach also was passed, and the whole

Napoleon's advance against Blucher, who falls back.

Aug. 20.

Aug. 21.

* "My cousin—Inform the Duke of Tarentum, (Macdonald,) that I have put under his orders the army of the Bober, which is composed of 100,000 men, infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers included."—Napoleon's *Instructions to* Berthier *for* Macdonald, 23*d August* 1813. St Cyr, iv. 374; *Pièces Just.*

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army of Silesia concentrated around Jauer. But the retreat of the Allies, though decidedly pronounced, was far from being a flight: with admirable skill they took advantage of every favourable position to check the pursuit, and give time to the columns in rear to retire in order; and in several severe actions, especially one in front of Goldberg, inflicted a very severe loss upon the enemy. Such was the magnitude of the forces employed on both sides, and the extent of ground over which hostilities were carried on, that although they had only lasted five days, and no general engagement had taken place, each party were already weakened by full six thousand men. Napoleon evinced the greatest satisfaction at the result of this day's operations, and at thus seeing so great a mass of the enemy's forces retreating before him in the very outset of the campaign; yet cooler observers in the French army remarked, that the plan of the Allies was sagaciously designed, and skilfully executed, when they had thus early succeeded in attracting Napoleon to whichever side they chose, and yet avoided the risk of an encounter when the chances were no longer in their favour.[1]

Aug. 21.

[1] Odel. i. 241, 244. Bout. 10, 11. Fain, ii. 244, 245. Lab. i. 301, 302.

Advance of the Allies upon Dresden.

In truth, Blucher's advance and subsequent retreat were part of the general policy of the Allies for the conduct of the campaign laid down at Trachenberg, and developed with remarkable precision in his instructions;* and Napoleon, in consequence of it,

"* Should the enemy evince an intention to make an irruption into Bohemia, or to attack the army of the Prince-Royal of Sweden, the army of Silesia will endeavour to impede his operations as much as possible, always taking care not to engage superior forces. In order to arrive at that object, it will be necessary to harass the enemy with the advanced guard and light troops, and observe him narrowly, in order to prevent him from stealing a march, unperceived, into Saxony; but still every engagement with the enemy in superior force must be avoided. Should the enemy, on the other hand, direct his principal

and from the bold measures adopted in his rear, was brought to within a hair's-breadth of destruction. Following out the decided but yet judicious counsels of Bernadotte, Moreau, and Jomini, the allied sovereigns had taken the resolution of descending, with their whole disposable force, from Bohemia upon Saxony and Dresden, and thus striking at the enemy's communications, and the heart of his power, at the very time when the Emperor himself, with the flower of his army, was far advanced in Silesia in pursuit of the retiring columns of Blucher. At the time when Napoleon was driving the last corps of Aug. 21. the army of Silesia across the Bober, the grand army of the Allies, two hundred thousand strong, broke up from their cantonments in Bohemia, and began to cross the Erzegebirge mountains; all the passes into Saxony being soon crowded with the innumerable host. To oppose this formidable invasion, there was no force immediately available but that of St Cyr, stationed at Pirna, which numbered only twenty-two

forces against the army of Silesia, it will endeavour to arrest him as long as possible; and, having done so, operate its retreat upon the Neisse, taking especial care not to compromise its safety. In that event, the corps of General Sacken will extend itself along the Oder, and take measures, by means of a corps of light cavalry, to keep up the communication with the army of reserve in Poland. The light corps at Landshut will also, in that event, keep up the communication with the army of Bohemia; the fortresses of Silesia must be adequately garrisoned, chiefly from the landwehr, and the main army will retire upon Neisse. That place, with its intrenched camp, which must be put in a proper posture of defence, will serve as a *point-d'-appui* to it; while the army of Bohemia, and that of the Prince-Royal of Sweden, will take the enemy in rear. Should the enemy, on the other hand, direct his principal attack against the army of the Prince-Royal of Sweden, or on Berlin, the army of Silesia will resume the offensive; and the bulk of the allied forces will be directed against his rear, the army of Silesia on the right bank of the Elbe, that of Bohemia on the left bank."—*Instructions to* FIELD-MARSHAL BLUCHER.—ST CYR, *Histoire Militaire*, iv. 349.

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thousand men present with the eagles on the frontier, though its nominal amount was thirty thousand. Vandamme's corps, of greater strength, and Poniatowski's Poles, were within a few days' march, at the entrance of the passes towards Zittau and Gabel, leading into Silesia; but they could not be relied on to co-operate in any sudden attack on the capital. But, meanwhile, the danger was instant and pressing on the 21st. Barclay de Tolly and Wittgenstein presented themselves in great strength before the barriers, on the heights of Peterswalde, which they speedily forced, and laid open the great road from Prague to Dresden. The Prussians, under Kleist, farther to the left, descended from the mountains upon Gotleub and Dohna; while the great masses of the Austrians, with the imperial headquarters, moved by the roads of Altenberg and Sayda on Dippodiswalde; while, on the extreme left, Colloredo, Chastellar, Giulay, and Klenau, poured down from the Marienberg hills, and, directing their advance upon Freyberg, threatened entirely to intercept the communication between Dresden and the Rhine.[1]

Aug. 22.

[1] St Cyr, iv. 78, 80. Fain, ii. 252, 253. Bout. 24, 25. Lab. i. 307.

The Allies approach Dresden.

St Cyr had from the beginning conjectured, from the perfect stillness of the allied army along the whole Bohemian frontier, contrasted with the incessant rattle of tirailleurs which Blucher kept up in front of his line, that the real attack was intended to be made outside of Dresden; but having been unable to get the Emperor to share his opinion, he was left alone to make head against the torrent. Too experienced, however, to attempt to withstand so vast a force with the comparatively few troops at his disposal, he contented himself with impeding their advance as much as possible; and, after some sharp

encounters with Wittgenstein's advanced guard, withdrew within the redoubts of Dresden, while Wittgenstein occupied the town of Pirna, and the allied headquarters were advanced to Dippodiswalde. 23d Aug. Schwartzenberg's original intention was not to have moved on Dresden, but to have directed the main body of his force on Freyberg, with a view to a combined operation with Bernadotte in the neighbourhood of Leipsic; and it was only after arriving at Marienberg on the 23d, that this plan was abandoned. Without doubt, the movement upon Dresden promised infinitely greater and more immediate results than an advance into the plains of Saxony; but it was owing to the time lost in this march and countermarch, that the failure of the operation was owing; for if their whole force had from the first marched direct upon Dresden, they would have arrived before its walls on the evening of the 23d, and it would have been carried by assault on the day following, thirty hours before the nearest of Napoleon's troops could have come up to its relief.[1]

[1] St Cyr, iv. 85, 86. Bout. 26, 27. Fain, ii. 252, 253. Jom. iv. 380.

As it was, the Allies had now accomplished the greatest feat in strategy: they had thrown themselves in almost irresistible strength upon the enemy's communications, without compromising their own. Nothing was wanting but vigour in following up the measure, adequate to the ability with which it had been conceived; and Dresden would have been taken, a corps of the French army destroyed, and the defensive position on the Elbe, the base of Napoleon's whole positions in Germany, broken through and paralyzed. But to attain these great objects, the utmost vigour and celerity in attack were indispensable; for Napoleon was at no great distance on the right bank of the Elbe, and it might with certainty be anticipated, that as soon as he was made aware of the danger

Important advantage gained by this movement.

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with which the centre of his power was threatened, he would make the utmost possible exertions to come up to its relief. The Allies arrived, however, in time to gain their object so far. Notwithstanding the unnecessary detour towards Freyberg, part of their army arrived in the neighbourhood of Dresden on the evening of the 23d,* and next morning the trembling inhabitants of that beautiful city beheld the smiling hills around their walls resplendent with bayonets, and studded with a portentous array of artillery. During the whole of the 24th, the troops, who were extremely fatigued, continued to arrive; and on the morning of the 25th, a hundred and twenty thousand men, with above five hundred pieces of cannon, were assembled round the city.† Moreau and Jomini warmly counselled an immediate attack, and Lord Cathcart, who with his usual gallantry had rode forward over the green turf behind the Gross Garten, between Plauen and Raecknitz, to the close vicinity of the enemy's posts, reported that the coast was clear, and strongly supported the same advice. Alexander was clear for adopting it; but Schwartzenberg and the Austrians, accustomed only to the methodical habits of former wars, and insensible

* "Dresden, 23*d August* 1813, *Ten at night.*—At five this afternoon the enemy approached Dresden, after having driven in our cavalry. We expected an attack this evening, but probably it will take place to-morrow. Your Majesty knows better than I do, what time it requires for heavy artillery to beat down enclosure walls and palisades."—ST CYR *to* NAPOLEON, 23d *August* 1813. ST CYR, iv. 380.

† "An immense army, composed of Russians, Prussians, and Austrians, is at this moment all around Dresden, with a prodigious train of artillery. From the vast amount of force which he has collected, it would appear that the enemy is determined to hazard an attack, knowing that your Majesty is not far off, though perhaps not suspecting that you are so near as you actually are. We are determined to do all in our power; but I can answer for nothing more with such young soldiers."—ST CYR *to* NAPOLEON, 25th *August* 1813, *Midnight.* ST CYR, iv. 384, 385.

to the inestimable importance of time in combating Napoleon, insisted upon deferring the attack till Klenau's corps, which, being on the extreme left, had not yet arrived from Freyberg, should be in line. This opinion prevailed, as the most lukewarm and timid invariably does with all *small* assemblies of men on whom a serious responsibility is thrown;[1] the attack was deferred till the following afternoon, and meanwhile Napoleon arrived with his cuirassiers and guards, bearing the issue of the strife upon their sabre points.[1]*

[1] Bout. 27. Jom. iv. 382, 383. St Cyr, iv. 96, 99. Lond. iii.

Napoleon returns towards Dresden.

The Emperor having received intelligence of the movements of the Allies across the Bohemian frontier, had halted at Lowenberg on the 23d; and after giving the command of the army destined to combat Blucher to Marshal Macdonald, retraced his steps the same day, accompanied by the reserve cavalry and guards, to Gorlitz. The same evening Murat was sent on to Dresden to inform the King of Saxony and St Cyr of the speedy arrival of the Emperor with the flower of his army; and such was the confidence which prevailed at headquarters, that Berthier said, in a careless way, "Well, we shall gain a great battle; we shall march on Prague, on Berlin, on Vienna!" The soldiers, however, who marched on their feet, and did not ride like Berthier in an easy carriage, though animated with the same spirit, were by no means equally confident: they were ready to sink under their excessive fatigue, having marched since the renewal of hostilities nearly ten leagues a day; and, such was their exhaustion, that the Emperor ordered twenty thousand

* The preceding account of what passed before Dresden on the 25th, is entirely confirmed by the minute details on the subject I have often received from my highly-esteemed and venerable friend, Lord Cathcart, himself.

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bottles of wine to be purchased at Gorlitz, and distributed among the guards alone. So great, however, was the exhaustion of the country, from having so long been the seat of war, that hardly a tenth part of that number could be procured, and the greater part of the wearied men continued their march without any other than the scanty supplies which they could themselves extract by terror from the inhabitants. Napoleon continued his march in the middle of his guards all the 24th, and halted at Bautzen; and there took his determination to continue his march direct upon Dresden, or move to the left upon Pirna, and threaten the communications and rear of the Allies, according to the information he might receive as to whether or not that capital, unaided, could hold out till the 28th.[1]

[1] Fain, ii. 256, 257. Bout. 30. Odel. i. 248, 249.

Reasons of Napoleon's return to Dresden.

Early on the following morning, the Emperor resumed his march, still keeping the road which led alike to Dresden and Pirna, with the design of throwing himself, if possible, on the rear of the Allies. Having, however, the day before, dispatched General Gourgaud to Dresden* to obtain information as to the state of the city, he halted, according to agreement, at Stolpen, where the road to Dresden branches off from that to Bohemia, and there received the most alarming intelligence as to the state of affairs in the Saxon capital. The letters both of Murat and St Cyr left no room for doubt that the city was in the most im-

* "To-morrow," said Napoleon to General Gourgaud, "I will be on the road to Pirna, but I will stop at Stolpen. Set you out immediately for Dresden; ride as hard as you can, and be there this evening; see St Cyr, the King of Naples, and the King of Saxony; re-assure every one. Tell them to-morrow I can be in Dresden with 40,000 men, and the day following arrive there with my whole army. At daybreak visit the redoubts and outposts; consult the commander of engineers as to whether they can hold out. Return to me as quickly as possible to-morrow at Stolpen, and report well the opinion of Maret and St Cyr, as to the real state of things."—FAIN, ii. 256.

minent danger; that the accidental delay in the attack had alone hitherto preserved it; and that its fall might hourly be looked for. At eleven at night Gourgaud returned, and confirmed the intelligence, adding, that it was surrounded by so vast an army, that not a chance remained of holding out another day but in the immediate return of the Emperor. Already the lines of investiture extended from Pirna to Plauen, and nothing but the arrival of Klenau, the approach of whose columns was already announced, was wanting, to enable the enemy to complete the circle to the Lower Elbe. Preparations were already made for evacuating the Gross Garten: the glare of a village in flames immediately behind it, threw an ominous light on the domes of Dresden; and when Gourgaud left the city shortly after dark, the whole heavens to the south and west were resplendent with the fires of the enemy's bivouacs.[1]

[1] Fain. ii. 257, 258. St Cyr, iv. 98, 99.

Napoleon now saw that affairs were urgent: there was not a moment to be lost if Dresden was to be saved, and the communications of the army preserved. He instantly sent for General Haxo, the celebrated engineer, and thus addressed him:—"Vandamme is beyond the Elbe, near Pirna: he will find himself on the rear of the enemy, whose anxiety to get possession of Dresden is evidently extreme. My design was to have followed up that movement with my whole army: it would, perhaps, have been the most effectual way to have brought matters to an issue with the enemy; but the fate of Dresden disquiets me. I cannot bring myself to sacrifice that town. Some hours must elapse before I can reach it; but I have decided, not without regret, to change my plan, and to march to its relief. Vandamme is in sufficient strength to play an important part in that

Instructions to Vandamme.

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general movement, and inflict an essential injury on the enemy. Let him advance from Pirna to Gieshubel, and gain the heights of Peterswalde; let him maintain himself there, occupy all the defiles, and from that impregnable post await the issue of events around Dresden. To him is destined the lot of receiving the sword of the vanquished; but he will require *sang-froid*: above all, do not let him be imposed upon by a rabble of fugitives. Explain fully my intentions to Vandamme; tell him what I expect from him. Never will he have a finer opportunity of earning his marshal's baton." Haxo immediately set out; descended from the heights of Stolpen into the gorges of Lilienstein; joined Vandamme, and never again quitted his side. [1]

[1] Fain, ii. 259, 260.

Entrance of the French guards into Dresden.

By daybreak on the following morning, the whole troops around the Emperor's headquarters were in motion, and defiling on the road to Dresden. Despite their excessive fatigue, having marched forty leagues in four days, they pressed ardently forward; for now the cannon were distinctly heard from the left bank of the Elbe, and the breathless couriers who succeeded each other from Dresden announced, that if they did not speedily arrive the city was lost. The guards were at the head of the array: next came Latour Maubourg's cuirassiers; then Victor's infantry and Kellerman's cavalry: while Marmont's corps moved in a parallel line on the direct road from Bautzen, which they had never left. At eight o'clock, the advanced guard reached the elevated plateau where the roads of Bautzen, of Stolpen, and of Pilnitz intersect each other, shortly before the entry of the new town of Dresden, and from which the eye can survey the whole plain on the other side of the Elbe. With what anxiety did they behold it entirely filled

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by an innumerable host of enemies; and the hostile columns so near the advanced works, that an assault might every instant be expected! Already the Prussian uniforms were to be seen in full possession of the Gross Garten: columns of attack were forming within cannon-shot of the suburb of Pirna; while on the banks of the Elbe, Wittgenstein had constructed batteries to enfilade the road by which the troops were to enter the capital. Dresden was surrounded on all sides; the suburb of Friderichstadt alone was not enveloped. The French were visible in force in the redoubts, and behind the works; but their numbers appeared a handful in the midst of the interminable lines of the beleaguering host; and a silence more terrible than the roar of artillery, bespoke the awful moments of suspense which preceded the commencement of the fight.[1]*

[1] Fain, ii. 261, 263. St Cyr, iv. 99, 100. Odel. i. 250.

Arrival of the Emperor and his Guards in Dresden. Aug. 26.

So violent was the fire kept up by Wittgenstein's guns on the road by which the Emperor was to pass, that he was obliged to leave his carriage, and creep along the ground on his hands and knees over the exposed part; while the bullets from the Russian batteries on the one side, and the bombs from the

* On approaching Dresden, Schwartzenberg issued the following order of the day to his troops:—"The great day is arrived, brave warriors! Our country reckons on you: heretofore she has never been disappointed. All our efforts to obtain peace on equitable terms—such terms as alone can be durable—have failed. Nothing could restore the French government to moderation and reason. We enter not alone into the strife: all that Europe can oppose to the powerful enemy of peace and liberty, is on our side. Austria, Russia, Prussia, Sweden, England, Spain, all combine their efforts to attain the same object—a solid and durable peace;—a reasonable distribution of force between the different powers, and the independence of each individual state. It is not against France, but the overwhelming domination of France beyond its own limits, that this great alliance has been formed. Spain and Russia have proved what the constancy and resolution of a people can do. The year 1813 will demonstrate what can be effected by the united force of so

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redoubt Marcellini on the other, flew over his head. Having thus got over the dangerous ground, he suddenly made his appearance at ten o'clock at the Marcellini palace, to the no small astonishment of its royal inmates, who were deliberating on the necessity of coming to terms with the enemy. After a short visit to the king, whom he reassured by the promise of the speedy arrival of his guards, Napoleon went out to visit the exterior works from the suburb of Pirna to that of Freyberg, accompanied only by a single page to avoid attracting attention; and so close were the enemy's posts now in that quarter, that the youth was wounded by a spent musket-ball, while standing at the Emperor's side. Having completed this important reconnoissance, on which his operations for the day, in a great measure, depended, he returned to the palace, and sent out couriers in all directions to convey his orders to the corps which successively arrived for the defence of the capital. Meanwhile the guards and cuirassiers, in great strength, followed the Emperor like a torrent across the bridges into the city; and it was soon apparent, from their numbers and gallant bearing, that all immediate danger was at an end. In vain

many powerful states. In a war so sacred, we require more than ever to practise those virtues by which our armies in time past have been so distinguished. Devotion without bounds to our monarch and our country: magnanimity alike in success or reverses: determination and constancy on the field of battle: moderation and humanity towards the weak—such are the virtues of which you should ever give the example. The Emperor will remain with you; for he has trusted to your arms all that he holds most dear—the honour of the nation, the protection of our country, the security and welfare of posterity. Be grateful, warriors, that you march before God, who will never abandon the cause of justice; and under the eyes of a monarch whose paternal sentiments and affection are well known to you. Europe awaits her deliverance at your hands, after so long a train of misfortunes."—CAPEFIGUE, ix. 196, 198. Note.

the inhabitants offered them refreshments; these brave men, impressed to the lowest drummer with the urgency of the moment, continued to press on, though burning with thirst, and ready to drop down under the ardent rays of the sun. From ten in the morning till late at night, ceaseless columns of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, defiled without a moment's intermission over both the bridges; and while the enemy's columns darkened the brows of the heights of Raecknitz, the gallant cuirassiers, in defiling over the bridges, keeping their eyes fixed on the spot, held their heads the higher, and passed on undaunted.[1]

[1] Odel. i. 249, 242, and ii. 164. Fain, ii. 264, 265. Lab. ii. 309, 310.

Formidable attack on Dresden.

At length, at four o'clock in the afternoon, Schwartzenberg's patience, which had long held out for the arrival of Klenau's corps, which had not yet come up, became exhausted, and he gave the signal for the attack. Instantly the batteries on all the heights round the city were brought forward, and above a hundred guns in the front line commenced a terrible fire on its works and buildings. The bombs and cannon-balls fell on all sides, and over its whole extent; several houses speedily took fire; the inhabitants, in despair, took refuge in the cellars and vaults, to avoid the effects of the bombardment; while the frequent bursting of shells in the streets, the loud thunder of the artillery from the ramparts and redoubts, the heavy rolling of the guns and ammunition-waggons along the pavement, the cries of the drivers, and measured tread of the marching men who forced their way through the throng, combined to produce a scene of unexampled sublimity and terror.[1] Every street and square in Dresden was by this time crowded with troops; above sixty thousand men had defiled over the bridges since ten o'clock, and the balls fell and

[1] Lond. 112. Odel. i. 251. Tém. Ocul. ii. 166. Fain, ii. 268.

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bombs exploded with dreadful effect among their dense masses.

Awful aspect of the allied columns as they attacked Dresden.

The attack of the Allies was indeed terrible. At the signal of three guns, fired from the headquarters on the heights of Raecknitz, six columns, deep and massy, descended from the heights, each preceded by fifty pieces of artillery, and advanced, with a steady step and in the finest order, against the city. It was an awful, but yet an animating sight, when these immense masses, without firing a shot or breaking the regularity of their array, descended in silent majesty towards the walls. No force on earth seemed capable of resisting them; so vast, yet orderly was the array, that their tread, when hardly within cannon-shot, could be distinctly heard from the ramparts. Wittgenstein commanded the three columns on the right, who advanced from the Gross Garten; Kleist's Prussians in the centre moved partly through the great garden, partly over the open ground to their left, under Prince Augustus of Prussia, and with them were combined three divisions of Austrians under Count Colloredo; the remainder of the Austrians on the left, under Prince Maurice of Lichtenstein, formed the completion of the vast array. Soon the beautiful buildings of Dresden were enveloped in smoke and flame; an incessant fire issued from the works; while the allied batteries on the semicircle of heights around, sent a storm of projectiles through the air, and the moving batteries in front of their columns, steadily advanced towards the embrasures of the redoubts.[1]

[1] Lond. 112, 113. Odel. i. 252. Tém. Ocul. ii. 166, 167. Fain, ii. 268, 269. Vaud. i. 152. Kausler, 645.

Early success of the Allies.

At some points the attack was irresistible. The great redoubt, situated in front of the Mocsinsky garden, was carried in the most gallant style, after its palisades had been beat down by the Austrians

under Colloredo. Sir Robert Wilson, ever foremost where danger was to be encountered or glory won, was the first man who entered it. At the same time, an impetuous attack by the Russians under Wittgenstein, carried the redoubts on the left, near the Hopfgarten; while Kleist, with his ardent Prussians, drove the enemy entirely out of the Gross Garten, and approached on that side close to the barriers of the suburb. The French, by bringing up fresh troops, regained the Mocsinsky redoubt; but the fire of the Austrian batteries, which now enfiladed it on both sides, was so terrible, that the men who entered were almost all destroyed, and the work again fell into the enemy's hands. By six o'clock in the evening, the last reserves of St Cyr's corps had been all engaged; the suburbs were furiously attacked, as well on the side of Pirna as that of Plauen. Napoleon, seriously disquieted, had stationed all the disposable battalions of the Old Guard at the threatened barriers, and was dispatching courier after courier to hasten the march of the Young: the Austrian guns were furiously battering the rampart, at the distance only of a hundred paces; a tempest of bombs and cannon-balls was falling in the streets; the trembling inhabitants were wounded as soon as they appeared at their doors; frequent explosions of shells and ammunition-waggons in the streets, diffused universal consternation: already the hatchets of the pioneers were heard at the gate of Plauen and barrier of Dippodiswalde, and the triumphant cry was heard among the assailants, "To Paris! to Paris!"[1]

[1] Fain, 270, 271. Odel. i. 253, 254. Tém. Ocul. Ibid. ii. 169, 170.

Napoleon, who had evinced great anxiety while this tremendous attack was going forward, was at length relieved at half-past six by the arrival of the Young Guard, and now deemed himself in sufficient

Sally by Napoleon, which repels the attack.

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strength to hazard a sally at each extremity of his position. The gate of Plauen was thrown open, and the dense masses of the Guard under Ney rushed furiously out; while a quick discharge of musketry from the loopholed walls and windows of the adjacent houses, favoured their sortie. The Austrian columns, little anticipating so formidable an onset, fell back in disorder; and the French guards, taking advantage of the moment when the gate was free, defiled rapidly out, and, forming in line on either side of it, by their increasing mass and enthusiastic valour gained ground on the enemy. Similar sorties took place at the gate of Pirna and at the barrier of Dippodiswalde: at all points the assailants, wholly unprepared for such an attack, and deeming the day already won, lost ground; the Young Guard, with loud cheers, regained the bloody redoubt of Mocsinsky; the left, under Mortier, drove the Russians from the suburb of Pirna, and dislodged the Prussians from the Gross Garten; while Murat, issuing with his formidable squadrons from the gate of Plauen, established himself for the night in the rear of the right wing under Ney, which had emerged altogether from the suburbs on the road to Freyberg into the open country. Astonished at this unexpected resistance, which they had by no means anticipated, and perceiving, from the strength of the columns which had issued from the city, as well as the vigour of the attacks, that Napoleon in person directed the defence, the allied generals drew off their troops for the night; but, not yet despairing of final success, they resolved to await a pitched battle on the adjacent heights, on the following morning.[1]

[1] St Cyr, iv. 104, 106. Lab. ii. 313, 314. Lond. 113, 114. Fain, ii. 270, 271. Jom. 29.

The weather, which for some days previous had been serene and intensely hot, now suddenly changed;

vast clouds filled the skies, and soon the surcharged moisture poured itself out in a torrent of rain. Regardless of the storm, Napoleon traversed the city after it was dark, and waited on the bridge till Marmont and Victor's corps began to defile over; and as soon as he was assured of their arrival, returned hastily through the streets again, issued forth on the other side, and, by the light of the bivouacs, visited the whole line occupied by his troops, now entirely outside the city, from the barrier of Pirna to the suburb of Friderichstadt. The force he had accumulated was such as to put him in a condition, not only to repel any further attack which might be directed against the city, but to resume the offensive at all points. In addition to the corps of St Cyr, Marmont, and Victor, he had at his command the whole guards, and all the heavy cavalry of Milhaud and Latour Maubourg; under Murat; at least a hundred and twenty thousand men, of which twenty thousand were admirable cavalry. His position at Dresden also gave him very great advantages; for by securing his centre by means of a fortress, of which the strength had been tried on the preceding day, it enabled him to throw the weight of his forces on the two flanks; while the Allies, having no such protection for the middle of their line, were under the necessity of strengthening it equally at all points, and thus in all probability would be inferior to the enemy at the real points of attack. Considerable reinforcements, however, came up during the night from the side of Freyberg; and although Klenau had not yet made his appearance, yet his arrival was positively announced for the following day. Notwithstanding the loss of six thousand men in the assault of Dresden, they had now nearly a hundred

State of both parties during the night.

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and sixty thousand men in line, independent of Klenau, who it was hoped would come up before the action was over. They resolved, therefore, to await the attack of the enemy on the following day; and, withdrawing altogether from cannon-shot of the ramparts, arranged their formidable masses in the form of a semicircle on the heights around the walls, from the Elbe above the suburb of Pirna, to the foot of the slopes of Wolfnitz, near Priesnitz, below the city.[1]

[1] Lond. 114, 115. Bout. 29, 31. Odel. ii. 255, 256. Jom. iv. 390, 391.

Napoleon's dispositions on the 27th.

Napoleon disposed his troops after the following manner:—The right wing, composed of the corps of Victor, and the cavalry of Latour Maubourg, was stationed in front of the gate of Wildsdrack, and in the fields and low grounds from that down the Elbe towards Priesnitz; the centre, under the Emperor in person, comprised the corps of Marmont and St Cyr, having the infantry and cavalry of the Old Guard in reserves, supported by the three great redoubts; on the left Ney had the command, and directed the four divisions of the Young Guard and the cavalry of Kellerman, which extended to the Elbe, beyond the suburb of Pirna. Above a hundred and thirty thousand men * were, by daylight on the following morning, assembled in this position, having Dresden, bristling with cannon, as a vast fortress to support their centre:

* St Cyr's corps, three divisions,	20,000
Marmont's do. three divisions,	22,000
Victor's do. four divisions,	28,000
Latour Maubourg's cavalry, four divisions,	14,000
Kellerman's do. three divisions,	9,000
Infantry of the Old Guard,	6,000
Do. of the Young Guard, four divisions,	28,000
Cavalry of the Guard, four divisions,	4,000
	131,000

—Londonderry, 114. Vaudoncourt, 129.

but their position was extraordinary, and, if defeated, altogether desperate; for they fought with their backs to the Elbe and their faces to the Rhine: the allied army, in great strength, had intercepted their whole communications with France, and if worsted, they were thrown back into a town with only two bridges traversing an otherwise impassable river in their rear.[1] Bout. 31. 32. Lond. 114, 115. Vaud. 154. Jom. iv. 390. St Cyr, iv. 110, 111.

On the other hand, the Allies arranged their troops in the following manner:—On the right, Wittgenstein commanded the Russians on the road to Pirna, and Kleist the Prussians between Streisec and Strehlen: in the centre, Schwartzenberg with the corps of Colloredo, Chastellar and Bianchi's grenadiers in reserve, occupied the semicircle of heights which extend from Strehlen by Raecknitz to Plauen; while beyond Plauen, on the left, were posted the corps of Giulay and one division of Klenau's troops, which had at length come up. But from the extreme allied left, at the foot of the heights of Wolfnitz to Priesnitz, was a vacant space wholly unoccupied, destined for the remainder of Klenau's men when they should arrive; and the whole of that wing was not only entrusted to inexperienced troops, but was destitute of any solid support, either from inequality of ground or villages —an oversight on the part of the general-in-chief which was the more reprehensible, as they stood opposite to the terrible cuirassiers of Latour Maubourg, fourteen thousand strong, with nothing but an intervening level place for the horse to charge over; while, if they had been drawn back half a mile, to the passes and broken ground in their rear, or not pushed across the precipitous defile of Tharandt, which separated them from the main army, they would have been beyond the reach of danger.[1] Positions of the Allied troops. Vaud. i. 154, 155. Bout. 32, 33. Jom. iv. 390, 391. St Cyr, iv. 111, 112.

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Battle of the 27th August.

Both armies passed a cheerless night, drenched to the skin by the torrents of rain which never ceased to descend with uncommon violence. Napoleon, however, who had supped with the King of Saxony the night before in the highest spirits, was on horseback at six in the morning, and rode out to the neighbourhood of the great redoubt, which had been the scene of such a desperate contest the preceding day. Ghastly traces of the combat were to be seen on all sides; out of the newly made graves hands and arms were projecting, which stuck up stark and stiff from the earth in the most frightful manner. The Emperor took his station beside a great fire which had been lighted by his troops in the middle of the squares of the Old Guard, and immediately behind were the cavalry of the Guard dismounted beside their horses. The cannonade soon began along the whole line; but it was kept up for some hours only in a desultory manner, the excessive rain and thick mist rendering it impossible either to move the infantry or point the guns with precision. Jomini strongly urged the allied sovereigns during the interval to change the front of their line, and accumulating their force on the enemy's left, which was next the Elbe, to cut off Vandamme and Poniatowski, who were at Pirna and Zittau, from the remainder of the army. This manœuvre, which would have re-established affairs, was altogether foreign to Schwartzenberg's ideas, which were entirely based upon cutting off the French communications by their right with Torgau and Leipsic. Meanwhile the French right gradually gained ground upon the detached corps of Austrians beyond the ravine on the allied left, which was equally incapable of maintaining itself by its intrinsic strength,[1] or obtaining succour across the chasm from the

[1] Bout. 33. St Cyr, iv. 110, 111. Jom. iv. 390, 391. Lond. 115.

centre; and Klenau, though strenuously urged to accelerate his movements, had not yet come up.

Napoleon was not long of turning to the best account this state of matters in the allied line. Occupying himself a strong central position, and in a situation to strike at any portion of the vast semicircular line which lay before him, he had also this immense advantage, that the thick mist and incessant rain rendered it impossible, not only for the allied generals to see against what quarter preparations were directed, but even for the commanders of corps to perceive the enemy before they were close upon them. This last circumstance led to a most serious catastrophe on the left. Unperceived by the enemy, Murat had stole round in the rear of Victor's men, and entirely turning the flank of the Austrians, got with Latour Maubourg's formidable cuirassiers into the low meadows which lie between Wolfnitz and the Elbe, in the direction of Preistitz, where it was intended that Klenau's corps should have completed the allied line to the river. Shrouded by the mist, he had thus got with his whole force close to the extreme Austrian left, and almost perpendicular to their line, before they were aware of his approach. Murat, in order to divert the enemy's attention from this decisive attack, caused Victor's infantry to occupy Lobda in their front, from whence they advanced in column against the line, and kept up a heavy cannonade from a strong battery posted on an eminence on their left; and, when the action had become warm with the foot, suddenly burst, with twelve thousand chosen horsemen, out of the mist, on their flank and rear. The effect of this onset, as of the Polish lancers, under similar circumstances, on the English infantry at Albuera, was decisive.[1] In a few minutes the line

Total defeat of the Austrian left.

[1] Kausler, 651, Bout. 32, 33. Lab. ii. 309, 310. St Cyr, iv. 111, 112. Jom. iv. 391, 392.

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was broken through, pierced in all directions, and cut to pieces. A few battalions next the centre made their way across the ravine, and escaped—the whole remainder, being three-fourths of the entire corps, with General Metsko, were killed or made prisoners.

Operations on the French left.

No sooner was Napoleon made aware, by the advancing cannonade on his right, that Murat's attack had proved successful, than he gave orders for his left to advance against Wittgenstein, while the action in the centre was still confined to a distant cannonade. Ney had concentrated the four divisions of the Young Guard between the Gross Garten and the Elbe, and with them and Kellerman's dragoons he immediately made a vigorous attack upon the enemy. He was received by the Russians with their wonted steadiness. The villages of Seidnitz and Gross Dobritz were gallantly defended, against an overwhelming superiority of force, by General de Roth; and when he could no longer make them good, he retreated in good order to the main body of Wittgenstein's men, placed in the rear behind Rieck. Jomini seeing Ney far advanced along the Elbe, and showing his flank to the allied centre, counselled the Emperor Alexander to move forward Kleist, Milaradowitch, Colloredo, and the masses of the centre which had not yet been engaged, and assail his columns in flank, by Strehlen: a movement which promised the most important results, and would probably have balanced the success of Murat on the left. Alexander at once appreciated the importance of this movement, and Kleist and Milaradowitch were already in motion to execute it; but to support them, and fill up the chasm in the line occasioned by their descending the hills to the right, it was necessary that Barclay de Tolly, with the Russian reserve,[1] should advance

[1] Jom. iv. 394, 395. Bout. 33. Kausler, 650, 651. St Cyr, iv. iii. Lond. 121.

to the front. Barclay, however, did not move: the signal made for that purpose, was at first not seen from the mist, and subsequently disregarded; and before the order could be renewed by an officer, a dreadful catastrophe had occurred, which in a great measure determined the Allies to retreat.

Wound and death of Moreau.

Moreau, who had with equal energy and ability discharged the important duties devolved upon him in the council of the Allies ever since the campaign reopened, was in earnest conversation with the Emperor Alexander about this very advance of Barclay's, when a cannon-shot from the French batteries in the centre almost carried off both his legs, the ball passing through the body of his horse. This melancholy event excited a very deep sensation at the allied headquarters, and for a time averted Alexander's attention at the most critical moment of the action. The interest which it awakened was enhanced by the extraordinary heroism which the wounded general evinced under an excess of pain which might well have shaken any man's fortitude. He never uttered a groan while carried to the rear, with his mangled limbs hanging by the skin; and when laid on the table of the cottage into which he was carried to suffer amputation, he called for a cigar, which he smoked with the utmost tranquillity. He bore the painful operation with the same firmness which had distinguished his whole demeanour since his wound: and when the surgeon who had cut off the right leg examined the other, and pronounced, with a faltering voice, that it was impossible to save it—"Cut it off then, also," said he calmly, which was immediately done. When the retreat commenced, he was transported in a litter to Laun, where he wrote a letter to his wife singularly

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characteristic of his mind.* Alexander was indefatigable in his attentions to the illustrious patient, and sanguine hopes were at one period entertained of his recovery: but at the end of five days fever supervened, and he expired with the same stoicism as he had lived, but without giving the slightest trace of religious impression. His body was embalmed and conveyed to Prague, whence it was transported to St Petersburg, and buried in the Catholic church of that capital with the same honours as had been paid to the remains of Kutusoff. Alexander wrote a touching letter to his widow,† and presented her with a gift of five hundred thousand roubles, (L.20,000,) and a pension of thirty thousand, (L.1500;)[1] but the remains of Moreau remained far

Sept. 1.

[1] Lond. 11.5, 121. Capef. x. 201, 202. Biog. Univ. xxx. 95, 96.

* "MY DEAREST—At the battle of Dresden, three days ago, I had both my legs carried off by a cannon-ball. That rascal Bonaparte is always fortunate. They have performed the amputation as well as possible. Though the army has made a retrograde movement, it is by no means a reverse, but of design to draw nearer to General Blucher. Excuse my scrawl: I love and embrace you with my whole heart."—CAPEFIGUE, x. 201.

† "When the frightful catastrophe which befell at my side General Moreau, deprived me of the guidance and experience of that great man, I indulged the hope that by means of care he might yet be preserved for his family and my friendship. Providence has disposed it otherwise; he has died as he lived, in the full possession of a great and constant mind. There is but one alleviation to the evils of life: the assurance that they are sympathized with by others. In Russia, Madame, you will every where find these sentiments; and if it should suit your arrangements to fix yourself there, I will strive to do every thing in my power to embellish the existence of a person of whom I consider it a sacred duty to be the support and consolation. I pray you, Madame, to count on this irrevocably, and not to permit me to remain in ignorance of any circumstance in which I can be of any service to you, and always to write to me directly. The friendship which I had vowed to your husband extends beyond the tomb; and I have no other means of discharging what is but in part the debt which I owe him, but by attending to the comfort of his family. Receive, Madame, in these sad and mournful circumstances, the assurances of my unalterable friendship—ALEXANDER."—*See* CAPEFIGUE, x. 205. Note.

from his native land, and amidst the enemies of the people whom he had conducted with so much glory.*

The manner in which this great general met his death-wound, was very remarkable. The cannon of the Guard, which were posted in front of the position which Napoleon occupied, had been observed for some time to exhibit an unusual degree of languor in replying to the discharges of the enemy; and the Emperor sent Gourgaud forward to inquire into the cause of so unusual a circumstance. The answer returned was, that it was to no purpose to waste their fire, as they could not reply with effect to the enemy's batteries, placed on the heights above, from so low a situation. "No matter," said the Emperor, "we must draw the attention of the enemy to that side; renew firing." Immediately they began their discharge, and directed their shot to a group of horsemen which at that moment appeared on the brow of the hill on the heights above. An extraordinary movement in the circle soon showed that some person of distinction had fallen; and Napoleon, who was strongly inclined to superstition, at first supposed it was Schwartzenberg, and observed on the sinister augury which the conflagration in his palace on the night of the fête on Marie Louise's marriage had afforded.† It was then, however, that Moreau was struck; and so anxious had the Emperor been to conceal the intelligence of that great commander's arrival from his troops, though well aware of it himself, that it was not till next

Singular manner in which he came by his death.

* The spot where Moreau was struck, is marked by a simple monument shaded with trees; and constitutes one of the many interesting objects with which the charming environs of Dresden abound.

† Ante, vii. 799.

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day that it became known; when the advanced guards, in pursuing the Allies towards Bohemia, coming upon a little spaniel which was piteously moaning, were attracted by the collar round its neck, on which were written the words—"I belong to General Moreau." Thus they became at once acquainted with his presence and his fate.[1]

[1] Fain, ii. 291, 292. Capef. x. 202, 203.

Council of war among the Allies, when it is resolved to retreat.

A council of war was now held at the allied headquarters as to the course which should be pursued; the Emperor Alexander, King of Prussia, and principal generals, assembled on horseback in a ploughed field, to deliberate on a step on which the destiny of Europe might depend. The King of Prussia was clear for continuing the action, and to this opinion the Emperor of Russia and his principal generals inclined; observing that the whole centre and reserves had not yet engaged; that the French would hardly venture to attack their centre, when defended by so powerful an artillery; and that a decisive blow might yet be struck at the French left. But Schwartzenberg was decidedly for a retreat. Independent of the disaster on his left, which he felt the more sensibly as it had fallen almost exclusively on the Austrian troops, he was not without anxiety for his right, on account of the progress of Vandamme in his rear in that direction, who had advanced to Koenigstein, and already made himself master of the defile of Pirna. He strongly represented that the reserve parks of the army had not been able to get up; that the prodigious consumption of the two preceding days had nearly exhausted their ammunition, several guns having only a few rounds left; that the magazines of the army had not been able to follow its advance; in fine, that it was indispensable to regain Bohemia to prevent the dissolution of the

army. These reasons, urged with the authority of the commander-in-chief, and supported by such facts, proved decisive, and a retreat was agreed to against the strenuous advice of the King of Prussia, who foresaw to what risk it would expose the allied cause, and in an especial manner his own dominions. But it is evident that they were mere covers, put forward to conceal the sense of a defeat: no victorious army ever yet was stopped in its career by want of ammunition, and somehow or other the successful party hardly ever fails to find food.[1]*

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[1] Jom. iv. 395. Bout. 34, 35. Lond. 120, 121.

But although retreat was thus resolved on before dark on the 27th, it was by no means equally clear how it was to be effected. Vandamme was master of the road by Pirna; that by Freyberg had been cut off by the successes of the King of Naples. Thus the two great roads, those by which the army had traversed the mountains, were in the enemy's hands; and the intermediate range between them was crossed only by country or inferior roads, which, amidst the torrents of rain which were falling, and the innumerable chariots and guns which would have to roll over them, would soon be rendered almost impassable. There was every reason to fear that the allied columns, defiling with these numerous encumbrances in the narrow gorges, traversed by these broken up roads, would fall into inextricable confusion, and at the very least lose a large part of their artillery and baggage. Schwartzenberg, however, deemed the risk of a prolonged stay in presence of

Extraordinary difficulties as to the line of retreat.

* The preceding account of Moreau's wound and death, and the council of war which assembled to determine on the retreat, is entirely confirmed, and in part taken from the statement made to me, by my venerable friend Lord Cathcart, who was with the Emperor Alexander the whole time, and both witnessed Moreau's fall at his side, and was present at the conference.

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the enemy, after the disasters of his left, more than sufficient to counterbalance these dangers; and therefore, though Klenau came up on the night of the 27th, the retreat was persisted in the following day. The army was ordered to march in three columns; the first under Barclay de Tolly, with the Prussians of Kleist, on Peterswalde; the second under Colloredo, on Altenberg; and the third, led by Klenau, on Marienberg. Wittgenstein was intrusted with the command of the rearguard; and Ostermann, who, with a division of Russian guards and cuirassiers, had been left to oppose Vandamme on the side of Pirna, was ordered to fall back towards Peterswalde.[1]

[1] Bout. 34, 35. Jom. iv. 396, 397. Fain, ii. 288.

Appearance of the field of battle. Aug. 28.

Early on the morning of the 28th, Napoleon, after his usual custom, visited the field of battle. It may be conceived what a ghastly spectacle was presented by the ground, on which, within the space of a league round the walls, three hundred thousand men had combated for two days with determined resolution, under the fire of above a thousand pieces of cannon. The wounded had, for the most part, been transported during the night into the town by the efforts of the French surgeons and the unwearied zeal of the inhabitants, who on this occasion, as after the battle of Bautzen, exhibited in its full lustre the native benevolence of the Saxon character. But the dead still unburied lay accumulated in frightful heaps, for the most part half naked, having been stripped by those fiends in woman's form, whom so prodigious a concourse of men had attracted in extraordinary numbers to the scene of woe. They lay piled above each other in vast masses around and within the Mocsinsky redoubt, before the Dippodiswalde and Plauen barriers, near

Lobda, and in the environs of the Gross Garten. The profound excitement which the war had produced throughout the civilized world, was there manifest; for the corpses of the slain exhibited all nations and varieties of men, both of Asia and Europe: the blue-eyed Goth lay beneath the swarthy Italian; the long-haired Russian was still locked in his death struggle with the undaunted Frank; the fiery Hun lay athwart the stout Norman; the lightsome Cossack and roving Tartar reposed far from the banks of the Don or the steppes of Samarcand. Cuirasses, muskets, sabres, helmets, belts, and cartouche-boxes lay about in endless disorder, which the inhabitants,[1] stimulated by the love of gain, were collecting, with the vast numbers of cannon-balls which had sunk into the earth, for the French artillery and stores.[1]

[1] Odel. i. 262, 263. Fain, ii. 288, 294. Lab. i. 323.

Napoleon was far from being insensible to the magnitude of the wreck, and gave orders that the principal Saxon sufferers by the siege should be indemnified as far as possible; and then rode on to the height where Moreau had been struck, and caused the distance to the battery from whence the shot issued to be measured, which proved to be two thousand yards. The vast array of the Allies was already out of sight; a few horsemen alone observed the approach of the French, who were actively engaged in the pursuit. Seeing he could not overtake them, the Emperor turned aside and rode to Pirna, where he enquired minutely into what had passed there during the two preceding eventful days. The Prince of Wirtemberg, he learned, had that morning been engaged with Vandamme's corps, and was retiring in good order towards Tœplitz, closely pursued by that general: Murat, with his horse, was following on the traces of the left wing, on the road

Napoleon sets out in pursuit.

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of Freyberg; and Marmont and St Cyr's columns were pursuing the centre on the intermediate roads. After sitting still an hour, he said, in the highest spirits, "Well, I think I have seen it all: make the Old Guard return to Dresden; the Young Guard will remain here in bivouac;" and, entering his carriage, returned to the capital.[1]

[1] Odel. i. 262, 265. Fain, ii. 288, 298. Lab. i. 322, 324.

Great ability displayed by Napoleon in this battle.

The battle of Dresden is one of the most remarkable victories ever gained by Napoleon; and if it were memorable for no other reason, it will never be forgotten for this—it was the LAST pitched battle he ever gained. The advance to Pirna seemed the fatal limit of his prosperous fortune: from the moment that he then relinquished the pursuit, he became involved in calamity; and disaster succeeded disaster, till he was precipitated from the throne. Yet was this great battle a truly glorious achievment, worthy to be placed beside the brightest of his earlier career, and such as well might cast a long ray of light over the dark vista of misfortune by which it was succeeded. Anticipated by the Allies in their masterly march upon Dresden, wellnigh deprived of that vital stronghold by his never conceiving they would have the courage to attack it, he contrived, by extraordinary efforts, not only to arrive in time for its deliverance, but to discomfit the Allies by a signal defeat under its walls. This battle is the only one in his whole career in which Napoleon operated at once by both flanks, without advancing his centre; and the reason of his selecting this singular, and, in ordinary circumstances, perilous mode of attack, was not merely that his position in front of the intrenched camp enabled him to do so without risk, while the great strength of the allied centre forbade an attack on them in that quarter; but that by gain-

ing, by success at these two extremities, command of the roads of Freyberg and Pirna, he threw the Allies back, for their retreat to Bohemia, upon the intermediate inferior lines of communication across the mountains, where there was reason to hope that a vigorous pursuit would make them lose great part of their artillery and baggage.[1]

[1] Jom. iv. 397. Bout. 35.

The fruits of this victory were as great as its conception had been felicitous. Thirteen thousand prisoners, almost all Austrians, were taken. Six-and-twenty cannons, eighteen standards, and a hundred and thirty caissons, fell into the hands of the enemy. Including the killed, wounded, and missing, on the two days, the allied loss was not short of twenty-five thousand men, while the French were not weakened by more than half the number. But these results, important and dazzling as they were, especially in re-establishing the *prestige* of the Emperor's invincibility, were but a part of the consequences of the discomfiture at Dresden. Barclay had been ordered to take the road, by Dohna and Gieshubel, to Peterswalde; but the Russian officer who delivered the order, said Altenberg by mistake, instead of Peterswalde. Barclay understood him so: the consequence of which was, that Kleist alone, with his Prussians, was left to follow the great road by Pirna, and the Russians were thrown on the road by Dippodiswalde and Altenberg, already encumbered with the prodigious accumulation of Austrian carriages. The highway was speedily cut through—the confusion of artillery and carriages of all sorts became inextricable. Cannon and baggage-waggons were abandoned at every step; and the disorder soon became extreme. Different corps of different nations got intermingled in the crowded defiles: orders were given

Results of the battle on both sides.

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in a language which one half who heard them did not understand: supplies of all sorts were wanting, and it was only by straggling on either side that the soldiers for some days could pick up a scanty subsistence. A great quantity of baggage and ammunition waggons fell into the enemy's hands; and before the troops had extricated themselves from the mountains, two thousand additional prisoners had been taken. The poet Körner, who had recovered of the wound he had so perfidiously received at the commencement of the armistice, received a ball in his breast, and died in the action: a few hours before it began, he had composed his immortal lines to his sword, the testament of his genius to his avenging countrymen. But the most sensible loss which the Allies sustained during the retreat, was that of General Moreau, whose great talents were never more required than at that period, to arrest the evils which then menaced the very existence of the coalition. But Providence had decreed that the cause of virtue and justice should triumph by its own native strength, and owe nothing even in their most exalted or blameless form to the forces of the Revolution.[1]

[1] Lond. 121, 122. Jom. iv. 397. Vaud. i. 157. Bout. 36, 37. Capef. x. 207.

Glaring errors of the Austrian commander on this occasion.

Great, however, as were the abilities displayed by Napoleon on this occasion, they would have failed in producing the results which took place, if he had not been seconded to a wish by the imbecility displayed in the *execution* of the attack upon Dresden. The original conception of that design was in the highest degree felicitous; and by succeeding in placing themselves in overwhelming strength before that capital, and on the direct line of the enemy's communications on the 25th, when Napoleon and his guards were still a full day's march off, they had completely outgeneraled that vigilant commander, and brought

him, beyond all question, to the very brink of destruction. Had they commenced the assault that afternoon, success was certain, for they were already six to one: St Cyr and his corps would have been beaten, and the whole defensive system of Napoleon on the Elbe broken through and destroyed. Even when, by delaying the attack till next day, they had given time for Napoleon himself to come up, they might still, by commencing the assault early on the forenoon of the 26th, before the bulk of his guards had arrived, have carried the place, with the additional lustre of having done so when the Emperor in person was in command. By delaying the attack till four in the afternoon, they gained nothing; for Klenau even then had not come up; and they had merely given time for Napoleon to bring up sixty thousand additional men for the defence. It was impossible to expect to carry a fortified place, garrisoned by eighty thousand men, by a *coup-de-main:* the stroke was now too late, and should not have been delivered. The dispositions next day were equally faulty: for Schwartzenberg, contrary to all advice, insisted on extending his left over the open ground beyond Plauen, without any support, against Murat's cavalry, to which, in consequence, it fell an easy prey; while by throwing it back, up the side of the ravine of Tharandt, it would have been altogether secure on the top of its precipitous banks from attack: and he placed inexperienced infantry there, without horse to cover them, when thirty thousand noble cavalry were massed together in useless strength behind the centre, which was already so strong from its position on the heights, and the prodigious array of artillery by which it was defended, as to be beyond the reach of danger.

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In justice to Schwartzenberg, however, it must be observed, that these glaring errors are not to be wholly ascribed to him. It is no easy matter, as he himself said, to command an army, when emperors and kings are with its general. Such were the disensions which at this period prevailed at the allied headquarters, that nothing but the most exalted spirit in the bosoms of the sovereigns who ruled its destinies, and the most indefatigable efforts on the part of the able diplomatists who were entrusted with its counsels, prevented the alliance from being broken up within a few days after it began the great contest for the deliverance of Europe. Hardenberg, Metternich, D'Anstett, Lord Aberdeen, and Sir Charles Stewart, laboured assiduously, and not without effect, to reconcile the conflicting jealousies and interests, but it was a herculean task; and nothing but an universal sense of the common danger which they all incurred, could have prevented a rupture taking place. They experienced the truth of the words of Tacitus: "prospera omnes sibi vindicant, adversa uni solo imputantur." No one would acknowledge responsibility for the advance against Dresden after it failed: to hear the opinions of the military council, you would imagine it had been forced on the army against the universal opinion of its leaders. The Russians loudly exclaimed against the Austrians as the authors of all the calamities, and referred not without secret satisfaction to the magnitude of the losses which they, and they alone, had sustained; the Austrians replied, that if Barclay had obeyed Schwartzenberg's order to advance on the forenoon of the 27th, all would yet have been repaired. The Prussians lamented a retrograde movement which would, to

Great divisions at the allied headquarters.

all appearance, deliver up Berlin to the cruel exactions of the enemy, and paralyse the rising spirit of Germany by the exhibition of its northern capital in chains. Conferences, political as well as military, were frequent during the retreat; the troops of the different nations would take no orders but from their own generals: it was hard to say who really governed the army, or whether it had any direction at all. Schwartzenberg deemed it advisable, situated as he was, to avoid any general action, and remain wholly on the defensive; and it was apparent to all, that if Napoleon persevered in making propositions, there was great probability they would be listened to. Such was the untoward aspect of affairs at the allied headquarters, when the face of events was entirely changed, unanimity and concord restored to the combined chiefs, and confidence and mutual esteem to their followers, by a series of events in the exterior circle of the conflict, so marvellous that they defeated all human calculation, and converted the recriminations of misfortune into the song of triumph, over the whole allied states.[1]

[1] Lond. 120. 122.

On the very day on which Napoleon gained his decisive success before Dresden, Vandamme, following up his instructions, to throw himself upon the rear of the allied army and await the issue of events before that city, had crossed the Elbe at Koenigstein, and been engaged with Ostermann, who had been left to watch him with the division of the old Russian guards and the Russian division of Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg. The French general advanced towards Pirna, in order to intercept the line of the enemy's retreat, and the disproportion of force gave him good reason to hope that he would be able to do so; for he had twenty-seven thousand infantry, three thou-

Movements of Vandamme against Ostermann.

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sand cavalry, and eighty pieces of cannon;* whereas the Russian had only seventeen thousand at his disposal. Ostermann in the first instance fell back also towards Pirna; but on the day following, being that on which Napoleon halted his guard at that place, he was obliged, by the retreat of the Allies and its occupation by the French, to change the direction of his retreat, and fall back towards Peterswalde. Vandamme had got before him on the high-road to that place, and the Russians had to fight their way through the enemy's ranks at Gieshubel and Nollendorf. Ostermann's grenadiers, however, made their way after a sharp encounter, and he reached Peterswalde, where he collected his forces, and prepared to oppose a stout resistance to Vandamme, who, having failed in barring the way to his columns, was now preparing to follow closely upon his footsteps, and press him vigorously with all his forces.[1]

Aug. 27.

[1] Kausler, 654. Jom. iv. 398. St Cyr, iv. 128, 129. Bout. 40, 41. Vaud. i. 158.

Great interests depending on this conflict.

A great issue now depended on the efforts of these intrepid generals; nothing less than the ruin of the allied army, or the destruction of the corps which had so fearlessly descended into its rear, was at stake. All the roads from Saxony in that direction through the Erzgebirge range, terminate upon Tœplitz, in the Bohemian plain. If, therefore, Vandamme could make himself master of that point of intersection, he would be in a situation to prevent the allies debouching from the mountains; while the King of Naples on the one road, Marmont and St Cyr in the centre, and Napoleon with the guards on the left pass, pressed the rear of their columns, and thus exposed them to almost certain ruin when entangled with several

* He had fifty-two battalions, twenty-nine squadrons, eighty guns.—KAUSLER, 653, and Napoleon has told us "they were 30,000 strong."—See NAPOLEON *to* St CYR, 17*th August* 1813.—St CYR, iv. 367.

thousand carriages in those narrow defiles and inhospitable ridges. On the other hand, if the French were defeated, they ran a still greater risk of being destroyed by the retiring masses of the grand allied army, who would fight with the energy of despair to re-open their communication with the Bohemian plains. Thus, both parties had equal motives for exertion; both saw clearly the vital importance of the contest, and the meanest soldier in the ranks was as strongly impressed with it as their chiefs. Vandamme now recollected the Emperor's words, that to him would be given to receive the sword of the conquered, and that now was the time to win his marshal's baton. Ostermann was penetrated with the conviction, that on his efforts, and those of his brave guards, would depend the safety of their beloved Emperor, and both were firmly resolved to conquer or die on the ground where they stood.[1]

[1] Jom. iv. 398, 399. Bout. 40, 41. Fain, ii. 312, 313. Lab. i. 331.

Battle of Culm, and heroic resistance of the Russians. Aug. 29.

Vandamme, sensible of the value of time in the critical operation which had been entrusted to him, and aware that the Young Guard was at Pirna, to give him the support which Napoleon had promised him if required, eagerly descended on the morning of the 29th from the mountains, and approached the Russians, who had taken post in a good position in the plain between CULM and Tœplitz, little more than half a league in advance of the latter town. Ostermann's forces, however, were now much reduced; from the losses and detachments of the preceding days, he could not collect above fourteen thousand men to defend his posts, and the French had at least double the number. Already the near approach of the enemy had spread the most violent alarm among its inhabitants, and the whole *corps diplomatique* in particular had taken to flight, and were already far

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advanced on the road to Dutch and Lahn; and the King of Prussia, who was there, and remained at his post, alone succeeded by his coolness in preserving some degree of order in the rear of the combatants. The French general, conceiving he had only to deal with the broken and dejected remains of the army beaten at Dresden, at first brought forward his troops as they successively came up into action, and hurried with only nine battalions to assault the Russian left wing. This rash attempt was speedily repulsed; but the arrival of the division of Mouton Duvernet restored the combat in that quarter, and the Russians in their turn were compelled to give way. An obstinate action with various success now took place over the whole line: the villages of Straden and Priesten were successively carried by the division Philippon, which had just come up; but the latter village was shortly after retaken, and after being three times lost and won at the point of the bayonet, finally remained in the hands of the Russians. The weight of the French attack, however, was directed against the Russian left, where the line stood in the open plain; and Ostermann, seeing this, brought up three regiments of the Russian guards to the menaced point—the Bonnet d'or, Preobazinsky, and Simonofsky grenadiers; and the heroic resistance of these incomparable troops, the flower and pride of the Russian army, opposed a wall of steel to the French, which all the efforts of the assailants were unable to pass. In vain the French batteries were advanced to within pistol-shot, and sent a storm of grape through the Russian lines; in vain company after company was swept away by the terrific discharges of their musketry; these heroic troops stood firm, constantly closing to the centre as their ranks were thinned.

They found there the Russian Thermopylæ, and the greater part of them perished where they stood; but, like the three hundred Spartans under Leonidas, they changed the fate of the world by their blood. A strong French column in the evening advanced against Priesten, carried it by assault, and moved on to attack the grand Russian battery in the centre; but the heroism of the guards had gained the requisite time. General Diebitch and the Grand Duke Constantine, at this moment arrived with the cavalry and some grenadiers of the Russian guard, with which this menacing column was stopped; and Vandamme, seeing that the Russians were now receiving considerable reinforcements, drew off for the night to the ground he occupied before the action.[1]

[1] Kausler, 654, 656. Bout. 40, 41. Jom. iv. 399. Lond. 123, 124. Fain, ii. 314, 315.

Vandamme remains firm on the next day.

Prudence now counselled a retreat to the French general; for the superiority of force which he had the first day was now turned the other way; and the increasing force of the enemy, who were now issuing at all the passes from the mountains, threatened, not only to expose him to ruinous odds, but even might entirely overwhelm his corps. He had been promised support, however, by Napoleon, and distinctly ordered to advance to Tœplitz; the Young Guard, eight-and-twenty thousand strong, was only a few hours' march in the rear; and he never for a moment conceived it possible, that, having assigned to him the onerous duty of cutting off the retreat of the right wing of the allied army, that great commander would leave him unsupported in the perilous attempt.* The marshal's baton danced before his eyes: instances were frequent, in the earlier history

* Vandamme received, on the night of the 29th, a distinct order from Berthier to push on to Tœplitz: it was brought to him by a Colonel of the Swiss état-major.—Jomini, iv. 401. Note.

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of the revolutionary wars, of a similar act of daring being attended with the most glorious results; in war, as in love, he who nothing ventures will nothing win. Influenced by these considerations, to which the native resolution of his character gave additional weight, he resolved to maintain his ground, and disposing his corps, now reduced by the losses of the preceding days to twenty-three thousand men, in the best order, he awaited the approach of the Allies in the neighbourhood of Culm.[1]

[1] Fain, ii. 315. Jom. iv. 400, 401. St Cyr, iv. 128, 129.

Dispositions of the Russians to attack him, 30th Aug.

The hourly increasing numbers of the enemy, now gave them an opportunity, of which they skilfully availed themselves, of crushing the audacious invader who had thus broken into their rear, in the hope of receiving the sword of the conquered. Their dispositions were speedily made. Vandamme had taken post on the heights in front of Culm, looking towards Toeplitz, his right resting on the foot of the mountains—his centre crossing the great road leading to Pirna—his left in the plain, as far as the hamlet of Zigeley. This was the weak point of his line, as the ground afforded no natural advantages; and the allied generals therefore resolved to overwhelm it with superior force, and drive both it and the centre up against the mountains, where escape, at least for the artillery and carriages, would be impossible. With this view, Barclay de Tolly, who had now assumed the command, as well from his rank as the wound of Ostermann, who had lost an arm on the preceding day, directed the Russians under Raeffskoi to attack on the left; while the right, composed of twenty squadrons of Russian cavalry, under the orders of Prince Gallitzin, and the Austrian corps of Colloredo, and the division Bianchi in reserve, was destined to make the decisive onset on the French left,

which was unsupported in the plain. A screen of Russian light and heavy horse stretched across the chaussée, with a powerful artillery, and united the right and left wings. The total force thus brought to bear against Vandamme, was little short of sixty thousand men, of whom ten thousand were admirable horse.[1]

[1] Bout. 42. Lond. 126, 127. Lab. i. 333. Vaud. i. 160. Jom. iv. 401, 402.

Second battle of Culm, 30th Aug.

The battle began by a vigorous charge of the Russian horse on the flank of the French left in the plain, which being outflanked, and turned at the same time that Colloredo's corps advanced against its front, was speedily thrown into confusion, and driven up against the centre, in front of Culm. Steadily the Austrians moved directly towards that town, while the French left, now entirely broken, and pushed on by the cavalry in flank, was dispersed over the plain like chaff before the wind. Vandamme, now seriously alarmed, dispatched a fresh brigade to stop the progress of the enemy on the left; but they, too, were overwhelmed in the confusion, and the allied horse sweeping round their rear, had already approached the village of Arbesau, not far distant from the great road to Pirna. At the same time, a sharp conflict was going on on the right, and the Russians were gradually gaining ground on their adversaries posted on the slopes of the mountains. Matters were in this critical state when a loud fire of musketry, followed by several explosions, was heard on the summit of the pass, towards Nollendorf, directly in the rear of the French column, and on the only line by which they could escape. Joy at first illuminated every countenance in the French ranks, for no one doubted that it was the Young Guard pushed on from Pirna to their support, which would speedily re-establish the fortunes of the day; but this satisfaction

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was of short duration, and was converted into corresponding consternation when the Prussian standards were seen on the summits; and the news circulated through the ranks, that it was Kleist with eighteen thousand Prussians who thus lay directly on their only line of retreat. In effect, the Prussian general, who had been directed to retreat by Schoenwald and Nollendorf, and had the evening before received orders from Alexander to descend upon the right flank of the French, towards Kraupen, finding the road which he followed insupportably bad, had made his way across to the great chaussée, and had just seized and blown up some French caissons at the top of the pass.[1]

[1] Kausler, 658. Jom. iv. 401, 402. Bout. 43. Fain, ii. 316, 317. St. Cyr, iv. 129.

Appearance of Kleist, and total defeat of the French.

And now a scene ensued, unparalleled even in the varied annals of the revolutionary war. Vandamme, seeing his danger, drew off his troops from the heights on the right in front of Culm, and rallying as well as he could the broken remains of his left, formed his whole force into a column, the cavalry in front under Corbineau, the artillery in the centre, and the infantry on the flank. Having made these dispositions, which were the best which circumstances would admit, he began his retreat and got through Culm in safety; but in the little plain beyond, extending to the foot of the gorge of Tilnitz, the Russian and Austrian horse precipitated themselves on all sides upon the retreating mass, while a formidable array of artillery, by incessant discharges, threw its rear into confusion. Disorder was already spreading rapidly in the ranks, and Vandamme had resolved to sacrifice his guns to save his men, when, to complete their misfortunes, the advanced guard reported that the defile which they must immediately ascend was occupied in strength

by the Prussian corps! Despair immediately seized the troops; all order and command was lost; Corbineau, at the head of the horse, dashed up the pass with such vigour, that though the ascent was so steep that in ordinary circumstances they could hardly have ascended at the gentlest trot, he pushed right through the Prussian column, cut down their gunners, and seized their artillery, which, however, he could not carry away, and got clear off.[1]

[1] Jom. iv. 402. Bout. 44. Fain, ii. 319. Vaud. i. 161. Sir R. Wilson, 44, note.

The Prussians now imagined that they were themselves cut off, and at the point of ruin; and their whole infantry, breaking their ranks, rushed like a foaming torrent headlong down the defile, to force their way through the barrier which seemed to oppose their retreat at its foot. In the middle of the gorge they met the French column, in similar disorder and impelled by the same apprehensions, which was struggling for life and death, with the Russians thundering in their rear, to get up! A scene of indescribable horror ensued: close pent in a steep and narrow pass, between overhanging scaurs and rocks, nearly thirty thousand men on the two sides, animated with the most vehement passions, alike brave and desperate, contended elbow against elbow, knee against knee, breast against breast, mutually to force their way through each other's throng. In the confusion Kleist was seized by the French, but speedily delivered; Vandamme, however, was made prisoner by the Prussians. The remainder of his corps, who were squeezed through or out of the defile, immediately dispersed through the neighbouring woods and wilds, and, throwing away their arms, made the best of their way over the mountains to Peterswalde, where they were received and re-armed by St Cyr's

Dreadful struggle in the defile of Tilnitz.

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corps.* Nearly twelve thousand men, including Corbineau's cavalry, escaped in this manner, though in woful plight, and totally ruined as a military force; but the whole remainder of the corps, including both Vandamme's and Haxo's men, were either killed or made prisoners. The latter amounted to seven thousand; and sixty pieces of cannon, two eagles, and three hundred ammunition-waggons were taken. The total loss of the French in the two days was not less than eighteen thousand men, while that of the Allies in the same period did not exceed five thousand.[1]†

[1] St Cyr to Berthier, Aug. 31, 1813. St Cyr, iv. 389. Bout. 44, 45. Jom. iv. 402, 403. Fain, ii. 318, 319. Sir R. Wilson, 43.

Napoleon's views at this period for an attack on Berlin.

On the morning of the 30th, thus fraught with disaster to Napoleon, he was with great complacency surveying the different positions of his corps on the map, and anticipating the brilliant accounts he was so soon to receive of the operations of Vandamme in rear of the enemy. "At this moment," said he to

* "Generals Philippon and Duvernet are occupied in rallying what remains of their troops; their number, they think, exceeds 10,000. We are furnishing them with cartridges and cannon; in fine, we would put them in a respectable situation, if they can only succeed in recovering their spirits."—ST CYR *to* BERTHIER, 31*st August* 1813. ST CYR, iv. 389.

† "Of this number, no less than 3200 were killed and wounded in the Russian Imperial Guard, whose numbers at going into the battle did not exceed 8000 men, cavalry included. The great loss sustained by so small a body of men, being full half of the infantry who were seriously engaged, is a decisive proof, when they were not broken, of the extreme severity of the action, and gallantry of their resistance. This action deserves to be borne in mind as the most desperate and glorious engagement of any body of the Russian or German troops during the war, and is to be placed beside the heroism of the British at Albuera, where, out of 7500 English engaged, the loss was 4300. It must be observed, however, that nearly half of the English loss was occasioned by the surprise of the Polish lancers, which cut off nearly three entire battalions; so that the amount of the respective loss is not in these instances an exact test of the comparative heroism of those worthy rivals in arms."—*See* LONDONDERRY, 124, 125, for Russian loss at Culm; and *Ante*, viii. 325, for British at Albuera.

Berthier, "Marmont and St Cyr must have driven the Austrian rearguards on Tœplitz; they will there receive the last ransom of the enemy. We cannot be long of hearing news of Vandamme; and we shall then know what advantages he has been able to derive from his fine position. It is by him that we shall finish in that quarter. We will leave some corps of observation, and recall the rest to head-quarters. I calculate that, after the disasters experienced at Dresden, it will take at least three weeks for the army of Schwartzenberg to re-organize itself, and again take the field. It will not require so much time to execute my projected movement on Berlin." Such were Napoleon's views on the morning of that eventful day, and the forenoon was spent in making arrangements for his favourite design of marching on Berlin, which was at once to demonstrate the reality of his victory, and again spread the terror of his arms through the whole north of Germany.[1]

[1] Fain, ii. 312, 313.

In the afternoon of the same day, the most alarming news began to spread from the side of Pirna. It was rumoured that a great disaster had been sustained beyond the mountains; it was even said that Vandamme's corps had been totally destroyed. Soon the frequent arrival of breathless and disordered horsemen confirmed the dismal intelligence; and at length Corbineau himself, wounded and covered with blood, made his way to the Emperor, still armed with the Prussian sabre which, in the *mêlée*, he had exchanged for his own. From him Napoleon heard authentic details of the extent of the calamity; and he learned with grief, that not only the grand allied army was saved, but that it would bear back to Prague the trophies of a victory. Napoleon received the details of the disaster coldly, and said—"To a

Manner in which he received the accounts of the disaster at Culm.

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flying enemy you must either open a bridge of gold or oppose a barrier of steel. Vandamme, it appears, could not oppose that barrier of steel." Then, turning to Berthier, he said, "Can we have written any thing which could have inspired him with the fatal idea of descending into the plain of Bohemia? Fain, look over the order-book." Nothing, however, it is said, was discovered to warrant the descent from Peterswalde. "Well," said he to Maret, "this is war. High in the morning—low enough at night. From a triumph to a fall, is often but a step." Then, taking the compasses in his hand, he mused long on the map, repeating unconsciously the lines of Corneille,[1]—

Fain, ii. 320, 321.

> "J'ai servi, commandé, vaincu, quarante années;
> Du monde entre mes mains j'ai vu les destinées:
> Et j'ai toujours connù qu'en chaque évènement,
> Le destin des états depend d'un moment."

Reflections on the real causes of Vandamme's disaster.

But, in truth, without disputing the incalculable influence of a few hours, or even minutes, on the fate of nations during war, nothing is more certain than that, in this instance, the misfortunes of Napoleon were owing to himself; and that the attempt which he made, according to his usual custom, to throw the blame upon others, was as unjust as it was ungenerous. He maintained stoutly in writing, as well as speaking, thinking that Vandamme was killed, that he had given him positive orders to intrench himself on the summit of the mountains, and not descend into the gulf at their feet;* and yet, only two days before,

* "That unhappy Vandamme, who seems to have been killed, had not left a single sentinel on the mountains, nor any reserve in any quarter; he engulfed himself in a hollow, without feeling his way in any manner. If he had only left four battalions and four pieces of cannon on the heights in reserve, that disaster would not have occurred. I had given him *positive orders to intrench himself on the heights, and encamp his*

Berthier, by his orders, had enjoined him "to march directly upon Tœplitz;"* and on the very day on which the disaster occurred, (30th August,) Berthier had written to St Cyr, informing him of Vandamme's success on the first day against Ostermann, from which he anticipated the most glorious results.† In fact, Napoleon himself admitted, in conversation to St Cyr, that he should have moved forward the Young Guard from Pirna to support Vandamme;‡ in which case not only would no disaster at all have been incurred, but the movement on Tœplitz, which was ably conceived, would have led to the destruction of Kleist's corps, and the disorganization of the whole right wing of the allied army. Decisive success was within his grasp, when he omitted to seize it,[1] and permitted the advantage to pass over to the

[1] Fain, ii. 298.

corps there, and send down into Bohemia nothing but parties to disquiet the enemy, and obtain news."—NAPOLEON *to* ST CYR, *1st September* 1813. ST CYR, iv. 392.

* "*March direct to Tœplitz; you will cover yourself with glory.*"—BERTHIER *to* VANDAMME, *29th August* 1813.—"Three or four hours only were required to retreat to Nollendorf, where he would have been in an impregnable position; but Vandamme conceived he was not at liberty, after this positive order, to effect that movement. What would he have said to Napoleon, if, on his retreat, he had met him at Nollendorf, as he had been led to expect would be the case, and the enemy meanwhile, resuming his ground at Culm, had secured the retreat of the grand army?"—*Victoires et Conquêtes*, xxii. 5. Note.

† "I have received your letter of the 6th, from Reinhard Grimme, in which you describe your position behind the 6th corps, (Marmont.) The intention of his Majesty is, that you support the 6th corps; but it is desirable that you should select for that purpose a road to the left between the Duke of Ragusa and the corps of *General Vandamme*, who has obtained great success over the enemy, and made 2000 prisoners.—BERTHIER *to* ST CYR, *30th August* 1813. ST CYR, iv. 388.

‡ "The Emperor admitted to me, in conversation on the 7th September, that if he had not halted his guard at Pirna on the 28th, but, on the contrary, followed it up on the traces of Vandamme, he would have found a great opportunity of striking a blow in the neighbourhood of Tœplitz."—ST CYR, iv. 137, 138.

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enemy, by retaining his young guard inactive at Pirna during the two most vital days of the campaign.

Failure of all attempts to exculpate Napoleon on this point.

His panegyrists endeavour to account for this neglect by observing, that he was seized with vomiting at Pirna, and obliged to return to Dresden in great pain on the afternoon of the 28th; but, admitting this to have been true, it was no reason why he should not have advanced Mortier with the young guard, to support a corps charged with so perilous and momentous a mission as that of stopping the retreat of a hundred thousand men. No man knew better than he did what risk is incurred in striving to stop the retreat of a large army; his own success on the Beresina must have been fresh in his recollection. Even on the night of the 29th, it would have been time enough to have moved up the young guard; for they required only a few hours to march from Pirna to Peterswalde.* The truth was, that Vandamme neither disobeyed orders, nor was forgot: he acted strictly according to his instructions, and was fully present to the Emperor's mind, who watched his march with the utmost anxiety. But Napoleon judged of present events by the past. He conceived that the apparition of thirty thousand men in their rear, immediately after a severe defeat in front, would paralyze and discomfit the Allies as completely as it

* "On the 29th in the evening, the Emperor must have known that Vandamme had fought the whole day, not only against the forces of Ostermann, but those which Barclay had brought up. He had, therefore, the whole of that night to make his dispositions, which a man such as he could easily have done in an hour; and if he conceived the position of Vandamme hazardous, as unquestionably it was, he had time to draw it back, or support it by his guard. The latter corps could have marched to Nollendorf or Peterswalde in a few hours; that is, before Kleist's Prussians, who were encamped on the night of the 29th at Furstenwalde, had come up."—St Cyr, iv. 129.

had done in the days of Rivoli and Ulm; and he was unwilling to engage the young guard in the mountains, as it might erelong be required for his own projected march upon Berlin. He forgot that his conscripts were not the soldiers of Austerlitz and Jena; that the Russian guards were not the Austrians of 1796; and that Ostermann was neither Alvinzi nor Mack.*

Operations in Silesia at this period.

While these momentous events were going forward in the neighbourhood of Dresden, and in the Bohemian valleys, events of scarcely less importance were in progress among the ravines of Upper Silesia, and on the sandy plains in front of Berlin.

Napoleon's instructions to Macdonald, and his movements.

Napoleon, on leaving the command of the army of Silesia to Macdonald, had given that general instructions of the most judicious description, and which, if duly followed out, would have probably prevented the dreadful disaster which he experienced. They were, to "concentrate his troops and march towards the enemy, so as to be in a situation to lend a helping hand to the operations of the grand army against Dresden or Bohemia; but, if attacked by superior forces, to retire behind the Queisse and hold Gorlitz; and if hard pressed, and the Emperor was far

* "Vandamme's defeat was a double misfortune; for it was to be ascribed to an evident oblivion of the first principles of war, which prescribe the pursuit to extremity of a beaten enemy. Napoleon should unquestionably have pursued, *à l'outrance*, the defeated army of the allied sovereigns. There was the vital point of the war; all the rest was merely secondary, and could have been repaired. There also was the greatest chance of disorder, from the number of chiefs who commanded different corps. If he had quitted Pirna to fly to the succour of Macdonald, routed on the Katzbach, the proceeding would have been at least intelligible, but he did not then know of it; and his return to Dresden, having no other object but to prepare the march upon Berlin, was one of the greatest faults of his whole career. Independent of its cutting short the fruits of victory, it became the principal cause of Vandamme's defeat."—Jomini, *Vie de* Napoleon, iv. 403, 404.

CHAP. LXXI. 1813. advanced in his attack, by Zittau, upon Prague, to retire to the intrenched camp at Dresden: keeping in view that his principal care should be to keep in communication with him. Instead of following this judicious direction, Macdonald, who was inspired with that unfounded contempt for his adversaries which so often proved fatal to the lieutenants of Napoleon, no sooner found himself, after the departure of the Emperor to Dresden on the morning of the 24th,* at the head of three corps and a division of cavalry, numbering seventy-five thousand combatants, than he broke up early on the 26th to attack the enemy, whom he conceived still to be concentrated in the position he had taken after his retreat before Napoleon in front of Jauer. Instead, however, of following up the Emperor's instructions to concentrate his forces, Macdonald, impressed with the belief that the enemy was continuing his retreat in the direction of Breslau, and that he had nothing to do but follow upon his traces, divided his troops, for the facility of marching and getting supplies, into five columns, spread out over a front twenty-four miles in breadth, from Schoenau to Leignitz. In this straggling manner they were to cross the Katzbach and advance towards Jauer; the right wing, under Lauriston, moving by Schoenau and the foot of the mountains; the centre, under Macdonald in person, by the Wuthende-Neisse on Neinburg; while the left, led by Sebastiani and Souham, in the absence of Ney, who had been despatched to command the army destined to act against Berlin, was to move by Leignitz to pass the KATZBACH there, and fall on the right of the enemy.[1]

Aug. 26.

[1] Jom. iv. 373, 410. Vict. et Conq. 80, 81. Vaud. i. 145.

* Ante, ix. p. 468.

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By a singular coincidence, Blucher, having rested his troops in their position in front of Jauer on the 24th and 25th, and being informed of the departure of the Emperor for Dresden on the morning of the first of these days, which the halt of his advanced guard on the Katzbach entirely confirmed, had on the very same day broken up from his ground to resume the offensive. He kept his troops, however, much better in hand, and was better qualified in consequence to take advantage of any omission on the part of his adversaries, or guard against any disaster on his own side. He directed his three corps to pass the Katzbach between Goldberg and Leignitz; D'York and Sacken on the right, towards the latter place, directing their attack against Ney's corps; and Langeron on the left, on the side of Goldberg, moving towards Lauriston and Macdonald. At two o'clock in the afternoon, the troops were so far advanced that the enemy were in sight, and Blucher made his dispositions for a general attack. The better to conceal his movements from the enemy, and confirm them in the illusion under which they laboured, that the Allies were flying before them, he concealed his troops behind some eminences which lay in their front, on the plateau of Eichholz, and awaited the movements of his opponents. A heavy rain, accompanied with thick mist, which had fallen the whole day, contributed to conceal the movements of the opposite armies from each other; and it was only some Prussian batteries placed on the top of the eminences, which, by the vivacity of their fire, made the French suspect that any considerable body of the enemy were in their way, and that a general engagement might be expected. Macdonald immediately gave orders for his columns to deploy at all

Simultaneous advance of Blucher against Macdonald.

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points between Weinberg and Klein Tintz; but it required a long time for the orders to be conveyed along so extensive a line; and Blucher, seeing that the enemy had only partially crossed the ravine of the Neisse, so that the troops which had got through were in a great measure unsupported, and judging the opportunity favourable, and the enemy unprepared, gave the signal for attack.[1]

[1] Blucher's Official Account. Schoell, Recueil, iv. 361, 362. Lab. i. 327. Bout. 14, 15. Vaud. i. 145.

Battle of the Katzbach.

Macdonald's right, so far as hitherto come up, when thus unexpectedly assailed, was supported by the rocky banks of the Wuthende-Neisse; but his left was in an elevated plain beyond that river, which its rear columns were still crossing, wholly uncovered except by cavalry under Sebastiani, the squadrons of which were at that moment in part passing the defile. Blucher, perceiving the weak point of his adversary's line, detached Wassilchikoff, Aug. 26. at the head of the cavalry of Sacken's corps, to charge the French horse which had mounted upon the plateau, and so uncover their left. This order was immediately executed, and with the happiest effect. The Russian cavalry, superior in number, and greatly more experienced, approached the French dragoons on the extreme left, both in front and flank; while Karpoff's Cossacks, who had been sent round by a long detour, were to threaten their rear in the middle of the action. Sebastiani's horse, little prepared for the danger, had to struggle through the narrow defile of Kroitsch at Neider Crain, already encumbered with the whole artillery of Ney's corps, which was passing it at the time. The consequence was, that the squadrons arrived successively on the plateau on the other side, where they were immediately charged by a formidable body of horse, four thousand strong, in close array, both in front and flank.

Unable to resist the shock, the French dragoons were driven back headlong into the defile in their rear, from which they had just emerged: two brigades of infantry, which were brought up to support them, shared the same fate: Sacken's main body now came up, and as the incessant rain prevented the muskets going off, charged with loud hurrahs with the bayonet against the unprotected infantry of Ney's corps, which broke, and was driven headlong over the precipices into the roaring Katzbach and Wuthende-Neisse, where vast numbers were drowned.* The guns, still entangled in the defile, to the number of twenty-six, with their whole ammunition-waggons, were taken, and fifteen hundred prisoners on this wing fell into the enemy's hands.[1]

[1] Kausler, 639, 640. Bout. 14, 15. Sacken's Official Account. Schoell, Recueil, iii. 80, 81. Jom. iv. 411, 412.

Defeat of Souham on the French left.

To complete their misfortunes, Souham, who was marching towards Leignitz, still further to the French left, hearing the violent cannonade to his right, turned aside, and, moving in its direction, arrived at the mouth of the defile of Neider Crain at six o'clock. This movement, ably conceived and in the true military spirit, would in ordinary circumstances have probably restored the battle, by throwing a fresh division into the scale when the Allies were disordered by success: but as matters stood, it only aggravated the disaster. Souham's men arrived at the edge of the ravine of Kroitsch, just as Sebastiani's horse were beginning to break on the plateau opposite. Uniting to Sebastiani's cuirassiers, which were left in reserve, Souham immediately led his men down the defile, and hastened to ascend the

* The name "*Wuthende*-Neisse," (mad or furious Neisse,) indicates with what a raging torrent that stream, at ordinary seasons insignificant, and fordable in every part, descends during floods from the Bohemian mountains.

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front, in hopes of reaching the opposite plateau in time to arrest the disorder; but just as they began to mount the gorge on the opposite side of the glen, they met the torrent of fugitives from the other side, who were hurrying down, with the bloody Russian and Prussian sabres glancing in their rear. The confusion now became inextricable: the dense and ardent columns pressing up, were for the most part overwhelmed by the disordered mass of horse and foot, mixed together, which was driven headlong down; and such of the battalions and squadrons as succeeded in forcing their way through the throng, and reached the summit, were speedily swept away and driven back into the gulf, when attempting to deploy, by the impetuous charges of a victorious and superior enemy, now firmly established on the summit, who, with loud hurrahs, asserted the triumph of Germany.[1]

[1] Jom. iv. 412, 413. Kausler, 640, 641. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 82, 83.

Continuation of the battle on the right and centre.

While this decisive success was in the course of being gained on the allied right, their left, under Langeron, had also come into collision with the French right, under Lauriston, near Hennersdorff. The combat there was more equal, and very obstinate: both sides stood their ground with great resolution; but, towards night, the French general having learned the disaster on his left, fell back, still, however, in good order, to Praunnitz. The action seemed over for the day, when an accidental circumstance renewed it, and augmented the losses of the French general. At nine at night, two fresh divisions of Ney's corps, now under the orders of Souham, having come up, Macdonald in haste crossed them over the Katzbach, at the ford of Schmochowitz, below the confluence of the Neisse, and directed them against the extreme right of Sacken's corps, now ad-

vanced to the very edge of the plateau, and engaged in driving the other division and Sebastiani's horse into the flooded torrents at the foot of the precipitous banks. These divisions were under the command of General Tarayre; they drew with them sixteen pieces of cannon, and ascended to the top of the plateau with a good countenance. Sacken, however, who had received intelligence of their approach, was on his guard: his troops were rapidly made to front to the right, and these fresh divisions were driven by Count Lieven and General Neweroffski again over the Katzbach, with considerable loss.[1]

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[1] Sacken's Official Account. Schoell, Rec. iii. 81. Bout. 16. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 83. Jom. iv. 412, 413.

Next day, Blucher early put his columns in motion to follow up his successes; while Macdonald, in great consternation, drew back his shattered bands towards Goldberg. It would seem, however, as if the elements had conspired with the forces of the enemy to accomplish his destruction. The floodgates of heaven seemed literally opened the whole night; the rain fell without an instant's intermission in tremendous torrents; and next morning, not only were the raging waters of the Neisse and the Katzbach unfordable at any point, but several of the bridges over those streams, as well as over the Bober, which also lay further back in the line of the French retreat, were swept away by the floods which descended from the Riesingeberg chain. Lauriston, sorely pressed by Langeron, only succeeded in getting across the foaming torrents by the sacrifice of two-and-twenty pieces of cannon, his whole ammunition-waggons, and two thousand prisoners. On the same day the Allies occupied Goldberg, and, continuing the pursuit, on the day following crossed the Katzbach, and drove the enemy back at all points towards the Bober. All the bridges over that river

Great successes of the Allies on the following day.

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had been swept away except that at Buntzlau; and of necessity the whole French divisions were directed to that point. In the course of the rapid retreat thither, forty pieces of cannon, and several hundred ammunition-waggons were sacrificed, and fell into the enemy's hands.[1]

[1] Vict. et Conq. xxii. 83. Jom. iv. 414, 415 Bout. 16, 17.

Disaster of Puthod's division. Aug. 26.

A still more serious disaster, however, awaited the enemy in the course of this calamitous retreat. The division Puthod of Lauriston's corps had been dispatched on the 26th, by a circuit at the foot of the mountains by Schoenau and Jauer, in order to menace the rear of the Allies, and harass the retreat which was deemed on their part inevitable. He was already far advanced on his journey, when news of the disaster on the Katzbach arrived; and he at once felt the necessity of hastening to regain the main body of the army. Overlooked by the Allies in the first heat of the pursuit, Puthod succeeded without any great difficulty in retiring during the 27th; but, on arriving at the Bober, he found the bridge at Hirschberg swept away by the floods, and he was obliged to come down the right bank of the torrent to endeavour to effect a passage. Next morning, he got as far down as Lowenberg, but there too the bridge was destroyed; and after several vain attempts to re-establish it, he was obliged to wind his toilsome and devious way, anxiously looking out for a passage, towards Buntzlau. In doing so, ill luck made him fall in with the advanced posts of Langeron's corps, who, wholly unsuspicious of his arrival, were pursuing their opponents towards the Bober. The Russian general immediately collected his forces, and made dispositions for an attack. General Korff, with his own horse and Czorbatow's infantry, was dispatched so as to cut off the retreat of the French

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back again up the Bober, which they seemed at first disposed to attempt; while Rudziwicz was posted on the road to Buntzlau, so as to render all escape impossible. Surrounded in this manner by greatly superior forces, in the most frightful of all positions, with a roaring impassable torrent in his rear, the brave Frenchman did not despair, but taking ground on the hill of Plagitz, nearly opposite to Lowenberg, prepared to resist to the last extremity. There he was speedily assailed on every side; Rudziwicz attacked him on one flank, while Gorbatow and Korff charged him on the other, and a powerful train of artillery opened upon his columns in front. Shaken by such an accumulation of force, as well as by the evident hopelessness of their situation, the French broke, and fled in wild confusion down the hill towards the river; on the banks of which they were, with the exception of a few who swam across the foaming torrent, made prisoners: nearly two thousand were slain or drowned. A hundred officers, including Puthod himself, and his whole staff, three thousand private soldiers, two eagles, and twelve pieces of cannon, with the whole park of the division, fell into the enemy's hands, who did not lose a hundred men.[1]

[1] Langeron's Official Accounts. Schoell, ii. 83, 84. Bout. 17, 18. Jom. iv. 414, 415. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 84. Vaud. i. 147, 148.

Such was the great battle of the Katzbach; the counterpart to that of Hohenlinden, and one of the most glorious ever gained in the annals of European fame. Its trophies were immense, and coincided almost exactly with those which had, twelve years before, attended the triumph of Moreau;* eighteen thousand prisoners, a hundred and three pieces of cannon, and two hundred and thirty caissons, besides

Results of the battle.

* Ante, iv. 406.

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seven thousand killed and wounded, presented a total loss to the French of twenty-five thousand men. When Macdonald reformed his broken bands behind the Queisse, he could with difficulty collect fifty-five thousand around his standards, instead of eighty thousand, who, when he received the command from Napoleon, crowded the banks of the Bober. The loss of the Allies was very trifling, considering the magnitude of the success gained: it did not exceed four thousand men. Indeed, there was scarcely any serious fighting; the French having been surprised by Blucher's attack when wholly unprepared for it, and subsequently prevented, by the dreadful weather and casual destruction of the bridges in their rear by the floods, from reuniting their broken bands, or forming any regular mass for resistance to the enemy.[1]

[1] Vict. et Conq. xxii. 84. Bout. 19. Jom. iv. 19. Vaud. i. 148.

Reflections on the conduct of the Generals on both sides.

Great as were the successes thus achieved by the army of Silesia, and deservedly as they have given immortality to the name of Marshal Blucher, it may be doubted whether he would not more completely have succeeded in his object of disorganizing the French army, if, instead of directing the weight of his forces against the enemy's left, he had thrown it against their right wing, placed at Goldberg, as it was by that town that the whole French communications were preserved, and consequently a reverse there would have cut off Souham and the French left, and paralysed the whole army. On the other hand, when the line of operating on the French right was taken, it must be admitted that the Prussian general showed admirable skill in the selection of his ground for the principal attack, where a precipitous glen in the rear of the French rendered retreat on their part impossible; in the concealment of his own troops till half the enemy was past the ravine; and in then fall-

ing on the portion which was drawn up on the plateau, with such a concentration of infantry and cavalry as at once rendered resistance hopeless, and assistance through the narrow gorge impossible. The movements of the French general will not admit of a similar apology. In direct violation of the instructions of Napoleon—which were, to concentrate his troops and decline battle except with a superiority of force—he rashly advanced against an enterprizing general, at the head of an army superior both in number and in warlike experience to his own, with his troops so scattered over a line from Leignitz to Schœnau, nearly thirty miles in length, that, when assailed in his centre and left on most critical ground by the concentrated masses of the enemy, he had no adequate force at hand to arrest the disaster consequent on their first successful onset. Nor was the management of his principal force less injudicious than its direction. By directing the bulk of his troops on the great road from Goldberg to Jauer, Macdonald would at once have menaced his opponent's communications, covered his own, and secured to himself a comparatively safe retreat in case of disaster; whereas, by accumulating them on the left, he both uncovered his vital line, left untouched that of his adversary, and got his troops entangled in the rugged ravines of the Katzbach and Wuthende-Neisse, where any check was the certain prelude to ruin.[1]

[1] Vict. et Conq. xxii. 85, 86. Bout. 20, 24.

While these important operations were going forward in Saxony, Bohemia, and Silesia, the campaign had also been opened, and an important blow struck to the north of the Elbe, in the direction of Berlin. Although nothing is more certain than that the vital quarter of the war was to be found on the Bohemian or Silesian frontier, where the great masses

Operations against Bernadotte; and Napoleon's great anxiety for success over him.

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of the Allies were concentrated, yet it was by no means in that direction that Napoleon was desirous to begin hostilities, or most anxious to obtain success. He was much more intent upon making himself master of Berlin; it was to clear his flank of Blucher, before engaging in that enterprize, that he opened the campaign by the march into Silesia. The first question which he asked when he returned to Dresden, beset by the allied grand army, was, whether there was any news from Berlin; and it was to prosecute that favourite design that he made the fatal stop of the Young Guard at Pirna, and returned himself to Dresden, in the midst of the pursuit of Schwartzenberg's army. Napoleon, however, in his anxiety to dazzle the world by the capture of the Prussian capital, and to gratify his private pique by the defeat of Bernadotte, committed an extraordinary oversight in the estimate which he formed of the strength of the enemy to whom he was opposed in that quarter. He conceived that Bernadotte had only eighty-five thousand men in all under his command, including those who, under Walmoden, were opposed to Davoust at Hamburg; whereas such had been the efforts made to reinforce the army in the north of Germany, and such the enthusiasm with which, under a sense of recent wrongs, they were seconded by the people, that Bernadotte had now ninety thousand men under his immediate command, of whom nearly twenty thousand were admirable cavalry, besides above forty thousand who were opposite to Hamburg, or guarded the banks of the Lower Elbe. With this imposing force, he took post at Charlottenberg to cover Berlin, and concentrate his troops, as soon as the denunciation of the armistice gave reason to anticipate a resumption of hostilities.[1]

[1] Jom. iv. 405. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 49. Bout. 48.

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Meanwhile, Oudinot received orders to move forward and open the campaign; but he not being prepared immediately to obey the Emperor's directions, the Prince-Royal advanced his headquarters to Potsdam, and his numerous army occupied Juterbock, Trebbin, and the villages of Saarmunde and Bilitz. On the 21st, the French army moved forward, consisting of three corps of infantry, viz. Bertrand's, Regnier's, and Oudinot's, with Arrighi's cavalry, mustering in all about eighty thousand men; and, leaving the great road from Torgau to Berlin, made a flank movement towards the Wittenberg road. This speedily brought it in contact with the foremost posts of Bernadotte's army, and a rude conflict ensued with the advanced guard of Bulow's Prussians, which terminated in the forcing of the defile of Thyrow, and the establishment of Oudinot's forces on the heights behind Trebbin, and in front of Mittenwalde. Bernadotte, perceiving that a general battle was inevitable to prevent the enemy from making their way to Berlin, immediately gave orders for concentrating his forces, and the greater part of the day following was occupied in bringing them into line; but before they were all assembled, General Thumen, with a body of Prussians, was attacked by Regnier with so great a superiority of force at Trebbin, that he was forced to retire with considerable loss: the enemy carried the defile of Juhndorff, and the Prince-Royal, now seriously alarmed for his left, drew back the troops which he had at Trebbin and Mittenwalde, and brought up Tauenzein's whole corps to Blackenfelde. Oudinot's object in thus directing the weight of his forces against the enemy's left, was to beat his forces in detail towards Blackenfelde and Teltow,[1] and force the Prince-Royal, driven

Advance of Oudinot, and preparations for a battle.

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Aug. 22.

[1] Vict. et Conq. xxii. 98, 99. Bernadotte's Official Acct. Schoell, Recueil, i. 72, 73. Bout. 50, 51. Jom. iv. 405, 406.

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up against Potsdam, to throw back his left, and abandon Berlin. With this view, Regnier, in the centre, was directed to march on GROSS BEEREN; Bertrand, on the right, on Blackenfelde; while the commander-in-chief himself, with the left, moved on Ahrensdorf. He was not now above twelve miles from Berlin, which he fully expected to enter on the following day.

Battle of Gross Beeren, Aug. 23.

The battle began early on the morning of the 23d, by the French right, under Bertrand, who had the shortest distance to go over before arriving at the enemy, falling with great vigour on Tauenzein, who with his gallant Prussians held Blackenfelde. Bulow, who was in reserve behind the centre, upon this began to extend his columns to the left to aid his brethren in arms in that quarter; but the movement was countermanded by the Prince-Royal, for Tauenzein had made such a vigorous resistance, that not only were Bertrand's attacks repulsed, but several prisoners were taken, and the line was perfectly safe in that direction. Matters, however, wore a more serious aspect in the centre, where Regnier, at the head of twenty-four thousand Saxons, supported by a strong reserve, attacked and carried Gross Beeren, and established himself close to the very centre of the allied line. Bernadotte, sensible of the dangerous consequences of this success, instantly took the most vigorous measures to arrest it. Bulow's whole corps was stopped in its march to the left, and brought up to the support of the centre, which had retired, still, however, bravely fighting, to some woods in the rear of the village. Meanwhile Regnier, little anticipating a second conflict, and deeming the combat over, was preparing to establish his bivouacs for the night on the ground he had won, when Bulow,[1]

[1] Bernadotte's Official Report. Schoell, Recueil, i. 73. Bout. 52, 53. Vict. et Conq. xxii 97. Jom. iv. 406, 407.

at the head of thirty-five thousand Prussians, fell upon him. CHAP. LXXI.

The measures of the Prussian general were taken with great ability, and he was admirably seconded by the intrepidity of his troops. While he himself advanced with the main body of his forces to recover Gross Beeren in front, Borstel, with a strong brigade, was moved on to Klein Beeren, in order to turn the right of the enemy, and the Swedish horse were advanced so as to threaten their left. The troops advanced in two lines, preceded by sixty pieces of cannon, and followed by the cavalry in reserve; incessant rain had fallen the whole day, which prevented the muskets from going off; but the cannon on both sides soon opened a tremendous fire, while, in rear of the Prussian pieces, their infantry advanced with the precision and coolness of the troops of the great Frederick. At length they arrived within grape-shot range, and Bulow immediately ordered a charge of bayonets by the front line deployed, while the second followed in column. The struggle, though violent, was not of long duration: Regnier, assailed by superior forces in front, could with difficulty maintain his ground; and the attack of Borstel on his right, and the opening of the Swedish cannon, supported by an immense body of Russian horse on his left, decided the conflict. He was already beginning to retreat, when the Prussians in front, with loud hurrahs, charged with the bayonet. Gross Beeren was speedily won, several batteries were carried, and the allied horse, by repeated charges on the left flank, completed his defeat. Oudinot's corps, alarmed by the violence of the cannonade at this period, stopped their advance on Ahrensberg, and, hastening to the centre, came up in time to arrest the disorder. Be-

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Defeat of the French centre at Gross Beeren.

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hind their fresh columns the broken Saxons were enabled to re-form; but it was too late to regain the day. The Prussians, indeed, ignorant of the strength of the new army which they had thus encountered in the twilight, retired from the pursuit, and even at the moment evacuated Gross Beeren; but the defeat of the French centre determined the retreat of their left: their whole army retired to Trebbin, while Bulow reoccupied Gross Beeren, and Tauenzein advanced to Juhndorf.[1]

[1] Bout. 53, 54. Jom. iv. 407, 408. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 99, 100. Vaud. i. 166, 167.

Results of the battle.

Although the battle of Gross Beeren was not attended with such extensive trophies in the field as those of Culm or the Katzbach, yet in its moral influence, and the effects which it finally had on the fortunes of the campaign, it was almost equal to either of these memorable conflicts. Fifteen hundred prisoners, thirteen cannon, and a large quantity of baggage, were taken; but these were its most inconsiderable results. The moral influence of the defeat of the attack on Berlin, was immense. Great had been the consternation in that capital when the enemy's columns were advanced almost to within sight of its steeples, and every house shook with the discharges of their cannon; they remembered Jena and six years' bondage, and every heart throbbed with emotion. Proportionally vehement was the joy when news arrived at ten at night that the enemy had been repulsed, that his columns were retiring, and the capital saved; and the general transports were increased by the circumstance, that the triumph was exclusively national—Bulow and Tauenzein having, with their new Prussian levies, almost alone had a share in the action. The warmest thanks were next day voted by the municipality to the Prince-Royal as their deliverer; joy beamed in every countenance; great

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numbers of the Saxon prisoners, carried away by the torrent of patriotic feeling, petitioned to be allowed to serve in the ranks of the fatherland, and formed the nucleus of the Saxon corps which soon appeared in the lines of the Allies; while several of the officers, who had served under Bernadotte in the campaign of Wagram, wept for joy at finding themselves again in the patriot ranks of Germany, and under the banners of their old general.[1]

[1] Bernadotte's Official Account, Schoell, i. 75, 76. Bout. 53, 54. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 100, 101.

The battle of Gross Beeren was immediately followed by other successes, naturally flowing from the former, which materially augmented its trophies. On the 25th, Bernadotte moved forward, though very slowly and with extreme circumspection; but the enemy were so scattered that he could not fail, with his superiority in cavalry, to gain considerable advantages. Luckau had been fortified by the French, and garrisoned by a thousand men; but the governor not conceiving himself in sufficient strength to withstand the assault of the Allies, by whom he was soon surrounded, capitulated, when summoned, with nine pieces of cannon, and considerable magazines. A still more serious disaster soon after occurred on the side of Magdeburg. Gerard, with his division, five thousand strong, had issued from that fortress as soon as he heard of the advance of Oudinot, in order to co-operate in the general movement against Berlin; but the reverse of Gross Beeren, of which, from the hostile feeling of the country, he had received no information, followed by the advance of the Allies, led him, without being aware of it, into the very middle of the enemy's columns. Finding Belzig occupied by the Cossacks of Chernicheff, he withdrew to Liebnitz, where he took post to await further orders. There he was assailed next day by

Subsequent results of the battle.

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Aug. 26

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a division of the Prussians under Hirschfeld; and after a gallant resistance, being attacked in rear by Chernicheff's Cossacks, he was totally defeated, and compelled to take refuge in Magdeburg, with the loss of fourteen hundred prisoners and six pieces of cannon. These advantages made the total results of the battle of Gross Beeren four thousand prisoners, besides an equal number killed and wounded, and twenty-eight guns; while the Allies were not weakened by more than half the number. These results, considerable as they were, might have been greatly augmented, if Bernadotte had made a proper use of the superiority of force, and great preponderance in cavalry, which he enjoyed; but he was so cautious in his movements, that though he had no force to withstand him in the field, and the enemy fell back at all points, he took eleven days to advance from Gross Beeren to Rabinstein, near the Elbe, where he established his headquarters on the 4th September, though the distance was little more than fifty miles.[1]

Sept. 4. [1] Bout. 57, 59. Jom. iv. 408. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 100, 101. Vaud. i. 168, 170.

Napoleon was at Dresden when these disastrous tidings from Bohemia, Silesia, and Prussia arrived with stunning rapidity after each other. His whole projects for the campaign, which seemed to be opening in so auspicious a manner by the glorious victory of Dresden, were at once blasted; the moral effect of that great triumph was destroyed. The Allies, instead of regaining Prague in consternation, brought with them the trophies of Vandamme, and a considerable part of his corps prisoners. The battle of Culm had turned into cries of joy the desolation which began to be felt in the valleys of Bohemia; the army of Silesia was flying in disorder before its terrible antagonists, and loudly demanding the Emperor and his guards as the only means of stemming

Vast effects of these successes of the Allies.

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the torrent; the attack on Berlin had failed; instead of electrifying Europe by the capture of the Prussian capital, the northern army was thrown back to the Elbe, while the Prussian landwehr was singing the pæans of victory, and unheard of enthusiasm animated the whole north of Germany. Napoleon was strongly affected by these reverses, the more so as they were quite unexpected; and he immediately began, as usual, to lay the whole blame upon his lieutenants.* Circumstances, however, were so pressing, and succours were demanded from so many quarters at once, that it was no easy matter to say to which direction the Emperor should turn with the anxiously expected relief. His first design was to reinforce the army of the north, and resume in person, and with the aid of his guards, his favourite project of a march upon Berlin. But Macdonald's representations of the disastrous state of the army of Silesia were so urgent, and the advance of the enemy on that side so threatening, that he at length determined, though much against his will, to direct his steps towards Bautzen and the banks of the Bober.[1]

[1] Fain, ii. 324, 325. St Cyr, iv. 130, 131.

* "Mon cousin, le Duc de Tarente (Macdonald) s'est laissé pousser sur Gorlitz. Il sera possible que je sois obligé demarcher sur Bautzen, demain ou après demain. Occupez, donc, promptement les positions défensives."—NAPOLEON to ST CYR, 1*st September* 1831. ST CYR, iv. 391.

"Mon cousin, écrivez au Prince de la Moskwa (Ney.) Nous venons de recevoir des nouvelles du Duc de Reggio, (Oudinot,) qui a jugé convenable de venir se mettre, à deux marches, au dessus de Wittenberg. Le résultat de ce mouvement intempestif est, que le corps du Général Tauenzein, et un fort parti des Cosaques, se sont partis du côté de Luckau et de Bautzen, et inquiétant les communications du Duc de Tarente. *Il est vraiment difficile d'avoir moins de tête que le Duc de Reggio.* Il n'a point su d'aborder l'ennemi; et il a eu l'art de faire donner un de ses corps séparament. S'il l'eut abordé fraichement, il l'aurait partout culbuté."—NAPOLEON *to* BERTHIER, 2*d September* 1813. ST CYR, iv. 393, and JOMINI, iv, 417, 418. Note.

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Defensive measures of Napoleon for the protection of Saxony.

In pursuance of this resolution, orders were immediately given to stop at all points the pursuit of the allied columns into Bohemia; the broken remains of Vandamme's corps, entrusted to the care of Count Lobau, after being inspected at Dresden by the Emperor, were reconducted to the inhospitable summits of the mountains at Gieshubel and Peterswalde; St Cyr's corps was stationed between the latter point and Altenberg; while Victor occupied the passes and crest of the range from that to the right towards Reichenberg and Freyberg. The command of the army of the north was entrusted to Ney; the Emperor being with reason dissatisfied with Oudinot, for the senseless dispersion of his force which had led to the check at Gross Beeren, as well as for the eccentric direction of his retreat towards Wittenberg instead of Torgau, thereby putting in hazard the interior line of communication between the army of the north and the centre of operations at Dresden, and even exposing Macdonald's rear and supplies to the risk of being cut off or disquieted by the clouds of light horse, which inundated the plains beyond the Elbe, from Bernadotte's left. To prevent this inconvenience, and keep up the communication between the armies of Ney and Macdonald, Marmont's corps was withdrawn from the pursuit of the allied grand army, and transferred to Hoyerswerda, on the right bank of the Elbe, nearly midway between them; while the Emperor himself, taking with him the guards and reserve cavalry, and calling to his standard Poniatowski's corps, which had hitherto lain inactive in observation at Zittau, proceeded with sixty thousand choice troops to reinforce the dejected remains of the army which had been shaken by the disasters of the Katzbach. Thus, after all the losses

from the preceding defeats were taken into account, sixty thousand men were left under St Cyr, Victor, and Murat, to make head against the grand army of the Allies on the left of the Elbe; a hundred and twenty thousand, under the Emperor in person, were directed against Blucher in Silesia; seventy thousand, under Ney, were opposed to the army of Bernadotte; and eighteen thousand, under Marmont, were in observation, and kept up the communications on the right bank of the Elbe.[1]

[1] Fain, ii. 325, 326. Napoleon to St Cyr, 3d Sept. 1813. St Cyr, iv. 395. Jom. iv. 415, 416.

The Emperor's own movement, as usual, was attended with the desired effect. On the 3d of September, Napoleon set out from Dresden in the evening, and slept that night at the chateau of Hartau, near Bischoffwerda. The guards and cuirassiers of Latour Maubourg made a magnificent appearance as they defiled along the road. The departure of the Emperor was accelerated by the intelligence received that day, of the capture of a considerable convoy of ammunition between Bautzen and Bischoffwerda, by the Cossacks from Bernadotte's army. Marmont was pushed forward in that direction, to prevent a repetition of the insult, and finally took post at Hoyerswerda. On the following morning, Sept. 4. Napoleon set out by break of day, and early in the forenoon came in contact with the advanced guard of Blucher, which was strongly posted on the high grounds of Stromberg and Vohlaerberg, beyond Hochkirch, on the road to Gorlitz. The Prussian generals soon perceived, from the increased activity in the French army, and the splendid array of troops which crowded the roads coming from Dresden, that the Emperor was before them; and Blucher, faithful to the instructions he had received, and the general system agreed on at Trachenberg, immedi-

Napoleon advances against Blucher.

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ately fell back. The French, continuing to advance, soon reoccupied Gorlitz; while Blucher's retiring columns repassed successively both the Queisse and the Neisse. Napoleon slept on the night of the 5th in the parsonage manse of the parish of Hochkirch; and on the following morning resumed his march in pursuit of the allied troops, hoping that the impetuous character of the Prussian marshal, flushed with his recent victory, would lead him to halt and give battle. Blucher, however, still continued to retreat; and at noon, the Emperor, altogether exhausted with fatigue, entered a deserted farm-house by the wayside, where he threw himself on some straw in a shed, and mused long and profoundly on the probable issue of a contest, in which the Allies never gave him an opportunity of striking a blow in person, and the armies of his lieutenants, when left to themselves, hardly ever failed to be involved in disaster. At the close of his reverie he started up, and ordered the guards and cuirassiers to return to Dresden, leaving Marmont in such a situation at Hoyerswerda, as to be able to lend assistance, in case of need, either to Ney or Macdonald. His presence at the Saxon capital was much required; for already the Allies were beginning to resume the offensive on the frontier of Bohemia, and a terrible disaster had been incurred to the north of the Elbe.[1]

[1] Fain, ii. 325, 326. Bout. 70, 71. Odel, i. 269. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 105, 106.

Ney's movements against Bernadotte.

Ney, who had been appointed to replace Oudinot in the command of the army of the north, had received the Emperor's instructions to march direct to Baruth, where a corps was to be waiting him to bring reinforcements. He would there be only three days' march from Berlin; and so low did Napoleon still estimate the Prussian landwehr and light horse,

that he persisted in assuring him, that if he would only keep his troops together, and put a good countenance on the matter, all that rabble would soon disperse, and he would find the road to the Prussian capital lie open before him.* Ney, in pursuance of these instructions, and impelled not less by the ardour of his own disposition than the express command of Napoleon, immediately put himself in motion. He arrived at the headquarters of the army on the 4th of September, and found the whole troops arranged under shelter of the cannon of Wittenberg—a state of things which sufficiently evinced the entire incapacity of Oudinot for separate command; for he had now altogether lost his communication with the central point of Dresden, and permitted the whole right bank of the Elbe, between that fortress and the Saxon capital, to be inundated by a deluge of Russian and Prussian light horse, who did incredible mischief to the communication and supplies of both armies. Having reviewed his troops, and encouraged them by the assurance of prompt succour from the Emperor, Ney immediately put them in motion on the morning of the 5th, directing his march by Zahna and Seyda, so as to regain the high-road from Torgau to Berlin, which was his proper line of communication with the grand headquarters at Dresden. On the evening of the same

* "From Baruth you will be only three days' march from Berlin. The communication with the Emperor will then be entirely established, and the attack on the Prussian capital may take place on the 9th or 10th instant. All that cloud of Cossacks and rabble of landwehr infantry, will fall back on all sides when your march is once decidedly taken. You will understand the necessity of moving rapidly, in order to take advantage of the present state of inefficiency of the allied grand army in Bohemia, which might otherwise recommence operations the moment that they become aware of the departure of the Emperor."—*Instructions to* NEY, *2d September* 1813. ST CYR, iv. 394.

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day, the army was established on a line between these two villages, the Prussian advanced posts rapidly retiring before them. On the other hand, the Prince-Royal no sooner ascertained that the enemy were marching in strength against him, headed by his old comrade Marshal Ney, with whose determined character in the field he was well acquainted, than he took measures for concentrating his army. Setting out from Rabbenstein, where his head-quarters had been established, he marched across the country, so as to regain the great road between Torgau and Berlin. Tauenzein, who formed the advanced guard of his army, reached DENNEWITZ early on the morning of the 6th, and soon found himself in front of the vanguard of the French army, which, in its march from Zahna and Seyda, had approached that village on the route to Juterbock, where the great road from Torgau would be regained. Tauenzein immediately drew up his troops in order of battle, and unmasked a powerful battery, the fire of which arrested the progress of the Italian troops under Count Bertrand. The French general, however, was not disconcerted, but bringing up his remaining divisions, re-established the combat; the French artillery, posted on higher ground, played with advantage upon that of the Allies, and Morand advancing with his division, which was composed in great part of veterans, sensibly gained ground, and threatened the left wing of the Allies, which had first come into action, with total defeat.[1]

[1] Vaud. i. 171. Bout. 61, 62. Jom. iv. 419, 420.

Battle of Dennewitz. Sept. 6.

Succour, however, was at hand; for Bulow, who commanded the allied centre, which was marching up immediately after their left wing and in the same direction, no sooner heard the cannonade on the side of Dennewitz, than he hastened his march, and ar-

rived with twenty thousand Prussians, whom he deployed with the corps under Hesse Homberg in reserve; and not contented with remaining in position, he immediately directed the troops by an oblique advance against the flank of Bertrand's corps, which was now pushing Tauenzein before it, in front of Dennewitz. The Prussians advanced in echelon by the left, but, before they could reach the enemy, Regnier, with the Saxons, had come up to the support of Bertrand, and a combat of the most obstinate description ensued; the French centre and left presenting a front on the two sides of an oblique triangle to the enemy, and the Prussians urging them on both its faces. After four hours' hard fighting, however, the enthusiasm of the Prussians prevailed over the intrepidity of the Saxons. The village of Nieder Gerstorf and Gohlsdorf were successively carried, and the French centre and left driven back in the direction of Ohna.[1]

[1] Vaud. i. 172. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 103. Bout. 62. Jom. iv. 420, 421.

Arrival of Ney with his centre on the field.

Ney, however, now came up in haste with Oudinot's corps, which was stationed to the left of the Saxons, and immediately in front of Bulow's right. The arrival of this fresh corps, fully twenty thousand strong, made an immediate change upon the field of battle. The two corps uniting, turned fiercely on their pursuers, and being superior in numbers, not only regained Gohlsdorf, but drove the Prussians entirely across the road to the high grounds near Wilmsdorf, from which Bulow had originally come. Bulow upon this brought forward his reserve; the Saxons, though they combated bravely, were forced in their turn to retreat; and Gohlsdorf, the object of such fierce contention, a second time fell into the hands of the Prussians. Oudinot then again advanced the division of Pacthod, and it in the first

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instance gained ground upon the enemy, and restored the combat. It was hard to say to which side ultimate success would incline, when, at this critical moment, the Prussian brigade of Borstel, which was marching in the rear across the country towards Juterbock, informed, near Talischau, of the critical state of matters on the allied right, appeared on the field, and immediately attacked, with loud cheers, the extreme left of Oudinot in flank. At the same time, the Prussians under Thumen, who had combated behind Dennewitz ever since the morning, resuming the offensive; vigorously attacked and carried that village, and drove back Bertrand's corps, who were excessively fatigued with their long march and subsequent combat, to a considerable distance. The effect of this double advantage occurring at the same time, was decisive. Ney, finding both his wings driven back, and his centre in danger of being enveloped by the enemy, gave orders for a retreat at all points. This retrograde movement, however, was conducted with great regularity; the French braved, without shrinking, the destructive fire of grape-shot from the enemy's numerous batteries, which were now hurried to the front; and several charges of the Prussian horse were repulsed by the rolling fire and steady conduct of their retiring columns.[1]

Jom. iv. 421. Rout. 62, 63. Vaud. i. 172. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 103.

Arrival of Bernadotte with the Swedish reserve decides the victory.

Hitherto the Prussian army, not in all above forty-five thousand strong, had singly maintained the conflict, with heroic resolution, against the French, who numbered seventy thousand combatants. The Swedes and Russians, composing nearly a half of the army, had not yet come into action, having composed the right of the column of march, which was advancing with the left in front. But Berna-

dotte, with this powerful reserve, having broken up in the morning from Lobesson and Echmansdorf, had now reached Kaltenborn, a league in rear of Dennewitz, where the battle was raging, and, forming his whole force in order of battle, advanced rapidly to the support of the Prussians, now wellnigh exhausted by their long and arduous exertions. The appearance of this imposing mass on the field of battle, where Ney had no longer a reserve on his part to oppose to them, was decisive. Seventy battalions of Russians and Swedes, supported by ten thousand horse of the two nations, and preceded by a hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, advanced in beautiful array of columns of attack, with sufficient space left between them for the front file to deploy, and form a continuous line. Ney, who had not been able to succeed in his attack upon the Prussians alone, was in no condition to maintain his ground when this fresh and formidable body came upon him. Disorder and vacillation speedily became visible in his retreating columns; soon four thousand Russian and Swedish cavalry advanced at the gallop to support the points of the Prussian line,[1] where the contest was most obstinately maintained; and the ranks were no longer kept, when Bulow's men, opening with admirable discipline, made room for the infantry of the reserve to advance, and the Russian cavalry, charging furiously through the apertures, swept like a torrent round the French retreating columns.[1]

[1] Bernadotte's Official Acct. Schoell, iii. 116. Bout. 64, 65. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 104, 105. Vaud. i. 172, 173.

The retreat soon turned into a flight: in vain Ney endeavoured to hold firm, with the Saxons in the centre, who were hitherto unbroken, near Rohrbeck; the troops there, too, were seized with a sudden panic on seeing their flanks turned by the Swedish and Rus-

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sian horse, and, breaking into disorder, fled in confusion. The effects of this rout of the centre were in the highest degree disastrous; the enemy rushed into the huge gap thus formed in the middle of the line, and, vigorously pursuing the fugitives, separated the right from the left wing. In vain Arrighi brought forward his dragoons to cover the retreat; a thick cloud of dust enveloped the advancing squadrons of the pursuers, and rendered them more terrible from being unseen. Arrighi's men were shaken by the terrors by which they were surrounded, and wavered before reaching the enemy. Soon they were overwhelmed by the torrent, and drawn into its vortex before the Russian sabres were upon them; and at length the whole army presented nothing but a vast mass of fugitives. Ney did all that courage and coolness could suggest to arrest the disorder; but it was in vain: his utmost efforts could only preserve some degree of order in the retiring cannoniers, who, by rapidly working their guns, prevented the total destruction of the centre; but the wings were irrevocably separated. Oudinot, with his own corps and a part of the Saxons, retreated to Schweinitz; while Ney himself, Bertrand, and the cavalry, got off to Dahme. On the day following, additional successes were gained by the Allies: Ney's rearguard was attacked by the victorious Prussians, and defeated, with the loss of fifteen hundred prisoners; and during the night six hundred more were taken by their light horse, with eight pieces of cannon. It was not till the 8th that the French general succeeded in reuniting his shattered and divided columns, under cover of the cannon of Torgau.[1]

[1] Bernadotte's Official Acct. Schoell, iii. 117. Bout. 64, 65. Jom. iv. 422, 423. Vaud. i. 173.

The loss of the French in the battle of Dennewitz was very severe. It amounted, in the battle and sub-

sequent retreat to Torgau, to thirteen thousand men, of whom one-half were prisoners; with forty-three pieces of cannon, seventeen caissons, and three standards; besides six thousand stand of arms which the fugitives threw away to accelerate their flight. The Allies lost nearly six thousand men, of whom five thousand were Prussians; a clear proof upon whom the weight of the battle had fallen, and with whom the glory of the victory should rest. But its moral consequences were far more important. The Prussian troops, of whom a large proportion were landwehr, had here defeated the French in a pitched battle, led by one of their most renowned chiefs: the stain of Jena was washed out: the days of Rohrbeck and the Great Frederick seemed about to return; and Berlin, no longer trembling for foreign occupation, might send forth her sons conquering and to conquer on the brightest fields of European fame.[1]

Result of the battle.

[1] Bernadotte's Official Acct. Schoell, Recueil, iii. 117. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 105. Bout. 66. Jom. iv. 424.

The French military historians, confounded at this defeat—which they could neither ascribe to the cold, as in Russia, nor to the force of overwhelming numbers, as on the second day at Culm, nor to flooded rivers, as at the Katzbach—have laboured to save the honour of their arms by ascribing it entirely to the incapacity of Marshal Ney; who had no head, they affirm, for previous combination, and never received any illumination of genius till the enemy's balls were whirling through the bayonets. Without ascribing the disaster entirely to this cause, it must be admitted that the conduct of the French marshal on this occasion was not such as to support his great reputation. Like Oudinot at Gross Beeren, he was surprised by an attack on his line of march when little prepared for it, and under circumstances when such an event was not only probable but certain. When

Reflections on the battle.

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Ney took the command of the army under the cannon of Wittenberg, it was completely concentrated, and occupied a position of all others best adapted to act with effect on the army of the Allies, then occupying a line above twenty miles in length, from Rabenstein to Sayda. Instead of this, he brought up his columns in so desultory a manner to the attack, that he was never able to take any advantage of the great superiority of force which he might have thrown upon any point of the enemy's line, and in the end had the whole hostile array on his hands, before he had been able to make any impression on the corps first engaged. In justice, however, to the French marshal, it must be observed, that he was on this occasion very indifferently aided by his lieutenants; and that Oudinot, in particular, stung to the quick by having been deprived of the command, by no means pressed forward into action with the alacrity which might have been expected from his character. This jealousy of the marshals of each other, already so long known and sorely experienced in the Peninsular war, had already risen to such a height in Germany, as to render all cordial co-operation, except under the immediate eye and authority of the Emperor, impossible.[1]

Errors committed by the generals on both sides.

[1] Bout. 68, 69. Jom. iv. 25.

Nor was the conduct of the Prince-Royal, though crowned with success, by any means beyond the reach of reproach. Great as his victory was, it would have been much more decisive, if, instead of marching with his reserves on Echmandorf and Wilmersdorf, that is, in the rear of the Prussian line of battle, at the distance of five miles, he had followed the march of Tauenzein and Bulow by the great road direct on Dennewitz, which would have brought an overwhelming force on the flank of the French

at the crisis of the battle, just as Ney did to the Allies at Bautzen, and Blucher to Napoleon at Waterloo. Still more, his pursuit was languid and inefficient: he made no sufficient use of the unparalleled advantage of having utterly routed the enemy's centre, and separated their two wings from each other: his noble cavalry were not, on the day after the battle, thrown with sufficient vigour on the traces of the enemy; and an army which had been routed on the field, in a way hardly to be equalled in modern war, was allowed to retire with scarcely any molestation to the Elbe, and reunite its dissevered wings at Torgau, while the victor remained inactive at Juterbock, only a few miles from the field of battle.[1]

[1] Jom. iv. 424, 425 Beaut. 68, 69.

But if the conduct of Bernadotte, both at Dennewitz and Gross Beeren, was open to serious reproach, and indicated not obscurely a wish to spare the native troops of Sweden, and not to push the advantages even gained by the Prussians to the utmost, the vigour, resolution, and capacity evinced by the Prussian generals, especially Bulow and Borstel, in bearing up with inferior means for half the day, against superior forces on the part of the enemy, were most conspicuous; and, in particular, the perfect unanimity and concord with which they supported each other on every trying occasion, and the true military instinct which led them, at once and without orders, to hasten where the cannon was loudest and the danger greatest, were beyond all praise; and, seconded by the devotion and valour of their brave though inexperienced followers, mainly contributed to the victory on both these glorious days. Never, in truth, was a more animated spectacle witnessed than the Prussian army exhibited at that period. Jealousies there

Admirable conduct of the Prussian generals and soldiers.

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were none in that noble array: individual interests, separate desires, were forgotten; old established feuds were healed; recent rivalries were suppressed: one only feeling, the love of country, throbbed in every heart; one only passion, the desire to save it, gave strength to every hand.[1]

[1] Bout. 69, 70.

These defeats destroy the charm of French invincibility.

The repeated defeats which he had thus experienced in every quarter, and under circumstances where the faults of generalship appeared to be pretty equally divided between the contending parties, at length brought home to Napoleon the painful conviction, that neither his own troops nor those of his opponents were what they once had been. However much the adulation of his military courtiers might at the time, or the fond partiality of his subsequent panegyrists may still, be inclined to ascribe these misfortunes to errors of conduct on the part of the generals at the head of the movements, or to inconceivable fatality, their reiterated occurrence, under every variety of command, officers and troops engaged, was sufficient to demonstrate to all unprejudiced observers, that the long established superiority of the revolutionary troops was at an end. In presence of the Emperor, indeed, and with the consciousness that his redoubtable guards and cuirassiers were at hand to arrest any disorder, the conscripts evinced extraordinary enthusiasm, and still performed heroic actions; and the able use which he long made of that formidable reserve of fifty thousand chosen veterans, in battles where he commanded in person, arrested the tide of disaster. But where this great cause of enthusiasm and tower of strength was wanting, the usual appearances of a sinking cause were apparent. The marshals wanted vigour, and had become timid and over circumspect; or were unduly rash and

overweening in their movements: the troops generally went into battle with courage, but they failed to sustain it with constancy; and on the first appearance of a reverse took to flight by whole battalions, or laid down their arms, like the Austrians in the beginning of the war, in large bodies. Thirty thousand prisoners and two hundred guns had been taken by the Allies in pitched battles, within three weeks after the resumption of hostilities; while the Russians retreated from the Niemen to Moscow, a distance of six hundred miles, in presence of four hundred thousand men in close pursuit, without one battalion being broken or one cannon taken. A change therefore had plainly come over the spirit of the contest; the old enthusiasm of the Revolution was worn out, the military array of the empire had broken down; while its oppression had roused an indomitable spirit of resistance on the other side, and its antagonists had learned, in combating, to conquer it. The effects of this truth being perceived, were in the highest degree important: Napoleon lost confidence in his troops and his fortune, and no longer exhibited those daring strokes which had so often in former campaigns crowned him with success; while his marshals evinced that dread of responsibility, and nervousness about consequences, which are the invariable attendants, save among those whom a sense of duty supports, of the secret anticipation of disaster.

Second advance of the Allies towards Dresden.

While these events were taking place in the northern line of operations, the allied grand army had resumed the offensive on the Bohemian frontier. No sooner was Schwartzenberg made aware, by the cessation of the pursuit of his columns, that Napoleon had set out in a different direction, than he put his troops in motion, again to threaten the Saxon capital.

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On the 5th September, Wittgenstein crossed the mountains with the right wing, and pushed his advanced guard to Nollendorf, and on the following day he reached Gieshubel; while Ziethen occupied Gross Koeta, and Count Pahlen and Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg, who had crossed by Heppersdorf, took possession of Nentmansdorf. On the day following, Wittgenstein, continuing his march, occupied Pirna, and his advanced posts again appeared in the environs of Dresden; Schwartzenberg himself, with his heavily laden Austrians, also approached the mountains in the rear of the Russians, and on the 8th reached Aussig, near Tœplitz, while certain intelligence was received that Benningsen, with the Russian reserve, full sixty thousand strong, was advancing by rapid strides from the Oder, and might be expected on the Elbe before the end of September. This intelligence was accompanied by the opinion from St Cyr, that "the system of the enemy is, to hazard nothing on the points where the Emperor is ascertained to be, with the troops which he always brings along with him. It may be presumed, therefore, that he will undertake no operation against Dresden so long as his Majesty, with his guards, is known to be in the neighbourhood of that town; but that he will march against it as soon as they are withdrawn, the great bulk of his force being concentrated within one march of Dresden, on the passes of Altenberg, Furstenwalde, and Peterswalde.[1]"

Sept. 5.

Sept. 6.

Sept. 7.

[1] Bout 71, 72. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 106, 107. St Cyr to Napoleon, 3, 4, 5, and Sept. 7, 1813. St Cyr, iv. 397, 405.

Napoleon had no sooner received this intelligence than he took measures for the concentration of his troops on the side of Silesia, by ordering Macdonald to retire to Bautzen, near which Poniatowski was placed, so as to form his right, while he himself with the guards set out in the direction of Pirna;

Napoleon resumes the offensive in Bohemia.

Sept. 7.

Marmont was drawn back with his corps to Dresden, and a division, ten thousand strong, was stationed at Leipsic under Margaron. The repeated checks he had received made him feel the necessity of contracting his circle of operations, and stationing his generals at such distances from the central Saxon capital, that in a day or two he might be able, with his guards and reserve, to carry succour to any quarter where their assistance might be required. Meanwhile the Russian army, in great strength, was concentrating in the environs of Culm and Tœplitz, while the Austrians were coming up behind them, though still at a considerable distance, from the side of Prague. The Emperor felt strongly the necessity of delivering some decisive blow, to extricate himself from his difficulties; and immediately after he joined Marshal St Cyr, in the neighbourhood of Pirna, on the evening of the 7th, he had a long conversation with that able general, in the course of which he admitted, that "he had lost a brilliant opportunity of striking such a stroke, by halting the Young Guard at Pirna when Vandamme was advancing to Culm;" but still inclined to the opinion that it should now be directed towards Blucher or Bernadotte, and insisted that the grand allied army would attempt nothing during his absence. Impressed with these ideas, which St Cyr in vain combated with military frankness, he returned to Dresden the same night, meditating a great blow against Bernadotte, and consequent triumphal entry into Berlin; but early next morning he was roused from his dream of security, and recalled to the advanced posts on the side of Pirna by the sound of cannon, which announced a formidable attack by the Russian vanguard in that quarter.[1]

Sept. 8.

[1] St Cyr, iv. 140, 143. Bout. 72. Vaud. i. 176.

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Quick as lightning, Napoleon moved up his guards and cuirassiers to the scene of action, and after reconnoitring the enemy's columns from the heights of Gahrnig, determined that, although the great body of his reserves had not yet come up, it was advisable not to delay the attack, as by the next day the plateau which the enemy occupied would be so strongly supported by artillery as to be altogether unassailable. He, accordingly, forthwith put his troops in motion, and, aiming his movement against the left of the allied advanced guard, he directed the weight of his forces towards Liebstadt, whereby he threatened their communications with Tœplitz. To avoid that danger, Wittgenstein immediately withdrew his men, and joined Kleist at Nollendorf; while at the same time Klenau's Austrians, who had been pushed on towards Chemnitz, retired to Marienberg. The arrival of Napoleon was felt like a shock along the whole line of the Bohemian hills. Satisfied with this advantage, Napoleon retired to his quarters at Dahme, where he received from Ney's aide-de-camp the whole details of the disaster at Dennewitz. The Emperor interrogated him closely as to all the particulars, and explained in the most lucid manner the causes of the reverse to the generals present, without giving vent to any ill-humour whatever against his lieutenant, but ascribing it all to the difficulties of the military art, which, he said, were far from being generally understood.* He had just received the

He forces back the Russian centre.

* Napoleon's conversation on this occasion, which is reported by St Cyr, who was present, was very remarkable:—"The Emperor interrogated the officer minutely, and entered with the most imperturbable *sang-froid* into the movements of the different corps; after which he explained, in a manner equally lucid and satisfactory, the causes of the reverse, but without the slightest expression of ill humour, or any manifestation of displeasure at Ney, or any of the generals engaged. He ascribed the

account of one of the greatest disasters of the campaign, and which in the end was attended with the most ruinous effects to his fortunes; and he was not only calm enough to discuss the subject, as he would have done the wars of Scipio and Hannibal, but had the magnanimity to exculpate entirely the general whose errors had had no small share in inducing it.[1] CHAP. LXXI. 1813.

[1] St Cyr, iv. 149, 150. Bout. 73, 74.

On the following morning, at daybreak, St Cyr's corps pursued its march, and reached without opposition the village of Ebersdorf, on the Geyersberg—the highest point of the mountains between Saxony and Bohemia; and from the heights adjoining which the eye can discover a considerable expanse of the

Napoleon reaches the summit of the mountains, Aug. 10.

whole to the difficulties of the art, which, he said, were far from being generally known. He added, that one day or other, if he had time, he would write a book on the subject, in which he would demonstrate its principles in a manner so precise that they should be within the reach of all military men, and enable them to learn the art of war as they learn any other science. I (St Cyr) replied, that it were much to be wished that the experience of such a man should not be lost to France, but that I had always doubted whether it were practicable to form such a work, though if any one could, it was himself; that it seemed extremely doubtful whether the longest experience or practice was the best school for learning the art of a commander; that of all the generals, whether on our own side or that of our enemies, whom we had seen at the head of the armies of Europe, in all the long wars which the French Revolution had occasioned, none appeared to have gained by experience; and that I did not make any exception in his own case, as I had always considered his first campaign in Italy as his *chef d'œuvre* in war. He said I was right, and that, considering the limited force he then had at his disposal, he regarded it as his greatest campaign; that he knew but one general who had constantly gained by experience, and that was Turenne—whose great talents were the result of profound study, and who had approached nearest to the end which he proposed to demonstrate, if one day he had time to compose the work which he had mentioned. That conversation was brought on by the recital of one of the greatest disasters of the campaign—a disaster attended with terrible effects to the interests of many, and of none so much as himself. He spoke, nevertheless, of it as calmly as he would have done of the affairs of China, or of Europe in the preceding century."—St Cyr, *Histoire Militaire*, iv. 149, 150.

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plains from Tœplitz towards Prague. No sooner had the Emperor set foot on the frontier, than he dispatched a messenger to the King of Saxony to announce that the enemy was thrown back into Bohemia, and then halted to gaze at the prospect which opened before him. Immediately at his feet descended the rapid slope of the Geyersberg, its sides, naked rocks or hanging woods, with the road, which was much cut up by the retreat of the allied troops from Dresden, descending in zig-zag down the steep, till it was lost in the gulf at its feet. The artillery with extraordinary alacrity threw themselves into the hollow, and already the descent of the army had commenced, when the progress of the column was stopped by a carriage breaking down in a hollow part of the way; Drouot was sent forward to report on the passage, and he stated that it was impracticable till it was repaired. A few hours only, however, were required for that purpose, and Napoleon had himself shown, at the passages of the Landgrafensberg, the evening before the battle of Jena,* how quickly the most formidable obstacles of that description yield to the vigorous exertions of a skilful body of engineers.[1]

[1] Odel. i. 276. Fain, ii. 331. St Cyr, iv. 157.

But declines to descend to Culm, or enter Bohemia.

St Cyr eagerly pointed to the plain at the foot of the mountain, where the Russian and Prussian army were to be seen in great masses, deploying, widening, and extending, as if in preparation for an immediate attack. From the rapidity of their movements, the confusion which prevailed, and the hurrying of officers to and fro, it was evident that they expected to be instantly assailed, for which they were little prepared, and that their leaders were in great anxiety for the result, as their situation and the nature of

* Ante, v. 748.

the ground in their rear would not admit of a retreat in presence of the enemy; while a huge column of smoke, the agreed on signal, rising from the elevated summits of the Millerschauer, the highest point of the range, told to the whole north of Bohemia that the dreaded invasion of the Franks had commenced. Prince Constantine's reserve of the guards were the first in position, next Wittgenstein's Russians, and Kleist's Prussians, formed in close array, but still there was no appearance of the Austrians; and St Cyr strongly urged the Emperor to hasten the attack, when his whole forces were at hand, and the Russians and Prussians, in a position from which they could not recede, stood alone exposed to his blows. Napoleon, who, from the elevated position which he occupied, beheld every rank, almost every man, in the hostile array, remained with the telescope at his eye, intently gazing on the enemy for above an hour; but at the end of that time he said, "I will not attack the enemy in that position—but cautiously conceal my intention: let the engineers continue to repair the road to-day and to-morrow; and suffer every one to rest in the belief that we are to have a great battle; if you are attacked on the mountain, I will support you." So saying, he returned to Pirna much dejected at the failure of his designs, and the day after re-entered Dresden; having thereby lost the only opportunity which presented itself during the campaign, of engaging on favourable terms the Russians and Prussians when detached from the Austrians.[1]

Sept. 11.

[1] St Cyr, iv. 156, 158. Fain, ii. 332. Odel. i. 276, 277.

St Cyr's sinister presentments were not long of being verified; no sooner were the Allies aware, by the cessation of the advance, that Napoleon was no longer on the summit of the Erzgebirge, than they again resumed at all points their offensive movement. Witt-

The Allies again attack St Cyr when the Emperor retires.

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genstein ascended directly towards Nollendorf; and two regiments of Russian hussars attacked, with out waiting the arrival of the other troops, the French division of Dumonceau on the summit of the mountain, cut to pieces one battalion, made prisoners of another, and forced back the whole to Peterswalde, with the loss of above fifteen hundred men, which compelled St Cyr to draw back his whole corps to Gieshubel. Meanwhile Napoleon was busied with orders for the construction of a bridge over the Elbe at Pirna, and the formation of a great series of redoubts around it, to secure the passage of the army from one bank of the Elbe to the other; as also intrenchments on a large scale near Gieshubel, to bar the entrance from Bohemia in that quarter. Every thing announced a resolution to hold by the Elbe to the last extremity, and, without resuming the offensive to any considerable degree at any one point, to maintain that line as long as possible, and take advantage of any errors the enemy might commit in their operations on an immense circumference around it. During all this time, however, the troops, perched on the inhospitable summits of the Erzgebirge, were starving; the few villages which were to be met with in those elevated regions, devastated by the triple passage of armies over them, were entirely laid waste: so universal was the destruction, that it was with the utmost difficulty, and only by repairing a ruin, that quarters were got for the Emperor himself in the parish manse at Breitenau; the conscripts, stretched on the cold ground, had no protection against the frosty nights and frigid dews of autumn,[1] nor was their satisfaction increased by beholding their adversaries comfortably encamped in the rich plains of Culm and Tœplitz, and hearing the joyous sound of the

[1] Odel. i. 277, 279. Fain, ii. 333. St Cyr, iv. 167, 168. Lond. 136.

feux-de-joie which announced the universal transport of the allied troops at the victory of Dennewitz..

No sooner was Napoleon informed that the Allies were again threatening St Cyr, and of the check experienced by Dumonceau, than he hastened, at the head of a powerful body of his guards and cuirassiers, to the frontier, and suddenly approaching Petterswalde, fell unexpectedly with superior forces on a considerable body of the enemy's horse, which was defeated, and Colonel Blucher, son of the marshal, after a gallant resistance, made prisoner. On this occasion the Emperor altered his line of attack: it was against the enemy's right, and ascending the course of the Elbe, that his columns were directed; in consequence, he found the roads every where passable, and the enemy were without difficulty thrown back into the Bohemian plain. There, however, they stood firm, and took a position in the level, ready to give battle. The opportunity of striking a blow with advantage had been lost: great part of the allied army were now assembled, above seventy thousand strong, in the plain at the foot of the mountains. Ziethen, with their advanced guard, occupied a wood at the base of the hill, Wittgenstein was in Culm, Colloredo on the heights of Striegewicz in its neighbourhood, and Kleist at Siberschen: the Russian and Prussian guards in reserve between Culm and Tœplitz.[1]

Napoleon again returns to the frontier, and repels the enemy. Sept. 15.

Sept. 17.

[1] Bout. 77, 78. St Cyr, iv. 169, 171. Fain, ii. 333.

Every thing seemed to presage a decisive battle, and the soldiers in both armies expected it. Nevertheless, the crisis passed over with nothing more than some sharp affairs of advanced guards. In truth, the generals on both sides were desirous to avoid such an extremity: it was obviously for the interest

Views of the opposite generals at this period.

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of the Allies to postpone any general engagement till the arrival of Benningsen's reserve had added sixty thousand fresh troops to their arms; and Napoleon was desirous not to descend with the bulk of his forces into the Bohemian plain, both because retreat in case of disaster was difficult back again over the mountains, and because he still thought that it was on the side of Berlin or Silesia that the decisive blow was to be struck, and that some unguarded movement on the side of the allied generals would soon enable him to deliver it with advantage. He had no fixed plan, but was on the look-out for his opportunity, and he saw clearly it was not to be found on the side of Bohemia.[1]*

[1] St Cyr, iv. 173, 175. Vaud. i. 179. Bour. 78, 79.

Affair of Nollendorf, in which the French are worsted.

Desirous, however, not to depart for Dresden without having accomplished something worthy of his renown, and which might check the Allies from renewing their incursions during his absence, he ordered, on the afternoon of the 17th, a partial descent into the plain and attack on the enemy's position. Zeithen, who held the post at the foot of the descent, was dislodged, and driven back towards Culm by Mouton Duvernet, and Arbesau was carried. Napoleon himself, encouraged by the success of his advanced guard, descended to Dodnitz, at the foot of the declivity, where he eagerly reconnoitred the position and strength of the enemy. An obscure haze concealed the greater part of the hostile columns; even the chapel of Culm could not be discerned through the mist, when suddenly a terrible cannonade loudly

* "Yesterday I made a reconnoissance to ascertain the force and position of the enemy; and although the debouche of Peterswalde was favourable for artillery, the declivities being gentle, the position of the enemy did not permit me to attack him. I have resolved therefore to hold to the system of *va et vient*, and to await my opportunity."—NAPOLEON *to* ST CYR, *18th September* 1813. ST CYR, iv. 421.

re-echoed from the neighbouring mountains, burst forth on the right and left; numerous batteries, placed on the heights on either side, concealed by the woods and fog, sent a storm of bullets down on the advancing columns; while the Russians in front resuming the offensive, with loud shouts returned to the charge. Napoleon quickly retired to the heights, but the column which had advanced into the plain did not escape without very serious loss. Colloredo turned their left, and regained Arbesau at the point of the bayonet; Meerfeldt, on the right, moved direct from Aussig on Nollendorf, so as to threaten their retreat, while Wittgenstein and Zeithen fiercely assailed their rear. A thick fog, which prematurely brought on the darkness of night, alone saved the whole division, which had descended into the plain, from total destruction; but as it was, they did not regain the mountains without the loss of an eagle, three guns, and twelve hundred prisoners, besides an equal number killed and wounded.[1]

[1] Vaud. i. 179. Lond. 138. Bout. 78, 79. Odel. i. 282, 284. Fain, ii. 334.

Napoleon marches again against Blucher.

Convinced by the view he had now obtained of the positions and strength of the enemy, that nothing was to be made of an attack on the side of Bohemia, and conceiving that the Allies were so situated and scattered, that they could not make any formidable attack on the French position on the mountains, at least for some days,* Napoleon returned to Pirna, and from thence to Dresden. After a few hours' rest there, he continued his march with his guards and

Sept. 21.

* On the morning of the 18th, when the mist had cleared away, Napoleon ascended an eminence, and long gazed through his telescope at the columns of the enemy. "All that I can see," said he to Berthier, "forms perhaps two corps of 60,000 men—they will require more than one day before they can unite and attack. Let us return to Pirna."—FAIN, ii. 334.

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cuirassiers across the Elbe, to check the incursions of Blucher, who, taking advantage of the Emperor's absence, was now driving Macdonald before him, and had already occupied Bautzen and extended himself along the line of the Spree. Napoleon arrived in front of the enemy, whose advanced posts were in the wood of Hartau. He immediately mounted on horseback, and a skirmish ensued, in the course of which the village of Goldbach became the prey of the flames. That night the Emperor slept at a miserable hamlet near Hartau, with only a part of his guards around him; the greater part, unable to bear up against the incessant fatigue of so many marches and countermarches, which led to nothing, had fallen behind.[1]

Sept. 22.

[1] Fain, ii. 336. Odel. i. 287, 288. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 110, 111.

Returns to Dresden without effecting anything.

The utmost melancholy prevailed at his headquarters. The campaign seemed endless; the troops, worn out by incessant fatigue and the severest privations, had lost much of their former spirit; fatigue, sickness, and the sword of the enemy, had in an extraordinary degree thinned their ranks; and the generals could not conceal from themselves, that the French army, daily hemmed in within a more contracted circle, and diminishing in numbers, was no longer able to resume the offensive with a prospect of success at any point. On the following day, the Emperor seemed, what was most unusual to him, a prey to indecision: Blucher's army was drawn up in order of battle, but he did not venture to attack him; and after remaining under arms for the whole forenoon, galloped at ten in the evening towards Neustadt, where a body of Austrians and Russians, under General Neipperg, was engaged in a skirmish with Lauriston, previous to their retiring into Bohemia. Next day, feeling himself too weak to resume the offensive in any direction, he returned

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to Dresden; and, being sensible of the necessity of contracting his circle of operations, withdrew Macdonald's army to Weissig, within two leagues of that capital, thereby in effect abandoning the whole right bank of the Elbe to the Allies. On the morning of Sept. 24. that day there was a dreadful storm, accompanied with loud peals of thunder: an unusual circumstance so late in the season, and when the chill of winter was already felt; which, combined with the state of the Emperor's fortunes, was deemed by many ominous of his fall.[1]

[1] Odel. i. 287, 289. Jom. iv. 431. Fain, ii. 335, 336. Bout. 83.

Partizan warfare in the rear of the French.

While these indecisive but important operations were going on in Saxony and on the Bohemian frontier, a serious partizan warfare had sprung up in the rear of the French army towards Leipsic and Westphalia. Secure in their mountain stronghold of Bohemia, the allied sovereigns wisely resolved to take advantage of their great superiority in light horse, to threaten the French communications, and seize their convoys on the roads to the Rhine. With this view, Schwartzenberg advanced Klenau's corps to Frey- Sept. 10. berg, where he made four hundred prisoners; from whence Thielman, with three thousand horse, was detached to scour the country towards Leipsic, while Mensdorf, with two thousand, beset the road from Dresden and Torgau towards that city. Thielman at first had considerable success. He attacked and destroyed, near Weissenfels, a large convoy Sept. 11. of ammunition destined for the use of the grand army; made prisoners five hundred men in Merse- Sept. 18. berg, and spread alarm through the whole of western Saxony. Lefebvre Desnouettes, however, now took the field with eight thousand *chasseurs à cheval* and cavalry of the guard, and coming up with Thielman, near Merseberg, defeated him with considerable loss, Sept. 24.

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and obliged him to retire towards Zwickau, after abandoning his prisoners. This check, however, had no other effect than that of calling forth Platoff, who

Sept. 26. issued from Bohemia with seven thousand Cossacks and Austrian horse, two days after, and directing his

Sept. 28. march to Altenberg, where Lefebvre Desnouettes lay, wholly unconscious of the impending danger, attacked him with such vigour, that he was quickly driven back to Zeitz. The French general, however, was effecting his retreat by echelon in good order, while still pressed by Platoff in rear, when he was attacked by Thielman, who had rallied after his check, and totally defeated with the loss of five guns and fifteen hundred prisoners; a blow the more sensibly felt, that it fell on some of the best corps of cavalry in the French army.[1]

[1] Lond. 141, 142. Bout. 84, 85. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 112.

Commencement of the siege of Wittenberg.

Operations of a still more important character were undertaken at the same period by the army of the Prince-Royal in the north of Germany. Slowly advancing forward after his important victory at Dennewitz, Bernadotte at length moved his headquarters, a week after the battle, to Coswig, in the direction

Sept. 15. of the Elbe, and on the 15th he had got as far as Zerbst, while his vanguard was at Dessau on the Elbe. Bulow, meanwhile, laid siege to Wit-

Sept. 24. tenberg. The operations were pushed forward with great vigour, and on the 24th the suburbs were carried; under cover of a heavy bombardment, which set the town on fire in many different places, the second parallel was opened; and every thing announced that, if not relieved, it could not hold out for any considerable time. Ney, who commanded now only two corps, not numbering above fifty thousand combatants, (Oudinot's corps having been dissolved, and its remains incorporated with the two others since the

disaster of Dennewitz,) was in no condition to raise the siege; and a movement which he made from Torgau, to clear the left bank of the Elbe of some of the allied parties who had begun to infest it, had no other effect but to make them withdraw within the *tête-du-pont* at Dessau, which he did not feel himself in sufficient strength to attack.[1]

[1] Bout. 80, 81. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 109, 110.

Meanwhile Chernicheff, with more than his wonted boldness and address, carried the partizan warfare, with the most signal success, into the heart of Westphalia. Detached with three thousand horse from the army of the north, this indefatigable leader crossed the Elbe at Dessau, and pushing with great celerity across Germany, reached Cassel, the capital of the kingdom of Westphalia, in the end of September. Jerome, with the few troops which the necessities of the Emperor had left him for the defence of his capital, made a precipitate retreat without firing a shot; and Chernicheff immediately made his entry into the city at the head of his Cossacks, amidst the vociferous applause of the people, and proclaimed the dissolution of the kingdom of Westphalia. Symptoms of insurrection against the French authorities were immediately manifested; the students flocked in hundreds to be enrolled in battalions of volunteers; crowds assembled in the streets loudly demanding arms, and the flame rapidly spread into all the villages in the neighbourhood. But the Russian commander, being destitute of infantry and artillery, was unable to maintain the advanced position which he had gained; and, after remaining in the capital a week, he was obliged, by the approach of a considerable body of French troops, to evacuate it and retire across the Elbe. He regained

Great success of Chernicheff in Westphalia.

Sept. 30.

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the right bank of that river, however, as he had effected his advance, without losing a man, taking with him in triumph the stores of the arsenal, the royal horses and carriages, and an immense store of booty beneath the saddles of his Cossacks. But the moral effect of this blow far exceeded these predatory gains: the brother of Napoleon had been put to flight from his capital, his dethronement pronounced and all but effected, by a foreign partizan; and a dangerous example given to the world of the facility with which these oppressive military thrones, destitute of all support from the interests or affections of the people, might be swept from the earth the moment the military power which upheld them was overturned. The effect, accordingly, of this stroke was soon felt through the whole north of Germany: already a Saxon battalion had come over from the camp of Marshal Ney to that of the Prince-Royal; the remainder was only prevented by their personal regard for their sovereign, and the energetic appeals which he made to their military honour, from following the example; and more than one Westphalian battalion, after the surrender of Cassel, took the first opportunity of passing over from their fugitive monarch to the ranks of German freedom.[1]

Sept. 27.

[1] Fain, ii. 357, 359. Bout. 84, 85. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 113. Vaud. i. 182, 183.

Operations also of minor importance, but still of great local interest, had, during the same period, taken place on the Lower Elbe. The forces there were very nearly matched: Davoust having above thirty thousand men under his command at Hamburg, and Walmoden thirty-five thousand on the outside of its walls. Neither party, for some time after hostilities were resumed, made any considerable move-

Operations of Davoust and Walmoden on the Lower Elbe.

ments; but at length Davoust issued forth on the right bank of the Elbe and moved towards Berlin. Lauenberg was early attacked by a battalion of French infantry, and the partizan corps of Jutzon expelled. Aug. 19. Walmoden, whose forces were injudiciously scattered, had not troops adequate at any one point to restrain the enemy; and the consequence was that he was compelled, though superior in numbers upon the whole, to fall back towards Grabow, leaving his right wing, composed of Swedes under Vegesack, seriously endangered. Davoust's instructions, however, were to await the result of Oudinot's advance at that period to Berlin; and he remained, therefore, inactive at Schwerin, till the defeat of Gros-Beeren having rendered the projected combined movement against the Prussian capital impossible, Aug. 30th. he made the best of his way back to the Elbe. In doing so, the Danes under his command separated from the French, the former retiring to Lubeck, and the latter to the lines in front of Hamburg.[1]

[1] Bout. 85, 87. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 113, 114. Vaud. i. 186, 187.

Though this sortie of the French from Hamburg was attended with no material results, and, by leading to the dislocation of the French and Danish forces, was rather hurtful than beneficial to their ranks, yet it opened the eyes of the allied generals to the necessity of strengthening the force which observed the enemy's operations in that quarter. With this view, twenty thousand of the landwehr of Mecklenburg and Swedish Pomerania were called out, who did good service, by rendering disposable a much larger portion of Walmoden's regular forces than he had hitherto been able to bring into the field. The beneficial effects of this arrangement were soon conspicuous. One of his light squadrons, which scoured the

Walmoden destroys the French division Pecheux.

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left bank of the Elbe, having intercepted a despatch from the French marshal to the governor of Magdeburg, in which he announced his intention of dispatching the division Pecheux from Hamburg to reinforce the garrison of that fortress—which was threatened with a siege after the rout of Dennewitz—the Prussian general immediately took measures to intercept and destroy it. For this purpose, leaving Vegesack, with the Swedes and landwehr of Mecklenburg, in the environs of Schwerin to observe Davoust, he himself set out with the flower of his army, sixteen thousand strong, for Doernitz, where, with surprising celerity, he had thrown a bridge of boats across the Elbe, and having crossed the river, came up with Pecheux, who had six thousand men and eight pieces of cannon, at the village of Goerda, near Dannenberg. There the French were speedily assailed by forces twice as numerous as their own, and totally defeated; the general and eighteen hundred men made prisoners; the whole guns and caissons taken, and twelve hundred killed and wounded; while the Allies lost only eight hundred men. Having gained this brilliant success, Walmoden instantly recrossed the Elbe to oppose Davoust, who was greatly superior to the forces left to observe him; and with such secrecy and skill were the operations conducted, that he was back, like the Consul Nero in the war with Hannibal, before the enemy were aware of his absence.[1]

Sept. 16.

[1] Vict. et Conq. xxii. 114, 115. Bout. 88, 89. Vaud. i. 187, 188.

Reasons which now compelled a change of the seat of war by Napoleon.

Matters had now arrived at that pass with Napoleon, that a change of position, and an alteration of his line of action, had become indispensable. With equal judgment and ability, he had taken every possible advantage of the fortified line of the Elbe; and, by

means of the skilful use of his bridges over that river, and his interior line of communications, he had long, with inferior forces, maintained his ground in the heart of Germany. By so doing, he had preserved his ascendancy over the states of the Rhenish confederacy longer than in any other way could have been practicable, and kept at bay forces of the Allies, by which, under any other system of operations, he would in all probability have been crushed. But the time had now arrived when this defensive system could no longer be maintained. Rich as the agricultural productions of Saxony are, they were by this time entirely consumed by the enormous multitudes of men and horses who had so long been quartered on its territory; and the contracted circle within which, on all sides, the French armies now stood, rendered it totally impossible for any further subsistence to be extracted from the soil; while the increasing audacity and strength of the allied cavalry made any supply from the rear to the last degree precarious. Not only had all the towns and villages around Dresden been long ago exhausted by the triple scourge of quartering, pillage, and contributions, but the forage was every where totally consumed, the stack-yards emptied, the houses burnt or in ruins; while the fields of potatoes in the rural districts, in some cases ten times turned over in search of food, told to what shifts the countless swarms of troops, of all nations, by whom they had been trodden, had been reduced.* On

* "Not a vestige of forage was to be got for the horses. The frontier villages were all in ruins. All the houses not built of stone were torn to pieces for the fires of the bivouacs. All the environs bore the impress of the ravages of war. The earth in the fields, which had been ten times turned over, was again carefully searched for the few potatoes which might have escaped the eye of former plunder."—*Témoin Oculaire, in* ODELEBEN, ii. 278.

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the small town of Pirna, already reduced to despair by previous exactions, the crushing burden of six thousand rations a-day was imposed in the end of September; while such were the necessities or cupidity of the soldiers, when quartered in the villages between it and Dresden, that not only were the wooden crosses, erected by the piety of former ages over the places of interment, torn up and burned for firewood, but the graves themselves were opened, the coffins broken and dragged up, the bones and corpses scattered about, the very shrouds and dead-clothes they contained, with the garlands of flowers found on once loved hearts, seized by avaricious hands, and sold to the miscreants who followed the army to profit by its excesses.[1]

[1] Témoin Oculaire, ii. 196, 197. Odel. i. 268, 269, 278. St Cyr, iv. 177, 178.

Deplorable condition of the French in Dresden, Torgau, and the fortresses of the Elbe.

Deplorable as was the condition of the troops in the environs of Dresden, from the total ruin of the country, and the excessive privations to which they were exposed, their lot was enviable compared to that of a great part of the soldiers who were accumulated in the towns. The latter had warmth and lodging indeed, but they were often dearly purchased amidst the accumulated horrors of famine, contagion, and mortality. The immense number of wounded who had been brought into the hospitals of that city since the campaign recommenced, had not only filled all the public establishments, but a great number of private houses; with the sick and the maimed; and although death had fearfully thinned their ranks, often at the rate of two hundred a-day, yet fifteen thousand were still heaped together in such a state of misery as to engender the never-failing accompaniment of human woe, a typhus fever of the most malignant kind. In this state of wretchedness they were when the general retreat of the army from

Silesia and the Bohemian frontier, in the end of September, suddenly filled the city with thirty thousand fresh troops, besides twice as many quartered in the environs, upwards of two-thirds of whom were in a state of the most deplorable destitution. The accumulation of men and horses in a narrow space, and consequent spread of contagion, were then prodigiously augmented. In vain the most severe orders were issued by the Emperor—one in particular, that every tenth marauder should be shot—to arrest the progress of disbanding and wandering on the part of the troops; the necessities of their situation, the confusion which prevailed, the thirst for gain and enjoyment, with the continual prospect of death before their eyes, rendered the men utterly indifferent to all such precautions.* The distribution of rations of meat had become rare; those of bread were reduced a half, and nearly the whole army, with the exception of the guards, were compelled to forage individually for their own subsistence. This system, which did admirably well as long as the French armies were continually advancing, under the guidance of victory, to hitherto untouched fields of plunder, told against them with crushing but well-deserved severity, now that they were thrown back by defeat upon the exhausted theatre of former devastation.[1]

Orders of Sept. 5.

[1] Odel. ii. 196, 197. Tém. Oculaire.

* "The recent movements of the grand army had entirely exhausted the last resources of the country; and the soldier, having no longer the excitement of combats to distract his misery, felt it the more keenly. To all verbal complaints on this head, the answer always was, 'Cause the commissary to be shot, and you will want for nothing.' To the written reclamations an invitation was given to apply for orders or decorations, being more easy to supply than bread. At this moment, the Emperor sent a decree by which the town of Pirna, at that moment at the lowest point of misery itself, should furnish us with six thousand rations of bread a day."—St Cyr, iv. 178.

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It was the counterpart of the compulsory retreat by the wasted line of the Smolensko road.

Dreadful effects of these causes on the French army.

Often a hundred men were crowded together in huts intended only for a single family, and that of the humblest rank; men and horses, soldiers and marauders, camp-followers and prostitutes, were shut up together, half famished, and eagerly snatching from each other the plunder which they had wrenched from the miserable inhabitants. Even the hospitals of the insane had been seized on for lodging, and the lunatics turned out without the slightest means of subsistence, in pursuance of Napoleon's inhuman order, "to turn out the mad."* The wonted spirit of the soldiers was entirely broken by the sombre aspect and protracted fatigues of the campaign, and, above all, the exhausting marches and countermarches which came to no result. Their discontent broke out in open murmurs, and their despondency exhaled in bitter and graphic terms in their correspondence with their relations in France, great part of which was taken by the partizan corps in the rear, and fell into the hands of the Allies.† It may be conceived how the bonds of discipline were relaxed, how the progress of contagion was accelerated,

* "Depuis plusieurs mois il y avait à Sonnenstein, près de Pirna, une maison de santé pour les insensés. Le 14 Sept. elle fut tout à coup evacuée et convertie en une forteresse. Le directeur de l'établissement obtenait pour toute réponse du chef supréme, 'Qu'on chasse les fous.' Le major chargé de prendre possession du chateau, rendit encore plus dure par la rigeur du mésures qu'il prit, l'execution de cet act de violence."—ODELEBEN, *Témoin Oculaire*, ii. 200.

† The following are a few of the extracts:—"Two years in succession of such torments exceed the limits of human strength." Another,—"I am worn out with this life; continually exposed to fatigue and danger, without any appearance of a termination." A third,—"Louis is there, wounded and a prisoner; this, then, is the end of military

among multitudes thus cooped up together, under circumstances of such physical privation and mental depression. The diminution experienced in the effective force of the French army from these causes, was far greater than that occasioned by capture, or the sword of the enemy. From official documents it appears, that the total number of military inmates who were quartered on the inhabitants of Dresden and its suburbs, from the 15th June to the 15th November in this year, amounted to the enormous, and, if not proved by authentic evidence, incredible number of 5,062,871 different persons,* a result which can only be explained by recollecting how frequently armies of a hundred thousand men, with their followers, passed through its gates during that disastrous period; while, from equally certain evidence, it is proved that the military force at the disposal of Napoleon, which, when the armistice was broken, amounted to nearly three hundred and sixty thousand men present with the eagles, had, by the end of September, a period of only six weeks, sunk down to less than two hundred thousand combatants.' † CHAP. LXXI. 1813.

[1] Odel. ii. 196, 197. Lond. 140.

On the other hand, the condition of the Allies, since the struggle commenced, had sensibly ameliorated. They had lost, indeed, by sickness, prisoners, and the sword, above eighty thousand men since hostilities were renewed; but this number, great as

honours; this the issue of our prosperity." A fourth,—"Such a one has been killed: if this continue every one will be killed: such as survive one campaign will be cut down in the next."—FAIN, ii. 374, 375.

* See App. A., chap. lxxi., and ODELEBEN, *Témoin Oculaire*, 287.

† See App. B., chap. lxxi.—LORD BURGHERSH'S *War in Germany*, 316. App. No. ii.

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it was, would be nearly replaced by Benningsen's army, which was now advancing by rapid strides across Silesia, and which crossed the Elbe on the 25th, and reached Tœplitz in the beginning of October. Their troops were incomparably more healthy than the French. With the exception of the advance to Dresden in the end of August, when the fatigue had been excessive, the soldiers had not been exposed to any considerable hardships. Comfortably hutted or lodged in Bohemia, the grand allied army was able, by the advance of a few corps to a short distance on the frontier, to put the flower of the French troops in motion, and bring back Napoleon's guards, in breathless haste, from the extremity of Silesia to the summit of the Erzgebirge. Their wants, purveyed for by the wealth of England in the immense circle of Germany in their rear, were amply supplied: rations were regularly served out to the men; and the necessity of providing for their own wants, so fatal to military discipline and subordination, was almost unknown. The enthusiastic spirit and signal success of the troops, preserved them from mental depression; the sick and wounded were attended to in the rear, where contagion was not fostered by multitudes, and the kindly feelings of the peasantry alleviated the evils they had undergone; while the universal exhilaration and spirit which prevailed, served as a balm to the wounds of those who had been injured, and sent them back in an incredibly short time to the ranks of war.[1]

[1] Lond. 139, 140. Bout. 88.

The arrival of Benningsen's army at Tœplitz, where it was reviewed on the 1st October, and found in a very efficient state, along with the accession of eight thousand Prussians to Kleist's corps, raised the

Russian and Prussian armies in Bohemia, after all their losses, to eighty thousand effective men in the field, exclusive of the Austrians, who were full seventy thousand. This was the signal for the recommencement of great operations. The allied sovereigns were at first inclined to have gone into Schwartzenberg's plan, which was to have called Blucher's army, as well as that of Benningsen, into Bohemia, and acted by one line, by Kommotau and Chemnitz, on Leipsic, so as to intercept altogether the communications of the French army, and compel them to fight their way through two hundred and thirty thousand men back to the Rhine. But, independent of the consideration, that this would have left on Bernadotte's hands a force which he would not attempt to resist, if the enemy chose to cross the Elbe with all his forces, and carry the war into the hitherto untouched fields of Prussia, whereby Berlin would inevitably be taken, difficulties all but insuperable were experienced, when the proposal was mooted to place Blucher and the Silesian army under the immediate direction of the Austrian commander-in-chief. They had hitherto done very well at a distance, and when each obeyed the commands of his respective sovereign; but it was very doubtful whether this harmony would continue if they were brought into immediate and personal collision; little cordial co-operation could be expected from the hussar-like energy of the Prussian veteran and the methodical circumspection of the Austrian commander; and Blucher himself, whose opinion, age, and great services were entitled to respect, had expressed his disinclination to any such arrangement. It was, therefore, resolved to descend with the grand army of Bohemia and Benninsgen's corps alone into the plains

Plan of the Allies at this period.

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of Leipsic; and to unite Blucher's army to that of the Prince-Royal, which would form a mass of a hundred and fifty thousand men, capable, it was hoped, either of arresting any advance of the enemy in the direction of Berlin, or of co-operating in a general and decisive attack on his forces in the Saxon plains.[1]

[1] Jom. iv. 432, 433. Bout. 92. Lond. 142.

Movements of Blucher across the Elbe in conformity with this plan of operations. 21 October.

The different corps of the Allies forthwith received orders in conformity to these views. Blucher, as usual, was the first in motion. Leaving the division of Prince Czerbatow at Bautzen to cover Lusatia from the incursions of the garrison of Dresden, he marched with the remainder of his forces, about sixty-five thousand strong, towards the Elbe, and reached Elsterwerda, while the French corps there crossed at Meissen. To deceive the enemy, he caused Sacken's advanced guard to attack the bridge-head at that place; and, while their attention was forcibly drawn to that point, he himself marched rapidly by Hertsberg and Jessen, and on the night of the 2d October reached the Elbe, at the mouth of the Schwartze-Elster. Bridges were thrown across with incredible expedition; and such was the activity of all concerned in the operation, and the admirable arrangements made for its completion, that by six next morning half the army was across without experiencing the slightest opposition. Bertrand's corps, however, eighteen thousand strong, was strongly intrenched at Wartenberg, at a short distance from the river, and Blucher could not advance without forcing this position. He commenced the attack, accordingly, at eight o'clock with the troops which had effected the passage; and after six hours' hard fighting, drove the enemy from their position, with the loss of six hundred prisoners and an equal number killed

3d October.

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and wounded, though the loss of the Prussians, who were alone engaged, was hardly less considerable. On the following day, the remainder of the army effected its passage without opposition, and Blucher, moving forward, established his headquarters at Duben.[1]

[1] Bout. 93, 94. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 118, 119. Jom. iv. 433.

At the same time the Prince-Royal of Sweden crossed the Elbe without any resistance, the Russians at Ackow the Swedes at Rosslau, where headquarters were immediately established. His advanced posts were pushed forward, so as to enter into communication with Blucher from Duben; and on the day following Bulow and Tauenzein were also crossed over, leaving Thumen only, with fourteen thousand men, to continue the siege or blockade of Wittenberg. Ney, whose army was so reduced that he had under his immediate command only Regnier's corps, now not more than twelve thousand strong, was in no condition to make head against forces so considerable: he therefore evacuated Dessau, and retreated by Bitterfeldt towards Leipsic, summoning Bertrand to join his standard. At the same time the grand allied army began to defile by its left through the mountains, to penetrate into Saxony by the route of Sebastiansberg and Chemnitz. Colloredo remained at Tœplitz, to guard the magazines there, and Benningsen continued in the same place, but for a few days only, to rest his soldiers after their long march across Germany. The reserve of that army, under Prince Labanoff, presented striking marks of the prodigious efforts which Russia had made to recruit her forces; a great number of Tartars and Baschirs were to be found in its ranks, who had come from the Lake Baikal and the frontiers of China, and some of whom were armed with their

Movements of Bernadotte and Schwartzenberg.

October 4.

— 5.

— 6.

— 7.

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primitive weapons of bows and arrows. On the 3d October, the advanced guard, under Klenau, reached Chemnitz, where it was attacked, at first with success, by Prince Poniatowski at the head of his gallant Poles; but the indefatigable Platoff appeared on the flank of the victors as they were pursuing their advantages, and compelled them to make a precipitate retreat to Mittwerda. Next day the headquarters were advanced to Marienberg; a hundred thousand men had already entered the Saxon plains, while a hundred and thirty thousand had crossed the Elbe, under Blucher and Bernadotte, to encircle the French Emperor.[1]

October 4.

[1] Bout. 95, 96. Jom. iv. 433. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 119. Fain, ii. 363, 366.

Napoleon's views at this period.

While the vast armies of the Allies, acting upon an immense circle, and directed by consummate judgment, were thus drawing round the French army, and preparing to crush it in the position it had so long maintained on the banks of the Elbe, Napoleon, for the first time in his life, remained without any fixed plan, and watching merely the course of events to select his point of attack. When he first regained Dresden, after his last abortive expedition against Blucher, he said, "I will not go out again; I will wait:" and in effect he rested on his oars for ten days, constantly expecting his enemies to commit some fault, which would give him an opportunity of striking with effect. He summoned up Augereau with his newly raised corps, about fifteen thousand strong, to Leipsic from Mayence, where it had barely completed its military formation. Meanwhile, however, the losses sustained by the partizan warfare in his rear, and the frightful progress of famine and disease in Dresden, Torgau, and the other fortresses on the Elbe, rendered it indispensable for the French army to move: the Emperor had no alternative but to do so, or see his army melt

away and sink to the last stage of weakness before his eyes without firing a shot. The rapid march of Blucher to the Elbe; the movements of the grand army towards Kommotau and Chemnitz; the passage of the Elbe by Bernadotte at Rosslau—all indicated a determination on the part of the Allies to hem him in on every side, and possibly renew on the banks of the Elbe the catastrophe of the Berezina. Napoleon felt his danger; and calling St Cyr to his cabinet at midnight on the 6th October, he thus expressed himself upon the prospects of the campaign.[1]

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[1] St Cyr, iv. 178, 185.

"I am going to leave Dresden," said he, "and I will take Vandamme's and your own corps with me. I am certainly about to engage in a decisive battle: if I gain it, I shall regret not having had my whole forces at my disposal to profit by it; if, on the other hand, I experience a reverse, you will be of no use to me in the battle; and, shut up here, you will be lost without resource. Besides, what is Dresden now to me? It can no longer be considered as the pivot of the army, which is unable to find subsistence in the exhausted country which surrounds it. As little can it be considered as a great depot; for there remain in it only provisions for a few days: almost all the stores of ammunition are exhausted, and what little remains may be distributed among the soldiers. There are at Dresden twelve thousand sick or wounded; but they will almost all die, being the remains of sixty thousand who have entered the hospitals since the opening of the campaign. When winter sets in, the Elbe no longer affords a position: being frozen, it can be passed at every point. I am about to take up another position, which is defensible at every point. I will throw back my right as far as Erfurth, support my left by Magdeburg, and my

His admirable views expressed to St Cyr.

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centre by the heights forming the left bank of the Saale, which form a material bulwark, at all times capable of arresting an enemy. Magdeburg will become to me another Dresden: it is a noble fortress, which can be left as long as necessary to its own resources, without the risk of seeing it carried, as Dresden might have been during the three days that the Allies were before its suburbs, if they had been commanded by a man of capacity. Dresden can never be made a strong place without destroying the vast suburbs which at present constitute the chief part of that beautiful capital. In addition to this, it would require to be re-stored with ammunition and provisions, and it is now impossible to introduce them. In fine, I wish to change my position. Dresden is too near Bohemia: no sooner have I left it, even upon the shortest expedition, than the enemy are before its walls; and I have not the means of preventing that by threatening their rear. By the more distant position which I propose to take, I will be in a situation to direct great strokes against them, and force them to a durable peace."[1] St Cyr expressed his entire concurrence in these lucid and masterly opinions; and he was dismissed with the assurance that next morning he would receive the requisite formal order for the destruction of the blockhouses, palisades, and exterior fortifications of Dresden, and the evacuation of its stores upon Magdeburg.

[1] St Cyr, iv. 186, 188.

Early next morning Napoleon set out from Dresden, and had a conference with Murat at Meissen; but, instead of then following out the plan he had formed, and transmitting the instructions he had promised to St Cyr, for the evacuation of the capital, he totally altered his views, transmitted orders

to that general to hold it to the last extremity, and placed under his orders his own and the remains of Vandamme's corps, about thirty thousand sabres and bayonets, besides twelve thousand sick and wounded, who encumbered the hospitals. With the bulk of his forces the Emperor marched to the northward, with the intention of joining the army of Ney in the vicinity of Torgau, and resuming his favourite project of an attack on Berlin; not without the hope that he would succeed, with his army in a central position between Bernadotte and Blucher, in separating the one of these commanders from the other, and beating them both in succession. To cover his communications, and keep in check the grand allied army, which was now fast issuing from Bohemia towards Leipsic, by Marienburg and Chemnitz, he detached Murat, with fifty thousand men, composed of the corps of Victor, Lauriston, and Poniatowski, to Freyberg, with instructions to retard the advance of the enemy as long as possible, and when he could no longer keep his ground retire towards Leipsic and the Upper Mulda.* The imperial guard and cavalry, with Macdonald's and Marmont's corps, fol-

Napoleon alters his plan, sets out to join Ney, and leaves St Cyr at Dresden. Oct. 7.

* Napoleon's instructions to Murat, which explained his views at this period, were in these terms:—"I have raised the siege of Wittenberg: I have separated the corps of Sacken from that of Langeron and D'York: Augereau this evening will be at Lutzen or Leipsic, and Arrighi has orders to join him, which will bring you a reinforcement of at least 30,000 men. One of two things will happen: either I will attack the enemy to-morrow and beat him, or, if he retires, I will burn the bridges over the Elbe. Then you will do what you can to preserve Leipsic, so as to give me time to beat the army of Silesia; but if you are obliged to quit Leipsic, you should direct your course to the Mulda: the bridges of Duben and Eulenburg are guarded. My intention is to pass over to the right bank of the Elbe, and to manœuvre between Magdeburg and Dresden, debouching by one of my four places on that river to surprise the enemy."—See JOMINI's *Vie de Napoleon*, iv. 435, 436.

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lowed the standards of the Emperor; and, joined to the corps of Oudinot, Bertrand, and Regnier, under Ney, would form a mass of a hundred and twenty-five thousand men, with which he proposed to strike the redoubtable blows which he meditated in the direction of Berlin. The King of Saxony, with his family and court, left Dresden in the suite of the Emperor: it was a mournful sight when the long train of carriages, amidst the tears of the inhabitants, defiled through the streets, and the sovereign, leaving his beloved capital to the horrors of an inevitable siege, set out a suppliant or a captive in the iron ranks of war.[1]*

[1] Fain, ii. 366, 367. Norvin's Recueil de 1813; ii. 371, 372. Jom. iv. 434. Odel. ii. 210, 211.

Dresden is left to St Cyr, and surrounded by the enemy.

The rapid evacuation of the right bank of the Elbe, in pursuance of these orders for the concentration of the army, prevented the execution to the letter of the rigorous orders of Napoleon, which were "to carry off all the cattle, burn the woods, and destroy the fruit-trees." The officers entrusted with the execution of this inhuman order found various excuses, and, in general, had not time to execute instructions which would have reduced a large part of Saxony, where they had been treated with so much hospitality, to a desert wilderness. The rapid approach of the allied armies, who covered the whole right bank of the river, and were already descending from the Bohemian hills by Pirna and Sonnenstein, threw back the numerous swarm of stragglers whom the French had left behind them. Dresden was speedily invested on all sides, and numerous covered boats, laden with crowds of sick and

* Napoleon's notes on the position of the French and the Allies, and the different plans which he had entertained for the conduct of the campaign at this critical juncture, are very curious and instructive.—See APPENDIX C, Chap. LXXI; and NORVIN'S *Recueil de* 1813, ii. 366.

wounded, in the last stage of weakness and contagion, were daily arriving within its walls. Nothing could be more revolting than the conduct of the French military to these miserable wretches, when there was no longer any prospect of their being serviceable in the campaign. A soldier in the last stage of dysentery was found lying by the roadside, almost buried in a dunghill, and uttering the most piteous cries. One said in passing, "That is no business of ours;" another, "I have no orders on the subject." An officer passed by, and exclaimed—"He is not to be pitied—he is about to die."[1]

[1] Tém. Ocul. ii. 212, 213. Odel. ii. 213.

As soon as Napoleon was informed of the passage of the Elbe by the Prince-Royal, he moved forward to interpose between his army and that of Silesia, and, if possible, crush one or other before any assistance could be obtained. With this view he pushed on at the head of a hundred and twenty-five thousand men. The French army, being concentrated, had the fairest prospect of falling on the detached columns of Blucher's army, which were marching across from the Elbe, in the direction of Bernadotte's forces. Langeron and D'York alone were at the headquarters at Duben, Sacken being between Eulenburg and Torgau. So late was the Prussian general of receiving information of the approach of danger, that it was only by a sudden decision and immediate movement, that he extricated himself from his perilous situation. On the 9th he passed the Mulda, and by forced marches joined Bernadotte with all his forces, late on the evening of the 10th, at Zoerbig. On the same day Napoleon established his headquarters at Duben, which Blucher had left the morning before.[1] So near was Sacken being cut off, that in following the wake of Blucher towards

Napoleon advances against Blucher, who joins Bernadotte.

Oct. 9. —— 10.

[1] Bout. 97, 98. Jom. iv. 436, 437. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 120, 121. Fain, ii. 369, 370.

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Duben on the evening of the 9th, he found the town already occupied by the French advanced guard, and only got on by filing to his right, and making a detour by the village of Sokana, where he passed the night.

The Allies march to the west, and pass Napoleon, who prepares to cross the Elbe and invade Prussia.

The decisive crisis was now approaching: every moment was precious; the fate of Europe hung in the balance, suspended almost even; a feather would make it incline either way. Both parties now adopted equally bold resolutions; and it was hard to say which would be first pierced to the heart in the desperate thrusts that were about to be exchanged. Each army had passed the other, and lay in great strength upon his opponent's communications; Blucher and Bernadotte at Zoerbig were between Napoleon and the Rhine, while he at Duben was

Oct. 10.

between them and the Elbe. Both thought that, by threatening their adversary's communications, they would draw him back or reduce him to the defensive,

Oct. 11.

and both acted on this principle. On the 11th the Prince-Royal and Blucher, leaving Thumen before Wittenberg, and Tauenzein at Dessau, to guard the passage of the Elbe, instead of returning towards the Elbe, marched still further to the south-west, and established themselves at Halle and Rothenburg, directly between Napoleon and the Rhine, and in such a situation that they could open up a communication across the plain of Saxony with the grand army descending from Bohemia. Napoleon, on his part, pushed forward Regnier to Wittenberg, and Ney to Dessau. The former, with the aid of the garrison of the besieged fortress, speedily raised the siege of Wittenberg, and drove Thumen, who commanded the blockading force, before him towards Rosslau; while Tauenzein, finding himself in no

condition to make head against Ney at Dessau, fell back with considerable loss to the same place, and, after breaking down the bridge over the Elbe, continued his retreat by Zerbot, towards Potsdam and Berlin. Napoleon was highly elated with these advantages, and seeing the road to that capital open before him, entertained the project of carrying the war into the heart of the Prussian territory, rallying to his standard the besieged garrisons on the Oder, and establishing his winter quarters, supported by Torgau, Magdeburg, and Wittenberg, in the hitherto untouched fields of northern Germany.[1]* Oct. 12.

[1] Bout. 98, 99. Napoleon to St Cyr, Oct. 10, 1813. Jom iv. 436. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 120, 121. Vaud. i. 196, 197.

False movement of Bernadotte towards the Elbe.

Although, however, Napoleon did not prosecute his projected movement upon Berlin, and even withdrew Regnier back to Wittenberg, yet his demonstrations against that capital had the effect of withdrawing Bernadotte from his true line of operations, and endangering in the last degree the army of Silesia. On the 12th October, he detached himself from Blucher, recrossed the Saale, and moved back towards the Elbe as far as Coethen. The forces under his command, however, as Tauenzein was on the other side of that river, did not exceed fifty thousand combatants, with which he could never have hoped to stop Napoleon at the head of a hundred and twenty thousand; while the separation seriously endangered Blucher, whose communications were now entirely cut off, and who had lost a considerable part of his baggage by the operation of the French light horse

* Napoleon at this period wrote to St Cyr:—"I have raised the siege of Wittenberg; the army of Silesia is in full retreat by the left bank; to-morrow I will compel it to receive battle, or abandon the bridges of Dessau and Wartenburg. I shall then probably pass over to the right bank with all my army; and it is by the right bank I will return to Dresden."—NAPOLEON *to* ST CYR, *11th October* 1813. JOMINI, iv. 436.

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on his rear. Bernadotte's true policy would have been to have continued united to Blucher, who had so gallantly made his way to him through many dangers across the Elbe; and their united force, a hundred and thirty thousand strong, might not only have bid defiance to Napoleon, but would have entirely cut him off from the Rhine, and rendered his retreat to France or even Holland impossible.[1]

[1] Bout. 150. Vict. et Conq. xii. 121, 122. Vaud. 197, 198.

Advance of the grand allied army towards Leipsic.

Meanwhile, however, the grand allied army was not idle. Issuing from the defiles of the Bohemian mountains, Klenau, on the extreme left, pushed as far as Penig on the 6th, on the direct road to Leipsic, while Wittgenstein on the right reached Altenburg on the same day. Meanwhile, Murat marched from Freyberg to Orderau—a central position at the foot of the high mountains, well calculated at once to maintain his connexion with the garrison of Dresden, and keep in check the advancing columns. On the day following, Schwartzenberg moved his headquarters with the bulk of his army to Chemnitz; and although Murat, Poniatowski, and Victor exerted themselves to the utmost, and the Poles even regained Penig, and drove back Klenau to a considerable distance, yet the continued approach of the vast masses of the Allies on all the roads, turned all the positions which they took up, and compelled them to fall back towards Leipsic. It was impossible that fifty thousand men could maintain their ground against a hundred and twenty thousand. The Austrians, constantly pressing forward, gained ground in every quarter, and on the night of the 9th, their advanced guard, under Prince Maurice of Lichtenstein and Thielman, surprized Wetlau, between Naumburg and Weissenfels, and on the direct road from Leipsic to Mayence. This movement in advance, however, which, by destroying the French

Oct. 6.

Oct. 7.

Oct. 8.

Oct. 9.

communications, would have been of the very highest importance if effected by a large body of the Allies, totally failed in its effect from the insufficiency of the means employed. Augereau, who was hurrying up by forced marches to Leipsic, next morning attacked them with great vigour, and not only cleared the road, but defeated the allied advanced guard with considerable loss. On the 12th, Augereau with fifteen thousand men entered Leipsic, where a considerable concentration of troops had already taken place. On the allied right, Wittgenstein continued to advance, though not without experiencing considerable resistance, and after several severe combats with Murat's cavalry. The forward movement, however, of the allied right, rendered Murat's position at Orderau no longer tenable, and he was obliged to fall back along the course of the Tchoppa to Mittwerda. On all sides the allied forces were approaching Leipsic, and already their advanced posts were within sight of that city. On the same day on which Augereau entered it, Giulay made himself master of Weissenfels, on the road to France from Leipsic, where he captured twelve hundred sick and wounded; and, two days afterwards, Schwartzenberg made a reconnoissance with the corps of Klenau and Wittgenstein, which led to a severe action between three thousand of Murat's horse and Pahlen's dragoons, which, after several gallant charges, terminated in the overthrow of the French by sixteen squadrons of Prussian cuirassiers, in which the former lost almost all the veteran cavalry under Milhaud, eighteen hundred strong, which had just arrived from Spain.*

Oct. 10.

Oct. 12.

Oct. 14.

Vict. et Conq. xxii. 123, 125. Bout. 103, 104. Vaud i. 199, 200. Norvin, Recueil de 1813, ii. 380.

* The Russian cavalry on this occasion were overwhelmed by the great superiority of the enemy, and would have been destroyed had it not been for the brilliant charge of the Prussian cuirassiers, who threw

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While the vast masses of the Allies were thus in all directions concentrating towards Leipsic, Napoleon remained inactive at Duben, waiting the concentration of his corps to carry into execution the plan which he had so long meditated, of transferring the war to the Prussian territory, and, under the protection of the strong places which he still held on the Elbe and the Oder, maintain the contest in the space hitherto untouched between these two rivers.* When he came to propose this bold design, however, to his marshals, he experienced an unanimous and most determined resistance. They were not equally sanguine with the Emperor as to the success of future operations; they had experienced the inability of their troops to contend with the Allies when the

Napoleon's project for carrying the war into Prussia.

themselves upon the enemy, in the midst of their triumph, with the most determined courage. When Colonel Boutourlin, Alexander's aide-de-camp, expressed to an officer engaged in it the high admiration which he felt at witnessing their gallant bearing, the brave Prussian replied, "Comrade, could we do less? this is the anniversary of the battle of Jena."—BOUTOURLIN, 106. In the course of this desperate cavalry encounter, six regiments of cuirassiers, which had come up with Augereau, and had recently arrived from Spain, were almost totally destroyed. Murat, who threw himself with his wonted gallantry upon the enemy, was on the point of being made prisoner. When the Prussian cuirassiers broke those of France in the close of the day, he was obliged to fly, closely pursued by the enemy; and an officer who headed the pursuit, almost touching the monarch, repeatedly called out, "Stop, stop, king!" A faithful follower of Joachim passed his sword through the pursuer's body, and so effected the monarch's deliverance; for which he was made an esquire of the king on the spot, and next day received the decoration of the Legion of Honour from Napoleon.—ODEL.

*"The plan of the Emperor was to have allowed the Allies to advance into the territory between the Elbe and the Saale, and then, manœuvring under protection of the fortresses and the magazines of Dresden, Torgau, Wittenberg, and Hamburg, to have carried the war into the territory between the Elbe and the Oder, on which latter river, France still held Glogau, Stettin, and Custrin; and, according to circumstances, to have raised the blockade of Dantzic, Zamosc, and Modlin, on the Vistula. Such was the success which might have been expected from that vast plan, that the coalition would have been disorganized by it."—NAPOLEON *in Montholon*, ii. 125.

animating effect of his presence was no longer felt; and they not unnaturally entertained the greatest dread of plunging, with two hundred and fifty thousand men, into the north of Germany, when four hundred thousand allied troops were prepared to interpose between them and the Rhine, and cut them off entirely from their communications with the French empire. Granting that they would find provisions for a considerable period in the fields of northern Prussia, and shelter from the fortresses of the Elbe and the Oder, of which they still retained possession, how were they to get ammunition and military stores for so vast a host in the plains of Brandenburg, or forage for their cavalry amidst the clouds of light horse by which they would speedily be enveloped? In the desperate strife in which they would be engaged, when each party threw himself upon his enemy's communications, and disregarded his own, was it not probable that two hundred and fifty thousand would be crushed by four hundred and fifty thousand, and the party inferior in light horse by the one which had so great a superiority in that formidable arm? Above all, what would the Allies lose by the war being transferred into Prussia but Berlin, and the warlike resources, now nearly exhausted, of that diminutive realm?—they still retained Austria, Silesia, and southern Germany, from which they could derive all their supplies; but if the French army were irrevocably cut off from the Rhine, a very few weeks' warfare, such as that which had recently occurred, would exhaust all their resources; and the very magnitude of their forces would the sooner paralyse them, from the failure of all the muniments of war.[1]

[1] Jom. iv. 438, 439. Fain, ii. 372, 373. Las Cases, vi. 38, 40. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 121, 122.

Notwithstanding these obvious considerations,

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Napoleon was strongly bent upon carrying his bold project into execution; and the four days that he spent at Duben, endeavouring to overcome the repugnance of his marshals, and revolving in his mind the probable risks and advantages of the undertaking, were among the most gloomy and painful of his life.

Napoleon's interview with his marshals, and reasons for advancing to Berlin.

"When the intentions of the Emperor," says Caulaincourt, "to cross the Elbe, and carry the war into Prussia, became known, there was a general explosion of murmurs in the army. 'Are we then,' said they, 'to recommence a levy of bucklers in Prussia, and go and bury the remains of the army at Berlin? Has he not yet slaughtered enough? this will never come to an end. It is too late to adventure on this perilous campaign. Had he replaced us on the Rhine, we should have found winter quarters; and in spring, if necessary, resumed the offensive. We have had enough of fighting: we must regain France.' I was in the salon of the Emperor when the staff in a body came to supplicate him to abandon his projects on Berlin, and march on Leipsic. No one who did not witness that deplorable scene, can conceive what he suffered in that moment. The reasons they advanced were futile in the extreme. He remained cold and reserved. 'My plan,' replied he, 'has been deeply calculated: I have admitted into it, as a probable contingency, the defection of Bavaria: I am convinced that the plan of marching on Berlin is good. A retrograde movement, in the circumstances in which we are placed, is a disastrous step; and those who oppose my projects have undertaken a serious responsibility—I will think on it, gentlemen.' With these words he re-entered his cabinet, and remained the whole remainder of the day wrapped in thought, silent and moody. The weather was

sombre and cold: the wind blew with violence, and moaned through the vast corridors of the ancient chateau of Duben, and its old lead-encased windows trembled in their sockets. Every thing in that mournful residence bore the character of profound melancholy."[1] It is interesting to recollect that exactly similar circumstances attended the decisive debate in the National Assembly of France on the 17th June 1789, when the sovereignty of the nation was assumed, the monarchy overthrown, and the march of the Revolution rendered inevitable.*

[1] Caul. Souvenirs. i, 261, 263.

In spite of all the obstacles which the marshals threw in his way, it is probable that the Emperor would have ventured on the movement immediately; but news arrived on the 12th, which rendered it impossible. The cabinet of Munich, which, ever since the war began in Germany, had been besieged with entreaties on the part of its subjects to abandon the confederation of the Rhine and join the alliance against France, had at length, notwithstanding its strong partiality for Napoleon, and natural gratitude for the benefits he had conferred upon the Bavarian governments, been compelled to yield; and a treaty signed at Ried, on the 8th of October, had secured the accession of Bavaria to the grand alliance. This important event, which the Emperor had foreseen, as he had been forewarned of it by the King of Bavaria, but which was not equally expected by the army, gave great additional weight to the marshals who urged a return to France. "By this inconceivable defection of Bavaria," said they, "the question is entirely changed: we must look forward to the other defections which will follow. Wirtemberg, Baden, and Darmstadt, will be swept away by the impulse given so violently to the north of Germany. The Austrian army,

Defection of Bavaria, which overturns his project. Nov. 12.

* Ante, i. 201.

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which was on the Inn, is doubtless already in march for the Rhine. The Bavarian army will follow it. They will draw after them the whole armed force which they find on their road, and then our frontier is at once menaced and invaded. What can be so urgent, then, as to draw near to it? It is always, without doubt, an evil to change a plan; and the peril here is the greater, that we must operate towards the Rhine, when we were prepared to have marched across the Elbe. But is it not better to resign ourselves to it, than to lose every thing? Circumstances have changed: we must change with them." The Emperor was not convinced by these reasons, how weighty soever they might appear; but he yielded to the torrent, and gave orders to recall Regnier and Bertrand, who were making ready to march on Berlin, and all was prepared for a retreat to Leipsic.[1]

[1] Fain. ii. 377, 378. Jom. v. 439, 440.

Fearful danger with which the French were environed.

When this resolution was taken, however, matters had proceeded to such extremities, that it was not only impossible to regain the Rhine without a battle, but the losses likely to be incurred, in case of disaster, were frightful. St Cyr was to be left at Dresden with thirty-five thousand men, Davoust with twenty-five thousand at Hamburg; Magdeburg, Wittenberg, and Torgau, had each their garrison, which would be speedily surrounded; and if the French army were obliged to continue its retreat to the Rhine, it was easy to foresee that the whole fortresses on the Elbe, with ninety thousand men in arms within their walls, would become the prey of the victor. Magdeburg contained the great magazine of provisions for the army: the grand park of artillery, and reserves of ammunition, which had been stopped at Eulenburg, were hurried into Torgau;

while the King of Saxony prepared to follow the fortunes of the grand army to Leipsic. In this way, Napoleon set out to fight his way back to the Rhine, through two hundred and fifty thousand enemies, separated both from his magazines and his reserve artillery and ammunition. It must be admitted that a more perilous position could hardly be conceived, and that the system of pushing forward, and making war maintain war, had now been strained till it was ready to burst. The Emperor felt his danger; but still trusted to his star. "A thunderbolt," said he afterwards, "alone could have saved us; but nothing was desperate so long as I had the chances of a battle; and in our position a single victory might have restored to us the north as far as Dantzic."[1]

[1] Las Cases, vi. 38. Fain, ii. 378, 381.

Universal joy with which the French army received the orders to move towards Leipsic.

With joyful steps, the army obeyed the order to face about and march towards the Rhine. Joy beamed in every countenance; the sounds of mirth were heard in every rank: at length their sufferings were to come to an end, and they were to revisit their beloved France. The Emperor set out early on the morning of the 15th, and arrived at noon at LEIPSIC, where Marmont and Augereau had for some days past united their forces. In approaching the city, which he already foresaw was to be the theatre of a decisive battle, he cast an eager glance over the heights of Pfaffendorf, and the windings of the Partha, which protect on that side the approach to the town. He then rode out to survey the ramparts, which encircle the old city and separate it from the suburbs; and, while doing so, the sound of cannon was heard in the direction of Pegau. It was the King of Naples, who, on the position of Magdeborn, arrested the approach of the advanced guard of Schwartzenberg's army. Five corps, and a numerous

CHAP. LXXI. 1813. Oct. 13. body of cavalry, in all eighty thousand men, were there assembled under his orders. He had previously intended to conduct the bulk of his army through Leipsic, and join the Emperor to the north of that city, conceiving that it was in that direction that the battle was to be fought; and, under this idea, he had abandoned to the enemy the important defiles at Grobern and Gochrew: but, being informed the same day of the resolution of Napoleon to hold the town to the last extremity, he retraced his steps the day following, and took post on the heights of Magdeborn, where the severe cavalry action took place between the French dragoons and Russian and Prussian cuirassiers, which has already been noticed.[1]

Oct. 14.

[1] Jom. iv. 446, 447. Fain. ii. 383, 384. Bout. 108, 109.

Description of the town and environs of Leipsic.

The old city of Leipsic, which is of no great extent, is surrounded by an irregular rampart, which forms nearly a square. It consists of an old curtain of masonry, covered by a ditch almost obliterated, without a counterscarp, beyond which broad boulevards, planted with trees, form a spacious and shady walk for the citizens. The suburbs, which stretch, as in most continental cities, beyond this verdant belt, were much more considerable at that period; and they were then, as now, also shut in towards the south and east, by walls, and the gates strengthened by palisades: but towards the north, on the side of the Partha, they were altogether open. To the eastward, on the road to France, the city is bounded by the marshes of the Elster and the Pleisse, which streams, flowing in a lazy current to the north-west, enclose between them swampy meadows nearly two miles broad, wholly impassable for carriages; and though the rivers are of no great breadth, they are so deep and muddy, that they are in most places unfordable either by cavalry or infantry. This broad marsh is

crossed only by the road to Lutzen and Mayence, which, after traversing the long and narrow street which leads to the barrier of Machranstadt, enters the city by the gate of Halle, over a bridge at the same place. There were no other bridges over the Elster but one or two wooden ones for foot passengers, and the stone bridge over which the great road passes, well known from the frightful catastrophe a few days after, which has rendered it immortal in history. To the east the country consists of a beautiful plain, in the highest state of cultivation, offering a theatre worthy of the battle which was to decide the fate of the world. To the south-east, like a chain of verdure, extend the hills of WACHAU, then occupied in force by Murat's army; while to the north-east, in the direction of Mockern, the windings of the Partha, and the gentle swells and villages adjoining its banks, present a variety of obstacles to retard the advance of an approaching enemy.[1]

[1] Personal observations. Bout. 161. Cap. ix. Introd. 15. Fain, ii. 383.

No sooner was the arrival of the Emperor known to Murat, than he hastened to wait upon him; and the two sovereigns rode out together towards the heights behind Lieberwolkwitz, from whence the whole plain to the south-east of Leipsic can be descried. From an elevated point in that direction, near the bed of the Pleisse, Napoleon surveyed the whole field, and gave the necessary orders for the day following. Seated by a blazing watchfire, after his usual custom, in the midst of the squares of his guard, he long and anxiously surveyed the ground, and in particular the mossy and swampy beds of the Pleisse and the Elster, which extended, in a broad belt nearly two leagues across, in the rear of the whole position occupied by the French army. From

Napoleon inspects the field of battle.

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thence he rode on to the hills of Lieberwolkwitz, from which elevated ridge, not only the positions of his own troops, but the advanced posts of the enemy, were visible. A few gun-shots only separated the two armies. The heads of the Russian and Austrian columns appeared in great strength within cannon range; but as yet all was still: not a sound was heard, and no appearance of hostilities was visible. Here an imposing ceremony took place, in the distribution of eagles by Napoleon to three regiments which had not hitherto received them; and he returned to Leipsic by the course of the Pleisse, after inspecting Poniatowski's Poles, who occupied the marshy banks of that stream.[1]

[1] Odel. i. 15, 17. Fain, ii. 381, 383.

Positions of the French army round Leipsic. Oct. 15.

The positions occupied by the French army on the night of the 15th, were as follow:—Bertrand's corps held Lindenau, at the entrance of the chaussée which crossed the marshes of the Elster, in order to cover that important defile, and keep at a distance a strong column of the enemy, which, having gained the great road to Erfurth, menaced the rear, and had already entirely cut off the communications, of the French army. To the eastward of the marshes, under the immediate command of the Emperor, three corps were stationed, facing to the southward; viz. Poniatowski's Poles on the right, on the edge of the Elster and Pleisse, between Mark-Kleberg and Connewitz; next Augereau, on the southern slope of the heights of Wachau, flanked on either side by Milhaud's cavalry; behind Wachau was placed Victor's men; from thence to Lieberwolkwitz stretched Lauriston's corps; on their left, Macdonald's extended to Holzhausen;[2] Latour Maubourg and Sebastiani's horse stood on either flank of Victor's corps; while the imperial guard, around Napoleon, were in

[2] Vict. et Conq. xxii. 127. Bout. 112. Vaud. i. 204. Kausler, 932.

reserve near Probstheyda. In all, six corps of infantry and four of horse, mustering a hundred and ten thousand men, of whom eighteen thousand were cavalry; and of these a hundred thousand were to the eastward of the Pleisse, and on the proper field of battle.

Force and position of the French on the north of Leipsic.

To the north-west of Leipsic, but so far removed from it as to be a separate army, a considerable force was collected to combat Blucher and the Prince-Royal of Sweden, who, in that direction, were drawing near to the city with a formidable array of troops. They consisted of Marmont's corps and two divisions of Ney's, which were posted between MOCKERN and Enteritch; the other division of Ney's corps, with the artillery, were on march from Duben, but had not yet taken up their ground. Arrighi's cavalry, however, three thousand strong, had come up, and Regnier's Saxons were hourly expected. The forces on the ground consisted of forty-five thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry. The whole army, already arrived or on the road from Duben, and certain to take part in the battle, amounted to a hundred and forty thousand infantry and thirty-five thousand cavalry, with seven hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, distributed in three hundred and eighty-four battalions, and three hundred and seventy-two squadrons. An immense force! equal to that with which Napoleon had conquered at Wagram, and superior to that which had fought at Borodino;* but, great as it was, it was overmatched by the ranks of the Allies, who had now arrayed under their banners the greatest military force that modern Europe had ever seen assembled in a single field.[1]

[1] Vaud. i. 201, 204. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 127, 128. Bout. 108, 109. Lab. ii. 379. Kausler, 932. Bat. de Leipsic, Posen, 1835, 32.

* Ante, vii. 469; viii. 694.

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The forces of the Allies were divided, like the French, into two armies; the principal of which, under Schwartzenberg, was opposed to the grand army of Napoleon, while that of the north, under Bernadotte and Blucher, advanced against Ney and Marmont. They were thus arranged in the grand army for the attack of the French from the south. On their own left, opposite to the French right, and on the edge of the morass of the Elster, stood Giulay's corps of Austrians, with Lichtenstein and Thielman's light troops; the centre, opposite to Wachau, and from thence towards the Elster, was very strong, consisting of Meerfeldt and the Prince of Hesse-Homberg's Austrians, Wittgenstein's Russians, and Kleist's Prussians; while the right wing, opposed to Macdonald and Lauriston, was composed of Klenau's corps of Austrians; Ziethen's brigade of Prussians, who were at Gross Pothna, having their extreme flank covered by the Cossacks under Platoff. The reserve, consisting of the Russian and Prussian guards, and two divisions of cuirassiers, under the Grand Duke Constantine and Milaradowitch, were at Magdeborn. The great defect of this arrangement, but which no representations on the part of the Russian generals could induce Prince Schwartzenberg to alter, was, that the rivers Elster and Pleisse flowed through the middle of the allied line, separating thus the left wing from the centre, and one part of the centre from the other—a most perilous situation, if any disaster had rendered it necessary for one part of the allied line to assist the other, and which exposed the portion of it which was placed between the two rivers to imminent danger. The Austrian general even carried his infatuation so far, as to desire to place the flower of the allied army, the

Position of the grand allied army to the south of Leipsic.

Russian and Prussian guards, in the narrow space between the Pleisse and the Elster; and it was only by the determined resistance of the Emperor Alexander, that they were brought to the decisive point on the right, to the east of both these rivers. Although Benningsen's corps and Colloredo's reserves had not yet come up, the force here assembled was immense: it consisted of no less than a hundred and forty-three thousand combatants, of which twenty-five thousand were cavalry, with six hundred and twenty guns. Benningsen and Colloredo's reserve, although not in time for a battle on the 16th, might be expected on the day following; and they were thirty-eight thousand more, of whom three thousand were horse, with a hundred and thirty pieces of cannon.[1]

[1] Kausler, 931. Vaud. i. 202. Bout. 110, 111. Jom. iv. 448, 449.

To the north of Leipsic, the disproportion was still greater. The armies of Silesia and Bernadotte, which lay in that direction, formed in all a mass of a hundred and three thousand combatants, of whom sixteen thousand were cavalry, with three hundred and ninety pieces of cannon. They had not all, however, come up. Bernadotte, as already mentioned, had made an eccentric movement towards the Elbe, and those in line consisted only of the corps of Langeron and D'York, with Sacken in reserve, which had their headquarters at Skenditz, on the road to Halle; and they amounted to fifty-six thousand effective men, with three hundred and fifty-six guns. Thus the contending parties towards Mockern were very nearly matched on the first day; the French having forty-eight thousand, and the Allies fifty-six thousand men. But if the contest should be prolonged for another day, and the Prince-Royal come up in time to take part in it, forty-seven thousand additional

Forces and position of the Allies to the north of Leipsic.

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combatants would be thrown into the balance, to which the French reserves brought from Duben, would not oppose more than thirty thousand. Thus, upon the whole, for the final shock on which the contest would ultimately depend, the Allies could count upon two hundred and ninety thousand men, and above thirteen hundred guns; while the French could only reckon on a hundred and seventy-five thousand men, and seven hundred and twenty pieces of cannon: a great disproportion, which all the advantages of Napoleon's central position and great abilities could hardly compensate; and which demonstrated that the formidable military confederacy, of which he had so long formed the head, was now fairly overmatched by the vast host which its intolerable exactions had arrayed to assert the independence of mankind.[1]*

[1] Bout. 121. Kausler, 931, 932. Vaud. ii. 202, 203. Fain, ii. 405.

Schwartzenberg's proclamation to his troops, and feelings of the soldiers on both sides.

At midnight on the night of the 15th, two rockets were sent up to a prodigious height from the headquarters of Prince Schwartzenberg, to the south of Leipsic, and were immediately answered by three, two of a blue and one of a red light, from Blucher's, on the north. These awful signals told the assembled myriads, that all things were in readiness in both armies, and that the hour of the final struggle had struck. All was tranquil in the French lines: their watchfires burned with a steady light, and no moving figures around the flame indicated an intention to retreat. Unspeakable was the ardour which the solemnity of the moment excited in the allied ranks. Now was the appointed time—now was the day of salvation. Retreat to the enemy without a

* See App. D., Chap. LXXI., where a detailed account of the whole forces engaged on either side, at Leipsic, is given.

conflict was impossible: the host of Germany encircled his ranks: on the morrow, the mighty conflict which was to avenge the wrongs of twenty years, and determine whether they and their children were to be freemen or slaves, was to be decided. Confidence pervaded every bosom: hope beat high in every heart: recent success, present strength, seemed the certain harbingers of victory. A sombre feeling of disquietude, on the other hand, pervaded the French army: their ancient courage was the same, their hereditary spirit was unshaken; but disaster had chilled their ardour, diminished numbers depressed their hopes, and their confidence in the star of the Emperor had been irrevocably shaken. Still they looked forward undaunted to the fight, and resolved to show themselves, under whatever fortune, worthy of the eagles which they bore. At daybreak, the following noble proclamation was issued by Prince Schwartzenberg, and read at the head of every company and squadron in his army:—

"The most important epoch of this sacred war has arrived, brave warriors! Prepare for the combat. The bond which unites so many powerful nations in the most just, as the greatest of causes, is about to be yet closer drawn, and rendered indissoluble on the field of battle. Russians, Prussians, Austrians! you all combat for the same cause: you fight for the liberty of Europe—for the independence of your children—for the immortal renown of your names. All for each! each for all! With this device, the sacred combat is about to commence. Be faithful at the decisive moment, and victory is your own." No proclamation was issued to the French army: no heart-stirring words breathed the fire of Napoleon's spirit, or announced the well-known prophecy of victory[1]—

[1] Capef. x. 218.

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an ominous circumstance, indicating in no equivocal manner that the Emperor's confidence in his fortune was at an end.

Commencement of the battle, and early success of the Allies.

Early in the morning of the 16th, Napoleon repaired to the army of Murat, and, from a height near Lieberwolkwitz, long and anxiously surveyed the field of the approaching battle. Precisely at nine three guns were discharged from the centre of Schwartzenberg's army, and immediately the fire began along the whole line. The allied columns, dark and massy, advanced to the attack in the most imposing array; two hundred pieces of cannon preceded their march, and soon the cannonade on the two sides exceeded any thing ever heard of in the annals of war. The earth, literally speaking, trembled under the discharge, on the two sides, of above a thousand guns: the balls flew over every part of the field of battle, and killed several persons in Napoleon's suite, as well as in the guards and cuirassiers, who were stationed a little in rear; while through the midst of the iron tempest the allied columns advanced to the attack. Kleist, with the left, following the course of the Elster, moved against Mark-Kleberg, of which he soon made himself master. To check his progress beyond that village, a considerable body of Milhaud's horse were brought forward by Poniatowski; but Lewachow, at the head of two regiments of Russian cuirassiers, boldly charged across the ravine which descends from the heights of Wachau to that village, and scaling the rugged banks on the opposite side, dispersed the enemy's horse, and brought back his own without sustaining any loss. In the centre, however, the attack was not equally successful. Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg was at first repulsed at Wachau by the heroic defence of

Victor's men, while his guns were silenced by the superior fire of the French artillery. And although, by a great effort, he at length carried the village, he was speedily driven out again with great loss by the French reserves; while, on the right, Klenau and Gorzakow, not having succeeded in reaching Lieberwolkwitz at the same time, successively failed in dislodging Lauriston permanently from that important village, though it was at first carried by the Austrians under the first of these generals. Six times did the brave Russians and Austrians return to the attack of these villages, and six times were they repulsed by the invincible resolution of Lauriston's men, supported by Macdonald's corps and Sebastiani's dragoons.[1]

[1] Kausler, 937, 938. Bout. 113, 114. Jom. iv. 454. Odel. ii. 19, 20. Vaud. i. 206.

Napoleon prepares a grand attack on the enemy's centre.

At eleven o'clock, Macdonald brought up his whole corps in an oblique direction from Holzhausen, and taking Klenau's attacking corps in flank, he gained considerable success: the Austrians were driven back, and a battery which they had established on the heights of the Kolmberg, taken by Charpentier's division. Encouraged by this success on his left, and deeming the enemy in front of Lieberwolkwitz sufficiently exhausted by three hours' continued and severe fighting, Napoleon, who arrived at noon on the heights behind Wachau, followed by the guards and cuirassiers, resolved to put in force his favourite measure of a grand attack on the enemy's centre. With this view, two divisions of the Young Guard, under Oudinot, were brought up and stationed close behind Wachau: two others, under Mortier, were sent to Leiberwolkwitz: Augereau was dispatched from his ground on the right centre, to support Poniatowski, who had nearly succeeded in regaining Mark-Kleberg; and behind him the Old

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Guard moved forward to Doelitz, so as to be in readiness to support either the right or the centre, as circumstances might require. Finally, Drouot, with sixty guns of the guard, so well known in all Napoleon's former battles, was brought to the front of the centre; and these pieces, moving steadily forward, soon made the earth shake by their rapid and continued fire. The allied centre was unable to resist this desperate attack: Victor and Oudinot, preceded by the terrible battery, steadily gained ground; and Napoleon, deeming the battle gained, sent word to the King of Saxony in Leipsic that he was entirely successful, and had made two thousand prisoners; and enjoined him to cause all the bells to be rung, in the city and adjoining villages, to announce his victory.[1]

[1] Bout. 114, 115. Odel. ii. 21, 22. Kausler, 939. Vaud. i. 205, 206. Lab. i. 382, 383.

Schwartzenberg's measures to support his centre.

Schwartzenberg, finding his centre thus violently assailed, made the most vigorous efforts to support it. Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg, unable to resist the shock of Victor, supported by the Old Guard and Drouot's artillery, gave ground, and was rapidly falling into confusion, when Raeffskoi was brought up to support him with his invincible grenadiers. The brave Russians took post, one division behind the sheepfold of Auenhayn, and the other at Gossa; and, without once flinching before the terrible battery, kept up so incessant a fire as at length arrested the progress of the enemy. Klenau, however, attacked in front by Lauriston, and threatened in flank by Macdonald, was unable to maintain himself on the slopes of Lieberwolkwitz, and was forced back, after a desperate resistance by his cavalry, to Gross Posna and Seyfartshayn, where he at length succeeded in maintaining himself, though with great difficulty, till nightfall. Schwartzenberg, seeing his centre so nearly forced by the impetuous attack of

the French guard, ordered up the Austrian reserve, under Prince Hesse Homberg, from Zobigker, where it had been stationed, in spite of the strenuous remonstrances of Alexander and Jomini, on the other side of the Pleisse, and consequently in a situation where it could not be brought to bear on the decisive point without a long delay. They were hurried as fast as possible across the river; but meanwhile, Napoleon, desirous of beating down the resistance of Raeffskoi's grenadiers, ordered up his reserve cavalry under Latour Maubourg and Kellerman; while an attack by infantry was ordered, under Charpentier, on an old intrenchment on a hill, called the Swedish redoubt, where the bones of the warriors of the great Gustavus reposed, which had been won from the French in the early part of the day. So vehement, however, was the fire from the batteries on the summit, that the assaulting regiments paused at the foot of the hill. Napoleon hastened to the spot:—"What regiment is that?" said he to Charpentier.—"The 22d light infantry," replied the general. "That is impossible," replied Napoleon; "the 22d would never let themselves be cut down by grape-shot without taking their muskets from their shoulders." These words being repeated to the regiment, they were so stung by the reproach, that, breaking into a charge, they ran up the hill and carried the post, which seemed to give the Emperor a decisive advantage in that part of the field of battle.[1]

[1] Odel. ii. 331. Bout. 115, 116. Jom. iv. 455, 456. Fain, ii. 397, 399. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 131, 132.

Such was the impression produced by the reserve cavalry, that terrible arm which always formed so important an element in Napoleon's tactics, that it had wellnigh decided the battle in his favour. At one o'clock in the afternoon, Kellerman, at the head of six thousand horse, debouched from Wachau, between Connewitz and Grobern, to the left of that

Desperate combat of cavalry in the centre.

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village, supported by several squares of infantry, and advanced rapidly against the retiring columns of Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg. Lewachow, proud of his gallant achievement in the morning, threw himself, with his three regiments of Russian cuirassiers, in the way of the charge; but he was speedily overwhelmed, and driven back with great loss towards Gossa. The consequences might have been fatal, had not Alexander, after the advice of Jomini, shortly before brought up his guards and reserves to the menaced point in the centre, where they were stationed behind the Goeselbach; while Schwartzenberg, now sensible, when it was all but too late, of his inexplicable error in stationing the Austrian reserves in a position, between the Elster and the Pleisse, where they could be of no service, had brought up the Austrian cuirassiers of the guard to the point of danger. This superb corps, consisting of six regiments cased in steel, the very flower of the Austrian army, under Count Nostitz, after crossing the Pleisse at Grobern, arrived at the menaced point at the moment, and instantly bore down with loud cheers and irresistible force on the flank of Kellerman's dragoons, when somewhat disordered by the rout of Lewachow's men. The effect was instantaneous: the French horse were routed and driven back in great disorder to the heights behind Wachau, where, however, they re-formed under cover of the powerful batteries which there protected the French centre.[1]

[1] Vict. et Conq. xxii. 131, 132. Jom. iv. 456, 458. Bout. 116, 117. Kausler, 940.

While extreme danger was thus narrowly avoided in the centre to the west of Wachau, peril still more imminent threatened the Allies to the east of that village. Latour Maubourg and Murat, at the head of four thousand cuirassiers of the guard, there bore down on the flank of the allied right, while

Victor and Lauriston assailed its front. This double charge was at first attended with great success. Though the brave Latour Maubourg had his leg carried off by a cannon-shot in the advance,* the ponderous mass advanced in admirable order under Bordesoult, broke by a charge in flank Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg's infantry, routed ten light squadrons of the Russian guard, which strove to arrest its progress, and captured six-and-twenty guns. So violent was the onset, so complete the opening made in the centre of the Allies by this terrible charge, that the French horsemen pushed on to the position where the Emperor Alexander and King of Prussia had taken their station, and they were obliged to mount on horseback and retire a little distance to the rear, to avoid being made prisoners. But in this decisive moment Alexander was not wanting to himself or the cause with which he was entrusted. Imitating the coolness of Napoleon on occasion of a similar crisis at the cemetery of Eylau,† he boldly advanced to the front, and ordered the red Cossacks of the guard under Orloff Denizoff to charge the enemy's flank, while the reserve cavalry of Barclay were also ordered up, and the last reserve batteries directed to open their fire. These dispositions, promptly taken and rapidly executed, changed the fate of the day. With resistless force, Orloff Denizoff's men, all chosen cavaliers from the banks of the Don, bore down on the flank of the French cuirassiers immediately after they had captured the guns, and when their horses were blown

Latour Maubourg's vehement charge to the east of Wachau, which is defeated by Alexander in person.

* Amputation was immediately performed on this distinguished officer, which he bore with his usual courage and *sang-froid*. His servant, a faithful domestic, having given way to an agony of grief at the sight, he said,—"Why do you distress yourself? you will only have one boot to clean."—ODEL. ii. 32.

† Ante, vi. 75.

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by previous efforts: their long lances were more than a match for the cuirassiers' sabres: in the twinkling of an eye the whole hostile squadrons were pierced through and routed, four-and-twenty of the guns retaken, and the French cavalry driven back with immense loss to their own lines. Resuming the offensive, Raeffskoi's grenadiers now attacked the sheep-farm of Auenhayn, the object already of such desperate strife, and carried it at the point of the bayonet—an acquisition which, from its elevated position, again gave the Allies the advantage in that part of the field.[1]

[1] Bout. 116, 118. Vaud. i. 207. Jom. iv. 457, 458. Fain, ii. 399.

Arrival of the Austrian reserve on the field.

The crisis of the battle was now past; the direction of Napoleon's attacks was clearly indicated, and Schwartzenberg had gained time to rectify his faulty dispositions, and bring up his powerful reserves from the other side of the Pleisse to the scene of danger. At three o'clock in the afternoon, the Austrian reserves came up to the front at all points: Bianchi relieved, at Mark-Kleberg, Kleist's troops, who had with great difficulty maintained themselves there against the attack of Augereau and Poniatowski; and turning the powerful batteries which they brought up against the flank of Augereau's corps, they compelled it to fall back to its original position. Bianchi followed up his advantage: he issued from Mark-Kleberg, and charged the right flank of Napoleon's centre with loud cries, and with such vigour that all around the Emperor deemed the battle lost, and he himself was forced to retire some hundred paces. He immediately ordered up the battalions of the Old Guard, who stopped the head of the column; but its numerous artillery played in the most destructive manner on the flank of Victor's corps, and compelled it to fall back to

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the French lines. At the same time, the cannon sounded violently on the north, and repeated couriers from Marmont and Ney announced that, so far from being able to render the Emperor any further assistance, they could with difficulty maintain themselves against the impetuous attacks of Blucher.[1]

Bout. 118. Vaud. i. 208. Jom. iv. 458. Fain, ii. 401.

Sensible that, if success now escaped him, he would in vain seek to recall it on the following day, when the Prince-Royal, Benningsen, and Colloredo had brought up nearly a hundred thousand fresh troops to the enemy's standards, Napoleon resolved to make one more effort for victory. With this view, between five and six o'clock, he re-formed his reserve cavalry behind Lieberwolkwitz: Victor and Lauriston's corps were thrown into a deep column of attack, and, preceded by a numerous array of artillery, advanced against Gossa. Such was the weight of the column, and the rapidity with which the guns were discharged, that Gorzakow's corps was broken, and Gossa taken; but in this extremity Schwartzenberg brought up the Prussian division of Pirsch, which regained the village, and drove back the column to a considerable distance; while a powerful Russian battery of eighty pieces of the guard, by the precision and rapidity of their fire, arrested the progress of the enemy in that quarter. Excessive fatigue prevented either party from making any further efforts in the centre and left, and the battle there was reduced to a furious cannonade, which continued without intermission till night overspread the scene.[2]

Odel. ii.

Napoleon's last efforts.

[2] Viet. et Con. xxii. 133, 134. Bout. 118, 119. Jom. iv. 438, 439. Kausler, 941. Fain, ii. 401.

Meerfeldt soon after came up, having been long retarded in his march across the swamps between the Pleisse and the Elster, by the almost impracticable nature of the ground. Late in the evening, however, he succeeded in crossing the latter stream by the ford

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of Doelitz, and was advancing at the head of the leading battalion to attack the French right flank near Mark-Kleberg, when he was suddenly assailed by a division of the Old Guard in front, and Poniatowski's Poles in flank, and driven back with great loss into the river. Meerfeldt himself was made prisoner, with a whole battalion, and immediately brought into the Emperor's presence; and although the repulse of his corps was of no material consequence to the issue of the day, it threw a ray of glory over this well debated field of carnage.[1]

Last attack of Meerfeldt, which is repulsed, and he is made prisoner.

[1] Bout. 119, 120. Jom. iv. 460. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 134. Fain, ii. 403.

On the other side of the Elster, Giulay was engaged the whole day, with various success, against Bertrand's corps. Though far removed from the headquarters of either army, and separated by five miles of marshes from the great body of the combatants, the struggle there was one of life and death to the French army; for Bertrand fought for Lindenau, and their only line of retreat to the Rhine in case of disaster! The Austrians were at first successful, though not without a desperate struggle. After seven hours' hard fighting, their gallant corps overcame the stubborn resistance of the French, and Bertrand was not only driven out of Lindenau into the marshes, but forced to take refuge behind the Lippe, where his troops, drawn up in several squares, maintained the contest only by a loose fire of tirailleurs. If Giulay had, as soon as he got possession of the town, broken the bridges of Lindenau, the retreat of the French army would have been entirely cut off, and their communications with the Rhine rendered impossible. Seriously alarmed at the prospect of such a disaster, Napoleon sent positive orders to Bertrand to regain that important post at all hazards, coupled with severe remarks upon his having

Operations of Giulay at Lindenau.

ever lost it. Stung to the quick by these reproaches, Bertrand immediately re-formed his troops into columns of attack, and falling suddenly on the Austrians, who, deeming the contest over, were off their guard, drove them out of Lindenau, and reopened the communications of the grand army. Giulay, upon this, drew off his troops to the ground they had occupied at the commencement of the action.[1]

[1] Vict. et Conq. xxii. 134. Bout. 120. Fain, ii. 407. Lab. ii. 387, 388.

Battle of Mockern between Blucher and Ney.

To the north of Leipsic, on the side of Mockern, a conflict took place, less important from the number of forces engaged, but not inferior in the valour and obstinacy displayed on both sides, between the armies of Blucher and Ney. The Prussian general, in conformity with the general plan of operations, had put himself in motion at daybreak from his position in front of Halle, and advanced in two columns; Langeron by Radefeldt, and Breitenfeldt; and D'York by Lindenthal on Mockern; Sacken formed the reserve. Before they reached the enemy, however, who was posted near Skenditz, the action had begun on the south of Leipsic; and Ney, who had the command, was so impressed with the awful cannonade which was heard in that direction, that he dispatched two divisions of Oudinot's corps, now under the command of Souham, towards Wachau, to reinforce the Emperor. The effects of this generous zeal were in the highest degree disastrous to the French arms. The other divisions of Souham's corps having not yet come up from Duben, the French marshal had not at his disposal, after this large deduction, above twenty-five thousand foot and three thousand horse; while Blucher had fifty-six thousand. Ney drew up his troops in a strong position, the right in front of a wood of some extent in the neighbourhood of Breitenfeldt; the line extending from thence through

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Gross Wetteritz to Mockern on the left. Advanced posts also occupied Radefeldt and other villages in front. Langeron was directed to expel the enemy from Radefeldt; and pushing on, to force Breitenfeldt, and drive him into the open plain beyond, towards Leipsic; while D'York, on the French left, following the great road to Leipsic, was to turn to its left at Lutschen, and drive the enemy from Lindenthal.[1]

[1] Lond. 155, 156. Bout. 121, 122. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 134, 135.

Defeat of Ney by Blucher.

At the first onset, Ney, finding himself assailed by such superior forces, abandoned Radefeldt and the villages in front, and drew in his advanced posts over a considerable space to the main line running from Lindenthal to Mockern. There, however, notwithstanding his great inferiority of force, he stood firm, and a most obstinate conflict ensued. The wood on their right, and the villages of Gross and Klein Wetteritz, furiously assailed by Langeron, were as bravely defended by Ney; but, after being three times taken and retaken, finally remained in the possession of the Allies. D'York at the same time commenced a vigorous attack on Mockern, on the extreme French right; while the Russian horse charged with the utmost gallantry the French batteries and squares in the open plain between the villages. After a most sanguinary conflict, in the course of which it was five times taken and retaken, Mockern was carried by D'York; and Marmont's corps, driven back to the open plain in the direction of the Partha, soon fell into disorder, and lost a considerable part of its artillery under the repeated charges of the Russian and Prussian cavalry. The whole French line was falling into confusion before Sacken came up with the Russian reserve; so that he was not required to take part in the action. Late in the evening, Delmas' division of Ney's corps arrived from

Duben, and was immediately hurried forward to the right, to cover the retreat of the park of Ney's corps, which was in the most imminent danger of falling into the hands of the victorious Russians: but, though this calamity was averted by the good countenance which that body showed, yet it was too late to retrieve the day, and the shattered remains of Ney's army retired behind the Partha, having lost an eagle, two standards, twenty guns, and two thousand prisoners, besides four thousand killed and wounded, in this well-fought field. In addition, thirty cannon were surprised by the Cossacks on the night following; where the French, though defeated by superior numbers, displayed the most heroic courage and devotion.[1]

[1] Lond. 105, 159. Bout. 121, 122. Jom. iv. 461, 462. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 135. Fain, ii. 403.

Result of this day's fighting.

The battle of the 16th, though it terminated decisively in favour of the Allies only on the side of the Partha, yet was, in its final results, entirely to their advantage. Situated as Napoleon was, an indecisive action was equivalent to a defeat: his affairs were in such a situation, that nothing could retrieve them but a decisive victory. Under Napoleon in person the French might boast with reason of having had the advantage, since the Allies who made the attack, had been unable, excepting at Mark-Kleberg, to force them from their position; and the loss, which was upwards of fifteen thousand on each side, was pretty nearly balanced. But the defeat at Mockern threatened his rear: the frightful peril incurred at Lindenau, had shown the hazard in which his communications were placed. The enemy on the succeeding day would receive reinforcements to the amount of nearly a hundred thousand men, while he could not draw to his standards above thirty-five thousand; and his position, separated from his reserve park of ammu-

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nition, which was at Torgau, and his only magazines, which were at Magdeburg, with a single chaussée traversing two miles of morasses for his retreat, was in the last degree perilous. Sound policy, therefore, counselled immediate preparations for a retreat, when his forces were still in a great measure unbroken, and he could, by holding Leipsic as a *tête-du-pont*, gain time for his immense army to defile over the perilous pass in its rear. But Napoleon could not brook the idea of retiring from an open field, in which he himself had commanded. His position, as the head of a revolutionized military state, forbade it. He had announced to the King of Saxony, that he had been victorious: all the bells in and around Leipsic had been set a-ringing to celebrate his triumph: if he now retreated, it would be to announce to all Europe that he had been defeated. Actuated by these feelings, as well as by a lingering confidence in his good fortune, and in the likelihood of the allied generals falling into some error which might give him the means of striking a decisive blow from his central position, he resolved to remain firm; and not only made no preparations for a retreat, but gave no directions for throwing any additional bridges over the Elster and Pleisse in his rear, though the engineers could have established twenty in a single night.[1]

[1] Bout. 123, 124. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 136. Rogniat, Art de la Guerre, 394. Jom. iv. 462.

Napoleon's conference with Meerfeldt, whom he sends back with secret proposals.

No sooner had the fire ceased than Napoleon ordered Meerfeldt to be brought into his presence. He hailed with the utmost eagerness the opportunity of reopening by means of the Austrian general, with whom he was well acquainted, diplomatic relations, which he hoped might become separate and confidential, with the Emperor Francis and the cabinet of Vienna. Having partaken of the frugal supper which the bivouac would afford even for the impe-

rial table, Meerfeldt was at ten at night introduced into the Emperor's cabinet. By a singular coincidence, it was he who had come a suppliant on the part of the Emperor of Germany to solicit the armistice of Leoben: it was he who had conducted, on the part of the cabinet of Vienna, the treaty of Campo-Formio; and it was from his hand, on the night following the battle of Austerlitz, that the pencil note had come, which gave the first opening to the conferences which led to the peace of Presburg. The mutations of fortune had now brought the same general to the Emperor's tent, when the latter in his turn had become the suppliant, and he was to solicit, not to concede, peace and salvation from his former imperial opponents. He addressed to him some obliging expressions on the misfortune which he had sustained in being made prisoner, and dismissed him to the Austrian headquarters, stored with every imaginable argument that could be urged against continuing in the Russian alliance; and offered, on condition of an armistice being immediately concluded, to evacuate Germany, and retire behind the Rhine till the conclusion of a general peace.* "Adieu, general," said

* "Our political alliance," said Napoleon, "is broken up; but between your master and me there is another bond which is indissoluble. That it is which I invoke; for I shall always place confidence in the regard of my father-in-law. It is to him I shall never cease to appeal from all that passes here. You see how they attack me, and how I defend myself. Does your cabinet never weigh the consequences of such exasperation? If it is wise it will speedily do so: it can do so this evening; to-morrow it may perhaps be too late, for who can foretell the events of to-morrow? They deceive themselves in regard to my dispositions: I ask nothing but to repose in the shadow of peace, and to dream of the happiness of France, after having dreamt of its glory. You are afraid of the sleep of the lion: you fear that you will never be easy after having pared his nails and cut his main. You think only of repairing by a single stroke the calamities of twenty years; and, carried away by this idea, you never perceive the changes which time

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he, when he dismissed Meerfeldt on his parole; "when on my behalf you shall speak of an armistice to the two emperors, I doubt not the voice which strikes their ears will be eloquent indeed in recollections."[1]

[1] Fain, ii. 412, 414. Odel. ii. 23.

Mournful night at Napoleon's headquarters.

Napoleon's sense of the dangers of his situation was sufficiently evinced by his offering to retire from Germany on condition that an armistice was agreed to. He passed a melancholy night after Meerfeldt had departed, his tents being placed in the bottom of a dried fishpond, not far from the road which leads to Rochlitz, where they were pitched in the middle of the squares of the Old Guard. The cannon continued to boom occasionally on the side of Mark-Kleberg through the whole night, where the advanced posts were almost touching each other. The most sombre presentiments filled the minds of the generals who attended on the Emperor: ammunition was already becoming scarce, and no fresh supplies could be obtained; a few potatoes found in the fields were all the provisions the men could obtain in the country, and the stores in Leipsic would soon be exhausted: certain ruin appeared to await them, when the army, which had not been able to discomfit the enemy to whom they had been opposed, was assailed in addition by a hundred thousand fresh troops, who would come up on the succeeding day. Still the Emperor, though fully aware of his danger, made no preparations to guard against it; not a carriage was directed to the rear, not a bridge was thrown over the Elster;[1] but relying on the valour of his soldiers, his own good fortune, and the strength

[1] Odel. ii. 23, 25. Jom. iv. 463. Rogniat, Art. de la Guerre, 393, 394.

has made around you, and that now for Austria to gain at the expense of France is to lose. Reflect on it, general: it is neither Austria, nor France, nor Prussia singly, that will be able to arrest on the Vistula the inundation of a people half nomad, essentially conquering, and whose dominions extend from this to China."—Fain, ii. 412, 413.

of Leipsic as a *point d'appui* to his centre, the mighty conqueror remained in moody obstinacy to await the stroke of fate.

The allied sovereigns were too well aware of the advantages of their situation either to fall into the snare which Napoleon had laid for them, by sending back Meerfeldt with proposals for an armistice, or to throw them away by precipitating the attack before their whole forces had come up. Under pretence, therefore, of referring the proposals to the Emperor of Austria, Schwartzenberg eluded them altogether; and no answer was returned to them till after the French had recrossed the Rhine. Meanwhile, the great reinforcements on which they relied were approaching. Bernadotte, on the 16th, had reached Landsberg, on his way back from the Elbe, to which he had been drawn by Napoleon's demonstrations against Berlin; Benningsen was at Coelitz, and Colloredo at Borna; so that all three might be expected to take part in the action in the evening of the following day. The attack, accordingly, was ordered at two o'clock in the afternoon of that day; but such was the badness of the roads to the southward, from the immense multitude of artillery and chariots which had passed over them, that Colloredo and Benningsen had not then come up, and did not reach their ground, the former till four, the latter till late in the evening. The attack was, therefore, adjourned till the following morning, when the troops were ordered to be in readiness by daybreak; and no doubt was entertained of success, as the grand allied army would then be reinforced by above fifty thousand combatants, besides those who joined Blucher and Bernadotte.[1]

The Allies defer the attack till the 18th.

[1] Bout. 125, 126. Jom. iv. 464, 465.

But, although matters were thus favourable to the Allies on the ground where Napoleon and the allied

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sovereigns commanded in person, to the south of Leipsic, affairs were far from being in an equally satisfactory state to the north of that town, where Blucher was opposed to Ney and Marmont. Regnier, and the other divisions of Ney's corps, had now come up from Duben, which rendered him more than a match for the army of Silesia, weakened as that noble host was by six thousand men lost on the preceding day, and the incessant fighting which it had sustained since the commencement of the campaign. A violent cavalry action on the 17th, between Arrighi's dragoons and Wassilchikoff's Cossacks, on the banks of the Partha, had only terminated to the advantage of the Allies by bringing up the reserve hussars, who at length drove the enemy back to the very walls of Leipsic. Every thing, therefore, on that side depended upon bringing the Prince-Royal into action; but in that quarter a most alarming degree of backwardness had become visible, which threatened the cause of the Allies with the most serious consequences. Not only had Bernadotte, in pursuance of his usual system of saving the Swedes, so successfully applied at Gross Beeren and Dennewitz, arranged the troops of his own dominions a full march in the rear of the Russians and Prussians; but instead of directing them to Halle, as he was recommended, where they would have been, if not in line with Blucher, at least not very far in his rear, he had moved the Russians only to Zoerbig, while the Prussians and Swedes stretched by the Peterberg and Grobzig, so far from the decisive point as to be of no service whatever in the crisis which was approaching.[1]

Dangerous state of the allied affairs to the north of Leipsic.

Oct. 17.

Oct. 15.

[1] Lond. 160, 161. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 136.

Fortunately for the Allies and the cause of European freedom, their interests were at this juncture supported, at the headquarters of the Prince-Royal of Sweden, by men whose discernment showed them

here the decisive point lay, and whose moral courage rendered them equal to the task of enforcing it upon the commander. Sir Charles Stewart and General Pozzo di Borgo were officially attached to his headquarters on the part of their respective courts, and both possessed great influence with his royal highness; for the former had the disbursement of the British subsidies, and the latter was the accredited diplomatist and personal favourite of Alexander. Indefatigable were the efforts which these ardent men made at this crisis to overcome the backwardness of the Prince-Royal, and bring forward his powerful force, fifty thousand strong, to the support of Blucher, who was always in the front, and might be exposed from that cause, if not adequately backed, to the most serious danger. Not only did Sir Charles personally remonstrate, in the most energetic manner, on the 14th and 15th, against the pernicious and eccentric direction which Bernadotte was giving to his troops, and which had the effect of excluding them from all share in the action of the 16th; but on the morning of that day he addressed to him a written remonstrance, penned with respect but military frankness, and breathing a warm but not undeserved spirit of patriotic indignation.* These efforts, which were vigor-

Vigorous efforts of Sir Charles Stewart to bring up Bernadotte.

* These letters are very curious, and remain enduring monuments both of the tortuous policy at that period of Bernadotte, and of the clear military discernment and unflinching moral courage of the Marquis of Londonderry. At 9 A.M., on the 16th, he wrote to the Prince-Royal as follows;—"According to the report of General Blucher, the enemy has quitted Dolitch. It is of the last importance, according to my ideas, that the army of your Royal Highness should move to the left behind Dolitch; the marshes and defiles render such a movement free of all risk, and your Royal Highness will then be in a situation to take a part in the approaching battle, which will be more decisive with your army and military talents. As the whole enemy's force are in the environs of Leipsic, permit me to observe that the moments are precious. The English nation has its eye upon you; it is my duty to address you

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ously seconded by Blucher and Pozzo di Borgo, at length produced the desired effect; the circuitous sweep, indeed, which Bernadotte had given to his troops, saved Ney from destruction, and doubled Blucher's losses on the 16th; but at length he was brought forward to his ground. On the night of the 16th, Bernadotte slept at Landsberg, and on the evening of the 17th he was on the heights of Breitenfeldt, immediately in the rear of Blucher's army. His conduct on this occasion, as on many others during the

with frankness. The English nation will never believe that you are indifferent, provided the enemy is beaten, whether you take a part in the battle or not. I venture to beseech your Royal Highness, if you remain in the second line, to send forward Captain Bogue with the rocket brigade, to General Blucher, to act with the cavalry." Bernadotte, however, still hung back, and, by Blucher's desire, Sir Charles galloped to his headquarters, and found the Russians only at Landsberg: *the Prussians a march behind the Russians, and the Swedes a march behind the Prussians.* He could not obtain an interview with the Prince-Royal: but got from General Adlercrentz a promise to send forward 3000 horse next morning. Sir Charles then returned to Blucher, took part in the action, and after it was over rode back to Halle, where Bernadotte had still not arrived, and wrote to him the following laconic epistle:—"Halle, 9 P.M., 16th Oct.,—I have just come from General Blucher's field of battle. I have the honour to lay before your Royal Highness the details of the action. I venture to supplicate your Royal Highness to march the moment you receive this letter on Taucha. There is not an instant to lose: your Royal Highness has pledged your word to me to do so. I must now address you as a friend. *I speak now as a soldier; and, if you do not commence your march, you will repent it as long as you live.*" To a soldier and a gentleman this was sufficient, and Bernadotte at length moved next morning, and reached his ground on the evening of the same day. He was, however, most indignant at this freedom, and the first time he saw Sir Charles afterwards, he said, "Comment! Général Stewart, quel droit avez vous de m'écrire? Ne rappelez vous pas que je suis Prince de Suede, *un des plus grands généraux de l'age?* Et si vous étiez à ma place, que penseriez vous si quelqu'un vous écrivoit comme vous m'avez écrit?" The Gascons are always true to their name and character. He soon, however, recovered his good-humour; and when the Marquis and Marchioness of Londonderry visited Sweden in 1838, on their way to St Petersburg, he received them, much to his credit, with the most distinguished kindness and hospitality.—LONDONDERRY, 162, 177. *War in Germany.* And Personal Information.

campaign, was not owing either to want of military discernment or physical resolution, but to secret views of political ambition. He clearly foresaw and anxiously desired the fall of Napoleon; but he had no wish to have a hand in completing either his destruction or that of his army; being repelled as much by a natural-feeling of patriotic attachment to the land of his birth, as by a conviction that such a catastrophe would prove an insurmountable bar to his own ascent of the vacant throne on which he had already set his heart. [1]

[1] Lond. 162, 170.

Changes in Napoleon's position during the night.

Considerable changes, during the night of the 17th, were made by Napoleon in the disposition of his troops. At two in the morning, seeing that no answer had been returned to the propositions he had sent through Meerfeldt, he prepared for battle, and made the requisite contraction of the circle which his troops occupied, to enable them to withstand the prodigious force by which they were to be assailed. He had now brought up his whole reserves from Duben; and Regnier with his Saxons, now reduced to eight thousand men, had joined the standards of Ney on the Partha. The whole army effected a change of front to the left, the left wing being thrown back, and Connewitz, on the extreme right, serving as the pivot. Poniatowski remained fixed there, on the edge of the Elster; and the whole army, now not numbering more than a hundred and sixty thousand combatants, was arranged in a semicircle, facing outwards from that point to the extreme left, which rested on the Partha to the north of Leipsic. The line, thus contracted, abandoned Wachau, Lieberwolkwitz, and the heights in their rear, the object of such fierce contention on the preceding day; it ran from Connewitz to Probstheyda, in which last

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village Victor was stationed. Macdonald fell back to Holzhausen; Lauriston at Stoeteritz was a reserve to the two latter corps; while the imperial guard, under Napoleon in person on the Thonberg, near the Tobacco-windmill, still occupied a central position, from which he could succour any point that might be peculiarly menaced. Bertrand remained in his old position at Lindenau, and detachments in observation merely occupied the villages to the westward of Tweinainsdorf and Moelkau, round to Ney's army, which was in position immediately to the north of Leipsic on the Partha; Regnier at Paunsdorf, opposite Taucha; Ney at Santa Thecla; and Oudinot at Neutsch. Uneasy about his retreat, Napoleon repaired at three in the morning to Lindenau, where he had a conference with Bertrand, who received orders to push forward an advanced guard and occupy Wiessenfels, on the road to Mayence, which was done before noon on the same day. The position of the French army around Leipsic, with its flanks secured from being turned by the Elster and the Partha, and the old walls of the town itself as a great redoubt in its centre, was undoubtedly strong; and hardly liable, if bravely defended by such a force as Napoleon's, to be forced by any masses of assailants, how great soever. But it had a frightful defect, that it had but one issue for so vast a multitude of men, horse, cannon, and chariots in rear: resembling thus, in a striking manner, the position of the Russians, with the Alle at their backs, in front of Friedland,* of which Napoleon had taken such decisive advantage in the first Polish war.[1]

[1] But. 128, 129. Jom. iv. 464, 466. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 137, 138. Vaud. l. 211, 212.

Schwartzenberg, on his side, made the requisite

* Ante, vi. 264.

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dispositions for following up his advantages, and pressing upon the columns of the French from all sides of the narrow circle into which they had now retired. The grand army of Bohemia, and Benningsen's reserve from Poland, were formed into three columns: the right, under Benningsen's orders, composed of his own army, the corps of Klenau, and Ziethen's Prussians, was directed to advance from Gross Posna to Holzhausen: the centre, under Barclay de Tolly, who had the corps of Kleist and Wittgenstein under his command, with the grenadiers and guards in reserve, assembled near Gossa, and was to advance straight upon Wachau; while the left, under the direction of the Prince of Hesse-Homberg, consisting of Meerfeldt's and Colloredo's Austrians, his own reserve, and Lichtenstein's men, was to move forward by the edge of the Elster, from Connewitz and Mark-Kleberg, on Doelitz and Leipsic. To the north of Leipsic, also, the Prince-Royal and Blucher, now nearly a hundred thousand strong, had made their arrangements for a decisive engagement: the former, with the corps of Langeron, as well as his own troops, under his orders, was to cross the Partha, turn Ney's right, and force him back upon Leipsic, from the side of Taucha, and the road to Wittenberg; while Blucher, with his two remaining corps of Sacken and D'York, was to remain on the right bank of the Partha, and drive all before him who should remain on that side of the river. The forces of the Allies were more numerous than had ever been assembled in one field during modern times, for they mustered two hundred and eighty thousand combatants, with nearly fourteen hundred guns;[1] and in intrinsic strength and military equipment, far ex-

Dispositions of Prince Schwartzenberg for the attack Oct. 18.

[1] Bout. 128, 131. Jom. iv. 466, 467. Vaud. i. 212, 213. Kausler, 945, 946.

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ceeded any force ever collected for warlike purposes since the beginning of the world.*

Commencement of the battle, and success of the Allies on their left.

At length the battle of giants commenced. THE 18TH OCTOBER dawned, and the last hour of the French Empire began to toll. At nine, Napoleon took his station on the Thonberg: the enemy's columns were already approaching with rapid strides on all sides, and their heads were soon seen surmounting the hills of Wachau, and driving, like chaff before the wind, the French detachments which were stationed to retard their advance in the intermediate villages. Inexpressibly awful was the spectacle which their advance afforded to the agitated multitude who thronged the steeples of Leipsic. As far as the eye could reach, the ground was covered with an innumerable multitude of men and horses: long deep masses marked the march of the infantry: dazzling lines of light indicated the squadrons of cavalry; the glancing of the bayonets in the rays of the sun, sparkled like crests of foam on a troubled ocean; while a confused murmur, arising from the neighing of horses, the march of the columns, and rolling of the guns, was heard like the roar of a distant cataract. The allied left, under the Prince of Hesse-Homberg, first came into action, and its success was brilliant and immediate: the resistance of the Poles on the banks of the Elster, under the brave Poniatowski, proud of the rank of marshal of France, worthily conferred on him the day before by the

* Mardonius at Platæa is said to have had 300,000 men, and the Gauls, when they blockaded Cæsar in his lines round Alesia, had 240,000; but neither of these armies could bear any comparison, in the number of real soldiers and military strength, with the host which fought under the allied banners at Leipsic, which was 280,000, with 1384 pieces of cannon.

Emperor, was indeed heroic, but they were unable to withstand the superior numbers and vehement attacks of the Austrians, under Bianchi and Colloredo, and gave ground. The danger on that side was soon imminent; for the victorious Austrians, driving the Poles before them, soon passed Doelitz and Loessnig, and menaced Connewitz and the suburbs of Leipsic—the only line of retreat to the army. Napoleon immediately repaired to the spot with two divisions of the Young Guard, under Oudinot, while the Old, under Mortier, was stationed in the rear, in the suburbs of Leipsic: the steady countenance of these veterans restored the combat; Prince Hesse-Homberg was wounded; and though the Poles were driven back, after hard fighting, to Connewitz, the action on this side ceased to be alarming, and all Bianchi's efforts could not dislodge Poniatowski from that village, even with the aid of Giulay's corps, which Schwartzenberg dispatched to his support.[1]

[1] Fain, ii. 418, 420. Bout. 130, 131. Vaud. i. 214. Jom. iv. 470.

The village of Probstheyda formed the salient angle of the position occupied by the French around Leipsic, and as such it became, early in the day, the object of the most vehement contention between the opposite parties. In the first instance, the progress of the Allies in the centre was rapid: Lieberwolkwitz and Wachau, the scenes of such bloody struggles on the 16th, were abandoned after a slight combat of advanced posts; the allied artillery were hurried forward amidst loud shouts to the summit of the hills of Wachau, and soon two hundred pieces of cannon, arrayed along the heights, began to send an iron tempest into the French columns. But meanwhile Napoleon's batteries were not idle: sensible of the inferiority of their pieces in point of

Desperate conflict at Probstheyda in the centre.

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number to those of the enemy, the men endeavoured to supply the deficiency by the rapidity of their fire, and their guns were worked with extraordinary vigour. Every cannon that could be brought to bear on either side was hurried to the front; and soon eight hundred pieces of artillery discharged their fire, or played on the hostile masses, in a space of not more than half a league in breadth in the centre of the army. In the midst of this tremendous fire, Prince Augustus of Prussia, and General Pirsch received orders, with Kleist's corps, to carry Probstheyda. Swiftly they moved over the intervening open space, and entered the village with such vigour, that they reached its centre before the onset could be arrested; but there they were met by Victor and Lauriston, at the head of dense masses, who combated with such resolution that they were driven back.[1]

[1] Fain, ii. 420, 412. Bout. 131, 132. Jom. iv. 470, 471. Vaud. i. 214, 215.

Second attack on Probstheyda is repulsed by Napoleon in person.

Nothing daunted by this bloody repulse, Prince Augustus re-formed his men, and again rushed into the village, followed by Wittgenstein's Russians and nearly the whole of Kleist's corps. Such was the vehemence of their onset, that the French were entirely expelled; the fugitives and wounded overspread the plain, which extended towards Leipsic. Imposing masses at the same time displayed themselves towards Holzhausen, on the French left, and the centre seemed on the point of being forced. Napoleon instantly hastened to the spot with the remaining two divisions of the Young Guard: the steady columns made their way through the crowd of fugitives who were leaving the rear of the centre, and blocked up all the roads. Amidst the clouds of dust which obscured the view, and the cries of the combatants, which drowned even the roar of the artillery, he preserved his usual calmness and decision,

and pushing forward to the front, arrested the tumult with two battalions of the guard, and did not return to his station beside the windmill till he had entirely expelled the enemy from the village. Again the Russians under Wittgenstein, and Benningsen's reserves were brought up to the attack, and dislodged the French: but a third time the invincible soldiers of Lauriston and Victor recovered their post, and hurled back the assailants, with dreadful loss, into the allied ranks.[1]

[1] Fain, ii. 419, 420. Bout. 131, 132. Jom. iv. 470, 471. Vaud. i. 214. Lab. i. 393.

Operations on the allied right.

On the right, Ziethen's Prussians marched against Holzhausen and Zuckelhausen, at eleven o'clock in the forenoon, followed by a considerable part of Benningsen's Russians in reserve. In moving up they were charged in flank by Sebastiani's dragoons; but Pahlen's and Tschaplitz's cuirassiers speedily repulsed the charge, and drove back the enemy's horse with great loss into their own lines. At the same time, Platoff, with six thousand Cossacks, by a circuitous sweep turned the extreme left of the French on this side, and threatened the rear of Macdonald's corps. He, in consequence, abandoned Holzhausen, and fell back to Stoeteritz, warmly pursued by the victorious Prussians; and the allied sovereigns, who had now advanced their headquarters to the sheepfold of Meusdorf, ordered an attack on that village. Such, however, was the vehemence of the fire of the French batteries of a hundred guns, posted on either side of Probstheyda—which, seeing their rear thus threatened, wheeled about, and opened with terrible execution on the flank of the attacking column—that, after having all but carried the village, it was forced to recoil, glad to seek shelter in the nearest hollows from the fearful tempest. Still further to the allied right, Bubna's light horse, with a body of Pla-

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toff's Cossacks, pushed across the plain beyond the reach of the combatants, and opened up a communication with Bernadotte's outposts, which soon made their appearance from the direction of Taucha: united they fell upon the rear of the Wirtemberg brigade of Normann, which straightway abandoned the colours of France, and ranged itself in the ranks of the fatherland.[1]

[1] Kausler, 948. Bout. 132. Jom. iv. 471. Vaud. i. 215.

The Allies withdraw their columns, and open a combined fire of cannon.

Schwartzenberg, finding that the resistance of the enemy to the south of Leipsic was so obstinate, and that the assault of the villages was attended with such a fearful loss of life, and having received information of decisive success to the north, which would soon render the enemy's position untenable, ordered his columns over the whole semicircle to the south, to seek refuge in the nearest hollows from the dreadful effect of the enemy's batteries; and for the remainder of the day confined his attack on that side to another and more powerful arm. The whole cannon of the grand army, amounting to above eight hundred pieces, were brought forward to the front, arranged in the form of a vast semicircle two leagues in length, from Loesnitz by the ridges of Wachau towards Holzhauzen, and during the remainder of the day they kept up an incessant and most destructive fire on the enemy's columns. The French batteries in that direction, which numbered above five hundred pieces, answered with unconquerable vigour; but independent of their inferiority in point of number, the position which the allied guns occupied was far superior, being stationed in great part on the heights commanding the whole plain, which the enemy had occupied on the preceding day, while their semicircular position caused their concentric fire to fall with redoubled severity on the

dense and close masses of the French, the fire of whose batteries, on the other hand, spreading like a fan towards a wide circumference, was attended, comparatively speaking, with very little effect. Galled beyond endurance by the frightful discharge, Lauriston and Victor's men repeatedly, and almost involuntarily, rushed out of Probstheyda, and advanced with heroic resolution against the hostile batteries; but, as soon as they came within the range of grape-shot, the heads of the densest columns were swept away, and the broken remains recoiled, horror-struck, behind the shelter of the houses. For four mortal hours this awful scene lasted till nightfall; the allied batteries continuing, like a girdle of flame, their dreadful fire, while the French masses, devoted to death, still closed their ranks as they wasted away, but with unconquerable resolution maintained their ground. Close to Napoleon himself twelve guns were dismounted in a few minutes; from the ranks which immediately surrounded him, some thousand wounded were carried back to Leipsic. In Probstheyda, Vial, Rochambeau, and several generals of inferior note, were killed, and great numbers wounded during this dreadful interval; but still their columns stood firm beneath the tempest, exhibiting a sublime example of human valour rising superior to all the storms of fate.[1]

[1] Fain, ii. 428, 429. Odel. ii. 30, 31. Vaud. i. 215. Bout. 133, 134.

Operations of Blucher and Bernadotte against Ney.

While this terrible conflict was going on to the south of Leipsic, Ney and Marmont had to maintain their ground against still more overwhelming odds on the banks of the Partha. At ten in the morning, Blucher, in pursuance of the plan agreed on, crossed that river, and marched to join the Prince-Royal, who, on his part, broke up at eight from Brietenfeldt, and passed at Taucha and Mockau. Their

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united force, when they were both assembled, was little short of ninety thousand combatants, exceeding by fully forty thousand men the force which Ney could oppose to them; and they moved direct upon Leipsic by the right bank of the river. The French general, finding himself thus outnumbered, adopted the same change of front which Napoleon had followed to the south of Leipsic, and drawing back his men to Schoenfeld, Sellerhausen, and Stuntz, extended across to Regnier's corps, which was established at Paunsdorf. Thus the whole French army was now arranged in a circle around the city, having its right, under Poniatowski, resting on the Pleisse at Connewitz, and the extreme left, under Marmont, at the confluence of the Partha and Elster, below the gate of Rosenthal.[1]

[1] Kausler, 950. Bout. 135. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 141.

Defection of the Saxons, and retreat of the French centre and right to the north of Leipsic.

The first incident which occurred on this side was of ominous import, and depressed the French as much as it elated the Allies. A brigade of Saxon cavalry, as soon as the Russians approached the heights of Heiter Bleik, where it was stationed, instead of resisting passed over to the allied ranks. This example was speedily followed by two Saxon brigades of foot, with their whole artillery, consisting of twenty-two pieces; and the Wirtemberg horse of Normann, as already noticed, immediately after also went over to the enemy. This unparalleled event caused great consternation, as well it might, in Regnier's corps; for not only were they weakened, when already inferior in force, by full eight thousand men, but such was the exasperation of the Saxon cannoniers, that they pointed their guns, immediately after going over, against the French lines, and tore in pieces the ranks of their former comrades by a point-blank discharge. The French general, re-

duced to the single division Durutte, and threatened on the right by Bubna from the Bohemian army, and on the left by Bulow from that of the Prince-Royal, was immediately compelled to fall back to Sellerhausen, almost close to Leipsic. Ney, informed of the catastrophe, hastened to reinforce Regnier by Delmas' division of his own corps; while Marmont, to keep abreast of the retrograde movement in other points, withdrew his troops in a similar degree, with the exception of his extreme left, which still stood firm at Schoenfeld.[1]

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[1] Jom. iv. 471, 472. Bout. 136, 137. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 142, Lond. 172.

The allied troops, excited to the greatest degree by these favourable circumstances, now pressed forward at all points to encircle the enemy, and force them back, at the point of the bayonet, into the suburbs of Leipsic; while the French, roused to the highest pitch of indignation by the defection of their allies, made the most desperate and heroic resistance. No sooner was Napoleon informed of the defection of the Saxons, and that Schoenfeld, almost a suburb of Leipsic, was threatened, than, feeling the vital importance of preserving that city as his only line of retreat, he hastened with the cuirassiers of Nansouty, and a division of the Young Guard, to the menaced point. It was full time that succour should arrive; for when these veterans came up, Durutte and Delmas had been driven back close to Leipsic; the Swedish troops had penetrated to Kuhlgaesten, on the very edge of the city; while Langeron, furiously assaulting Schoenfeld, had three times penetrated into that village, and as often been dislodged by the heroic courage of Marmont's men. Nansouty and the guards were immediately pushed forward by Durutte in the direction where there was a sort of chasm, filled up only by a cordon of light troops,

Napoleon's effort on that side is defeated.

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between the extreme right of the army of Bohemia under Bubna, and the extreme left of the Prince-Royal under Bulow. This powerful corps rapidly made its way, almost unresisted, in at the opening; but before it had advanced far, it was assailed with such vigour on the right by Bubna, and on the left by Bulow, supported by the English rocket brigade, under the able direction of Captain Bogue, that it was forced to retire, after Delmas had been slain, with very heavy loss.* At the same time, Schoenfeld was vehemently attacked by Count Langeron, and as gallantly defended by Marmont: five times did the Russians penetrate in with irresistible vigour, and five times were they driven out by the devoted courage of the French; Marmont's aide-de-camp was struck down by his side; General Compans was wounded; General Frederick killed in this terrible struggle. At length, at six at night, it was carried a sixth time amidst terrific cheers, and remained finally in the hands of the Russians; while four thousand of their bravest soldiers and an equal number of its intrepid defenders lay dead, or weltering in their blood, in its streets.[1]

[1] Bout. 137, 138. Jom. iv. 474, 475. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 142. Lond. 172, 173. Kausler, 950.

Close of the battle, and commencement of Napoleon's retreat.

Such was the exhaustion of both parties by the long continuance of this mortal struggle, that neither for the remainder of the day were able to undertake any considerable operations. Gradually, however, and almost insensibly, the Allies gained ground on every side. Bulow, following up his success against

* This was the first occasion that this new and most formidable implement of modern warfare was brought into action. Such was its effect upon the enemy, that a solid square of French infantry, upon the flank of which it opened its fire, surrendered in a few minutes. Hardly was this brilliant success achieved, when the commander of the brigade, Captain Bogue, a noble and patriotic officer, struck on the breast by a cannon-ball, expired.—*See* LONDONDERRY, 172.

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Durutte and Nansouty, carried the villages of Stuntz and Sellerhausen, and drove the French on the north-east back under the very walls of Leipsic; while Sacken attacked the suburb of Rosenthal, from which he was only repelled by the devoted valour of Dombrowski's Poles and Arrighi's dragoons. But the near approach of the enemy on all sides now made it evident to Napoleon, that the position of Leipsic had become untenable, and dispositions were made for a retreat. He had early in the forenoon reinforced Bertrand, at Lindenau, with a considerable part of the reserves at Leipsic; and that general, driving Giulay before him, had succeeded in opening the road to Weissenfels, so that the principal line of their retreat was secured. Towards evening, the carriages and baggage of the army began to defile in that direction; and Blucher, observing the long files of chariots which filled the highway to France, immediately sent intimation to Schwartzenberg that the enemy was about to retreat, and dispatched D'York's corps, which had been kept in reserve during the day, to move upon Halle in order to anticipate his columns upon the left of the Saale.[1]

[1] Bout. 138, 139. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 144. Fain, ii. 430. Kausler, 951, 952.

Night came, more terrible even than day after such a conflict; for with it was brought the memory of the past, and the anticipation of the future. To the incessant roll of musketry, and the roar of two thousand cannon, succeeded a silence yet more awful, interrupted only by a casual shot from the sentries as they paced their rounds, and the hollow murmur which, over a field of such vast extent, arose from the cries of the horses and the groans of the wounded. Soon the bivouacs were spread, and the heavens, in the whole circumference of the horizon,

Night council held by Napoleon on the field.

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were illuminated by the ruddy glow of innumerable watch-fires. Silent and sad, Napoleon's marshals and generals assembled around him: little was said in the deliberations which succeeded; the position of the enemy, the dreadful circles of bivouac flames which surrounded them, the dead and the dying who environed them on every side, told but too plainly how near and imminent the danger had become. Sorbier and Dulauloy, the commanders of the artillery, were requested to report on the condition of the army's ammunition; they stated that above two hundred thousand cannon-shot had been discharged during the battle, and to renew it was impossible without thirty or forty thousand fresh troops, and some hundred caissons of ammunition. Neither could be obtained; for the last sabre and bayonet had been brought up on the preceding day: the grand park of ammunition had been deposited in Torgau, and Magdeburg and Erfurth were the nearest depôts of provisions. During this eventful conference, Napoleon, overcome with fatigue, fell asleep in the chair on which he sat; his hands rested negligently folded on his breast, and his generals, respecting the respite of misfortune, preserved a profound silence. Suddenly, at the end of a quarter of an hour, he awoke, and casting a look of astonishment on the circle which surrounded him, exclaimed—"Am I awake, or is it a dream?" Soon recollecting, however, what had happened, he sent a message to the King of Saxony, announcing his intention to retreat, and leaving it to him either to follow his fortunes, or remain where he was, and conclude a separate peace with the Allies.[1]

[1] Odel. ii. 34, 35. Fain, ii. 430, 431.

No words can describe the state of horror and confusion in which the inhabitants of Leipsic were kept during the whole night which followed the

battle. The prodigious multitude of wounded who had been brought in during the day, had filled to overflowing every house it contained; the maimed and the dying were lying, without either bandages for their wounds or covering for their bodies, in the streets; while the incessant rolling of artillery waggons and caissons, on every avenue leading to Lindenau, the cries of the drivers, the neighing of the horses as the wheels of the carriages were locked together, and the continued march of the columns, kept every eye open, in that scene of unutterable woe, during the whole night. At eight, Napoleon left his bivouac on the Thonberg, and took up his quarters in the hotel of Prussia. His horses were ordered to be ready to start at a moment's notice; but he himself sat up till daylight, with Berthier, Maret, and Caulaincourt, receiving reports and dictating orders. The King of Saxony, amidst the wreck of his fortunes, was chiefly inconsolable from the defection of his troops during the battle, and repeatedly requested counsel from Napoleon how he should act in the crisis. But the Emperor had the generosity to leave him altogether unfettered in the course he was to pursue; and more than once expressed his admiration of the constancy of a prince who showed himself the same now, when surrounded by disaster, as when he inscribed on his triumphal arches the words, "To Napoleon, the grateful Frederick Augustus." [1]

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Dreadful state of Leipsic during the night.

[1] Fain, ii. 432, 433. Odel. ii. 36, 37.

Early on the morning of the 19th, the allied generals made preparations for a general attack on Leipsic. By daybreak the French army was in full retreat on all sides. Victor and Augereau, with the whole five corps of cavalry, defiled across the suburb of Lindenau, and issued forth over the chaussée which traversed the marshes of the Elster;

French dispositions for a retreat on the following morning.

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but this was the sole issue for the army: one single bridge over that river was alone to receive the prodigious concourse of soldiers and carriages; for no orders to form other bridges had been given, excepting one of wood, which speedily gave way under the multitude by which it was beset. Regnier, with the division Durutte, which alone remained to him, was charged with the defence of the suburb of Rosenthal; Ney withdrew his troops into the eastern suburbs; while the corps of Lauriston, Macdonald, and Poniatowski, entered the town and took a position behind the barriers of the south. They were destined to the honourable post of the rear-guard; but, though the two former still numbered twenty-five thousand combatants, the Poles had been reduced, by their two days' bloody fighting on the banks of the Elster, to two thousand seven hundred men.* The total loss of the French army, in the two preceding days, had been fully forty thousand men; but nearly sixty thousand were still in Leipsic, besides an equal number who were defiling on the road to France: the barriers were all strongly palisaded, the adjacent walls and houses loopholed; and such a force, defending house by house the suburbs of the city so strengthened, could certainly, it was hoped, make good the post till the evacuation of the ammunition waggons and cannon was effected.[1]

[1] Fain, ii. 433. Kausler, 852. Odel. ii. 38, 39. Vaud. i. 219.

No sooner were the allied troops made aware of the preparations in the French army for a retreat, than a universal cry of joy burst from the ranks, and the

* "Prince," said Napoleon to Poniatowski, "you will defend the suburb of the south." "Sire," replied he, "I have few followers left." "What then," rejoined Napoleon, "you will defend it with what you have?" "Ah! sire," replied the descendant of the Jagellons, "we are all ready to die for your majesty."—FAIN, ii 434.

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whole army, almost by involuntary movement, stood to their arms, and loudly demanded to be led on to the assault. The allied sovereigns hastened to profit by this universal burst of enthusiasm, and their dispositions were promptly made. Sacken advanced against the suburb of Halle, supported by Langeron as a reserve. Bulow prepared to storm the barriers of Hinther-Thor, and Kuhl-Garten Thor, on the east; Woronzoff was to move against the barrier of Grimma, on the south-east; while Benningsen and the advanced columns of the grand army assaulted the barriers of Sand, Windmuhl, and Munz, on the south. A prodigious multitude of artillery waggons and chariots obstructed the approaches to the town in that direction; and the French troops, lining all the walls, gardens, inclosures, and windows of the suburbs, were evidently preparing for a desperate resistance; but the allied columns, flushed with victory and burning with enthusiasm, pushed rapidly forward with inexpressible enthusiasm. The instructions of Trachenberg had been executed to the letter: gradually and skilfully contracting the circle within which the enemy's movements were circumscribed, they were at length preparing to meet at the appointed rendezvous, in the centre of his camp.[1]

Dispositions of the Allies for the assault of Leipsic.

[1] Bout. 143, 144. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 148, 149.

Before the assault commenced, a deputation from the magistrates of Leipsic waited on the Emperor Alexander, beseeching him to spare the city from the horrors with which it was menaced if it were carried by open force; and, at the same time, a flag of truce arrived from Macdonald, offering to surrender all that remained of the Saxon troops, with the town, if the French garrison were permitted to retire with their artillery unmolested. This proposal, which would in effect have secured the retreat of half the French army, was of course rejected, and the troops moved

Napoleon's last interview with the King of Saxony, and his departure from Leipsic.

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on to the attack. Meanwhile Napoleon, at ten o'clock, went to pay a farewell visit to the King of Saxony. He was received with the accustomed etiquette, and conducted into the apartment of the Queen, where he remained a quarter of an hour, endeavouring to console the aged monarch in his misfortunes: at length, hearing the rattle of musketry, both on the side of the suburb of Taucha and Grimma, he bade him adieu, and, mounting his horse, set off. In the first instance, he directed his course towards the gate of Ranstadt, which leads into the suburb of Lindenau; but when he arrived there, the crowd of horsemen, carriages, and foot soldiers, was so prodigious, that even the authority of the Emperor's attendants could not clear a passage through them, and he was obliged to retrace his steps. He then returned through the centre of the city, issued on the opposite side by the gate of St Pierre, when the bullets were already falling around him, rode round the boulevards, and again reached Ranstadt, by making the entire circuit of the city. There, however, new dangers awaited him for; the confusion of carriages, artillery, and chariots, in the streets of the suburb was such, that to penetrate the mass was impossible; while the rapid approach of the enemy, whose deafening cheers were already heard surmounting the roar of the musketry, rendered the moments precious, and instant escape indispensable. In this extremity, one of the citizens pointed out a lane by which he got into a garden, by the back-door of which he escaped out on the banks of the Elster, and reached the chaussée beyond the suburb, and hastened across the marshes to Lindenau. Had it not been for that casual discovery, he would undoubtedly have been made prisoner.[1]

[1] Odel. ii. 333. Note and 41. Fain, ii. 439, 440. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 149.

Leipsic is carried on all sides, after a vigorous resistance.

Meanwhile the allied columns were pressing in on all sides; and the tumult in the interior of the city was such, that it was with the utmost difficulty, and only by the most energetic efforts on the part of Poniatowski, Lauriston, and Macdonald, who were charged with the maintenance of the post as long as possible, that any degree of order could be preserved in the defence. Despairing of the possibility of carrying off their innumerable artillery waggons and chariots, the French set fire to three hundred which were in park before the gate of Dresden; and the sight of the flames, by rendering it certain that the enemy intended to evacuate the place, redoubled the ardour of the allied troops. The resistance, however, was beyond expectation vigorous. Sacken was twice repulsed from the suburb of Halle beyond the Partha, and only succeeded at length in forcing his way in by the aid of Langeron's corps, and the sacrifice of almost the whole regiment of Archangel. Still the arch over the Partha and the inner suburb were to be carried; but the Russians crossed the bridge in the face of two heavy guns pouring forth grape-shot, and driving down the main street, commenced a murderous warfare with the French, who were firing from the windows and tops of the houses. At the same time an obstinate conflict was going on at the barrier of Hinther-Thor, where Bulow, supported by six Swedish battalions, after a furious conflict at length forced the gate, and commenced a guerilla warfare with the French at the windows and in the houses. The assailants, however, were now pouring in on all sides, and further resistance was unavailing. Woronzow, at the head of several Russian battalions, forced the barrier of Grimma; Krasowski stormed that of the hospital; while Ben-

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ningsen and the advanced guard of the grand army carried those of Sand, Windmuhl, and Pegau, looking to the south. On all sides the allied troops poured like a furious torrent into the city—the very steeples shaking with their hurrahs—bearing down all opposition, and driving before them an enormous mass of soldiers, carriages, artillery, and waggons, which, with the rearguard every where, yet bravely fighting, was rolled slowly onwards towards the west, like a huge monster, bleeding at every pore, but still unsubdued.[1]

[1] Bout. 143, 146. Vaud. i. 221. Jom. iv. 480, 481. Fain, ii. 441.

Blowing up of the bridge over the Elster, and surrender of the French rearguard.

At this dreadful moment the great bridge of Lindenau, the only remaining passage over the Elster, was blown into the air with a frightful explosion. The corporal charged with the mine which had been run under it by orders of Napoleon, hearing the loud hurrahs on all sides, and seeing some of the enemy's tirailleurs approaching in the gardens of the suburbs on either hand, naturally conceived that the French troops had all passed and the baggage only remained, and that the time was therefore come to fire the train, in order to stop the pursuit of the Allies. He accordingly applied the match; the arch was blown into the air, and the passage stopped; while the only other bridge over the river, hastily and imperfectly constructed, had shortly before sunk under the weight of the crowds by which it was beset. A shriek of horror, more terrible than even the loudest cries of battle, burst from the dense multitude which crowded to the edge of the chasm, when they found the arch destroyed; the ranks immediately broke, the boldest threw themselves into the river, where a few escaped across, but the greater part perished in the deep and muddy channel. Macdonald by great exertions succeeded in reaching the brink, and, plunging in, swam

his horse across, and escaped. Poniatowski also reached the side, and spurred his horse on; but the gallant charger, exhausted with fatigue, reeled as he strove to mount the opposite bank, and fell back on his noble rider, who perished in the water; Lauriston, Regnier, and twenty other generals, with fifteen thousand soldiers, were made prisoners; besides twenty-three thousand sick and wounded who lay in the hospitals and private houses. Two hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, nine hundred chariots and ammunition waggons; an incalculable quantity of baggage; the King of Saxony, two generals of corps, seven generals of division, twelve of brigade, and thirty thousand other prisoners, constituted the trophies, during the three days of a battle in which the total loss of the French was upwards of sixty thousand men. The loss of the Allies was also immense; it amounted to nearly eighteen hundred officers, and forty-one thousand private soldiers, killed and wounded, in the three days' combat. A prodigious sacrifice; but which, great as it is, humanity has no cause to regret, for it delivered Europe from French bondage, and the world from revolutionary aggression.[1] *

[1] Bout. 146, 149. Odel. ii. 39, 41. Jom. iv. 479, 481. Fain, ii. 442, 443. Vaud. i. 222. Lond, 174, 175.

* The following is the exact proportion in which the total loss was divided between the different powers whose troops were engaged, and affords a pretty fair criterion of the degree in which the weight of the contest fell upon them respectively:—

	Officers.	Noncomd. Officers and Privates.
Russians,	800	20,000
Prussians,	630	13,500
Austrians,	360	7,000
Swedes,	10	300
	1790	40,800
		1,790
		42,590

—KAUSLER, 952.

Great part of the French military writers, following the example of

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At two o'clock the carnage ceased at all points; the rattle of musketry was no longer heard, and a distant roar in all directions alone indicated that the waves of this terrible tempest were gradually sinking to rest. But what pen can paint the scene which the interior of the city now exhibited? Grouped together in wild confusion, lay piles of the dead and heaps of the dying; overturned artillery caissons, broken guns, pillaged baggage waggons, and dejected prisoners, were to be seen beside exulting bands of the victors, and dense columns of the Allies, who in admirable order forced their way through the throng, and, amidst cheers that made the very welkin to ring, moved steadily forward towards the principal square of the city. On the side of the suburb of Machranstadt in particular, the frightful accumulation of wounded fugitives, and as yet unwounded but captive warriors, recalled the awful image of the passage of the Berezina. Amidst this unparalleled scene, the allied sovereigns, at the head of their respective troops, made their entrance into the city. The Emperors of Russia and Austria, with the King of Prus-

Entrance of the allied sovereigns into Leipsic, Oct. 19.

Napoleon's official account in the *Moniteur*, have ascribed the catastrophe of the 19th entirely to the accidental blowing up of the bridge, by the corporal on guard, before the prescribed time. It is evident, however, that a single bridge could never have permitted so vast a mass as fifteen thousand soldiers, two hundred and fifty guns, and eight hundred chariots, to defile across in less than an hour, especially when the enemy were pressing the rear of the mass vigorously on all sides; and in the confusion of such a multitude of stragglers to get forward, with the musketry and cheers of the victors approaching on all sides, the passage would necessarily be speedily choked. This is, accordingly, admitted by the more judicious of the eye witnesses in the French ranks:—"Du reste, ceux qui furent coupés seraient de même tombés entre les mains de l'ennemi. Sans cet accident, l'impossibilité de sortir autrement que *l'étroit passage d'une seule porte*, les eut également livrés aux Alliés, qui avaient toute facilité de passer l'Elster sur d'autres points."—ODELEBEN, *Témoin Oculaire*, ii. 41.

sia, surrounded by their illustrious generals and brilliant staffs, came by the barriers on the south, the Prince-Royal of Sweden by those on the east, and all met in the great square. At this heart-stirring sight, the enthusiasm of the people knew no bounds: all felt as if themselves and all dear to them had escaped from death; the city resounded with acclamations, handkerchiefs waved from every window, and merry chimes rang from every steeple; and tears, more eloquent than words, rolling over almost every cheek, told that the tyrant was struck down, and Germany delivered.[1]

[1] Lond. 173, 174. Lab. i. 413.

While these scenes, outstripping even the splendour of oriental imagination, were passing in the city of Leipsic, the French army, sad, disorganized, and dejected, was wending its way towards Machranstadt. The Emperor, after passing the last bridge, that of the mill of Lindenau, ascended to the first floor of the windmill to examine the state of the army; but there his exhaustion was such that he fell asleep, and slept profoundly for some time, amidst the distant roar of the cannon at Leipsic, and the din of horsemen, guns, and foot-soldiers, who hurried in a tumultuous torrent past the base of the edifice. Wakened by the explosion of the bridge, on the other side of the marshes, he hastily arranged some guns in battery, to guard against an immediate attack; but finding he was not pursued, and having learned the real nature of the catastrophe, he continued his course more leisurely to Machranstadt, where the whole guard had already arrived, and where headquarters were established for the night. But it was already apparent how much the continued fatigues and calamities they had undergone had weakened the authority of the Emperor, and dissolved the dis-

Commencement of Napoleon's retreat towards the Rhine.

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cipline of the army. The troops, with feelings embittered by misfortune, marched in sullen and moody desperation: no cheers were heard on the approach of the Emperor: pillage and rapine were universal: the bonds of discipline, even in the guard itself, were relaxed; and the officers appeared to have lost at once the power and the inclination to stop the disorder which prevailed.[1]

[1] Fain, ii. 444. Odel. i. 43, 44.

Movements of the allied troops after the battle.

On the side of the Allies, a very considerable dislocation of the immense force which had combated at Leipsic immediately took place. Bernadotte with the Swedes, and a considerable part of his army, as well as Benningsen's force, moved towards Hamburg, where the presence of Davoust, with a powerful corps, both required observation and promised an important acquisition. Klenau was detached towards Dresden, to aid in the blockade of St Cyr, who, with thirty-five thousand men, was now altogether cut off, and might be expected speedily to surrender. Blucher, with the corps of Langeron and Sacken, moved after the French on the great road to Mayence, and reached Skenditz the same night. D'York was advanced to Halle, and Giulay with his Austrians marched on Pegau; but the great body of the allied army, worn out with its toils, remained in the neighbourhood of Leipsic. These movements, and in particular the speedy removal of Bernadotte from the headquarters of the allied sovereigns to a separate, but yet important command, were recommended not less by their military importance than by political considerations of yet greater weight. The Grand Alliance, though hitherto faithful to itself, and prosperous beyond what the most sanguine could have anticipated, was composed of materials which, when the pressure of common danger was removed, could

hardly be expected to draw cordially together. Bernadotte, in particular, could not be an object of very warm interest to the Emperor Francis, by whom his insults at Vienna, fourteen years before, when ambassador of the Directory, were far from being forgotten;* his backwardness, especially in the employment of the Swedish troops, during the whole campaign, was well known at headquarters; and he himself, as he admits, felt that he was in a false position, and that he would be better at a distance from the scene of French carnage and humiliation.[1]†

[1] Fain, ii. 449, 450. Mem. de Charles Jean, ii 100.

The funeral of Prince Poniatowski terminated the last scene of this bloody drama. Victors and vanquished vied with each other in striving to do honour to the hero, who, faithful to his country and his oaths, exhibited, amidst the general defection of Europe, the glorious example of unconquerable firmness and unshaken fidelity. After bravely combating at the head of his heroic but wasted band of followers, in the suburbs of Leipsic, to retard the advance of the Allies, he was retiring to the banks of the Pleisse, still keeping up a desperate resistance, when an explosion was heard, and the cry arose that the bridge was blown up. "Gentlemen," said he to the officers around him, drawing his sword, "it now behoves us to die with honour." At the head of this gallant band he made his way, though severely wounded, through a column of the Allies which strove to intercept his retreat, and reached the banks of the Pleisse, which he succeeded in passing by dis-

Funeral of Prince Poniatowski. Oct. 20.

* Ante, iii. 625.

† "The Prince-Royal lost no time in quitting Leipsic, and moved in the direction of Hamburg. The fact is, that at Leipsic he was in a false position. The sight of every dead body, of every wounded man, of every French prisoner, awakened in his breast the most cruel feelings."—*Mémoires de Charles Jean*, ii. 100.

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mounting from his horse. Exhausted with fatigue and loss of blood he mounted another, and, seeing no other possibility of escape, plunged into the deep stream of the Elster, and by great exertions reached the other side. In striving, however, to mount the opposite bank, the hind feet of the horse were entangled in the mud; it fell backward, and the exhausted chief sunk to rise no more. His funeral was celebrated with extraordinary pomp by the allied sovereigns, who hastened to do honour to a warrior whose military career had been unsullied, and who, in the last extremity, preferred death to surrender; but a still more touching testimony to his worth was borne by the tears of the Poles, who crowded round his bier, and anxiously strove to touch the pall which covered the remains of the last remnant of their royal line, and the last hopes of their national independence.[1]

[1] Lab. i. 409, 410: Rown Portefeuille de 1813, ii. 420, 421.

March of of the French army to Weissenfels, Oct. 20.

On the day following his dreadful defeat, Napoleon arrived at Weissenfels. In passing over the plain of Lutzen, the soldiers cast a melancholy look on the theatre of their former glory, and many shed tears at the sad reverse of which it exhibited so striking a monument. What had availed them the efforts made, the sacrifices endured, the blood shed, since that heroic combat had been maintained? Where were now the young hearts which then beat high, the glittering hopes that were then formed, the ardent visions which then floated before them "in life's morning march, when their bosoms were young?" Before the blood-stained environs of Kaia and Starsiedel, defiled, in wild confusion, the tumultuous array of a beaten, dejected, and half-famished army: three-fourths of those who there had fought so bravely for the independence of France had since perished, or were now captives; the few that remained, more like a

funeral procession than a warlike array, passed on pensive and silent; they envied the lot of those who had fallen, for they would not witness the degradation of France.

> "The boast of chivalry, the pomp of power,
> And all that beauty, all that wealth e'er gave;
> Await alike the inevitable hour—
> The paths of glory lead but to the grave."

The Old Guard halted at Rippail, near the spot where Bessieres had been slain the day before the battle of Lutzen, and there Napoleon experienced a momentary gratification in seeing a column of five thousand Austrian prisoners, with all the standards taken at Dresden, defile before him. But this enjoyment was of short duration. As the corps and regiments, in utter disorder and for the most part mingled together, crowded past, it became painfully evident that all the Germans had left their colours; several even of the Polish regiments had passed over to the enemy; of Poniatowski's followers, only six hundred foot soldiers, and fifteen hundred horsemen remained, and they had engaged to abide by the Emperor's standards only for eight days more. Already the Allies were pressing the rear of the army: Sacken's cavalry, under Wassilchikow, had made two thousand prisoners; and the great road being cut off by Giulay, who from Pegau had moved on Naumburg, it became necessary to throw bridges over the Saale, in order to gain by a cross march the other highway at Freyberg. Such was the emotion of Bertrand, who received the Emperor at Weissenfels, and there first became acquainted, from the confusion of the columns, with the magnitude of the disaster that had been sustained, that he shed tears, and openly besought him to hasten forward,[1]

[1] Fain. ii. 452, 453. Bout. 150. Odel. ii. 44, 47. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 152.

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even if it were alone, to Erfurth and Mayence, and preserve in his person the fortunes of France.

Pursuit of the Allies to Freyberg.

On the day following, the retreat was continued in the direction of Freyberg; but as they could not reach that place, the Emperor passed the night in a cabin on the road side, only nine feet square. Blucher and Sacken, continuing the pursuit, arrived the same day at Weissenfels, and immediately set about the construction of new bridges in lieu of the wooden ones, over which the French had passed, which had been destroyed. Burning with anxiety to overtake the enemy, the Prussian hussars pushed on the moment the passage was practicable, and came up with them at the passage of the Unstrutt at Freyberg, where, after a sharp conflict, the rearguard was overthrown, with the loss of a thousand prisoners, eighteen guns, and an immense quantity of ammu-

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nition and baggage. On the same day, Giulay had a more serious affair with the enemy at the defile of Roesen. That position, which is extremely strong towards Naumburg, offers scarce any obstacles to an enemy advancing from the left of the Saale. Bertrand, accordingly, without difficulty dislodged the enemy from it; and once master of the defile, its strength in the other direction enabled him easily to maintain himself in it against the repeated attacks of the Austrian corps. The passage of the Unstrutt at Freyberg, however, evinced in striking colours the disorganized state of the army. Such was the accumulation of cannon and chariots on the opposite hill, that Napoleon's carriages were unable to get through, and he himself was obliged to alight and make his way on foot, which he did with extreme difficulty, through the throng. When the enemy's guns began to play on the dense mass,

the most frightful disorder ensued: every one rushed headlong towards the bridges, and the bullets began to whistle over the head of Napoleon himself. Finding that he could no longer be of any service, he calmly turned aside the favourite bay horse which he had mounted, and penetrating through several narrow and difficult defiles, reached Eckartsberg, where he passed the night in the same house from whence, six months before, he had set out, radiant with hope, to try his fortune at the head of a brilliant host on the Saxon plains. Through the whole night, the army, like a furious torrent, never ceased to roll along in wild confusion, and with dissonant cries, under the windows of the apartment in which the Emperor slept, where all was still and mournful as the grave.[1] [1] Fain, ii. 457, 458. Odel. ii. 50, 55. Vaud. i. 224. Lab. i.

During these days, the greater part of the allied army marched by the main road through Naumburg and Jena; and passing Weimar, took post on the road to Erfurth, near Nohra, while the army of the Prince-Royal continued its march by Merseberg, in the direction of Cassel. In this way the latter repeated exactly the pursuit of the grand army by Kutusoff, on the parallel line of march from Malaroslawitz to Krasnoi; and contenting themselves with harassing the rear of the French army by the army of Silesia, compelled them, by this able disposition, to recoil on the wasted line of their former advance. On the 22d, the French retreated with such expedition over the great plains which stretched from the neighbourhood of Eckartsberg to Erfurth, that even the Cossacks were unable to overtake them; and on the following day they reached the latter town, where fortified citadels gave a feeling of security to the army, while the distribution of provisions from extensive magazines assuaged the pangs of hunger which

Napoleon arrives at Erfurth, where Murat leaves him.

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were now so severely felt. Murat there quitted Napoleon, and bent his course for his own dominions. The pretext assigned for this departure was threatened disturbances in his dominions, and the necessity of providing for their defence in the dangers with which Italy would soon be menaced. But though these reasons were plausible, and not altogether without foundation, his real motives were very different. A secret correspondence had commenced with Metternich; and the King of Naples, in the hope of preserving his crown in the general wreck, was preparing to abandon his brother-in-law and benefactor. Napoleon, who, ever since his desertion of his post on the Vistula in the preceding spring, had watched his proceedings with a jealous eye, had no difficulty in divining his real motives; but he dissembled these feelings, and embraced his old companion in arms, as he parted with him, with a melancholy presentiment, which was too fatally realized, that he should never see him again.[1]

[1] Fain, ii. 470, 471. Jom. iv. 484, 485.

Stay of the French army at Erfurth, Oct. 23 and 24.

Napoleon passed two days at Erfurth, entirely engrossed in the labours of his cabinet. There he composed and sent off his famous bulletin, giving the account of the battle of Leipsic; from the place, and the very hotel, where five years before, during the conferences with the Emperor Alexander, his fortunes had attained their highest elevation,* he now was doomed to date the narrative of his decisive overthrow. These two days' rest had a surprising effect in restoring the spirit and rectifying the disorders of the army; and then might be seen the clearest proof how much the rapid diminution which, since hostilities recommenced, the French army had un-

* Ante, vi. 792.

dergone, had been owing to the almost total want of magazines of provisions for their subsistence, and the consequent necessity of individual pillage; all the effects of the abominable revolutionary maxim, that war should maintain war. So indignant was the Emperor at this result of physical privations, which he never felt himself, that on witnessing the effect of the magazines of Erfurth in restoring order, he said to the officers around, "Now, only see what a set they are; they are going to the devil. I shall lose eighty thousand men from hence to the Rhine in this manner." Even in this moment, however, when his beaten and dissolving army was only held together by the temporary supply of the magazines which they passed on their march, he was dreaming of fresh projects of conquest, and said repeatedly, "From hence to the Rhine; in spring I shall have two hundred and fifty thousand combatants." He was perfectly calm and collected in his manner, however; firm and unshaken in his views; and heard with equanimity all that was addressed to him, even on the necessity of making peace with the Allies: the subject of all others the most repugnant to his secret thoughts.[1]

[1] Odel. ii. 57. 58. Fain, ii. 465, 466.

Re-organization of the French army.

The army underwent a great change of composition during its brief sojourn at Erfurth, eminently descriptive of the awful catastrophes which had recently thinned its ranks. All that remained were formed into six corps,* the sad remains of thirteen, which, when the armistice terminated, followed the standards of the Emperor. Three whole corps, viz. those of Lauriston, Regnier, and Poniatowski, had disappeared during the catastrophe of Leipsic, and

* Commanded by Victor, Ney, Bertrand, Marmont, Augereau, and Macdonald.

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never were heard of again in the French army. Oudinot's had been dissolved after the disaster of Dennewitz; two, viz. St Cyr's and Vandamme's, had been left in Dresden; Davoust was in Hamburg, with detachments in Torgau and Magdeburg, and Rapp still held the ramparts of Dantzic. Above a hundred and ten thousand men were left to their fate in the garrisons on the Elbe; in Magdeburg alone there were thirty thousand; in Hamburg twenty-five; in Dresden thirty-five; in Torgau fourteen thousand. The garrisons of these places had been swelled to this enormous amount by the multitude of stragglers, sick and wounded men, who sought a refuge under shelter of their walls, after the retreat of the grand army from the Elbe; but they proved rather a burden than an advantage to their garrisons, for they brought with them the seeds of physical contagion and mental depression, from the miseries and privations of the campaign, and augmented the number of mouths, which pressed upon their now straitened supplies of provisions. The whole force which the Emperor brought with him from Erfurth towards the Rhine was under ninety thousand men; while twice that number were left blockaded in the fortresses on the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula: a most extraordinary and unparalleled result of the campaign, and saying little for the general plan of operations which he had adopted.[1]

[1] Fain, ii. 466, 467. Vaud. i. 225.

Continued retreat of the French, and pursuit of the Allies.

The stay of the Emperor at Erfurth, even for two days, filled the citizens, most of whom had been reduced to destitution by the continued exactions of the French army, with the utmost anxiety; for they were afraid that, to complete their miseries, they were to be involved in the horrors of a siege. It was necessity, however, arising from the dilapidated

state of the artillery, and the disorganized condition of his troops, which alone dictated this stoppage; and no sooner were the guns and caissons replenished from the magazines of Erfurth, and the troops partially fed and arranged in different corps, than the army resumed its march for the Rhine, and on the same day reached Gotha. Blucher, with unwearied activity, followed on its traces, and not only collected all the abandoned guns and captured the stragglers, but attacked and defeated the rearguard near that town, with the loss of two thousand prisoners. The grand allied army, with the headquarters of the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia, followed through the Thuringian forest; but so rapid was the retreat of the French towards the Rhine, that they were unable to keep pace with them, and beyond that woody region, the task of pursuing the retiring columns was devolved on the Cossacks. These formidable light troops, however, under their renowned leaders, Platoff, Orloff Denizoff, Chernicheff, and Kowaiski, continued the pursuit with indefatigable perseverance; not only were all foraging parties on either side of the road cut off, but the whole stragglers made prisoners, and a vast quantity of abandoned guns and ammunition collected at every step. The certainty of being made prisoners had no effect in deterring a large part of the army from straggling. Such were the pangs they underwent from hunger, that they were often glad of a pretence for yielding themselves to the enemy for the sake of momentary relief; and the woods, for some leagues, were filled with isolated men, great part of whom sank, from pure exhaustion, into the arms of death. With the exception of the frost and snow, the retiring army presented the same appearances as in the Moscow

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retreat; desertion prevailed to a frightful extent, especially among the few troops of the Rhenish confederacy which still adhered to the fortunes of Napoleon; the road was strewed, the ditches on either side filled, with the dead bodies of men and horses who had dropped down from the effects of fatigue and famine; and so rapid was the process of dissolution in the whole army, that it was hard to say, in the last days of the retreat, whether it was not melting away as fast as the host which retreated from Moscow had done under the severity of the Russian winter.[1]

[1] Vict. et Conq. xxii. 153. Bout. 154, 155. Fain, ii. 472, 473. Lab. i. 415, 416.

March of Wrede and the Bavarians to the Rhine.

While Napoleon, however, was thus making by rapid strides for the Rhine, a new and unexpected enemy was arising in that quarter, who threatened to intercept his retreat, and renew on the banks of the Maine the horrors of the Berezina. Bavaria, though the last to join the alliance, had taken the most decisive steps to demonstrate her sincerity in the new cause which she had adopted. No sooner were the cabinet of Munich relieved, by the march of Augereau for Leipsic, of the apprehensions excited by the presence of his corps near their frontier at Wurtzburg, than they yielded, as already mentioned, to the solicitations of the Allies, and concluded a peace with the cabinet of Vienna on the 8th October, in virtue of which Bavaria acceded to the grand alliance. Military operations of the highest importance were not slow in following upon this diplomatic conversion. The Bavarian army, under Marshal Wrede, which was stationed at Braunau, opposite to the Austrian corps under the Prince of Reuss, joined itself to the latter force, and both united set out in the middle of October in the direction of Frankfort on the Maine, under the command of Wrede. The whole consisted of three divisions of Bavarian infan-

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try, and two brigades of cavalry, of that state; and two divisions of Austrian infantry and one of cavalry, and numbered fifty-eight thousand combatants. On the 19th they passed the Danube at Donauwerth, and Wrede marched with such expedition, that on the 27th headquarters were at Aschaffenburg, from whence he detached ten thousand men to Frankfort; and on the 29th he took post in the forest of HANAU, stationing his troops across the great road, and blocking up entirely the retreat of the French army to Mayence.[1]

[1] Jom. iv. 487. Bout. 154, 155. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 153.

Forces with which Napoleon advanced against him.

The forces which Napoleon brought back with him were much more considerable in point of numerical amount; but a large part of them were so completely disorganized and depressed by the privations they had undergone during their retreat, that the contest between the two armies could not be said to be unequal. Nearly ninety thousand men had set out around his standards from Erfurth; but ten thousand had strayed from their colours, or been made prisoners in the subsequent forced marches, and when the army approached the Maine, it did not number above eighty thousand combatants. Full thirty thousand of these, also, were either stragglers, or so far in the rear as to be of no value in the shock which was approaching; so that, to clear his passage, Napoleon could not rely upon more than fifty thousand men; and his once magnificent artillery of thirteen hundred pieces was reduced to two hundred guns. They were, for the most part, however, the artillery of the guard, second to none in Europe for vigour and efficiency; and the troops, aware of their danger, ardently desirous to get back to France, and perfectly sensible that no other way remained but what they could win at their swords'

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point, might be expected to fight with the courage of despair. The guards, moreover, upon whom the weight of the contest was likely to fall, had suffered comparatively little in the late disasters; and Bertrand's corps had been an entire stranger to the disasters of the last two days' combat at Leipsic. The Emperor, therefore, who had slept on the 29th at Langen-Schold, the chateau of the Prince of Isemberg, no sooner heard that the road to Mayence was blocked up by the Bavarian troops, than he made his dispositions for an attack.[1]

[1] Fain, ii. 472 473. Jom. ii. 487, 488. Bout. 157, 158. Vaud. i. 227, 228.

Description of the field of battle at Hanau.

Wrede, who had driven the garrison of Wurtzburg into the citadel, and so secured the passage of that important town on the 27th, reached Hanau with his advanced guard on the 28th, and on the day following brought up the bulk of his forces to that town, and stretching his line across the high-road leading to Frankfort and Mayence, entirely stopped the way, and soon came into communication with the Cossacks of Chernicheff and Orloff Denizoff, which hovered round the outskirts of the French army. No sooner was the junction formed than the Bavarian general arranged his troops in order of battle, and the position which they occupied was so peculiar as to be entirely different from any which had formed the theatre of combat since the commencement of the revolutionary war. The allied army stood in front of Hanau; the right wing resting on the Kenzig, the left in echelon on the road from Erfurth to Frankfort. Sixty pieces of cannon were planted in the centre between the bridge of Gelnhausen over the Kenzig and the great road, to play on the advancing columns of the enemy when they attempted to debouche from the forest. The vanguard was posted at Ruckingen, with orders

to retire from that post as soon as it was seriously attacked, and fall back to the main body of the army, which was drawn up across the great road in the plain which lies between the town of Hanau and the forest of Lamboi. A large body of light troops occupied the forest, to retard the advance of the enemy: that great tract of wood extends for above two leagues in breadth towards Erfurth, and is composed of old oaks, many of them as large as those in Windsor forest, whose aged stems at times rise out of close thickets of underwood, at others, overshadow with their spreading boughs beautiful vistas of greensward, where numerous herds of swine feed on the acorns; realizing thus, in the days of Napoleon, that scene of primitive nature in northern Europe, in the time of Richard Cœur de Lion, over which modern genius has thrown so enchanting a light.[1]*

[1] Personal Observation. Bout. 157. Viet. et Conq. xxii. 155. Fain, ii. 475.

The position which the allied army thus occupied, resembled, in a military point of view, that held by Moreau at the western side of the forest of Hohenlinden; and if Wrede had been in sufficient strength to keep his ground in front of the issues from the wood, and hinder the enemy from deploying, at the same time that a division was thrown across the thickets, on the flank of the advancing columns, like that of Richepanse at Hohenlinden, he might possibly have realized the brilliant success of the great republican general on that memorable spot.† But his army was not in sufficient strength to effect such an object. After deducting three battalions left to blockade the citadel of Wurtzburg, and ten thousand imprudently detached to Frankfort, he could not bring above forty-five thousand men into the

Advantages and weakness of Wrede's position there.

* The opening scene of the forest in *Ivanhoe*.

† Ante, iv. 391.

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field; and, with such a force, it was impossible to expect that the retreat of eighty thousand combatants, with two hundred pieces of cannon, fighting with the courage of despair, could be arrested: the more especially when the head of the columns was composed of the Old and Young Guard. Nor was the position of the Allies exempt from peril; for, if they were defeated—and the French army was in a condition to follow up its successes—they ran the risk of being thrown back upon the Maine, and destroyed by superior forces, in attempting to make their way across that broad and deep river.[1]

[1] Jom. iv. 487, 488. Bout. 157. Vaud. ii. 229, 236. Wrede's Official Account. Schoell, Recueil, iii. 388.

Commencement of the action, and forcing of the passage by the French advanced guard.

At eleven o'clock on the forenoon of the 30th the battle commenced. The French columns, preceded by a cloud of tirailleurs, advanced in dense masses—the artillery following the great road, the light troops spread out in the thicket and greensward on either side—and soon a warm fire began in the forest. The dark recesses of the wood were illuminated by the frequent flashes of the musketry: the verdant alleys were hastily traversed by files of armed men, and the action began like a magnificent hunting party in the forest of Fontainbleau. Victor's and Macdonald's corps, now reduced to five thousand combatants, headed the advance, and with some difficulty made their way, fighting as they advanced through the wood to the plain beyond it; but when they came there, and endeavoured to deploy on its south-western skirts, they were crushed by the concentric fire of seventy pieces of cannon, which stood before the allied line, and for four hours the French army was unable to clear its way through the narrow plain which lay between the forest and the banks of the Kinzig. During this period, however, the guards and main body of the French army had time to come up; and

Napoleon, now seriously disquieted for his line of retreat, immediately ordered a general attack on the enemy. General Curial, with two battalions of the Old Guard, dispersed as tirailleurs, were brought forward to the front, and began to engage the Bavarian sharpshooters; the hardy veterans soon gained ground, and won not only the issues of the forest, but part of the little plain scattered with oaks which lay beyond; and to the space thus won, the artillery of the guard, under Drouot, was immediately brought forward. This admirable officer commenced his fire with fifteen guns; but they were gradually augmented to fifty, and soon acquired a decided superiority over the batteries of the enemy, whose artillery, though more numerous, returned the fire feebly, from an apprehension of exhausting their ammunition, the reserves of which had not yet come up from Aschaffenberg. Under cover of Drouot's terrible fire, Nansouty and Sebastiani debouched with the cavalry of the guard, which had suffered less than any other part of the army in the preceding actions, and by a vigorous charge overthrew every thing that was opposed to them. Wrede, seeing his danger, collected his cavalry, and the Bavarian horse and squares endeavoured to rally behind Chernicheff's Cossacks; but although the Russian dragoons combated bravely, they were unable to withstand the thundering charges of the French cuirassiers, and the point-blank discharge of the artillery of the guard; and the whole left wing of the Allies gave way and fled towards the Kinzig, leaving the plain between the river and the wood, and the road to Frankfort, open to the enemy. As a last resource, the Bavarian general made an effort on his right;[1] but Napoleon quickly pushed forward two battalions of the Old

[1] Vict. et Conq. xxii 156, 157. Bout. 158, 159. Fain, ii. 477, 479. Wrede's Official Report, Schoell, Rec. iii. 389.

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Guard, who arrested his advance; and Wrede, despairing of success, withdrew the shattered remains of his army behind the Kinzig, under protection of the cannon of Hanau.

Position and danger of Napoleon during the action.

While this vehement conflict was going on at the entrance of the wood, Napoleon himself, in the depths of the forest, was a prey to the most anxious solicitude. Fresh troops were continually coming up from the rear; but the highway and alleys through the forest were already blocked up with carriages and cannon, and the increasing multitude, when no issue could be obtained, only augmented the confusion and embarrassment in its wooded recesses. Napoleon, unquiet and anxious, was mean time walking backwards and forwards on the highway, near the bend which the road makes, conversing with Caulaincourt. A bomb fell near them in a ditch bordering the highway; the latter immediately placed himself between the Emperor and the danger, and they continued their conversation as if nothing had occurred. The attendants of the Emperor hardly ventured to draw their breath; but the bomb had sunk so deep in the ditch, that it was prevented from bursting. Meanwhile the forest on all sides resounded with the echoes of artillery; the eye sought in vain to measure its depths, even with the aid of the bright flashes which illuminated their gloom; the crash of the cannon-balls was heard, with frightful violence, on the gnarled branches of the oaks; and not a few of the French were killed by the fall of the huge arms which had been torn from the sides of these venerable patriarchs of the forest by the violent strokes. When Wrede's last and desperate onset was made on the French left, in particular, the combatants approached so near that their cries were distinctly heard, and the

tops of the trees were violently agitated, as in a hurricane, by the bullets which whistled through their branches. The repulse of that attack by the infantry of the Old Guard removed, indeed, the danger, and opened the road to Frankfort; but the Emperor, notwithstanding, did not march; on with the advanced guard, but spent the night in the forest, like Richard Cœur de Lion, beside a blazing watchfire under the oaks, where next morning he received a deputation from the magistrates of Hanau, who came to beseech him to spare their city the horrors of an assault.' * [1]

[1] Fain, ii. 478, 479. Norvin's Portefeuille de 1813, ii. 431.

During the night after the battle, the French army defiled without intermission on the great road by Wilhelmstadt, from whence it moved by Hochstadt on Frankfort. But, though the guards and principal part of the army were thus placed beyond the reach of danger, it was not so easy a matter to say how the rearguard, and the numerous stragglers who followed its columns, were to be brought through the perilous pass between the forest and the river. Late on the evening of the 30th, the rearguard, under Mortier, was still at Gelnhausen, on the other side of the forest; and, in order to protect his retreat, Marmont was left before Hanau, with a considerable part

Capture and recapture of Hanau on the 31st.

* The field of battle at Hanau is one of the most interesting of the many spots on the continent of Europe to which the exploits of Napoleon have given durable celebrity, as well from the circumstance of its having been the theatre of the last of his German conflicts, as the extraordinary and romantic character of the old forest where the severest part of the action took place. When the author visited this spot, twenty-five years ago, the marks of the then recent conflict were every where conspicuous on the huge trunks and gnarled branches of the oaks, many of which were cleft asunder or torn off their stems by the cannon-shot; while the naturally picturesque appearance of the decaying masses was singularly increased by the cavities made by the howitzers and balls, which were in many places sunk in the wood, and the ruined aspect of the broken branches, half overgrown with underwood, which encumbered its grassy glades.

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of the army. At two in the morning of the 31st, he began to bombard the town, and with such effect, that it was evacuated early in the forenoon by the Austrian garrison, and immediately taken possession of by the French forces. No sooner was this *point d'appui* secured on the other side of the Kinzig, than Marmont attacked the right of the Allies posted behind the road to Aschaffenberg, and with such impetuosity, that it was forced to give way, and thrown back in disorder on the Maine, where it must inevitably have been destroyed, if the guards and cuirassiers of the French army had been at hand to support the advantage. They had, however, meanwhile passed on towards Frankfort, and Marmont, in consequence, solicitous only to secure the passage of the rearguard of Mortier, paused in the career of success, and at two in the afternoon fell back towards Hanau, followed by Wrede, who, stung to the quick by the disaster he had experienced, himself led on his forces, and stormed that town at the head of his troops; but, in pursuing the Italian rearguard towards the Kinzig, he received a severe wound, which obliged him to relinquish the command. At the same time, another column of the Allies drove the French over the bridge of Lamboi; but, pursuing their advantage too warmly in the plain in front of the forest, they were attacked in flank by a French column issuing from the woods, and driven back with great loss. These checks, and the wound of Wrede, rendered General Tresnel, who succeeded him in the command, more circumspect: relinquishing all hope of inflicting further injury on the retreating army, he withdrew his troops behind the Kinzig, and Marmont continued his retreat to Frankfort, where the same night he was joined by Mortier with the rearguard;[1] who,

[1] Bout. 161, 162. Fain, ii. 480, 481. Vaud. 252, 253. Wrede's Official Account. Schoell, Recueil, iii. 390, 391.

having heard an exaggerated account of the losses of the army on the preceding day, had, by marching all the preceding night by Langensibold, succeeded by a circuitous route in avoiding the scene of danger.

Results of the battle, and passage of the Rhine by the French.

The battle of Hanau cost the Allies ten thousand men, of whom four thousand were prisoners; and the French lost seven thousand, of whom three thousand were wounded and left in the forest, from want of carriages to convey them away. The road to Frankfort resembled an immense wreck, being strewed with ammunition waggons, broken down guns, dead horses, and wounded men, who were abandoned in the precipitate retreat of the French army. Napoleon left Frankfort on the 1st November: soon the red domes and steeples of Mayence appeared in view; the army defiled in mournful silence over the long bridge which it had so often passed in the buoyancy of anticipated victory; the Emperor remained six days in that stronghold, to collect the ruined remains of his vast army, and then set out for Paris, where he arrived on the 9th; and the French eagles bade A FINAL ADIEU TO THE GERMAN PLAINS, the theatre of their glories, of their crimes, and of their punishment.[1]

[1] Fain, ii. 480, 481. Bout. 164. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 160, 161.

Reflections on this battle.

The battle of Hanau was a dignified termination to the exploits of the French revolutionary arms beyond the Rhine, and threw a parting ray of glory over their long and successful career. Its lustre reflects in an especial manner on the imperial guard, by whom the victory was almost exclusively gained; and certainly no troops could, under circumstances of greater difficulty and depression, have achieved a more glorious triumph. When we reflect that the soldiers who, after sharing in the dangers and witnessing the disasters of the greatest battle recorded

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in history, were obliged to toil for above two hundred miles through a wearisome and disastrous retreat, suddenly found themselves, at its close, assailed by a fresh army, superior to that which at the moment they could array against it, and which entirely blocked up their only line of retreat—we must admit that, equally with the discipline and resolution of the guard during the Russian retreat, their victory on this occasion demonstrates the unconquerable firmness of those iron bands, whom the discipline and victories of Napoleon had nursed up to be at once the glory, the terror, and the scourge of Europe. It throws a clear and important light upon the wisdom of Kutusoff in not attempting to stop the imperial guard at Krasnoi,* and contenting himself with the lesser but safer advantage of passing the succeeding columns by the edge of the sword; and on the injustice of the clamour which has been raised against Tchichakoff, because, with less than thirty thousand men, and a hundred and fifty guns, he did not succeed in stopping Napoleon at the Berezina, who had forty thousand efficient combatants, independent of as many stragglers, and two hundred and fifty guns at his disposal.† In truth, the success of the French at the Berezina, of the Russians at Culm, of the English at Corunna, and of Napoleon at Hanau, demonstrates the truth of the old adage, that it is in general well to make a bridge of gold for a flying enemy. Nothing is often more fallacious, in such a case, than to judge of the prostration of the strength of an army by the number of its stragglers, the disorder of its columns, the wreck of guns and ammunition waggons, which tracks its course, or the languor with which it resists when attacked by the

* Ante, viii. 786. † Ante, viii. 793.

pursuing enemy. All these are the beginning of ruin, but they are not ruin itself; and if their retreat is threatened, and the necessity of opening a passage at the sword's point becomes evident to every capacity, it is surprising how soon order will be resumed under the pressure of impending danger, and a desperate valour will compensate the loss of the largest amount of material resources.

Combat of Hochheim, and approach of the allied armies to the Rhine. 4th Nov.

While the sad remains of the French army were retiring across the Rhine, the allied troops followed closely on their footsteps; and the forces of central and eastern Europe poured in prodigious strength down the valley of the Maine. On the 4th November the advanced guards, under Prince Schwartzenberg, entered Frankfort; and on the same day the headquarters of the allied sovereigns reached Aschaffenberg. On the day following, Alexander made his 5th Nov. entry into Frankfort at the head of twenty thousand horse, amidst the universal transport of the inhabitants; and the imperial headquarters were fixed there, till preparations could be made for the arduous undertaking of crossing the Rhine, and carrying the war into the heart of France. At the same time their 6th — forces on all sides rapidly approached that frontier stream. Schwartzenberg forced the passage of the Nidde, and advanced his headquarters to Hochst, within two leagues of Mayence; while Blucher, on his right, approached the Rhine, and fixed his headquarters at Giessen. A few days after, Giulay re- 9th — ceived instructions to attack Hochheim, a small town fortified with five redoubts, which stood a little in advance of the *tête-du-pont* of Mayence at Cassel, and was garrisoned by six thousand men, under Guilleminot, supported by Morand with an equal force. So formidable, however, were the columns

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which the Allies had destined for its assault—consisting of Giulay's column, which attacked the town itself, while Prince Alois of Lichtenstein turned its right, and threatened its communication with the Rhine—that the place was speedily carried, and the French were driven, with the loss of three hundred prisoners, into the *tête-du-pont* of Cassel, the last fortified post in that quarter which they possessed on the right bank of the Rhine.[1]

[1] Vict. et Conq. ii. 161. Bout. 165, 166.

Winter quarters of both parties.

This combat was the last of the campaign, so far as the grand armies on either side were concerned. Exhausted with a contest of such unexampled fatigue and vehemence, both commanders put their forces into winter quarters. Those of Napoleon, entirely on the left bank of the Rhine, extended from Cologne on the north, to Strasburg on the south; but the bulk of his forces were stationed at Mayence, Coblentz, and opposite to the centre of the allied forces around Frankfort. The grand allied army, as well that of Blucher as of Schwartzenberg, extended along the course of the Rhine, from Kehl to Coblentz; the army of Silesia, forming the right, opposite to Coblentz, and spreading up the hilly part of the Rhine to Ehrenbreitzen; that of Bohemia, spreading from the Maine to the Neckar, and thence to the borders of the Black Forest.[2]

[2] Vaud. i. 237. Bout. 167.

Enthusiasm of the German troops when they approached the Rhine.

The Germans have long connected heart-stirring associations with the sight, and even the name of the Rhine. The vast amphitheatre of the central Alps, from the snows of which that noble stream takes its rise; the sublime cataract by which it descends into the plains of Germany; the ancient and peopled cities which lie along its banks; the romantic regions through whose precipices it afterwards flows; the feudal remains by which their summits are

crowned; the interesting legends of the olden time with which they are connected; the vineyards which nestle in their sunny nooks; the topaz blaze of the cliffs on which the mouldering ruins are placed —have long sunk into the heart of this imaginative people, and, united to the thrilling music of Haydn, have touched the inmost chords of the German soul.* They connected it, in an especial manner, with the idea of Germany as a whole; it was their great frontier stream; it recalled the days of their emperors and independence; it had become, as it were, the emblem of the fatherland. It may easily be conceived what effect upon the armies of a people thus excited—whose hearts had thrilled to the songs of Körner, whose swords had drunk of the blood of Leipsic—the sight of the Rhine, when it first burst upon their united and conquering arms, produced. Involuntarily the columns halted when they reached the heights beyond Hochheim, where its windings spread out as on a map beneath their feet; the rear ranks hurried to the front; the troops uncovered as they beheld the stream of their fathers; tears trickled down many cheeks; joy, too big for utterance, swelled every heart; and the enthusiasm passing from rank to rank, soon a hundred thousand voices joined in the cheers which told the world that the war of independence was ended, and Germany delivered.[1]†

[1] Personal knowledge.

* "The Rhine! the Rhine! Be blessings on the Rhine!
St Rochus bless the land of love and wine!
The groves and high-hung meads, whose glories shine
In painted waves below;
Its rocks, whose topaz beam betrays the vine,
Or richer ruby glow.
The Rhine! the Rhine! be blessings on the Rhine!
Beats there a sad heart here? pour forth the wine!"

† The following lines were added at this period to the national an-

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Nothing remained but to reap the fruits of this mighty victory, to gather up the fragments of this prodigious spoil. Yet so wide was it spread, so far had the French empire extended over Europe, that to collect its ruins was a matter of no small time and labour. The giant was thrown down, but it was no easy undertaking to uncase his limbs, and collect his armour. The rickety kingdom of Westphalia was the first of Napoleon's political creations which sunk to the dust, never again to rise. Jerome, already almost dethroned by the incursion of Chernicheff, was finally swept away by the arms of Bernadotte. Woronzow, with the advanced guard of his army, entered Cassel nine days after the battle of Leipsic; Jerome had previously abandoned that capital; the greater part of his army joined the Allies, and the few who remained faithful to his cause precipitately retired to Dusseldorf, where he crossed the Rhine. He was closely followed by Winzingerode, who not only soon organized the whole kingdom of Westphalia in the interest of the Allies, but overran and destroyed the revolutionary dynasty in the grand duchy of Berg, which united its arms to the common standards of Germany. The army of the Prince-Royal, united to that of Benningsen, no longer required for the great operations in the field, spread itself over the north of Germany; by Gottingen it marched to Hanover, every where re-establishing the authority of the King of England, amidst the unanimous transport of the inhabitants,

Final overthrow of the kingdom of Westphalia.

Oct. 28.

Nov. 6.

them, pointing to the anxious desire generally felt, to reclaim from the spoiler the German provinces on the left bank of the Rhine:—

"The Rhine shall no longer be our boundary;
It is the great artery of the state,
And it shall flow through the heart of our empire."

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who chased away their old oppressors, the douaniers, with every mark of ignominy. Bernadotte's head-quarters were established in that city, while Winzingerode spread over the grand duchy of Oldenberg and East Friesland; and Bulow marched to Munster, on his way to Holland, where the people were only waiting for the approach of the allied standards to throw off the French yoke, and declare their independence. Those Prussian corps, with their shoes and clothing entirely worn out by the protracted and fatiguing campaign they had undergone, were now in no condition to undertake any ulterior operation; but at this juncture a liberal supply of clothing and every necessary arrived from England, which at once restored their former efficiency, and for which they expressed the most unbounded gratitude.[1]

Nov. 12.

[1] Lond. 200, 202, 205. Bout. 168. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 162.

Operations against Davoust on the Lower Elbe.

Davoust, who had been left in Hamburg with twenty-five thousand French, besides ten thousand Danes, presented a more important and a more difficult object of conquest. Bernadotte wisely determined to unite his forces to those of Walmoden, in order to cut off the retreat, and secure the reduction, of this powerful body of veteran troops; and with this view he broke up from Hanover on the 20th November, and marched by Luneburg to Boitzenberg on the Elbe, where he arrived four days afterwards; while Woronzow invested Harburg, and Strogonow moved against Stade. An attempt to take the latter town by escalade failed; but the French commander, fearing a repetition of the attack, withdrew his forces across the Elbe, and joined the Danes at Gluckstadt. The Prince-Royal, now having collected forty thousand men, prepared a general attack on Davoust, who was in position behind the Stecknitz;

Nov. 20.

— 24.

— 26.

Dec. 1.

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but the French marshal, fearful of being cut off from Hamburg, quitted that position during the night, and retired behind the Bille. The effect of this retrograde movement was to separate entirely the French corps from the Danish auxiliaries; and the latter, foreseeing the perilous predicament in which their allies would soon be placed, deemed it most expedient to detach themselves from their fortunes, and accordingly retired to Lubeck. Thither they were immediately followed by the allied forces. The Danish commander, finding himself menaced with an assault which he was in no condition to resist, proposed a capitulation, which was accepted, and he was permitted to rejoin the bulk of the Danish forces at Segeberg, while Davoust shut himself up in Hamburg, resolved to defend his post to the last extremity.[1]

Dec. 3.

[1] Lond. 209, 210. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 163. Bout. 170, 171.

Concluding operations against the Danes, and armistice with them. Dec. 6.

The Danes after this retired towards their own country, followed by Walmoden; but seeing that the allied general had imprudently extended himself too far, they gained an unforeseen advantage over him. Three battalions of Danish infantry, with two regiments of cavalry, and six guns, having been vigorously charged by the Swedish horse, had laid down their arms; but the Swedish commander having imprudently left only a single squadron of hussars to guard so large a body of prisoners, they rose on their escort, and almost all escaped, leaving the guns alone in the hands of the Swedes. After this event, discreditable to both parties, the Danes retired in a body towards Kiel, pursued by Walmoden, who, in order to cut off their retreat, took post himself at Ostenrode with part of his forces, while the remainder pushed on after their line of retreat. The Danes, seeing their pursuers thus divided, quickly fell upon the corps at Ostenrode with ten thou-

Dec. 7.

sand men, and defeated it with considerable loss. The torrent of success, however, on the part of the Allies, was too violent to be arrested by such a casual check. Threatened by superior forces, the Danes shut themselves up in Rendsburg; Bernadotte advanced to Kiel; and the Allies spread themselves over the whole of the south of Jutland. The Danish commander, seeing it was impossible to keep the field against such superior forces, and that the whole southern provinces of Denmark would speedily be overrun, entered into conferences with the Prince-Royal with a view to an armistice, and the adhesion of Denmark to the allied powers. On the 15th December an armistice was, accordingly, concluded, to endure for fifteen days only; but this led to negotiations with the cabinet of Copenhagen, which terminated in a peace between Denmark and the allied powers, which was signed on the 14th January and 8th February 1814; the particulars of which will afterwards be given. Meanwhile, the two fortresses of Gluckstadt and Friedrichsort, near Hamburg, being excluded from the armistice, were besieged by the Swedish forces; and such activity did the Prince-Royal display in his operations, that the latter of these fortresses was compelled to surrender on the 19th December, with a hundred pieces of cannon and eight hundred prisoners.[1]

Dec. 15.

[1] Bout. 173, 174. Vict. et Conq. xii. 163, 164. See the Treaties in Martin's Sup. v. 673, 681. Dec. 19.

The principal attention of the Allies, however, after the battle of Leipsic, was drawn to the city of Dresden, where St Cyr, as already noticed,* had been left with thirty thousand men, when Napoleon set out in the direction of Wittenberg and Berlin. At that period, the only force left to observe the place was Count Tolstoy's, whose troops did not exceed

Operations of St Cyr and Tolsto before Dresden.

* Ante, ix. 549.

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twenty thousand men. Profiting by so considerable a superiority, St Cyr wisely resolved to make a sortie, and throw the enemy back upon the Bohemian frontier. Four divisions, accordingly, mustering among them twenty thousand men, issued on the 17th October against Tolstoy, whose forces were for the most part new levies who had never seen fire. Two divisions of the French attacked the Russians in front, while two others assailed them in flank by the side of Plauen. With such skill was St Cyr's attack conceived, and with such vigour was it executed, that Tolstoy's men were broken at all points, and obliged to retire in disorder, which their great superiority in cavalry prevented from being converted into a flight; but, as it was, the loss they sustained amounted to twelve hundred prisoners, ten guns, and a bridge equipage, besides fifteen hundred killed and wounded. Disconcerted by this check, Tolstoy hastened to regain the Bohemian frontier, which he crossed two days after; and the garrison of Tœplitz, consisting of ten thousand Austrians, having advanced to his support, St Cyr relinquished the pursuit and returned to Dresden, where, in the interval, all the works erected by the enemy to straiten the city had been demolished.[1]

Oct. 17.

Oct. 19.

[1] St Cyr, iv. 206, 218. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 166. Bour. 177, 178. Jom. iv. 491.

The blockade is resumed after the battle of Leipsic.

This advantage was considerable, and highly creditable to the talents of St Cyr, and the valour of the troops under his command; but it was an accessary only, and did not counterbalance the great events of the campaign. It was in the plains of Leipsic that the fate of Dresden and its immense garrison was decided. When Napoleon set out from the Saxon capital for Duben, he left for the troops it contained only provisions for seven, and forage for three days;[2] and so complete was the exhaustion of the surround-

[2] St Cyr, iv. 202.

ing country, that the garrison were able to add hardly any thing to these scanty stores, during the few days that they had regained possession of the open country. At the same time, the influx of stragglers, sick and wounded, left behind by the grand army on leaving the Elbe, continued unabated; all attempts to execute Napoleon's orders, by sending the maimed to Torgau, had failed, under circumstances of more than usual horror;* and Dresden, encumbered with agonized and useless mouths, soon found itself beset by a double amount of enemies. No sooner was the battle of Leipsic decided, than Schwartzenberg, justly eager to secure so splendid a prize as the fruit of his victory, detached Klenau with his whole force to reinforce Tolstoy, who, in the mean time, had more than recruited his losses by drafts from Tœplitz, and the other garrisons and depôts in the interior of Bohemia.[1] Their troops, fully fifty thousand strong, effected a junction on the 26th, and resumed the blockade of Dresden on the day following; when St Cyr, in no condition to keep the field against such superior forces, was

[1] St Cyr, iv. 227. Bout. 178. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 166. Oct. 26. — 27.

* "As soon as the wounded were apprized of the intention to remove them, they gave themselves up to transports of joy, thinking they would now at length revisit their country. In such multitudes did they crowd, or rather crawl, down to the quays, that the boats were in danger of sinking, and one was actually submerged, and all on board perished. Nevertheless, though a few only could be received, from the limited number of boats, nothing could prevail on these unhappy wretches to return to the hospitals. They preferred lying down in rows along the river side, to be in readiness to get into the first boat that appeared. The assemblage of these spectres, who lay out all night in the cold, presented the most hideous spectacle which a war, where such scenes were too frequent, could exhibit. But the superiority of the enemy, and the manner in which Napoleon had conducted the war, rendered the prescribed evacuation totally impossible. All the hospitals in the rear, sooner or later, fell into the enemy's hands. Three thousand were sent from Dresden in boats, but I never ascertained whether they reached Torgau."—St Cyr, *Histoire Militaire*, iv. 200, 201.

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obliged to shut himself up with a dejected army, and hardly any provisions.

Miserable condition and difficulties of St Cyr.

The condition of the French marshal was now in the highest degree alarming, and such as might well have struck terror into the most dauntless breast. Although the troops under his orders had exerted themselves to the utmost, during the ten days that they had the command of the adjacent country, to recruit their slender stock of provisions; yet such was the total exhaustion of its resources by the previous requisitions of Napoleon, and the passage of so many vast armies over its surface, that they were barely able to maintain themselves by the most rigorous exactions, without adding any thing to the miserable stores, adequate only to seven days' consumption, which Napoleon had left for their use. On the 27th October, therefore, they found themselves shut up in Dresden with this scanty stock of provisions; while, at the same time, the depression of the troops, the almost total exhaustion of ammunition, the rapid desertion of all the German auxiliaries within the place, and the superior forces of the enemy before its walls, rendered it altogether impossible to attempt to make their way out by force of arms. During the whole of this period they were left without any orders, direct or indirect, from Napoleon, or any other intelligence than the rumours, vague and exaggerated, which prevailed as to the disaster of Leipsic. Driven to desperation, St Cyr endeavoured to make a sortie, with fifteen thousand men, by the right bank of the Elbe, in order to effect, if possible, a junction with the garrison of Torgau or Wittenberg, and with their united force cut a way across to the Rhine.[1]

Nov. 6.

[1] St Cyr, iv. 247, 250. Bout. 177. Vaud. 241, 242.

But the allied generals had information of his

design, and were on the alert. General Wied Runkel met them with three thousand men on the 6th; and though the French were nearly five times superior in number, yet such was their physical extenuation from want, and moral depression from disaster, that they were unable to force their way through, and, after a slight combat, were thrown back again into Dresden. This check, and throwing back of mouths, proved fatal both to the spirits and resources of the garrison: discouragement became universal, escape seemed impossible, provisions of every sort were absolutely exhausted, discipline was dissolved by suffering; the miserable soldiers wandered about like spectres in the streets, or sank in woeful crowds into the hospitals;* and at length, the French marshal,

St Cyr in vain tries a sortie, and surrenders. Nov. 6.

Nov. 11.

* "Such was the famishing condition of the French troops, that they pillaged for the twentieth time the neighbouring vineyards, and cut flesh off the limbs of the wounded horses lying by the wayside. In the interior of the town, misery had risen to the highest pitch. The mills were idle: there was neither grain to grind, nor water to turn the wheels. The bakers had shut up their shops, having no more bread to sell: a miserable crowd surrounded their doors, demanding, with mingled threats and prayers, their accustomed supplies. Many of the poor had been for several days without bread; and, as the stock of butcher meat was also nearly expended, they were reduced to the most miserable shifts to support life. Nor were the French soldiers in any better situation: every day they killed thirty horses; and, instead of the accustomed ration of an ounce and a half of butcher meat, to which they had been long reduced, they got nothing but double the quantity of horse flesh, often so bad that the soldiers could not eat it, even though pressed by the pangs of hunger. At last, however, famine overcame this repugnance, and the miserable wretches disputed with each other the half putrid carcasses which they found in the streets, and soon their bones were laid bare, and the very tendons of the dead animals eagerly devoured. The ravages which a contagious fever made on the inhabitants of the town, added to the public distress. Not less than three hundred were carried off by it a-week, among the citizens alone. Two hundred dead bodies were every day brought out of the military hospitals. Such was the accumulation in the churchyards, that the gravediggers could not inter them, and they were laid naked, in ghastly rows, along the place of sepulture. The bodies were heaped in such numbers on the dead

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unable to prolong his defence, entered into a capitulation, in virtue of which the Allies gained possession of the town, and the French laid down their arms, on condition of being sent back to France, and not serving against the Allies till regularly exchanged. On the day following, the troops began to defile out of the town in six columns, and, after laying down their arms, proceeded on the road to France. The result showed the magnitude of the success which had been achieved, and the terrible disasters which were accumulating round Napoleon's empire since the catastrophe of Leipsic; for the number who surrendered were no less than thirty-two generals, seventeen hundred and ninety-five officers, and thirty-three thousand private soldiers, of whom twenty-five thousand were able to bear arms.[1]

[1] St Cyr, iv. 247, 257. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 166, 167. Bout. 178.

Terms of the capitulation, which are violated by the allied generals.

The terms awarded to the French garrison were nearly the same which Napoleon, in 1796, had granted to Marshal Wurmser at the capitulation of Mantua;* and the Allies obtained possession, by the surrender, of no less than two hundred and forty pieces of cannon. When the troops marched out, they afforded a melancholy proof of the degree to which the exactions of the Emperor had strained the physical resources of France, and his total disregard

carts, that frequently they fell from them, and the wheels gave a frightful sound in cracking the bones of the bodies which thus lay on the streets. The hospital attendants, and carters, trampled down the corpses in the carts, like baggage or straw, to make room for more; and, not unfrequently, some of the bodies gave signs of life, and even emitted shrieks under this harsh usage. Several of the bodies thrown into the Elbe for dead, were revived by the sudden immersion in cold water, and the wretches were seen struggling in vain with the waves, by which they were soon swallowed up. Medicines and hospital stores there were none; and almost all the surgeons and apothecaries were dead."—*Témoin Oculaire.*—ODELEBEN, ii. 227, 238.

Ante, iii. 112.

of the comforts or subsistence of his soldiers; for such was the weakness of the infantry, arising from youth, fatigue, and famine, that, by the admission of St Cyr himself, three-fourths of them would have perished before they reached the Rhine.* Such as it was, however, the capitulation was disapproved of by Schwartzenberg and the allied sovereigns, who intimated to St Cyr that no terms of surrender could be admitted but such as provided for the garrison being conducted as prisoners of war into the Austrian states; but that, if he was dissatisfied with these conditions, the troops would be replaced in Dresden in the same situation in which they were before the convention had been concluded. This offer, which was received by St Cyr at Altenberg, on the road to France, the day following the capitulation, was felt by him, as indeed it was equally by his opponents, to be perfectly elusory; as not only were the enemy now in Dresden, and had been there for seven days, but they had become acquainted with all its weak points, and in particular the absolute want of provisions to subsist a besieged garrison even for a single day.[1] He rightly declined to accede, therefore, to the alternative offered of returning to Dresden; and being unable to make any resistance, preferred being conducted, with all his followers, as prisoners of war into Bohemia; loudly protesting against this violation of the convention, as a breach of good faith and of the laws of war, which would one day recoil with fearful force on the heads of the parties who were guilty of it.[1]

19th Nov.

20th Nov.

[1] Chastellar to St Cyr, 19th Nov. 1813. St Cyr to Chastellar, 20th Nov. 1813. St Cyr, iv. 497, 499. See Capitulation in St Cyr, iv. 484.

* "Les soldats, trop jeunes pour supporter les fatigues d'une campagne aussi active, et des privations si longues, étaient à la vérité dans un tel état d'epuissement que la moitié, et peut-être les trois quarts n'auraient pu regagner les bords du Rhin."—ST CYR, *Histoire Militaire*, iv. 256.

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This refusal, on the part of the allied sovereigns, to ratify a convention concluded by the general in the full command of their armies on the occasion, has excited, as well it might, the most vehement feelings of indignation among the French writers. There can be no doubt that it was to the last degree impolitic in Klenau to have acceded to such a convention, when escape and subsistence were equally beyond the power of the enemy; and when, by simply maintaining his position for a few days, without firing a shot, he must have compelled them to surrender at discretion. It is equally certain that, even if half the garrison reached the Rhine, they would have proved no small acquisition to Napoleon, whose greatest weakness was now likely to arise from the want of experienced soldiers, and whose necessities might render him little scrupulous in his adherence to the treaty, as to their not serving again till exchanged. But all these considerations are reasons why the capitulation should never have been entered into: they afford none to vindicate its violation. Schwartzenberg might have debarred his lieutenants from entering into any capitulation, but such as contained a reservation of his sanction; but he had not done so. Klenau had full powers; and the convention, upon the faith of which the French had delivered up Dresden, surrendered their guns and laid down their arms, was clearly within his powers and province as the general commanding the siege, and was absolute, without any condition or suspensive clause. In these circumstances, it was unquestionably obligatory upon the honour of the victors, who are bound, by the most sacred of all ties, to respect the rights of those who are in their power and have become incapable of making any fur-

Reflections on the breach of this convension by the Allies.

ther resistance. Justice in such a case can admit of no equivocation, derived even from the most pressing reasons of expediency. Honour regards all treaties with the vanquished as debts which must be paid. The proposal to reinstate St Cyr in the Saxon capital, after its defences and total want of provisions had become known, and his own troops were far advanced on the road to the Rhine, though the best that could be done next to observing the convention, was plainly an offer such as the French garrison neither could, nor were bound to accept. In violating this convention, the allied sovereigns did not imitate the honourable fidelity with which Napoleon observed the conditions of the capitulation of Mantua, granted to Wurmser in 1796;* but rather took a model from the cordial approbation which he gave to the unworthy fraud by which the bridge of the Danube was surprised in 1805,† or the express example which he had set of disavowing an armistice, in his own refusal to ratify that of Treviso, concluded in 1801 by his lieutenant Brune.‡ Condemning equally such deviations from the path of honour by all parties engaged in the contest, it is with pride and gratitude that the English historian must refer to the conduct of his own country on occasion of a similar crisis; and when he recollects that the convention of Cintra, though unanimously condemned by the English people, was executed, on the admission of their opponents themselves, with scrupulous fidelity by the British government,§ he must admit that such an

* Ante, iii. 112. † Ante, v. 453. ‡ Ante, iv. 434.

§ "The convention of Cintra, though condemned by public opinion in England, was executed with honourable fidelity by the English government."—Foy, iv. 356. "Look at England. She condemned the convention of Cintra, but did not the less execute its provisions with scrupulous faith."—Napoleon.

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honourable distinction was cheaply purchased by all the advantages which its faithful observance gave to the enemy.*

Lord Londonderry prevents a similar capitulation being granted to Davoust.

The interest excited by the refusal, on the part of the allied sovereigns, to ratify the convention of Dresden, was, however, attended with one good effect, in preventing a similar political mistake in the case of Marshal Davoust and the garrison of Hamburg. Bernadotte, who had now assumed the command in chief in that quarter, was far from evincing the same activity and vigour in his operations against the important French army shut up in that city, which he had displayed in bringing to a conclusion hostilities with the ancient rivals of Sweden—the Danes. On the contrary, he had at this period entered into negotiations with the French marshal, the object of which was, that, upon condition of surrendering Hamburg and the adjacent forts, he was to be permitted to retire to France with all his forces. He, in the first instance, had promised Sir Charles Stewart that he would not enter into such a capitulation without his consent; but no sooner had the former been called to Frankfort, to attend on behalf of England the conferences of the allied powers, than he sent express instructions to Walmoden to bring about a convention of such a character with Davoust. But this equivocal step did not escape the vigilant eye of the English military plenipotentiary, who no sooner received intelligence of what was in agitation, than he dispatched such energetic remonstrances against the proposed measure, that the Prince-Royal was obliged to abandon it.† And thus the same emi-

* Ante, vi. 777.

† "I trust your Royal Highness, with your wonted condescension, will permit me to express the sentiments of Great Britain on a military

nent and patriotic officer, who, by his moral courage on the eve of the battle of Leipsic, had gained for the Allies the decisive advantage of bringing the Prince-Royal's army up to the charge on that eventful day, now rendered to his country the not less important service of preventing a capitulation, which, by restoring twenty-five thousand veteran troops to the standards of Napoleon, might have entirely changed the fate of the war next spring in France.[1]

[1] Lond. 210, 211.

The fall of Dresden was shortly after followed by that of the chief other fortresses on the Oder and the Vistula. On the 21st November, Stettin, which had been closely blockaded for eight months, and the garrison of which had exhausted their last means of subsistence, surrendered: the troops, still eight thousand strong, were made prisoners of war, and three hundred and fifty guns on the walls and in the magazines fell into the hands of the Allies, who shortly after dispatched the blockading force to reinforce the corps of Tauenzein, to which it belonged. Fifteen hundred Dutch troops, who formed part of the garrison, immediately entered the ranks of the Allies—an ominous circumstance,[1] which presaged

Fall of Stettin. Nov. 21.

[1] Bout. 179. Vict. et. Conq. xxii. 167.

question, in which it must feel the deepest interest. To all appearance Denmark is now with us, and Marshal Davoust is gone. Should he escape to France by means of any capitulation, I foresee it will affix the deepest stain to the military glory of the army of the north; it would be nothing less than to transport the corps of Davoust from a fatal spot, where its destruction is inevitable, into one in which it might again appear in battle against the Allies. My prince, you have loaded me with your kindness; be assured it is of your glory, of your personal interests, that I am thinking. I will answer for the opinion of my country. It is with the most sensible pain that I have recently heard, even after the assurances to the contrary which you gave me yesterday evening, that General Walmoden has received fresh orders to the effect I so earnestly deprecate."—Sir Charles Stewart (now Marquis Londonderry) *to the* Prince-Royal, 16*th November* 1813.

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but too surely the revolt of Holland, which in effect soon took place.

1813.

Siege and fall of Torgau.

Torgau was not long in following the example of Stettin, although the more recent investing of the place rendered it necessary to have recourse to an actual siege, instead of the more tedious method

Oct. 23. of blockade. On the 23d October, Tauenzein sat down before its walls; and on the 1st November the investiture was completed, and the trenches opened

Nov. 22. on the 22d. The approaches of the besiegers were proceeding rapidly, when an armistice was agreed to

— 28. on the 28th, with a view to arranging the terms of a capitulation. When the French commander, however, discovered that an unconditional surrender was required, he broke off the conferences, and hostilities were resumed. They were not, however, of long

Dec. 6. duration. Disease, more terrible than the sword of the enemy, was making the most unheard-of ravages within the walls. Typhus fever, the well-known and never-failing attendant on human suffering, was daily carrying off the garrison by hundreds; while thousands encumbered those awful dens of misery, the military hospitals. Decimated by death, extenuated by suffering, the garrison were in no condition to maintain the place against the impetuous and repeated attacks of the Allies. After a fortnight of open trenches, the outworks were carried by assault, and the rampart seriously shaken by the fire of the besie-

— 26. gers' artillery; and the governor Dutaillis, finding the troops under his command incapable of manning the works, from the extraordinary ravages of fever, was obliged to surrender at discretion. Including the sick in the hospitals, the number who were captured was ten thousand, the poor remains of eighteen thousand who had sought refuge there after the retreat of the

grand army from the Elbe; but such was the danger of contagion in that great pest-house, that the Allies did not venture to enter the fortress till the 10th of January. In Torgau was taken the whole reserve park of the grand army, the want of which had been so severely felt at the close of the battle of Leipsic, and two hundred and eighty-seven guns; but these advantages were dearly purchased by the terrible epidemic which, issuing from its woe-struck walls, made the circuit, in the following years, of every country of Europe, until among the Venetian paupers in 1816, and Irish poor in 1817, it encountered a starving population, where, amidst equal suffering, it swept away numbers proportionally greater into the common charnel-house of mortality.[1] *

[1] Vict. et Conq. xxii. 168. Bout. 186.

Operations before Dantzic during 1813.

During the course of this terrible struggle on the Elbe, the fortresses on the Vistula, still remaining in the hands of the French, have almost escaped observation; but the time was now approaching when their defence, after a siege or blockade of nearly twelve months, could no longer be prolonged. Rapp, as already mentioned, had done every thing which firm resolution and rigorous discipline could effect, to restore order among the motley group of five-and-thirty thousand men, who had taken refuge in Dantzic after the Moscow retreat; and in some degree he had succeeded. Disease, however, as usual after all these disastrous retreats, soon began to make ravages in the interior of its walls, and before the end of January 1813, six thousand were in hospital. The garrison, however, was still so powerful that

* The author witnessed the poor of Venice labouring under this epidemic in 1816, and the Irish prostrated by its ravages in 1817. The imagination of Dante himself never conceived any thing so terrible as the scenes of woe then exhibited under that frightful scourge—the sad bequest to humanity of the ambition of the wars of Napoleon.

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1813.

Jan. 29. Feb. 6. March 5. March 24. 1 Vict. et Conq. xxii. 169, 171. Vaud. i. 244, 245. Bout. 179.

the Russian blockading force, which was of not greater strength, and composed chiefly of landwehr, was unable to confine it within the circuit of the walls; and in the course of January and February several severe actions took place, with various success, but without the besiegers being able to complete the investment. Early in March, the Russians, being reinforced by the troops who had successfully terminated the blockade of Pillau, amounting to six thousand men, made a vigorous attack on the fortified posts held by the French in advance of the city, particularly Langenfurth, Stotzenberg, and D'Ohra; but they were repulsed after a severe action, with the loss of fifteen hundred men. Encouraged by this success, Rapp shortly after made a sortie to collect subsistence, which was beginning to fail, in which he in a great measure succeeded, and made himself master of an hospital of the enemy, containing several hundred sick and wounded.[1]

Operations there till the commencement of the regular siege in October. April 29.

Disease, however, now came to the aid of the Allies; and the accumulation of so many troops—some of them bringing the seeds of contagion with their columns into the fortress—began to produce the most fatal ravages. In the end of April, the health of the garrison having been in some degree restored, a sortie was hazarded into the island of Nehrung, the fertility and agricultural riches of which promised to afford considerable resources for the garrison. The Russians, three thousand strong, tried to stop the columns, but they were defeated with heavy loss, and the French advanced eight leagues along the island, making spoil of all its provisions, and bringing back grain in abundance to the fortress, besides five hundred head of cattle. In the course of May, however, the besieging army received considerable reinforcements from the interior of

Russia, and the adjoining provinces of Prussia; and in the beginning of June, the Duke of Wirtemberg, who had assumed the command, had thirty thousand combatants under his banners. Yet notwithstanding this, Rapp, on the 9th June, again made a sortie at the head of fifteen thousand men; and although defeated at some points, he succeeded in bringing considerable stores of forage and growing rye into the fortress. In this affair, both parties lost about twelve hundred men. Hostilities were soon after terminated by the armistice of Pleswitz, and not again resumed till the end of August—the fortress, in the intermediate period, having been revictualled every five days, by mutual commissioners appointed for that purpose, in terms of the convention. The armistice terminated on the 28th, and several obstinate conflicts took place, on the following morning, at the advanced posts; in the course of which, though success was balanced, the besiegers sensibly gained ground, and contracted the circle within which the posts of the besieged were confined. During the whole of September repeated sorties were made by the garrison, some of which were successful and others defeated; but the besieged, after a most honourable resistance, were at length thrown back, at all points, into the fortress; and the Duke of Wirtemberg having received considerable reinforcements, and a regular battering train having arrived, operations in form commenced in the first week of October.[1]

1813.

June 9.

— 10.

Aug. 29.

Sept. 16, 24, 29.

[1] Vaud. i. 246. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 178, 179. Dartois, Siège de Dantzic, 54, 72.

The bombardment commenced on the 8th, before the breaching batteries were ready, or any impression had been made even upon the external works of the place. With such vigour was the fire kept up, that in a short time the town was on fire in several

Continuation of the siege, and fall of the place.

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places. During the distraction produced by these conflagrations, the principal attack was directed against the suburb called Scholtenhauser, and the
Oct. 16. redoubts which covered it; and, after a vigorous cannonade for some days, the besiegers succeeded in establishing themselves in that outwork, though after sustaining a loss of a thousand men. From this advanced position the bombardment was resumed with redoubled vigour and terrible efficacy: soon the flames broke out in eight-and-twenty different quarters; the principal magazines in the place, both of provisions and clothing, were consumed; and, notwithstanding the extent of their supplies, provisions began to grow scarce. The body of the place, however, was still uninjured: the rampart was unshaken, and the firm spirit of Rapp could not brook the idea
Nov. 3. of submission. In the beginning of November, however, the regular siege commenced, and parallels were begun to be run with great vigour; and, although the approaches of the besiegers were sensibly retarded by the heroic exploits of a small corps of volunteers, who more than once carried terror and conflagration into the centre of the besiegers' lines,
— 7. yet their progress was rapid and alarming: all the external works of the place fell successively into the
— 9. enemy's hands: a naval officer, who was dispatched to make the Emperor acquainted with the distressed state of the garrison, was unable, after the most heroic efforts, to penetrate further than Copenhagen: desertion was taking place to an alarming extent, and all hopes of being relieved having vanished with the
— 29. battle of Leipsic, Rapp at length consented to capitulate; stipulating, however, that the garrison should be permitted to retire to France, on condition of not serving again till exchanged. The garrison still con-

sisted of sixteen thousand men, of whom about one-half were French, and the remainder Germans and Poles. By the capitulation, it was provided that the ratification of the Emperor of Russia should be obtained; and he having refused to sanction the condition relative to the return of the garrison to France, the same offer was made to them as had been made to St Cyr, that they should be reinstated in the fortress in the same position in which they were before they left it. This was strictly legal in this case, as the sanction of the Emperor had been expressly stipulated for in the convention; and as it was not agreed to, Rapp and the French were conducted as prisoners of war into Russia, but almost all the auxiliaries immediately entered the allied ranks.[1]

[1] Dartois, Siège de Dantzic, 12, 115. Vaud. i. 246. Jom. iv. 494. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 182. 185.

The lesser places still held by France on the Vistula, having exhausted their last means of subsistence, surrendered shortly after. The garrison of Zamosc, three thousand strong, capitulated on the 22d December; that of Modlin, with twelve hundred men, three days after; so that the tricolor flag no longer waved to the eastward of the Oder. About the same time General Dalton, who commanded the French garrison in Erfurth, finding himself not sufficiently strong to defend the wide circuit of the walls, retired into the citadel of St Petersberg, on the rocky summit of which he still maintained his post when the city was surrendered by capitulation in the beginning of January. At the close of the campaign, France retained only, of her immense possessions beyond the Rhine, the places of Hamburg, Magdeburg, and Wittenberg, on the Elbe; Custrin and Glogau on the Oder; and the citadels of Erfurth and Wurtzburg. All the rest of the places garrisoned or influenced by her arms, ha

Dec. 22.

— 25.

— 20.

Jan. 6, 1814.

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been swept away; the Confederation of the Rhine was dissolved, and its forces marching under the allied banners; and refluent over the bridges of Mayence, eighty thousand men, with two hundred guns, sad and dejected, had retired into France—the poor remains of four hundred thousand combatants, with twelve hundred cannons, who, three months before, still held the scales of fortune equal on the banks of the Elbe. The contest in Germany was over; French domination beyond the Rhine was at an end; thirty thousand prisoners taken on the field, and eighty thousand since surrendered in garrison, constituted the proud trophies of the battle of Leipsic.[1]

[1] Vaud. i. 247. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 180, 185, Bout. 180, 181.

Insurrection in Holland.

The universal fermentation produced in Europe by the deliverance of Germany, was not long of spreading to the DUTCH PROVINCES. The yoke of Napoleon, universally grievous from the enormous pecuniary exactions with which it was attended, and the wasting military conscriptions to which it immediately led, had been in a peculiar manner felt as oppressive in Holland, from the maritime and commercial habits of the people, and the total stoppage of all their sources of industry, which the maritime war and long continued blockade of their coasts had occasioned. They had tasted for nearly twenty years of the last drop of humiliation in the cup of the vanquished—that of being compelled themselves to aid in upholding the system which was exterminating their resources, and to purchase with the blood of their children the ruin of their country. These feelings, which had for years existed in such intensity as to have rendered revolt inevitable, but for the evident hopelessness at all former times of the attempt, could no longer be restrained after the battle of Leipsic had thrown down the colossus of French external power, and the

approach of the allied standards to their frontiers had opened to the people the means of salvation. From the Hanse Towns the flame of independence spread to the nearest cities of the old United Provinces; and the small number of French troops in the country at once encouraged revolt and paved the way for external aid. At this period, the whole troops which Napoleon had in Holland did not exceed six thousand French, and two regiments of Germans, upon whose fidelity to their colours little reliance could be placed. Upon the approach of the allied troops under Bulow, who advanced by the road of Munster, and Winzingerode, who soon followed from the same quarter, the douaniers all withdrew from the coast, the garrison of Amsterdam retired, and the whole disposable force of the country was concentrated at Utrecht, to form a corps of observation, and act according to circumstances. This was the signal for a general revolt. At Amsterdam, the troops were no sooner gone than the inhabitants rose in insurrection, deposed the Imperial authorities, hoisted the orange flag, and established a provisional government, with a view to the re-establishment of the ancient order of things; yet not violently or with cruelty, but with the calmness and composure which attest the exercise of social rights by a people long habituated to their enjoyment.[1] The same change took place, at the same time and in the same orderly manner, at Rotterdam, Dortrecht, Delft, Leyden, Haarlem, and the other chief towns; the people everywhere, amidst cries of "*Orange Boven!*" and universal rapture, mounted the orange cockade, and reinstated the ancient authorities; and after twenty years of foreign domination and suffering, the glorious spectacle was exhibited, of a people peaceably regain-

CHAP. LXXI. 1813. Nov. 15.

[1] Capef. x. 278, 279. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 164, 165. Bout. 174, 175. Ann. Reg. 1813, 160, 161.

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ing their independence, and not shedding a drop of blood, and, without either passion or vengeance, reverting to the institutions of former times.*

Landing of the Prince of Orange, and general expulsion of the French from the country.

Military and political consequences of the highest importance, immediately followed this uncontrollable outbreak of public enthusiasm. A deputation from Holland immediately waited on the Prince Regent of England and the Prince of Orange, in London; the latter shortly after embarked on board an English line of battle-ship, the Warrior, and on the

Nov. 27. 27th landed at Scheveling, from whence he proceeded to the Hague. Meantime the French troops and coast-guards, who had concentrated at Utrecht, seeing that the general effervescence was not as yet supported by any solid military force, and that the people, though they had all hoisted the orange flag, were not aided by any corps of the Allies, recovered from their consternation, and made a general for-

— 23. ward movement against Amsterdam. Before they got there, however, a body of three hundred Cossacks had reached that capital, where they were received with enthusiastic joy: and this advanced guard was soon after followed by General Benkendorf's brigade, which, after travelling by post from

* The following proclamation, issued by the provisional government of the Hague in name of the Prince of Orange, is singularly descriptive of this memorable and bloodless revolution. "*Orange Boven!* Holland is free: the Allies advance on Utrecht, the English have been invited, the French are flying on all sides. The sea is opened: commerce revives: the spirit of party has ceased—*what we have suffered is pardoned and forgiven.* Able and intelligent men have been called to the helm of government, which has invited the prince to resume the national sovereignty. We join our forces to those of the Allies, to compel the enemy to make peace: the people will erelong have a day of rejoicing at the expense of Government; but every species of pillage or excess is absolutely forbidden. Every one returns thanks to God: old times have returned. *Orange Boven!*"—See CAPEFIGUE, x. 278, 279. Note.

Zwoll to Harderwik, embarked at the latter place, and, by the aid of a favourable wind, reached Amsterdam on the 1st December. The Russian general immediately advanced against the forts of Mayder and Halfweg, of which he made himself master, taking twenty pieces of cannon and six hundred prisoners; while on the eastern frontier, General Oppen, with Bulow's advanced guards, carried Dornbourg by assault on the 23d, and, advancing against Arnheim, threw the garrison, three thousand strong, which strove to prevent the place being invested, with great loss back into the town. Next day, Bulow himself came up with the main strength of his corps, and, as the ditches were still dry, hazarded an escalade, which proved entirely successful; the greater part of the garrison retiring to Nimeguen, by the bridge of the Rhine. The French troops, finding themselves thus threatened on all sides, withdrew altogether from Holland; the fleet at the Texel hoisted the orange flag, with the exception of Admiral Verhuel, who, with a body of marines that still proved faithful to Napoleon, threw himself with honourable fidelity into the fort of the Texel. Amsterdam, amidst transports of enthusiasm, received the beloved representative of the House of Orange. Before the close of the year, the tricolor flag floated only on Bergen-op-zoom and a few of the southern frontier fortresses; and Europe beheld the prodigy of the seat of war having been transferred in a single year from the banks of the Niemen to those of the Scheldt.[1]

1813.

Dec. 2.

Nov. 23.

— 29.

— 30.

Dec. 1.

[1] Ann. Reg. 1813, 161, 162. Bout. 175, 176 Vict. et Conq. xxii. 165.

To complete the picture of this memorable year, there only remains to give a sketch of the Italian campaign, and of the operations of Wellington in the Spanish peninsula. The former can be but a

Operations in Italy during this campaign.

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sketch, for the operations of the opposite armies, though numerous and complicated, led to no material result; and it was on the fields of Leipsic and Vittoria that the fate of the French empire was decided, and on which the broad light of history requires to be thrown. Yet the narrative, how brief soever, will not be without its interest; for it will recall the memory of other days, when the fortunes of the young Republic played around the bayonets of Napoleon's grenadiers; and, after a long sojourn amidst the rough sounds of the German regions, there is a charm in the sweet accents of the Italian tongue.

Eugene's dispositions and measures for the defence of Lombardy.

Eugene Beauharnais, as already mentioned, retired from the grand army in Germany when Napoleon took the command, and he arrived at Milan on the 18th of May. His first care was to organize an army in Lombardy, which might put him in a condition to inspire feelings of apprehension in the cabinet of Vienna, or resist any attempt which it might make to recover, by force of arms, its lost and long-coveted possessions in Italy. Napoleon, by a decree, early in May entrusted the formation of the new army of Italy to his Viceroy, and it was to be composed entirely of native soldiers, or conscripts from the French departments adjoining the Alps. Though this ordinance bespoke strongly the confidence of the Emperor in his Italian subjects, and might be supposed to increase the patriotic spirit which was developed in the north of Italy, yet it was attended with one obvious danger, which came to tell with signal severity upon the fortunes of the empire in its last moments,—that these soldiers were bound by no tie to the tramontane regions, and might be expected all to desert if the fortunes of war should compel the French eagles to retire across the Alps. When the

May 10.

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Viceroy returned to Italy, he found only the skeletons of a few regiments, and three hundred officers and non-commissioned officers, who had been forwarded by post from Spain—the whole forces of the kingdom of Italy had perished in Russia, or been marched to the Elbe: but his energy and activity overcame every difficulty; and, by the beginning of July, fifty-two thousand men were in arms, of whom forty-five thousand infantry, and fifteen hundred horse, were present with the eagles.[1]

[1] Vignolles, Précis des Opér. des Arm. d'Italie en 1813, 1814, 9, 12. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 188, 192. Norvin, Portf. de 1813, ii. 464, 465.

On the other side, the Austrians were not idle. Early in July a respectable force was collected on the frontiers of Illyria, under the orders of Field-marshal Hiller; and, before the end of the month, it was raised to seven divisions, mustering full fifty thousand combatants, of a description much superior to the Italian conscripts. In addition to this, they raised the landwehr of Illyria and Croatia, and, reinforced by several thousands of these hardy mountaineers, commenced the campaign the moment they received intelligence of the armistice being denounced on the 17th August. At this period the Viceroy occupied the following positions. Two divisions under Grenier were stationed between Udina and Gorizia; and the remainder of the army, under Verdier, Marcognet, Gratian, and Palombini, stretched by the left by Palma Nuova to the blood-stained heights of Tarvis and Villach, occupying thus the whole eastern passes from Italy into Germany.[2] Hiller's force, directly in front, extended from opposite Villach on his right to Agram on his left, where he had concentrated two divisions; and the ferment in the provinces of Croatia, ceded to France, already promised the most favourable reception to the Aus-

Austrian forces, and position of both armies.

[2] Vignolles, 19, 24. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 192, 195. Norvin, Rec. de 1813, ii. 465, 466.

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trians, if they invaded that portion of the spoils which France had won from the hereditary states.

The Austrians commence the campaign, and gain considerable successes.

The Austrians being the stronger party, were the first to commence hostilities. On the 17th, two columns passed the frontier stream of the Save at Agram, and directed their march towards Karlstadt and Fiume. General Jeannin, who commanded in that quarter, at first made preparations for resistance; but finding himself speedily surrounded by an insurrection, which broke out on all sides at the sight of the much-loved Austrian standards, he was obliged to abandon the first city and fall back on the second. This retrograde movement threw the whole Illyrian provinces into a blaze: all Croatia was soon in insurrection; the flame spread along the Dalmatian shore; and, as far as the mouths of the Cattaro, the whole mountaineers were soon in arms to throw off the yoke of France. This vehement ebullition, coupled with the numerical inferiority of Eugene, who found himself assailed by above fifty thousand German troops, for whom his newly-raised Italians were no adequate match, rendered it impossible for him to maintain his ground along the whole frontier; and in consequence, abandoning Fiume and the whole coast of Illyria, he ascended with the bulk of his forces the course of the Isonzo, and took post in the intrenched camp at Tarvis, hoping to make good the passes till time was afforded for the armaments to be completed in his rear. Meanwhile Villach had been evacuated by the Italian troops; but no sooner did Eugene's reinforcement arrive in that direction than it was retaken by three French battalions: again it was carried by the Austrians, and finally gained by

Aug. 24.

Aug. 29.

Aug. 30.

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Eugene, who established his headquarters in that city. But these advantages were obtained by denuding the right and maritime provinces, and Fiume was occupied by the Austrians under General Nugent, without opposition, in the end of August.[1] Aug. 29.

[1] Vict. et Conq. xxii. 196, 197. Norvin's Portfeuille, ii. 466, 467.

On the 26th of August General Pino attacked the Austrian intrenchments on Mont Leobel; but the Italians failed entirely against that formidable bulwark, and were thrown back in utter disorder on Krainburg. Eugene brought them back to the charge in greater force, and the Austrians were driven out. The design of Hiller at this period was to have forced the enemy to evacuate the passes in his front in the Julian Alps, and retire behind the line of the Isonzo; and with that view, after the loss of Villach, he had fortified Fiestritz, from which point he could at pleasure either menace Tarvis or turn and descend the valley of the Upper Save. To frustrate this design, Eugene directed an attack on this fortified post, and after a sharp combat, Grenier, who commanded the assailants, carried it, with a loss to the enemy of eight hundred men. Encouraged by this success, the Viceroy made a general attack on the enemy's positions at all points. He met, however, with a severe check at Kaplafas, on his right, where General Belotti, with a brigade, was totally defeated, with a loss of twelve hundred men; and his right wing, disconcerted by this disaster, fell back, closely pursued by the Austrians, towards Trieste, while the insurrection in their favour spread over the whole of Istria. The Viceroy was obliged, therefore, to remain on the defensive; but, like a skilful general, he turned it to the best advantage. Observing that Hiller had directed the weight of his forces to the sea-coast on

Obstinate resistance of the Viceroy, and his successes against them.

Sept. 2.

Sept. 6.

Sept. 8.

Sept. 15.

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his left, to follow up his successes in the direction of Trieste, he moved in the same direction, and succeeded, after several actions, in expelling the enemy from Fiume, where General Pino established himself. So sudden was this attack, that the Archduke Maximilian, who was in the town at the time, with difficulty saved himself on board Admiral Freemantle's vessel.[1]

[1] Norvin, Port. de 1813, ii. 467, Vict. et Conq. xxii. 203, 204. Vignolles, 24, 36.

The French are driven back into the plain of Friuli.

These balanced successes on either side led to no decisive result, and, after a month's active hostilities, the position of the contending parties was not materially different from what it had been at their commencement. But events were now on the wing which gave a decisive advantage to the Austrians, and threw back the Italian army behind the Adige. Large reinforcements, chiefly from the landwehr of the adjoining provinces, reached Hiller in the middle of September; he passed the Drave on the 19th of that month, and soon gained considerable advantages over the divisions of Grenier and Verdier, on the French left in the Julian Alps. The object of this transference of active operations from the Austrian left on the sea-coast, to their right in the mountains, was soon apparent; the treaty of Ried, between the cabinet of Vienna and that of Munich, secured the accession of Bavaria to the alliance—again put the House of Hapsburg in possession of the great central fortress of the Tyrol, and enabled the enemy to turn the Italian valleys by their upper extremity, amidst the Alpine snows. Hiller was not slow in turning to the best account this signal advantage. Directing a considerable part of his force up the valley of the Drave, which entered Tyrol by Prunecken, and moving forward towards the valley of the Adige, by the bridge of Laditch, Brixen, and the

Sept. 19.
— 21.
— 25.
Oct. 8.
— 4.

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scenery immortalized in the Tyrolese war,* he himself remained in the centre to force the fortified posts held by the enemy at Tarvis. A vigorous attack was made by Hiller in person on the position of Tarvis, from which, after several obstinate conflicts, the Viceroy was at length driven with great loss. Despairing now of maintaining his ground in the hills, Eugene withdrew his troops, not without considerable difficulty, down all the valleys, abandoning altogether the crest of the mountains, and concentrated them on the banks of the Tagliamento, at the entrance of the plain of Friuli; while, by a decree from Gorizia, he directed the levy of fifteen thousand additional conscripts, to supply the loss of an equal number who had perished by fatigue, sickness, or the sword, during this consuming warfare of posts in the Alps.[1]

Oct. 7.
— 8.
— 12.
— 13.
— 14.

[1] Jom. iv. 497. Vict et Conq. xxii. 209, 211. Vignolles, 37, 44.

The retreat, once commenced, could not readily be terminated. Encouraged by the accession of Bavaria, and the enthusiastic support of the Tyrolese, who crowded with shouts of joy to their standards, the Austrians pressed every where on their retiring columns; and it was soon evident that the line of the Adige was the only one where a stand could be made. In contemplation of that event, the garrison of Palma Nuova was strengthened by three battalions, that of Venice augmented to twelve thousand men; while, to delay as long as possible the discouragement and disaffection which he was well aware the retreat of the army would produce in Italy, the Viceroy determined to maintain to the last extremity the line of the Isonzo; and so long was the circuit which the troops required to make by Brixen and

General result of the campaign, and retreat of the French behind the Adige.

* Ante, vii. 399.

CHAP. LXXI. 1813. Trent, that he was not without hopes that the new levies might be brought forward before the enemy threatened Verona. But so rapid was the march of events, that this was soon found to be impossible.

Sept. 25. On the 25th September, indeed, General Gifflenga, with an Italian division, had gained some advantages over the enemy, and re-occupied Brixen; but the hourly increasing strength of the Germans, whose columns were now augmented by a vast concourse of

Oct. 15. volunteers from all parts of Tyrol, soon compelled him to evacuate that town, and retreat successively by Bolzano and Lavis to Trent. The latter town

— 16. was next day evacuated, and its castle invested by the victorious Austrians; while the dispirited Italians retired to Volano, and the famous defiles of the Adige above Verona. Eugene finding his rear thus threatened, felt that the line of the Isonzo was no longer tenable. Throwing garrisons, therefore, into a few forts as he retired rapidly across the Tagliamento,

— 23. and after sustaining a severe defeat on the part of one of his divisions at St Daniel, he arrived on the 30th at Sproziano on the Piave. Meanwhile a

— 26. bloody combat took place at Volano, which, after a gallant resistance, was carried by the Austrians, the Italians falling back to the still stronger and well-

— 27. known position at the entrance of the pass of Serravalle. Here they were attacked next day: the Italian troops, now thoroughly discouraged, made a very feeble resistance, and were driven, in utter disorder,

— 28. — 31. to the plateau of *Rivoli*. The recollection of Napoleon's glory was unable to arrest, even for a day, on this memorable spot the rapidity of his fall; Rivoli was abandoned almost as soon as it had been occupied, and the enemy were driven back out of the hills to the very gates of Verona;[1] while two

[1] Vignolles, 52, 61. Vaud. guerre d'Italie, en 1813, 46, 54. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 214, 217.

days after the citadel of Trent, after a short but active siege, surrendered with its garrison of five hundred men. CHAP. LXXI. 1813.

This skilful operation of Hiller, in turning the French line of defence on the Piave by the mountains, rendered a further retreat indispensable, and soon brought their standards in the plain back to the Adige. To cover this retrograde movement, which was eminently hazardous in the level country, in presence of a superior and victorious enemy, the Viceroy on the 31st made a vigorous attack on Bassano, which had fallen into the hands of the Austrians, and the situation of which, at the entrance of the Val Sugana and the defiles of the Brenta, promised to secure the army from molestation on the side where most danger was to be apprehended, and carried the place with a loss to the Austrians of eight hundred men. Thus secured, the Italian army continued its retreat across the plain from the Piave to the Adige, while the grand park of artillery was directed to Vallegio and Padua. On the 4th November the Viceroy's headquarters were established at Verona; the garrisons were withdrawn from Bassano, and all the posts to the eastward of that city; and the campaign which had been begun on the Niemen and the Vistula, terminated on the Rhine and the Adige.[1]

Concluding operations of the campaign in Italy.

Oct. 31.

Nov. 4.

[1] Vignolles, 73, 81. Viet. et Conq. xxii. 219, 220. Norvin, ii. 468, 469.

The withdrawal of the Italian troops, however, behind this river, proved fatal to the French power on the whole eastern shores of the Adriatic. General Nugent, with the left wing of the Austrian army, speedily overran the shores of the gulf of Trieste, and invested that city in the middle of October. The operations, powerfully aided by an English squadron and auxiliary force from Sicily, were pushed with uncommon vigour; an important outwork, called

Surrender of Trieste and conquest of Dalmatia.

Oct. 15.

CHAP. LXXI. 1813. the Old Powder Magazine, was carried by assault by the combined British and Austrian forces on the 22d, and the breaching batteries being then established, a most vigorous fire was kept up on the citadel, which soon produced such an effect that the works were entirely ruined, and the place being no Oct. 31. longer tenable, surrendered at discretion on the 31st, with twelve hundred men, and very valuable magazines. Nor were the Allies less successful in Dalmatia, where the Austrian troops, powerfully assisted by an insurrection of the inhabitants on the one side, and the British marines on the other, spedily overcame every resistance: so early as the — 16. middle of October, they were masters of all the forts — 30. at the mouths of the Cattan; a fortnight after, the town of Knin was taken by assault; soon after, the garrison of Sebenico revolted, and surrendered it to the Nov. 2. Austrians: Spalatro was taken the same day, and the entire reduction of the province and eastern shores of the Adriatic effected, by the reduction of the strong fortress of Zara, which capitulated, after a severe cannonade of thirteen days, to the combined Dec. 9. Austrian and British forces on the 9th December. Meanwhile Palma Nuova was besieged, and Venice invested; and although the strength of the garrison of the latter, which, including the marine forces, was twelve thousand strong, and the magnitude of the flotilla, mounting above three hundred guns, which defended the lagunæ and approaches to the queen of the Adriatic, rendered its reduction a matter of time and difficulty. Yet the whole continental possessions of the old Republic, as far as the Adige, were occupied by the Austrians, whose forces extended to Ferrara and the banks of the Po.[1]

1 Ann. Reg. 1813, 165. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 220, 221. Vign. 94, 102.

Such was the memorable campaign in central Europe of 1813, the most fruitful in great events,

and the most momentous in its consequences, which had occurred in the annals of mankind. The armies of Cæsar or Scipio would have formed mere *corps d'armée* in its vast array; the forces of Tamerlane or Genghis-khan would have been blown to atoms by a few discharges of its stupendous artillery. Disciplined skill neither appeared there in miniature array, as in the Grecian republics, nor barbarian valour under the guidance of unskilled energy, as in the hosts of Bajazet or Attila. Civilization and knowledge had exhausted their resources for the contest; ambition poured forth the accumulations of ages for its support; barbaric valour strained the energy of the desert for the interests it involved. The last reserves, the arriere ban of Europe and Asia, were engaged in the struggle: on the field of battle, beside the Tartars and Bashkirs of the East, were to be seen the tender youth of Europe, only recently torn from the embraces of maternal love: in its maintenance were exhausted all that the military force of France could extort of wealth from the present sufferings of continental Europe, and all that the industry of England had accumulated of credit during past centuries of pacific exertion. Nor were the skill and science of the leaders in this memorable struggle inferior to the prodigious forces they were called to command, or the vital interests for which they contended: the genius of Napoleon, equal to that of Cæsar or Hannibal, all but overbalanced the heroism of Alexander and the science of Gneisenau, which may fairly be placed beside that of Scipio or Epaminondas; and the cause for which they contended was not the conquest of provinces or the plunder of cities, but the liberation of the human race from unbearable oppression, or the establishment of universal dominion upon an immovable foundation.

Reflections on this campaign.

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Great as were the disasters which attended Napoleon in the course of this memorable campaign, and rapid the fall which his power made during its continuance, it may be doubted whether he ever, on any previous occasion, displayed greater abilities, either in the general conception of his designs, or in their rapid and vigorous execution. His system of strategy was the same as it had been at Austerlitz and Jena; and, if it led to very different results, it was only because he was now opposed in a totally different manner, and resisted with a spirit commensurate to the attack. His general ideas for the conduct of the campaign, both in its outset at Lutzen and Bautzen, and in its subsequent stages, during the protracted and desperate struggle on the Elbe, were distinguished by all his usual vigour of conception and boldness of execution; and, although the obstinate tenacity with which he clung to that river involved him latterly in the most dreadful reverses, it is the general, and seems to be the just opinion among his ablest military historians, that, situated as he was, he could not have done better; that it was the last defensible position in which the empire of Germany could be maintained; that a retreat to the Rhine, though with undiminished forces, would immediately have been attended by the defection of all the states of the Rhenish confederacy; and that the risks were well worth incurring, which retained one half of Europe to his standards.*

Military ability displayed by Napoleon in this campaign.

* "The abandonment of Dresden and Saxony, would have decided the defection of the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine, and enabled all the allied armies to unite on the left bank of the Elbe; a fatal result, which would have taken away his last chance of fortune. On the other hand, by remaining on the Elbe, he had a central point which intercepted all the direct communications of the different allied armies, and put him in a situation to take advantage of any false manœuvres they might fall into, to beat them in detail."—BOUTOURLIN, *Camp. de* 1813, 91, 92.

If Napoleon's conduct in tactics, and on the field of battle, during this campaign, is considered, it will often appear worthy of still more unqualified commendation. The admirable rapidity with which he took advantage of his central position on the Elbe, to defeat the formidable assault of the allied sovereigns on Dresden, was equalled by the felicitous conception of an attack next day on both wings of his opponents: a measure unlike his ordinary tactics, unlooked for by them, and therefore the more likely to meet with decisive success. Though overwhelmed by superior numbers, and a moral energy which nothing could resist, at Leipsic, the gallantry of his resistance—the heroism of his troops, are worthy of the most unreserved admiration: the more so, that they wanted the stimulus of hope, the recollection of success, and that they fought, at least on the second day, with the mournful conviction that all was lost. Much as we may admire the redoubtable conqueror who struck down his opponents with his iron gauntlet at Austerlitz and Jena, there was as much vigour and resolution displayed on the field of Bautzen, or under the walls of Dresden: the central charge at Wachau was equal to that which decided the fate of Austria at Wagram; the daring intrepidity of the Berezina was again displayed in the forest of Hanau; and if his opponents had been of the same mould on the Elbe that they were at Ulm or Rivoli, the destinies of the world would have been irrevocably decided on the Saxon plains.

The skill of his tactics on the field of battle.

Nevertheless, nothing can be more certain than that Napoleon committed the most enormous errors in the course of this campaign, and that his conduct on more than one occasion was such, that if it had occurred on the part of any of his lieutenants, he would have made them lose their heads. In fact,

The signal and inexcusable errors he committed.

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when we recollect that, at the resumption of hostilities in the middle of August, he had four hundred thousand combatants and thirteen hundred guns concentrated under his immediate direction on the Elbe, besides three hundred thousand more who maintained the contest in Italy and Spain; * and that, of this immense force, he led back only eighty thousand men and two hundred guns across the Rhine in the beginning of November, we are at a loss, at first sight, to conceive how it was possible, that in so short a time so vast a host, hitherto always victorious (save with England) in pitched battles, could have been so entirely discomfited and overthrown. The killed and wounded, and prisoners taken in the different battles, will not explain the difficulty, for they did not amount to a third of the number; and although the unheeded ravages of the bivouac and the hospital always cut off more than the sword of the enemy, yet this source of diminution was common to both armies, and could have made no material difference on the fortunes of either. Napoleon managed matters so, that he rendered the prize of victory enormous beyond all parallel to the conquerors. Thirty thousand prisoners on the spot, and ninety thousand more taken in the fortresses, whom it virtually surrendered to the enemy, constituted the proud trophies of the battle of Leipsic;

* The warmest panegyrists of Napoleon admit this, and even estimate, at a higher amount, the total of the military force then at his disposal. "His military power," says Napier, "was rather broken and divided than lessened; for it is certain that the number of men employed in 1813, was infinitely greater than in 1812. In the latter four hundred thousand, but in the former seven hundred thousand men and twelve hundred field-pieces, were engaged on different points, exclusive of the armies in Spain. Then, on the Vistula, the Oder, and the Elbe, he had powerful fortresses and numerous garrisons, or rather armies, of strength and goodness, to re-establish his ascendancy in Europe."—NAPIER'S *Peninsular War*, v. 431.

and marvellous as were the conquests which followed the thunderbolt of Jena, they were as nothing compared to those which attended the shock of that mighty field which at one blow prostrated the French empire, and threw back the tricolor flag from the Vistula to the Rhine. CHAP. LXXI. 1813.

The faults in generalship committed by Napoleon during this campaign, were of such a kind as to be inexplicable on any other footing than that they were the necessary result and natural concomitant of his system of war, when met by a worthy and adequate spirit of resistance on the part of the enemy. We have the authority of Marshal St Cyr for the assertion, that the light troops of the Allies, by the manner in which they cut off the foraging parties, and intercepted the communications of the French, did them more injury while on the Elbe, than they sustained in all the pitched battles put together;* and the chief of Napoleon's engineers, General Rogniat, who had access to the whole official documents at headquarters, has stated, that he lost three hundred thousand men by *famine* in Russia in 1812, and

* "The numerous partizans of the enemy committed frightful ravages on our rear: our depots of cavalry were obliged to fall back towards the Rhine to avoid falling into their power: many horses might have gained the army, if it had been possible to allow them to take a few days' repose; nothing could make up for the want of subsistence for the troops and replenishing to the parks. It may safely be affirmed, that these detached corps, as numerous as armies in the time of Turenne, commanded by officers skilled in that species of war, did more injury to Napoleon than the grand allied armies, and were sufficient of themselves to have consummated his ruin, if he had not instantly adopted the part of drawing near to the Rhine. The magazines were so thoroughly exhausted, that soldiers, whom a complete ration of good food could hardly have maintained in health, were reduced from the outset of the campaign to half rations, and even this scanty supply was latterly often not furnished."—St Cyr, *Histoire Militaire*, iv. 323, 324.

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one hundred thousand by the same cause in Saxony in 1813.* It is in this incessant wasting away, the necessary result of carrying on a campaign with such enormous multitudes of men, without any adequate magazines or support of a lasting kind, save what they could extract from the suffering population among whom they were, that the real secret of the destruction of Napoleon's power is to be found; and the dreadful typhus fever, which in the close of the campaign swept off such unheard-of multitudes in the fortresses on the Elbe, was the natural result of the unexampled privations and misery to which he reduced the gallant conscripts who crowded round his standards. His panegyrists, both on this and the other side of the Channel, who follow the bulletins in ascribing his ruin entirely to the rigour of the Russian winter, would do well to explain away the fact proved by the records of the War-office at Paris, that the "morning state" at Wiazma on the 3d November 1812, *four days before the frost began*, exhibited a total of somewhat above fifty-five thousand combatants and twelve thousand horses; the poor remains of three hundred thousand soldiers and eighty thousand cavalry, whom Napoleon had led in person across the Niemen: that is, *he had lost above two hundred and forty thousand men under his*

* "From want of magazines, Napoleon suffered to die of famine, in the space of a few months, three hundred thousand men in Russia, and a hundred thousand in Saxony. The soldiers, obliged to separate in search of subsistence, in great part never rejoined their colours: all the bonds of discipline were relaxed; the troops seized every opportunity to disband; the inhabitants of the villages, exasperated by the pillage which went on, rose up and massacred the marauders; and in fine, in the midst of these disorders the armies disappeared, or perished from misery, especially when the war was prolonged for any considerable time on the same theatre."—ROGNIAT, *Chef de Génie à* NAPOLEON. *Art de la Guerre*, 457.

*immediate command, before a flake of snow fell.** It is neither, therefore, in the rigour of the elements, CHAP. LXXI. 1813.

* As this is a point of the very highest importance, involving, as it does, a decisive refutation of the assertion so often repeated, that it was the cold of Russia which destroyed the power of Napoleon, the following details, from the Morning State in the War-office at Paris, are given on the subject:—

	Strength on entering Russia.			Strength on 4th Nov. (3 days before the cold began.)		
	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Horses.	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Horses.
Imperial Guard,	41,094	6,279	16,322	14,000	2000	
1st Corps, Davoust,	68,627	3,424	11,417	13,000	459	
3d do. Ney,	35,755	3,587	8,039	6,000	231	
4th do. Eugene,	42,430	2,368	10,057	12,000	181	
5th do. Poniatowski,	32,159	4,152	9,438	3,500	324	
8th do. Vandamme,	15,885	2,050	3,477	1,200	294	
1st Corps, Cavalry, Nansouty,		12,077	13,014			
2d do. Monbrun,		10,436	11,125			
3d do. Grouchy,		9,676	10,451			
4th do.		7,994	8,766			
General Staff, Berthier,	3,075	908	1,748			
Four Corps and Staff united,					1,500	
Dismounted Cavalry,				500		
	239,025	62,951		50,200	4,989	
	62,951			4,989		
Grand Total of Men and Horses,	301,976		103,854	55,189		12,000

Thus, at Wiazma on 4th November, three days before the cold commenced, the central army, under the immediate command of Napoleon, had been reduced from 302,000 to 55,000; and its horses from 104,000 to 12,000: in other words, it had lost 247,000 men and 92,000 horses, *before a flake of snow fell;* and there was only left of that immense host for the frost to act upon, 55,000 men and 12,000 horses. The following table exhibits the progressive decline of the horses belonging to the cavalry before the cold began on November 7.

	Horses of Cavalry.
Crossed the Niemen with Napoleon,	85,000
Remained at Witepsk,	60,000
At Borodino,	45,000
At Wiazma, including the artillery horses, remained only,	12,000

So that above 70,000 horses of the cavalry had already perished before the frost set in.—See *Etats de la Guerre de* 1812, given in CAPEFIGUE, *Histoire de l'Empire de Napoleon*, ix. 421, 422; and *Imperial Muster Rolls*, in CHAMBRAY, i. App. No. ii.

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nor the accidents of fortune, that we are to seek the real causes of Napoleon's overthrow: but in the natural consequences of his system of conquest; in the oppressive effects of the execrable maxim, that war should maintain war; and in the impatience of taxation and thirst for plunder, in the rapacious military republic of which he formed the head; which, by throwing the armies they had on foot upon external spoliation for their support, at once exposed them, the moment the career of conquest was checked, to unheard-of sufferings, and excited unbounded exasperation among every people over whom their authority prevailed.

His unaccountable errors.

After making every allowance, however, for the influence of these causes, which, undoubtedly, were mainly instrumental in producing and accelerating the overthrow of the French revolutionary power; it must be admitted that there are some military errors which he committed in this campaign, which are altogether inexplicable. The destruction of Vandamme's corps, which was the beginning of his long train of disasters, was clearly owing to his imprudence in first ordering him to march on Tœplitz, with thirty thousand men, to cut off the retreat of a hundred thousand, and then neglecting to support him, when engaged on his perilous mission, by the Young Guard at Pirna. His plan of commencing offensive operations by three armies at the same time, diverging from a centre at Dresden, was, to say the least of it, imprudent and hazardous; for each army was weakened the further it removed from the central point; and neither, in case of disaster, could afford any rapid or immediate support to the other. On leaving the Saxon capital, he deposited his reserve park of artillery and ammunition in Torgau, sepa-

rated himself from his only considerable magazine on the Elbe, in Magdeburg, and left thirty-five thousand men, who might have cast the balance in his favour in the approaching decisive contest, to stand a siege in Dresden with seven days' provision for the men and three for the horses. At Leipsic, he chose a position to fight, having an impassable morass, traversed only by a single chaussée, in his rear, thereby violating what he himself has told us is the "first requisite for a field of battle, to have no defiles in its rear." When unable to conquer on the first day, he still clung to his ground, though the vast increase of the allied force rendered defeat inevitable: he made no preparation whatever for retreat, and threw no bridges over the Elster, though his engineers could have erected twenty in a single night: and he perilled his crown and his empire in a conflict with greatly superior forces in that dangerous situation, when a hundred and forty thousand of his veteran soldiers were cooped up in the fortresses on the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula, to be the trophy of the conqueror in case of defeat.

The generally hazardous character of his warfare.

Inexplicable as these military errors must always appear in so sagacious and clear-sighted a general as Napoleon, they are yet, if minutely considered, nothing more than the natural and inevitable result of his system of war, when it was once thoroughly understood, and opposed with a vigour commensurate to the attack. He has himself told us, that on many previous occasions he had been in equal danger, from which he had nevertheless extricated himself not only with credit but decisive success; and the course he pursued on these occasions had been just as perilous as that which, in 1813, proved his ruin. In the marshes of Arcola in 1796; during the advance to Leoben in

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1797; in Moravia, previous to the battle of Austerlitz, in 1805; in Poland, after the defeat of Eylau, in 1807; on the Danube, after the catastrophe of Aspern, in 1809—he was in equal, if not greater peril; and he extricated himself from the difficulties into which his imprudence had brought him, only by a happy audacity, which paralysed or divided his opponents when they had the means of destroying him absolutely within their grasp. He never thought of retreat; he never anticipated defeat where he was in person with the army—though he provided often carefully for it in the case of his lieutenants—but, dashing boldly forward, struck at the centre of the enemy's power, without any thought how, in case of disaster, he was to maintain his own. His own words, that "if Alexander had looked to his retreat at Arbela, or Cæsar at Pharsalia, they would never have conquered the world," reveal the ruling principle of his warfare, and explain at once his early triumphs and ultimate disasters. The wide difference between the two in the result of the same audacious system of warfare, is to be ascribed in a great degree to the superior vigour and unanimity with which he was resisted in the later, to what he had been in the earlier stages of his career. It was the incomparable energy with which the people rose in arms in the latter years of the war, the concord which prevailed among the sovereigns, the perseverance with which they carried through their designs, and the disinterestedness with which they sacrificed all separate interests to the general objects of the alliance, which led to its glorious results. And, without diminishing the credit due to all in this noble career, and admitting that it was on the Russian reserve that the weight of the contest in its last

and most serious stages in general fell, justice must yet admit that the chief glory of the deliverance of Germany is to be ascribed to Prussia; and that, but for the incomparable energy with which her people rose against its oppressors, and which filled the allied ranks with a host of warriors, beyond all precedent great for the amount of its population,* the first onset of Napoleon on the banks of the Elbe never could have been resisted, and the grand alliance which effected the deliverance of Europe never formed.

Memorable example of moral retribution which the revolutionary war affords.

"I shall not," says Gibbon, "be readily accused of fanaticism; yet I must admit that there are often strong appearances of retribution in human affairs." Had he lived to the present times, and witnessed the extraordinary confirmation of this truth which the revolutionary contest afforded, his innate candour would probably have extorted a still more unqualified testimony to Supreme superintendence from the great sceptic of the eighteenth century. On the 16th October 1793, at nine o'clock in the morning, Marie Antoinette ascended the fatal scaffold, and revolutionary crime reached its highest point by the murder of a queen and a woman, the noble and unoffend-

* Prussia, after its partition in 1807 by the treaty of Tilsit, possessed only 5,034,000 inhabitants. In 1813, she had 200,000 men in arms, and actually in the field, independent of the landsturm, or, as nearly as possible, one for every *twenty-five souls*. This is the largest proportion that occurred in any state resting on its own resources during the war; for although Great Britain had 800,000 men in arms out of a population, not at that period, including Ireland, amounting to more than eighteen millions; yet of these only 500,000 were regular soldiers and sailors, the others being local militia, who were not permanently drawn from their occupations. One in a hundred in arms is the largest proportion which any country, how warlike soever, has ever been able to keep up for any length of time.—*Vide* Ante, vi. 296; *and* LORD CASTLEREAGH'S *Speech, 17th Nov.* 1813. *Parl. Deb.*

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ing daughter of the Cæsars. On that day and that hour twenty years—on the 16th October 1813—the discharge of three guns from the allied headquarters announced the commencement of the battle of Leipsic, and the infliction of the greatest punishment on a nation which the history of mankind had exhibited. On the 19th of October 1805, revolutionary ambition beheld its greatest external triumph consummated by the surrender of Mack, with thirty thousand men, to its victorious leader on the heights of Ulm; and on that day eight years—on the 19th October 1813—the final blow was struck for Germany's deliverance by the swords of the fatherland: thirty thousand prisoners lowered their colours to the victors within the walls of Leipsic; and the mighty conqueror, sad and dejected, was leading back his broken and defeated host to the Rhine. On the 20th October 1805, Napoleon, as the brilliant array of Austrian captives defiled before him, said to those around him, "Gentlemen, this is all well; but I must have greater things than these—I want ships, colonies, and commerce." On the *very next day* after these memorable words were spoken, on the 21st October 1805, the united navies of France and Spain were destroyed by the arm of Nelson; the maritime war was finished by the thunderbolt of Trafalgar; and "ships, colonies, and commerce" had irrevocably passed over to his enemies. Whether these marvellous coincidences were the result of accident; of that accumulation of great events in the years of the Revolution, which rendered almost every day prolific of historic incident: or formed part of the general design of Providence for the more striking manifestation of its judgments upon the world, they are equally worthy of attention. What-

ever may be thought of the coincidence of days, it was no accident which directed the march of events; it was no casual combination of chances which led revolutionary ambition to expiate its sins on the Saxon plains; which let fall in due season the sharpened edge of German retribution; and at the darkest period of the contest, sunk the fleets of infidelity in the deep, and righted amidst the waves the destined ark of Christian civilization.

CHAPTER LXXII.

LIBERATION OF SPAIN.

ARGUMENT.

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Singular Progress in the Warlike Resources of France during the Revolution —Contrast which the Progress of the Efforts of England affords during the same period—Difference in the Resources of the two Countries—Causes of this extraordinary Difference—General Unanimity in Great Britain as to the Prosecution of the War at this period—Argument of the Opposition against the Conduct of the Spanish War—Reply on the part of the Government—Means taken for Recruiting the Army—Vast Military Force displayed by Great Britain during this year—Great amount of the Naval Force of that period—Prodigious Expenditure of the year—Revenue raised, and Loans contracted, during its continuance—Glorious position which Great Britain occupied at this period—Ruinous Change introduced at this time in the Financial System of the Empire—Mr Vansittart's new Plan of Finance, and Argument in support of it—Argument of Mr Huskisson and Mr Tierney against it—Reflections on this great Change in our Financial System—Difference in the Results of the old and new System—Answer to the Objection that new Debt was simultaneously contracted during the War—Wellington's Efforts to reorganize his Army in the winter of 1812—He is created Generalissimo of the Spanish Armies—Revolt of Ballasteros, which leads to his being deprived of his command—Intrigues at Cadiz, and Arrival of Wellington there—His Reception by the Cortes, and Measures for the Prosecution of the Campaign—Violent democratic Passions at Cadiz, and Abolition of the Inquisition in Spain—Enormous Amount of the Contributions levied in the Provinces under the French—Abuse in the Government and Administration of Portugal—Miserable condition of the Spanish Armies—Forces with which Wellington was prepared to open the Campaign—Positions and Distribution of this Force—Positions and Strength of the French Armies in the Peninsula—Their latent Sources of Weakness and Disunion—Operations on the east Coast of the Peninsula—Position and Force of Suchet there—Operations of Sir John Murray—Battle of Castello, and Defeat of the French—Position and Operations of the French Army to the North of the Tagus—Great Difficulties of Joseph's situation—Formidable Insurrection in Biscay and Navarre—Bloody partizan Warfare there—Siege and Fall of Castro—Wellington's Plan for the Invasion of Spain—Commencement of his March—Junction of the Allied wings on the Douro—Graham's important March through the Mountains on the left—Feeble and disjointed Movements of the Armies under Joseph—Advance of the British to Burgos—Concentration of the French Armies in the basin of Vittoria—Description of the Field of Battle there—Wellington's Force and Plan of Attack—Position and Strength of the French Army—Battle of Vittoria—Rapid Progress of the British on the Right—Forcing of the French centre—Graham's decisive Success on the Left—Total Defeat of the French—Wellington Blockades Pampeluna and Besieges St Sebastian—Murray's Operations in the East of Spain—Siege of Taragona, and

his Failure before that place—The Anglo-Sicilian Force is moved to Alicante—Suchet abandons Valencia, and retires across the Ebro—Whither he is followed by the allied troops under Lord William Bentinck—His operations in Catalonia—Siege of St Sebastian—Desperate Assault and Repulse of the British—Arrival of Soult at Bayonne, and Preparations to renew the Campaign—Relative Position and Numbers of the contending Armies at this Period—Soult's Irruption through the Pyrenees—Great success in the Outset—The British halt and give Battle in front of Pampeluna—Arrival of Wellington, and first Battle of Sauroren—Second Battle there, and Defeat of the French—Their Disastrous Retreat across the Pyrenees—Results of the Battles of the Pyrenees—Renewal of the Siege of St Sebastian—Preparations for a second Assault—Obstinate Resistance at the Breach—The place is Carried—Burning and Sack of the Town—Siege and Capitulation of the Castle—Soult advances meanwhile to raise the Siege—Is Defeated at San Marcial by the Spaniards—Views of Wellington for the Campaign at this Period—Passage of the Bidassoa, and Invasion of France—Obstinate Conflict at the Great Rhune—Position and Views of Soult at this Period—Suchet refuses to co-operate with him—Blockade and Fall of Pampeluna—Scandalous Violence and Intrigues of the Democratic Party at Cadiz—Wellington Resigns the Command of the Spanish Armies, and is Reinstated by the Cortes on his own terms—His gloomy Views of the Peninsular cause at this Period—Battle of the Nivelle, and Defeat of the French there—Soult's Position on the Nive—Excesses of the Spanish Troops, which cause them to be sent back into Spain—Passage of the Nive and Battles in front of Bayonne—Combat of the 10th—Desperate Battle on the 11th, under Hill—Combat of the 12th, and Final Defeat of the French—Position of the two Armies at this Period—Reflections on this Campaign—Extraordinary Rapidity with which the French Power in the Peninsula was overthrown.

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THE strength of France, put forth with extraordinary and unheard-of vigour at the commencement of the Revolution, subsequently exhibited the languor incident to a weak and oppressive democratic government; was again drawn out with unexampled ability by the powerful arm of Napoleon; and finally sunk under the total exhaustion of its moral energies and physical resources, from long continued warfare. In the year 1793, twelve hundred thousand burning democrats ran to arms, impelled alike by political passion, external ambition, and internal starvation; and, on the principle of making war maintain war, proceeded to regenerate by revolutionizing and plundering all mankind. In the year 1799, the vehemence of this burst had exhausted itself; the armies of the Republic, sunk down to less than

Singular progress in the warlike resources of France during the Revolution.

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two hundred thousand men, were no longer able to make head against their enemies; Italy, Germany, Switzerland, were lost; and on the Var, the Rhine, and the Limmat, its generals maintained a painful and almost hopeless defensive against superior forces. The extraordinary genius of Napoleon, by skilfully directing the whole talent and energy of France into the military profession, again brought back victory to the army of the Revolution, and carried the imperial standards in triumph to Cadiz, Vienna, and the Kremlin. But there is a limit in human affairs to the strength of passion, however profoundly aroused, or the energy of wickedness, however skilfully directed. The period had now arrived when all the material resources of the Revolution were at at once to fail, all its energies to be suddenly exhausted: when its external finances, deprived of the aid of foreign plunder, were to be involved in inextricable embarrassment; and its domestic resources, destitute of credit, and having exhausted every method of internal spoliation, were to become totally unproductive: when the confiscation of the property of the communities and the hospitals of the poor was to be unable to afford any relief to a yawning exchequer; and repeated levies, of three hundred thousand conscripts each, were to fail in making any sensible addition to the strength of its armies: when even the dreaded prospect of foreign subjugation was to be unable to excite any general spirit of resistance in the country; and the mighty conqueror, instead of sweeping over Europe at the head of five hundred thousand men, was to be reduced to a painful defensive with fifty thousand on the plains of Champagne.

The history of Great Britain, and the successive development of its resources during the same period,

exhibit a remarkable and memorable contrast to this downward progress. In the first instance, the forces which the British empire put forth were singularly diminutive, and so obviously disproportioned to the contest in which she had engaged, as to excite at this time unbounded feelings of surprise. The revenue raised for 1793, the first year of the war, including the loan, was under twenty-five millions; the land forces only reached forty-six thousand men in Europe, and ten thousand in India; the sea, eighty-five ships of the line in commission.[1] Such was the impatience of taxation in a popular, and ignorance of war in an insular and commercial community; and with these diminutive forces, aided by a disjointed and jealous alliance, its rulers seriously expected to arrest the torrent of revolutionary ambition, supported by twelve hundred thousand men in arms.

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Contrast which the progress of the efforts of England affords during the same period.

[1] M'Culloch's Stat. of Great Britain, ii. 438. James' Nav. Hist. i. App. Table ii. Porter's Parl. Tables, i. 1.

It is not suprising that disaster, long continued and general, attended such an attempt. But as the contest rolled on, England warmed in the fight; repeated naval triumphs roused the latent spirit of glory in her people; necessity made them submit without a murmur to increased expenditure; and magnanimous constancy, amidst continued continental reverses, still, with mournful resolution, prolonged the contest. At length the Spanish war gave her a fitting field for military exertion, and Wellington taught her rulers the principles of war, her people the path to victory. But even then, when her land and sea forces were every year progressively augmented, until they had reached a height unparalleled, when taken together, in any former age or country; when her fleets had obtained the undisputed dominion of the waves, and her land forces carried her standards in triumph to every quarter of the globe; the magnitude of her resources, the justice of her rule the

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industry of her people, enabled her to carry on the now gigantic contest without any recourse to revolutionary spoliation, or any infringement either on the credit of the state or the provision for its destitute inhabitants. Instead of declining as the contest advanced, her resources were found to multiply in almost a miraculous manner: twenty years of warfare seemed only to have added to the facility with which she borrowed boundless sums, and the regularity with which she raised an unheard-of revenue; while they tended to augment the fidelity with which she had performed her engagements to the public creditors, and the sacred regard which she paid to the sinking fund, the sheet-anchor of future generations, and the poor's rate, the refuge of the present. And it will not be considered by subsequent times the least marvellous circumstance in that age of wonders, that in the year 1813, in the twentieth year of the war, the British empire raised, by direct taxation, no less than twenty—by indirect, forty-eight millions sterling; that she borrowed thirty-nine millions for the current service of the year, at a rate of less than five and a half *per cent*, and expended a hundred and seven millions on the public service; that she had eight hundred thousand men in arms in Europe, and two hundred thousand in Asia, all raised entirely by voluntary enlistment, and two hundred and forty ships of the line in her service; that she carried on war successfully in every quarter of the globe, and sent Wellington into France at the head of a hundred thousand combatants, while her subsidies to foreign powers exceeded the immense sum of eleven millions sterling;[1] and that, during all this gigantic expenditure, she preserved inviolate a Sinking Fund of above fifteen millions sterling, and assessed herself annually to the

[1] See Porter's Prog. of Nation, 182, and ii. 290. Ann. Reg. 1813, 206, and Porter's Parl. Tables, i. 1.

amount of more than six millions sterling for the support of the poor.

Surprizing as the contrast between the opposite progress of France and England, in finances, expenditure, and national resources, during the same contest, undoubtedly is; and memorable as is the proof it affords of the difference between the ultimate resources of a revolutionary, and a free but stable community; it becomes still more remarkable, when the difference in the material resources with which they severally commenced the contest, is taken into consideration. France, at the commencement of the Revolution, had a population of somewhat less than twenty-eight millions, a revenue of twenty-one millions sterling, and a debt of two hundred and forty millions; and Great Britain, including Ireland, had not a population at the same period of more than fifteen millions, her total revenue was under seventeen millions, and her debt was no less than two hundred and thirty-three millions. While, therefore, the national burdens of the two countries were about the same, the physical and pecuniary resources of France were greater, the former by nearly a hundred, the latter by about thirty per cent than those of the British empire. And although, without doubt, England possessed vast resources from her immense commerce and her great colonial possessions; yet in these respects, too, France was far from being deficient. Her navy at that period numbered eighty-two ships of the line, a force greater than that which now bears the royal flag of England, and which had in the American war combated on equal terms with the British fleet; her mercantile vessels were very considerable, those engaged in the West India trade alone being above sixteen hundred, and employing twenty-seven thousand sailors; while her magnificent colony of St Domingo

Difference in the resources of the two countries.

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alone raised a greater quantity of colonial produce than the whole British West India islands, and took off manufactures to the extent of ten millions sterling yearly from the parent state.[1]*

[1] Ante v. 7.

Causes of this extraordinary difference.

"When a native of Louisiana," says Montesquieu, "wishes to obtain the fruit of a tree, he lays the axe to its root—Behold the emblem of despotism." It is in this striking remark that the explanation is to be found of the extraordinary difference between the progress in the national resources, during the contest, in two states which began with advantages preponderating in favour of the one which was ultimately exhausted in the strife. Democratic despotism, the most severe and wasting of all the scourges which the justice or mercy of Heaven lets loose upon guilty man, had laid the axe to the root of French internal prosperity, and forced her people, by absolute necessity, into the career of foreign conquest, even before the war commenced with the British empire. Spoliation had extinguished capital; the assignats had annihilated credit, confiscation ruined landed property, general distress destroyed industrial wealth. Judging from past experience, the British government not unnaturally imagined, that a nation in such a state of general insolvency would have been unable to maintain the contest for any considerable time; and this, doubtless, would have been the case, if it had depended on its own resources alone for the means of carrying it on. But they did not anticipate, what experience so soon and fearfully demonstrated, the energy and almost demoniac strength

* It produced no less than L.18,400,000 worth of sugar and other produce, including the Spanish portion: the whole British islands at this time do not produce so much.—In 1832, prior to the late disastrous changes in these islands, the value of their annual produce was about L.22,000,000; now it is reduced to less than L.17,000,000.—Ante, v. 7; and PORTER's *Parl. Tables*, i. 64.

which a nation, possessing a numerous and warlike population, can in such desperate circumstances acquire, by throwing itself in desolating hordes upon the resources of its enemies, after its own have been destroyed. It was this withering grasp which the French Revolution laid first upon the whole property of its own people, and then upon that of its opponents, which constituted, from first to last, the real secret of its success; and the energy which it so long developed was no other than the passions of sin, turned into this new and alluring channel. But despotic spoliation, whether at home or abroad, is still laying the axe to the root of the tree which bears the fruits of industry; and no different result can be expected, in the long run, from the one than the other. The exhaustion of the French empire, in 1814, when it had drained away the resources and exasperated the hearts of all Europe, was as complete as that of the Republic of France had been in 1795, when it had effected the destruction of property of every description within its own bounds. Whereas in England, where property during the whole strife was religiously respected, and the hand of the spoiler was withheld alike from the mite of the widow and the palace of the peer, the resources provided for the strife, though infinitely less considerable in the outset, were far more durable in the end; and, instead of declining and withering up as the contest rolled on, daily became greater and greater with the growth of the protected industry of her people; until they acquired a decisive preponderance over the gains of violence, and arrayed Europe in dense and burning battalions, to assert the triumph of the rule of justice over that of iniquity.

The dreadful catastrophe of the Moscow cam-

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paign, the animating prospect which the resurrection of Germany afforded, the glorious successes which the campaign of Salamanca had achieved, totally extinguished the division of opinion and voice of faction in Great Britain; and all parties, though from different motives, concurred in advocating the necessity of prosecuting the war with the utmost vigour. The Whigs saw in such a system the fairest and now the only prospect of attaining the object which they had uniformly desired—the general pacification of the world; while the Tories supported it from a conviction that one vigorous effort would now put a period to the sacrifices of the nation, and give a durable ascendency to the conservative principles for which they had so long and strenuously contended. Thus both parties, though with different objects, now combined in recommending the utmost vigour in the prosecution of hostilities; and what is very remarkable, and perhaps unprecedented in British history, the chief complaint made against Government by the leaders of the popular party was, that they had yielded too much to the advice which they themselves had so long and eloquently tendered, and had not prosecuted the war with the vigour which the favourable circumstances which had occurred so imperatively required.[1]

General unanimity in Great Britain as to the prosecution of the war.

1 Ann. Reg. 1813, 98. 209.

On the part of the Opposition, it was contended by Marquis Wellesley and Earl Grey, "What secret cause amidst the splendid scene which has been exhibited in the Peninsula, what malign cause amidst the rejoicings and acclamations of triumph, has counteracted the brilliant successes of our arms, and has converted the glad feelings of a just exultation into the bitterness of regret and disappointment? With an army in discipline and spirit superior to

Argument of the Opposition against the conduct of the Spanish war.

any that had ever before been assembled; uniting in itself qualities so various as to have never entered into the assemblage of any other species of force; with a general pronounced by the whole world to be unsurpassed in ancient or modern times—the pride of his country, the hope and refuge of Europe; with a cause in which justice vied with policy, combining all that was ardent in the one motive, with all that was sober in the other; with the admiration of the world excited by our achievements:—how is it that they have terminated only in disappointment; that a system of advance has suddenly and inevitably been converted into a system of retreat; and that the great conqueror who chased the French armies from the plains of Salamanca has been pursued in his turn over those very plains, the scene of his triumph and his glory, to take refuge in the very positions which he held before the campaign commenced?

"The advantages of our situation in the Peninsula, during the last campaign, were very great, and totally different from what they had been at any previous period. The reduction of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, weakened in a great degree the enemy's frontier lines; and this advantage was accompanied by a most extraordinary and unlooked-for failure in the means, and relaxation of the exertions, of the French in the Peninsula. The efforts of the French army were deprived of the unity of counsel, of design, and of action; distraction reigned among the generals; the exertions of their armies were wholly different from those which we have witnessed when the soul which inspired them was present, infusing its own vigour into every operation. The central government in Madrid was miserable beyond de-

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scription; without power to enforce obedience, without talents to create respect, or authority to secure compliance, it was at the mercy of rival and independent generals; each solicitous only for his own fame or aggrandizement, and little disposed to second each other in any operations for the public good. Here, then, was a most astonishing combination of favourable circumstances; and yet we have derived no greater benefit from them than we did from previous campaigns, when every thing was of the most adverse character.

"To take advantage of these favourable contingencies, we should clearly have augmented our force in Spain to such an amount as would have enabled its general at once to have in the field a force adequate to check the main body of the French army, and another to carry on active operations. Unless you did so, you necessarily exposed your cause to disaster; because the enemy, by relinquishing minor objects, and concentrating his forces against your one considerable army, could easily, being superior on the whole, be enabled in the end to overwhelm and crush it. Hill never had a force of more than five thousand British, and twelve thousand Portuguese and Spaniards; yet, with this handful of men, he kept in check all the disposable forces of Soult in Estremadura—a clear proof of the vast benefit which would have arisen to the allied cause if an adequate force of perhaps double or triple the amount had been similarly employed. Now, what period could have been desired so suitable for making such an effort, as that when the central government at Madrid was imbecile and nugatory, the French armies separated and disunited, Napoleon thoroughly engrossed with his all-absorbing expedition to Russia,

and the British army in possession of a central position on the flank of the theatre of war, which at once menaced hostility and defied attack? CHAP. LXXII. 1813.

"The successes which have been gained throughout the whole campaign,—and they have been not only brilliant, but in some degree lasting—were entirely owing to the skill of the general and the valour of his troops, and in no degree to the arrangement or combination at home on the part of those who had the direction of military affairs. Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz were both carried with means scandalously inadequate, by intrepid daring on the part of the general, and the shedding of torrents of English blood. After the reduction of the last of these fortresses, what was the policy which obviously was suggested to the British general? Evidently to have pursued his advantages in the south, attacked Soult in Andalusia, destroyed his great military establishments in that province, and again brought Spain into active hostility, by rescuing from the grasp of the enemy its richest and most important provinces. He was prevented from doing this, to which interest and inclination equally pointed, by the necessity of returning to the north to check the incursion of Marmont into Beira, and by the notoriously unprovided state of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz to withstand a siege. With whom did the blame of not providing adequate means for the protection of the north, when the career of victory was pursued in the south, rest? Evidently with the Government at home, which both neglected to send out the requisite supplies, and never maintained the British force in the field at more than half the amount which their ample resources, both military and pecuniary, would have afforded.

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"When the invasion of Leon was commenced in July, and the whole disposable British force was perilled on a single throw, the defects in the combinations, and languor in the support of Government, were still more conspicuous. That irruption, attempted by forty-five thousand men into a country occupied by two hundred and fifty thousand, could be based only on the prospect of powerful co-operation in other quarters. Was any such afforded? Murray's descent on the eastern coast, with the Anglo-Sicilian expedition, was mainly relied on; but did it arrive in time to take any part of the pressure off Wellington? So far from it, though the whole arrangements for the sailing of the expedition were concluded as early as March, yet on the 15th July he had heard nothing of its movements; and he was compelled to begin a systematic retreat—in the course of which he gained, indeed, by his own skill, a most splendid victory,—but which, leading, as it did, to a concentration of the enemy's troops from all parts of the Peninsula, involved him in fresh difficulties, where the incapacity of Ministers was if possible still more conspicuous. No sufficient efforts were made to provide the general with specie, and all his operations were cramped by the want of that necessary sinew of war. No adequate train of artillery was provided for the siege of Burgos; no means of resisting the concentration of troops from all parts of the Peninsula were afforded to him; and he was ultimately compelled, after the most glorious efforts, to relinquish all his conquests, except the two fortresses first gained, and again to take refuge within the Portuguese frontier.

"So nicely balanced were the forces of the contending parties during this memorable campaign,

that there is no stage of it in which twelve thousand additional infantry and three thousand cavalry would not have ensured decisive success. Now, was such a force at the disposal of Government, in addition to those which were actually on service in the Peninsula? The details of the war-office leave no room for doubt on this head. During the whole of last year there were, exclusive of veteran and garrison corps, forty-five battalions of regular infantry, and sixteen regiments of cavalry, presenting a total of fifty-three thousand men; besides seventy-seven thousand regular militia, two hundred thousand local militia, and sixty-eight thousand yeomanry cavalry. Can any one doubt that, out of this immense force, lying dormant as it were within the British islands, at least twenty-five thousand might have been forwarded to the Peninsula? And yet the whole number sent was only twenty-one thousand, of whom more than one half were drafts and recruits, leaving only ten thousand five hundred and forty-five actually sent out of fresh regiments. Why was not this number doubled—why was it not trebled? Were we looking for a more favourable opportunity than when Napoleon was absent with half his military force in Russia? Did we wait for more glorious co-operations than was afforded us during the Moscow campaign? And what would have been the effect in France if, when the shattered remains of the grand army were arriving on the Elbe, Wellington, with one hundred thousand men, flushed with victory, had been thundering across the Pyrenees?"[1]

[1] Parl. Deb. xxv. 25, 66.

To these able arguments it was replied by Lord Bathurst, Lord Castlereagh, and Lord Liverpool:—"The confident tone assumed by the noble Marquis might induce the suspicion that his brother, the

Reply on the part of Government.

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illustrious Wellington, shares his opinions, and is dissatisfied with the support which he received from Government during the campaign. But the fact is otherwise, and he has voluntarily written to them expressing his entire satisfaction with their conduct in this particular. The objections made are mainly founded upon this: that we have not in the Peninsular contest employed our whole disposable force; that it might have been materially augmented without detriment to the home service; but it was not the policy of this country, it was not in itself expedient, to employ its whole force upon any one foreign service, how important soever; but rather to retain a considerable reserve at all times ready in the citadel of our strength, to send to any quarter where it may appear capable of being directed to the greatest advantage. No one will dispute the importance of the Peninsular contest; but can it be seriously maintained that it is in that quarter *alone* that the dawning of European freedom is to be looked for? Is Russia nothing? Is Prussia nothing? And, with the profound hatred which French domination has excited in the north of Germany, is it expedient to put ourselves in a situation to be unable to render any assistance to insurrectionary movements in Hanover, Holland, or the north of Germany; countries still nearer the heart of the enemy's power, and abounding with a more efficient warlike population than either Spain or Portugal?

"When it is stated, too, that the campaign terminated with the British armies in the same quarters which they held at its commencement; this, though geographically true, is in a military and political point utterly erroneous. Was the reduction of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, the capture of the

whole heavy artillery of the armies of Portugal and of the centre, at the former of these fortresses and the Retiro, nothing? Is it no small matter to have shaken loose the spoiler's grasp over the whole of Spain? to have compelled the evacuation of Andalusia and Granada, taken twenty thousand prisoners, and destroyed the great warlike establishments at Seville and before Cadiz, stored, as they were, with above a thousand pieces of cannon? If the expedition of Soult to the south of the Sierra Morena, contrary as it was to all military principle, while the English power in Portugal remained unsubdued, was suggested entirely by the desire to open up new and hitherto untouched fields of plunder; the loss of these provinces, the throwing back the enemy for his whole support on the central provinces of Spain, the wasted scene of his former devastation, was a proportional disadvantage to his cause, a proportional benefit to the allied operations. How many campaigns in English history will bear a comparison, not merely in brilliant actions, but in solid and durable results, with that of Salamanca? And it is, perhaps, not the least proof of its vast moral influence, that it has wrought an entire change in the views of the gentlemen opposite; and, for the first time in the history of the war, made the burden of their complaint, not, as heretofore, that too much, but that too little has been done by British co-operation for the deliverance of Europe.

"The expected co-operation of Lord William Bentinck from Sicily, certainly, did not arrive at the time that was calculated upon; but the fault there lay not with Government, but in circumstances which prevented that officer from exercising in due time the discretion with which he was timeously invested,

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as to appearing with a powerful British force on the east of Spain in the beginning of July. The failure of the attack on Burgos, however much to be regretted, was neither to be ascribed to negligence on the part of Government in forwarding the necessary stores, nor to want of foresight on the part of Lord Wellington in the preparations for its reduction, but to the accidental circumstance of its having been, unknown to the English general, strengthened to such a degree as to render it impregnable with the means which he deemed amply sufficient for its capture. He never asked for a battering train, because he never thought it would be required; if he had done so, he could at once have got any amount of heavy guns he required from the ships of war at Santander. Even as it was, the fort would have been taken but for the accidental death of the officer who headed the assault on the 22d September, and the still more unfortunate circumstance of his having had upon his person a plan of the siege, so that the whole designs of the British engineers became known to the enemy. The complaints made of the want of specie at Lord Wellington's headquarters are sufficiently answered by the fact, that such was the state of the exchanges from the extraordinary demand for specie on the Continent, that we lost twenty-four per cent upon all remittances to the Peninsula, which, upon the L.15,000,000 which the campaign actually cost, occasioned a further loss of L.3,000,000. But the effect of the last campaign is yet to be judged of; it is not in a single season that the French power in the Peninsula, the growth of five years' conquest, is to be uprooted. The blow delivered at Salamanca loosened their power over the whole realm: one is, perhaps, not far distant which may totally overthrow it."[1]

[1] Parl. Deb. xxv. 66, 74, 87.

Upon a division, Marquis Wellesley's motion for a committee of inquiry into the conduct of the war, was negatived by a majority of 76—the numbers, including proxies, being 115 to 39.[1]

[1] Parl. Deb. 88.

Means taken for recruiting the army.

One good effect resulted from the able exposition made by Marquis Wellesley on this occasion, of the benefits which might be expected to result from the conducting of the war in Spain on a more extended scale, and in a manner worthy of the great nation which was engaged in the strife; viz. that Government were induced to make the utmost efforts, both to augment the numbers and efficiency of the regular army at home, and to increase the reinforcements that were forwarded to Wellington in the Peninsula. For several years past, the system had been adopted of providing for the increase of the regular army, by permitting the privates of the militia to volunteer into the line, and offering them large bounties, amounting sometimes to twelve and fourteen guineas, to do so. By this means, the objectionable measure of a direct conscription was avoided, and recruits were obtained for the army of a better description than could otherwise be obtained by voluntary enlistment, and possessing the great advantage of being already thoroughly drilled and exercised. So efficacious was this system, that, joined to the warlike enthusiasm produced by the victories in the Peninsula, it produced during this year twenty-five thousand men for the army; a force which more than compensated the waste of the Spanish war, great as it was, and which was nearly double of the amount obtained by private enlistment, which had never reached fourteen thousand.[2]

[2] Parl. Deb. xxiv. 346, 876.

The military force maintained during this year by Great Britain, independent of the force in India, was

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immense; and, coupled with the vast navy which it was necessary to keep for the maritime war, in which America had now appeared as a principal enemy, presented perhaps the greatest aggregate of warlike strength ever put forth by any single nation since the beginning of the world. The land forces presented a total of two hundred and twenty-eight thousand regular troops, having increased twelve thousand even after all the losses of the year 1812, besides twenty-eight thousand British soldiers in India, and ninety-three thousand militia in the British islands, in no respect inferior to the army of the line, and thirty-two thousand foreign corps in the British service. The sepoy force in India numbered no less than two hundred thousand men, presenting a total of five hundred and eighty-two thousand soldiers in arms, all raised by voluntary enlistment, and exclusively devoted to that as a profession. In addition to this, the local-militia, similar to the Prussian landwehr, in the British islands, amounted to no less than three hundred thousand; and the yeomanry cavalry, or landwehr horse, were sixty-eight thousand! exhibiting a total of nine hundred and forty-nine thousand men in arms, of which seven hundred and forty-nine thousand were drawn from the population of the British islands.[1]*

Vast military force displayed by Great Britain during this year.

[1] Martin's Colonial Hist i. 319. Army Estimates for 1813. Parl. Deb. xxiv. 346, 867.

Immense as these forces are, the marvel that they should have reached such an amount is much increased, when the magnitude of the naval establishment kept up in the same year is considered, and the limited physical resources of the country which, at the close of a twenty years' war, made such prodigious efforts. The British navy, at the commencement of 1813—and it was kept up at the same level during the

Great amount of the naval force at that period.

* Note A. App. Ch. LXXII.

whole year—amounted to two hundred and forty-four ships of the line, of which one hundred and two were in commission, and two hundred and nineteen frigates, besides smaller vessels: making in all, one thousand and nine ships in the service of England, of which six hundred and thirteen were in commission, and bore the royal flag! This immense force was manned by one hundred and forty thousand seamen, and eighteen thousand marines: making a total, with the land forces, of ELEVEN HUNDRED AND SEVEN THOUSAND MEN IN ARMS, all raised by voluntary enrolment, of whom above nine hundred thousand were drawn from the population of the British islands! When it is recollected that this immense force was raised in an empire in Europe, not at that period numbering above eighteen millions of souls over its whole extent,*—that is, considerably under half the population of the French empire, which had a population of forty-two millions to work upon for its army of nine hundred thousand men, and hardly any naval force afloat to support; it must be admitted, that history has not preserved so memorable an instance of patriotic exertion.[1]

[1] James's Naval Hist. vi. 516, Table ii.

But these efforts drew after them a proportional expenditure, and never at any former period had the annual charges of government in the British empire been so considerable. The army alone, cost L.19,000,000; its extraordinaries L.9,000,000 more: the navy L. 20,000,000; the ordnance L.3,000,000; and so lavish had the expenditure become, under the

Prodigious expenditure of the year.

* Population of Great Britain in 1811, . . 12,552,044
Ireland probably, . . . 5,000,000
Increase to 1813, . . . 500,000
18,052,044
—*Parl. Deb.* xxi. 286. *Census Papers.*

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excitement and necessities of the war, that the unprovided expenditure of the year preceding, amounted to no less than L.4,662,000. But these charges, great and unprecedented as they were, constituted but a part of the expenses of Great Britain during this memorable year. The war in Germany at the same time was sustained by her liberality; and the vast hosts which stemmed the torrent of conquest on the Elbe, and rolled it back at Leipsic, were armed, clothed, and arrayed by the munificence of the British government, and the resources of the British people. Portugal received a loan of two millions sterling; Sicily four hundred thousand; Spain in money and stores, two millions; Sweden a million; Russia and Prussia three millions; Austria one million; besides warlike stores sent to Germany, to the amount of two millions more. The war on the Continent, during this year, cost in all, in subsidies or furnishings to foreign powers, ten millions four hundred thousand pounds, of which Germany alone received above six millions; and yet so little was Great Britain exhausted by these immense exertions, that she was able at the same time to advance a loan of two millions sterling to the East India Company. The total expenditure of the year, including Ireland, and reckoning the current vote of credit, reached the amazing and unprecedented amount of ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTEEN MILLIONS[1] *

[1] Lord Castlereagh's speech, Nov. 17, 1813. Parl. Deb. xxvii. 132, 146. Supplies for 1813 Ibid. xxvi. 577.

Revenue raised and loans contracted during the year.

It may naturally be asked how supplies so prodigious, could by possibility be obtained during the currency of a single year, especially as the manufacturing industry of the country had for above two years been most seriously obstructed, and most grievous distress induced in many districts by the

* See App. B. Chap. lxxii.

cessation of all mercantile connexion with America: first, from the Non-Intercourse Act, and next, from the open hostility of the United States. As the sum raised by taxation within the year, amounted in all to L.68,800,000, a very large loan became necessary; and such were the demands upon the exchequer, that after the sum had been borrowed which appeared adequate to the whole probable necessities of the state, in March, a further and very considerable addition to the national debt had become necessary in November. The loan at first contracted in March was L.21,000,000; but even this ample supply proved insufficient, and parliament was assembled early in November to make a further addition to the means to be placed at the disposal of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. An addi- Nov. 15. tional loan of twenty-two millions was voted in that month, of which one half was devoted to the current expenses of the year, and one half to fund an equal amount of exchequer bills, which had now become so considerable as to occasion a very serious pressure on the money market. To meet the interest and contribution to the sinking fund for these great loans, additional taxes, chiefly on tobacco, malt, and spirits, to the amount of L.610,000 in Ireland, and spirits and sugar, and lesser articles in Great Britain, to the amount of L.800,000, were imposed; but they were were far from meeting the total interest on the sums and floating debt contracted, borrowed during the year. Yet so little were even these immense loans from affecting the public credit, or exhausting the pecuniary resources of Great Britain, that they seemed to have a directly contrary effect; the resources of the empire rose up with the more buoyancy the greater the load was which was imposed upon them. Decisive proof of this occurred in this year;

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for while the loan contracted in spring was concluded at the rate of L.5:10:6 per cent, that in November was obtained on the more favourable terms of L.5:6:2 *per cent;* and such was the competition of capitalists to obtain shares in the loan at this reduced rate, that not only were many disappointed who had come to bid, but the *premium* on it in the market next day rose three and a half *per cent.*[1]

[1] Mr Vansittart's speech, June 11th and Nov. 15th, 1813. Parl. Deb. xxvi. 578, 580, and xxvii. 107, 110.

Glorious position which Great Britain occupied at this period.

We have now reached the highest point in the military and national glory of Great Britain. Without having ever, in the course of this arduous contest, compromised her principles, or yielded to the enemy; without having touched one shilling of the sacred fund set apart for the redemption of the public debt, or infringed either upon the security of property or the provision for the poor, she had attained her long sought-for object, and not only provided for her own security by her valour, but delivered Europe by her example. In the eloquent words of Mr Canning, who, though in opposition to Government since his rupture with Lord Castlereagh in 1809, still remained true to his principles, "What we have accomplished is, establishing the foundations upon which the temple of peace may be erected, and imagination may now picture the completion of that structure, which, with hopes less sanguine, and hearts less high, it would have been folly to have attempted to raise. We may now confidently hope to arrive at the termination of labour and the commencement of repose. It is impossible to look back to those periods when the enemy vaunted, and we perhaps feared, that we should have been compelled to sue for peace, without returning thanks, amidst all our ebullitions of joy, to that Providence which gave us courage and heart still to bear up against accumu-

lating calamity. Peace is safe now, because it is not dictated; peace is safe now, for it is the fruit of exertion, the child of victory; peace is safe now; because it will not be purchased at the expense of the interest and the honour of the empire: it is not the ransom to buy off danger, but the lovely fruit of the mighty means we have employed to drive danger from our shores."[1] CHAP. LXXII. 1813.

[1] Parl. Deb. xxvii. 145.

"Nulla magna civitas," says Hannibal, "diu quiescere potest; si foris hostem non habet, domi invenit; ut prævalida corpora ab externis causis tuta videntur, sed suis ipsa viribus onerantur. Tantum nimirum ex publicis malis sentimus, quantum ad privatas res attenit; nec in eis quidquam acrius quàm pecuniæ damnum stimulat."[2] Never was the truth of these memorable words more clearly demonstrated than in the financial history of Great Britain, as it preceded and as it followed this momentous year. During the whole anxieties, perils, and burdens of the contest, the government of England, directed by noble hearts, upheld by heroic arms, had adhered with unshaken constancy to the system for the redemption of the public debt: not one shilling had been diverted from this sacred purpose during the darkest, the most distressed, or the most hopeless period of the contest; and the result had been, that the Sinking Fund—the sheet-anchor of the nation's credit—now exceeded fifteen millions sterling, having increased to that immense amount, from one million in 1786, when it was first placed on an efficient footing by Mr Pitt.* Now, however, when the nation was about to reap the fruits of its

Ruinous change introduced at this period into the Finance System of Great Britain.

[2] Liv. lib. xxx. c. 44.

* Ante, v. 543.

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heroic constancy; when the clouds which had so long obscured its course were dispersing, and the glorious dawn of peace and security was beginning to shine on the earth, the resolution of its rulers failed: the provident system of former days was abandoned; duty was sacrificed to supposed expediency; the fatal precedent was introduced, of abandoning the protection of the future for the relief of the present; and that vacillation appeared in our financial councils, which made it painfully evident, that, with the dangers of the war, its heroic spirit was about to depart.

Mr Vansittart's new plan of finance, and argument in support of it.

This great and momentous change in our financial policy, the effects of which have been felt with such severity in later times, was thus introduced by Mr Vansittart, on a day which deserves to be noted as among the most disastrous which England ever knew—March 3, 1813.—"Towards the close of last session, in the discussions which took place on our financial situation, a general conviction seemed to prevail, that some measure of unusual severity had become necessary to take off the load which depressed public credit. Six months, however, have elapsed since that period—six months, the most momentous ever known in the history of Europe. The face of the world has been changed; and from the conflict between insatiable, unprincipled, remorseless ambition on the one side, and hardy, stubborn, though untutored patriotism on the other, have resulted consequences the most important, and hopes the most satisfactory to the cause of humanity. That necessity no longer exists, and, in consequence, the time appears to have now arrived, when, without impairing our public credit—without postponing the period when the entire liquidation of our public debt may with confidence be anticipated—the nation may safely

obtain some relief from the unparalleled exertions which it has made.

"It is by an alteration on the Sinking Fund, as it has been established by act of Parliament in 1802, that this relief, which has now become necessary, is to be obtained. The great danger of the Sinking Fund, which has now become an engine of such vast power and efficacy in the state, is, that it will soon come to reduce the debt too rapidly. If the contraction of loans ceases, it will soon come to pay off twenty, thirty, nay, forty millions annually; and the reduction of these immense sums will not, as heretofore, be concealed or neutralized by the simultaneous contraction of debt to an equal or greater amount; but it will appear at once by the diminution to that extent of the public funds every year. Extraordinary as these results may appear, they are no more than a rigid application to the future of the experience of the past—the only safe method of reasoning that can be practised in political affairs. The Sinking Fund has now reached an extent of which the history of no country affords an example; but can we contemplate without alarm the prospect of paying off thirty or forty millions annually for the next thirty years, and then suddenly ceasing, which will be the case under the law as it at present stands, in consequence of the whole debt having been paid off? Such an event would produce effects upon the credit investments of the country, too formidable even for imagination to contemplate. All our financiers, accordingly, have concurred in the necessity of limiting, in some way or other, and at no remote period, this powerful agent of liquidation. By the original Sinking Fund Act of 1786, drawn by Mr Pitt, this limitation was to have taken place as soon as the fund should

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have accumulated to four millions *per annum*. Had not that original plan been varied by the act of 1802, the public would long ere this have felt relief from the operation of the Sinking Fund, though only to the limited extent of the interest on four millions a-year. Lord Lansdowne and all the authorities have also concurred in the opinion, that the idea of paying off thirty or forty millions a-year in time of peace, which the Sinking Fund, if maintained to its present amount, will unquestionably do, is altogether impracticable and visionary. Relief must, therefore, at some time or other be afforded to the public, by arresting the action of the Sinking Fund; and if so, the question occurs, is there any period when such relief is more loudly called for, more imperatively required, than at the present moment?

"When the Sinking Fund was established in 1786, the total amount of the debt was about 240,000,000; and the redemption of such a sum appeared, if not altogether hopeless, at least placed at a very remote distance. But, great as the difficulty then appeared, the firmness and perseverance of the nation, pursuing this important object with undeviating resolution, have at length completely surmounted it; and the accounts upon the table prove, that a sum equal to the total amount of the debt, as it existed in 1786, has been redeemed.* Instead of shifting the burden from themselves, and laying it upon posterity, the people of this country have nobly and man-

* Total national funded debt on 5th January 1786, L.238,231,248
Redeemed before March 1, 1813, ... 238,350,143

Overpaid of original debt by L.118,895

—Mr Vansittart's *Resolutions, March* 3, 1813. *Parl. Deb.* xxiv. 1092.

fully supported the load, even under the burden of increasing difficulties, which the vicissitudes of the contest have thrown upon them; and, what is still more remarkable, they have done this during a period when they paid a still greater amount in war taxes, to prevent the growth of another debt of a similar amount during the contest: so that experience has both amply demonstrated the wonderful powers of the Sinking Fund in accumulating funds for the redemption of the debt, and the strong claims which the people of England now have for some relief from the burdens with which it is attended.

"Mr Pitt not only strongly supported, but was the original author of the Act of 1802; and his original design was, that after reserving as much of the Sinking Fund as would redeem the whole debt at par in forty-five years, the surplus, then amounting to above a million, should be applied to the public service. We have now arrived at the period when a similar relief, without impairing the ultimate efficiency of the Sinking Fund, may be obtained. It is proposed that the debt first contracted should be deemed to have been first discharged; and that the sinking fund created in respect of any *subsequent* loan shall be first applied to the redemption of any prior loan remaining unredeemed; while the operation of the *per-centage* created for those earlier loans, shall be continued for the redemption of those subsequently contracted. Thus, in the event of a long war, a considerable resource might accrue during the course of the war itself, as every successive loan would contribute to accelerate the redemption of those previously existing; and the total amount of charge to be borne by the public in respect of the public debt, will be reduced to a narrower compass than under the existing mode, while the period of the ultimate

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discharge of the whole debt will be accelerated rather than retarded. The calculations which are laid on the table prove, that by the new plan means are provided for the total repayment of the existing debt from four to ten, and of the future debt from fourteen to twenty-seven years sooner than by the laws in force, while a very considerable surplus available to our present necessities will at once be obtained. According to the laws at present in force, the whole debt will be discharged by the year 1845, by the new plan in 1837."[1]

[1] Parl. Deb. xxiv. 1078, 1095.

Argument of Mr Huskisson and Mr Tierney against the new plan.

To these specious views, it was answered by Mr Huskisson and Mr Tierney—"The great and peculiar merit of Mr Pitt's system of the Sinking Fund is, that it makes an effectual provision for the *permanent* liquidation, not only of the existing, but of every future public debt. He wished, in the event of any future war, to guard the country against the evils arising from too rapid an accumulation of debt, and consequent depression of credit; and to place us beyond the reach of that hopelessness, despondency, and alarm, which had brought the finances of the country to the brink of ruin at the close of the American war. But his system has a still greater merit. He foresaw that the greatest difficulty which the statesmen of the country would have to contend with in subsequent periods of difficulty, would be to guard against the danger of future alienation. The plan which he introduced in 1792, was intended to guard against this specific danger; and it held out to the public a guarantee, that any future debt which the state might incur, would, how great soever its amount might be, be contracted under a system of redemption, which would inevitably provide for its extinction within a period of thirty years or so after its contraction. Under this admirable system, not

only the sinking fund which it provides, but the application and accumulation of that sinking fund are so interwoven and bound up with the contract for every loan, that its redemption became a condition between the borrower and lender, until the obligation of repayment was cancelled by the extinction of the debt itself. It was made an objection to this system, that it would place the reimbursement of all future loans beyond the reach or control of Parliament: but to every thoughtful observer, this very circumstance is its principal merit; for it placed the financial salvation of the country beyond the reach even of the future weakness of its rulers or people.*

"The fundamental position in Mr Pitt's financial system, the truth of which experience has so completely demonstrated, is, that provision should be made for every loan being redeemed from the resources provided at the time of its contraction, at latest within forty-five years. This is not founded upon any imaginary result or chimerical anticipation, but upon a rigorous application of arithmetical calculation, and is as certain as any proposition in geometry. He established a sinking fund of one *per cent* on each loan contracted, for which provision was made in the taxes laid on to pay its interest; and it was enacted that this one *per cent* should be regularly issued quarterly from Exchequer, to be laid out in the purchase or redemption of stock, to be invested in the name of the commissioners of the National Debt; and it is demonstrably certain, that this system, supposing the rate of interest to be invariably three *per cent*, will redeem a capital equal to a hundred times its amount in little more

* Ante v. 547, 553.

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than forty-five years. This is the fixed and certain rate of redemption at three *per cent*; that is, when the three *per cent* stock is at par: but it is a great and peculiar advantage of Mr Pitt's system, that it is calculated to act more powerfully when the price of stock is depressed, by rendering the purchases of the commissioners cheaper; that is, it draws an additional element of life from the very calamities which appear to threaten the existence of the nation.

"The foundation of the new system of finance proposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, is, that Parliament is at liberty, under the Act of 1792, to regulate and modify, according to its discretion, in any manner, the redemption of the debt contracted under that act, provided the final liquidation of each of these separate loans, which together constitute the aggregate of the debt, is not protracted beyond the full period of forty-five years. Is such an alteration consistent with public faith? That there is nothing in the act authorizing such an alteration in the means established for the creditor's security in the progressive liquidation of his debt, is quite apparent. Then, is there any thing in the nature of the change which calls for its adoption in the face of the express injunctions of the Act to the contrary? It is plain that there is not—nay, that the reason of the thing all lies the other way. The invasion upon the Sinking Fund proposed lies here. The new system does not interfere with the quarterly issue from Exchequer of the one *per cent* on each loan, as directed by the Act 1792: it is upon the concurrent application of these several one *per cents* to the reduction of their respective loans, and upon the transfer of the stock purchased by each of these sinking funds, that the change is made. And of the

magnitude of this change no clearer proof can be imagined, than that it is held forth by the Chancellor of the Exchequer as likely in the next four years to withdraw seven or eight millions sterling from the Sinking Fund to the necessities of the state; and that in twenty years it would prove equal to a loan of a hundred millions.

"The first report of the Committee of Finance in 1797, concludes with these remarkable words:—'The old Sinking Fund established in 1786 is no longer made applicable, by law, to the discharge at compound interest of what may then remain of the old debt; but the operation of the new sinking fund is to continue at compound interest till the new debt shall be wholly discharged.' Is it possible to express the object of the Act, and the intention of the legislature more clearly, than by thus drawing the distinction between the Act of 1786 and that of 1792? The promised subsidy of a hundred and twenty millions is merely a golden dream. It is no doubt true, that if we choose to abandon the Sinking Fund, or any considerable part of it, we shall find ourselves so much the richer for present operations by doing so. Every person who is in the course of paying off a debt, will find the same if he stops in the course of its liquidation, and applies all the funds destined for that purpose to his present necessities. There is nothing new in that: it has been the common excuse for wasteful improvidence from the beginning of the world. But what is to be the ultimate result of such a system? Ruin to the state, as it has been to every individual or family who ever yet pursued it.

"The real bait which is held out is, that this system will for the next three years supersede the necessity of laying on new taxes. Admitting the

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weight of the public burdens, and the painful duty which it is to propose any addition to them, is it not more manly and statesmanlike at once to do so, than to adopt a change in a system which hitherto has worked so admirably, and substitute for the steady operation of the Sinking Fund, under the present laws, which experience has so amply demonstrated to be well founded, a succession of new devices, to which no man can foresee an end? If the public necessities render it absolutely impossible to go on without having recourse to some extraordinary aid, it would be far better to mortgage the Sinking Fund to the extent of two millions yearly for the period, it is to be hoped short, that the war lasts, than to adopt a *permanent* change of system in a particular so vital to the national safety. Any appropriation of the Sinking Fund for a brief period would be preferable to such a lasting alteration on the system, and breaking in upon its efficiency and operation; whereas, by adhering to it with the constancy and resolution which has been hitherto evinced by government, we shall have the absolute certainty that a very few years of peace will accumulate its annual payments to such an amount, that in addition to providing for the reduction of the debt to as large an extent as is desirable, perhaps twenty millions a-year, we shall have the pleasing task to perform, of remitting the most oppressive part of the war taxes. To break in upon a system attended with such benefit, is the most dangerous of all innovations. The present system is neither more nor less than stopping the accumulation of the Sinking Fund just now, to add to it hereafter. Such a precedent, once established, will shake the security of our finances to the foundation—that hereafter will never come.

Some excuse will always be found for continuing the agreeable task of remitting present taxation by trenching upon the security of the future; and in the end it will be found that the first step in such a downward system is the first advance to ruin."[1]

[1] Parl. Deb. xxv. 286, 327, 359, 362.

The resolutions of Mr Vansittart were agreed to without a division, and a bill passed in terms thereof.[2]

[2] Ibid. 366, 367.

Reflections on this great change in our financial system.

Thus began the new system of British finance: that of shutting our eyes to the future; of considering only the exigencies of the moment; and trenching to any extent upon the interests or the security of subsequent times, provided only a stop can be put to present clamour, or a foundation laid for temporary popularity. Time, the great test of truth, has now completely demonstrated the perilous nature of this innovation, and too clearly verified Mr Tierney's prediction, that it would prove the first step to national ruin. Nor is there, perhaps, to be found in the whole history of human affairs, a more striking proof than the twenty-seven years immediately preceding, and the like period immediately following the year 1813, afford, of the difference between the results of that manly and provident system of government, which, founded on the foresight of the thinking few, lays, often amidst the clamours and misrepresentations of the unthinking many, the broad and lasting foundations of national greatness; and that conceding and temporizing policy, which, looking only to present objects and the attainment of immediate relief, secures unbounded momentary applause from the heedless multitude, by adopting measures which loosen the fabric of national power, shorten the period of national existence, and bring down upon its authors the

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lasting execrations of the wise and thoughtful in every future age.

Difference in the results of the two systems.

In the twenty-seven years which elapsed from 1786 to 1813, the finances under Mr Pitt's system were managed with manly constancy, scrupulous regard to the future, and a total disregard of present obloquy, and the consequence was, that the Sinking Fund rose in that short time from one, to fifteen millions; and the whole debt existing at its commencement, amounting to nearly two hundred and forty millions, had been extinguished at its termination. This happened, too, although twenty years of that period were occupied with the most extensive and costly war that has occurred in the history of mankind, and an expenditure had been forced on the country, which increased its revenue raised by taxation, from sixteen millions at its commencement, to sixty-eight millions at its termination. In the twenty-seven years which immediately followed 1813—from 1813 to 1840—a totally different system was followed. Tax after tax, amounting in the whole period to above forty-eight millions sterling, were repealed amidst the general applause of the unthinking many, and the profound indignation of the far-seeing few; Mr Vansittart's precedent of breaking in upon the Sinking Fund was readily adopted on every emergency, until the shadow even of this pillar of national credit disappeared, and for the last three years of the period, not a shilling had been applied to the reduction of debt; and the nation which had begun the fund with a fixed and certain sinking fund of fifteen millions a-year, in full operation and increasing at compound interest, found itself at its close without any sinking fund whatever, and a deficit which, during the last three years, had amounted to above six

millions.* This disastrous change occurred, too, during a period, with the exception of the last year of its continuance, of profound and general peace; in the course of which the population of the empire had increased fully fifty *per cent*, its agricultural produce in a still greater proportion, its imports had nearly, and its exports more than doubled!† With truth did Sir Joshua Reynolds say, that he who aims at obtaining popularity with his contemporaries, must lay his account with the neglect or detestation of posterity.

Nor is there any solid foundation for the obvious remark, so often repeated as the justification of government and the people, during this unparalleled increase of national resources and prostration of national strength, that the Sinking Fund redeemed and discharged debt so largely during the first period, because other debt to a much greater amount was contracted, and that it was gradually impaired, and at last totally annihilated in the second, because the simultaneous contraction of other debt had ceased. This observation, which has been so generally made as to have deluded a whole generation, proceeds upon confounding together two things, in themselves altogether distinct and separate; viz. the provision made by Mr Pitt for paying off, within forty-five years after it was contracted, every separate loan which he

Answer to the objection, that debt was simultaneously contracted during the war.

* Vide App. C. Chap. LXXII. for two most instructive tables, showing the progressive increase of the sinking fund under the one system, and its progressive extinction under the other.

	1814.	1840.
† Population of Great Britain and Ireland,	18,000,000	28,250,000
Exports, . . .	L.53,573,234	L.102,472,000
Imports, . . .	L.33,755,264	L.61,268,000
Shipping—Tons, British and Foreign,	1,889,535	3,783,000
Revenue raised by Taxes, .	L.68,748,363	L.47,250,849

—PORTER's *Progress of the Nation*, i. 11, ii. 98 *and* ii. 174; *and Finance and Parliamentary Accounts for* 1840.

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was obliged to borrow, and the simultaneous necessity to which he was exposed of contracting debt to an equal or greater amount, for the necessities of the revolutionary war. It is no doubt true, that, if two hundred and forty millions were paid off before the year 1813, debt to more than double that amount had been contracted; and it is that fact which has so generally misled the last generation. But these two things had no necessary or even casual connexion with each other. The funds provided for the liquidation of the former, were wholly independent of the debts contracted under the necessities of the latter. If the funds for the discharge of the debt had been drawn solely, or even partly, from borrowing, unquestionably the remark would have been well founded, that you in nowise better your condition by borrowing with the right hand to pay off with the left. But this was not the case. The funds provided for the liquidation of the debt were all drawn from indirect peace taxes, and would all have existed, if these taxes had not been repealed, after the war loans had entirely ceased. In private life we are never mistaken in such a case. If a man adopts a regimen which improves and insures his health at ordinary times, we never think of condemning it because he accidentally takes the typhus fever, and, during its continuance, the good effects of the system are overlooked or concealed. It is by its operation in seasons independent of such extraneous calamity, that we must judge of its effects; and if he indirect taxes, laid on for the upholding of the Sinking Fund, had not been repealed under the pressure of no necessity, but from a reckless thirst for popularity on the part of successive governments, nothing is more certain than that the

debt paid off would, by the year 1840, have been above six hundred millions; and, instead of a deficit of two millions and a half, we should now have had a surplus of revenue above the expenditure, of forty millions annually.*

Leaving these momentous but melancholy considerations, it is now time to resume the narrative of the glorious concluding events of the war.

Wellington's efforts to re-organize his army in the winter of 1812.

The winter which followed the campaign of Salamanca, though not distinguished by any warlike achievements, was one of extraordinary activity and unceasing efforts on the part of Wellington. The disasters in which it terminated, as well as the unceasing and protracted fatigues with which it had been attended throughout its long extent, had in a great degree loosened the bonds of discipline and impaired the efficiency of the army; and on various occasions, during the siege of Burgos and in the subsequent retreat, it had been observed, that the troops had neither fought with their accustomed spirit, nor gone through their duties with their wonted regularity. Wellington's stern but necessary reproof, which has already been mentioned,† had done much to remedy the most glaring evils which had crept in; and he was not slow in setting the first example himself of those useful reforms which he so strongly inculcated on others. Neither rank nor station had been able to screen those in fault: some had been tried, others dismissed, many allowed to retire home to avoid more painful consequences; and with such effect was the vigilant reformation which pervaded all departments

* Vide Ante v. 560 and 561, where this is fully demonstrated.

† Ante, viii. 501.

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attended, that the second division recovered no less than six hundred bayonets in one month. The ponderous iron camp-kettles hitherto used by the soldiers had been exchanged for lighter ones, similar to those employed in the French service; and the mules which formerly carried them bore tents instead, for the protection of the troops. The Douro had been rendered navigable above the confluence of the Agueda; a ponton train had been formed; carts of a peculiar construction, adapted for mountain warfare, had been formed; and a large supply of mules obtained, to supply the great destruction of those useful animals during the retreat from Burgos. Finally, large reinforcements, especially in cavalry, came out during the winter from England; and before spring arrived, the army, thoroughly recruited in health and vigour during its rest in cantonments, was prepared to take the field in greater strength than it had done since the commencement of the Peninsular war.[1]

[1] Nap. v. 503, 404. Tor. v. 139. Jom. iv. 345.

Wellington is appointed generalissimo of the Spanish armies, and goes to Cadiz.

It was an object of not less importance to take some decisive steps for the more effectual organization of the Spanish army; and in that quarter at length symptoms of a considerable change were visible. The colossal fame of Wellington, the magnitude of the services he had rendered to the cause of Peninsular independence, the sight of Andalusia liberated by his victories, of Cadiz disenthralled by his arms, had at length conquered alike the sullen obstinacy of Castilian pride and the secret hostility of democratic jealousy; and the English general was, by a decree of the Cortes, invested with the supreme command of the whole Spanish armies. Such, however, was the disorganized and inefficient state of all the forces of that monarchy, that Mr Henry Wel-

22d Sept. 1812.

lesley, Wellington's brother, and the British ambassador at Cadiz, advised him not to accept the office, as it was evident that it would excite jealousy and infer responsibility, without increasing strength or conferring power. The patriotic spirit of the English general, however, and his clear perception of the obvious truth, that it was only by combining the whole strength of the Peninsula under one direction, that the French could be driven across the Pyrenees, overcame the repugnance which he felt at undertaking so onerous and irksome a responsibility, and he accepted the high command. The Spanish government, however, soon found that the new commander-in-chief was not to accept the honours of his dignified situation without discharging its duties: he early remonstrated in the most energetic terms against the management of their armies, as calculated to destroy altogether their efficiency in the field;* and as it was evident that a very strong hand would

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* "The discipline of the Spanish armies is in the very lowest state, and their efficiency is in consequence much deteriorated. The evil has taken a deeper root, and requires a stronger remedy than the removal of the causes—viz. want of pay, clothing, and necessaries—which have necessarily occasioned it. Not only are your armies undisciplined and inefficient, and both officers and soldiers insubordinate, from the want of pay, clothing, and necessaries, and the consequent endurance of misery for a long period; but the habits of indiscipline and insubordination are such, that even those corps which by my exertions have been regularly paid and fed for a considerable period, and seldom if ever felt any privation, are in as bad a state, and as little to be depended on as the others. The desertion is immense, even from the troops last adverted to. If I had been aware of the real state of the Spanish army, I should have hesitated before I charged myself with such an herculean labour as its command; but, having accepted it, I will not relinquish the task because it is laborious and the success unpromising, but exercise it as long as I possess the confidence of the authorities who have conferred it on me."—WELLINGTON *to* DON JOSEF DE CARVAJAL, *Spanish Minister at War, 4th December* 1812.—GURWOOD, ix. 596, 597.

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be required to remedy such numerous and long established evils, he required that officers should be appointed to command solely on his recommendation; that he should be invested with the absolute power of dismissal; and that the resources of the state, which were applicable to the pay and support of the troops, should be applied as he might direct. As the Cortes evinced some hesitation in acceding to these demands, Wellington repaired in person to Cadiz, where he arrived on the 24th of December.[1]

[1] Wellington to Don Josef de Carvajal, minister at war. Dec. 4, 1812. Gurwood, ix. 597. Tor. v. 122, 139.

Revolt of Ballasteros, which leads to his being deprived of his command.

The appointment of Wellington to the command of the Spanish armies, led to an immediate explosion on the part of the democratic party in Cadiz. The *Diario Mercantil de Cadiz* loudly denounced the measure as illegal, unconstitutional, and disgraceful to the Spanish character; and it speedily rallied to its cause all that party, strong in every country, but especially so in Spain, with whom jealousy of foreigners is predominant over love of their own country. Such was the clamour which they raised, that it reached the armies; and Ballasteros, a brave and active, but proud and irascible officer, openly evinced a spirit of insubordination, and wrote to the minister of war, demanding that, before the command was definitively conferred on the English general, the national armies and citizens should be consulted. Such an example, if successful, would speedily have proved fatal to the slight bonds of authority which still held together the monarchy; and the regency, sensible of their danger, acted with a vigour and celerity worthy of the cause with which they were entrusted. Don Ildefonso de Ribera, an artillery officer of distinction, was immediately dispatched to Grenada, the headquarters of Ballasteros, to deprive him of his command. The dangerous mission was

Oct. 23.

Nov. 6.

executed with vigour and decision: the Prince of Anglona and Ribera, supported by the corps of the guards in his army, summoned the insurgent general to resign his command; he appealed to the other corps to resist the order, but they shrank from the prospect of openly braving the supreme authority, and Ballasteros was conducted to Ceuta without bloodshed, where he was detained a prisoner; although a sense of his services, and the popularity of the stand for national command which he had made, induced the government most wisely not to follow up his arrest with any ulterior proceedings.[1]

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[1] Tor. v. 125, 126. Nap. v. 399, 400.

This unwonted act of vigour on the part of the Spanish government, however, was the result of offended pride rather than roused patriotism: the retreat of Wellington into Portugal soon after renewed the spirit of disaffection in Cadiz; intrigue became more prevalent than ever; the agents of Joseph were indefatigable in their endeavours to represent the cause of independence as now evidently hopeless; and a conspiracy for delivering up the island of Leon, and proclaiming the intrusive monarch King of Spain, was set on foot, and soon acquired a formidable consistency, not only from its ramifications over the monarchy, but its embracing, beyond all question, some of the intimate friends of the Duke del Infantad, the president of the regency, and a well-known political *intriguante*, his avowed mistress.[1] We have the authority of Napoleon, accordingly, for the assertion, that at that epoch the Cortes treated in secret with the French; and although the intrigue had hitherto reached only a limited part of its numbers, yet it was apparent that any continuance of ill success or long protracting of the contest,[2] would speedily lead to a general defec-

Intrigues at Cadiz, and arrival of Wellington there.

[1] Tor. v. 39, 40.

[2] Tor. v. 39, 41. Nap. v. 399, 400. Las Cases, iv. 72.

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tion from the cause of independence. In the midst of this maze of intrigue, Wellington arrived at Cadiz, and was received with respect by the Cortes, and loud expressions of applause from the anxious multitude.

Wellington's reception at Cadiz, and measures for the campaign agreed on there.

The arrival of the English general at Cadiz, was shortly after followed by the intelligence of the total ruin of Napoleon's armament in Russia; the details of which, as painted with graphic power in the twenty-ninth bulletin, by a singular coincidence arrived there on the very night of a splendid ball given by the grandees of Spain to the victorious leader, and added not a little to the general enthusiasm which prevailed. His influence with the government was not a little augmented by this stupendous event, which at that period, even more rapidly than it actually occurred, prognosticated the fall of Napoleon; and he was received by the Cortes in full assembly with great pomp on the day following, when in a plain and manly speech, delivered in the Spanish language, he unfolded his views, and energetically enforced the necessity of unanimity and concord to effect the total expulsion of the French from the Peninsula. In consequence of these efforts, a new organization was given to the Spanish armies, which was soon attended with the happiest effects. They were divided into four armies and two reserves. The first was composed of the troops of Catalonia, under the command of General Copons: Elio's troops in Murcia formed the second: the forces in the Sierra Morena, formerly under the command of Ballasteros, now under that of the Duke del Parque, constituted the third: the troops of Estremadura, Leon, Gallicia, and the Asturias, including Murillo's and Carlos d'Espana's separate divisions, were placed under the command of

Dec. 29.

Dec. 30.

Castanos, and afterwards embraced also the guerillas of Porlier, Mina, and Longa, and formed the fourth army, which was attached to the grand army of Wellington on the Ebro. The Conde d'Abisbal was created Captain-General of Andalusia, and commanded the first reserve, composed of new levies formed in that province and Grenada; while Lacy was recalled from Catalonia, where he was replaced by Copons, and formed a second reserve in the neighbourhood of San Roque, in the southern extremity of the Peninsula. Having completed these arrangements, which placed the armies under better direction, and given an infinity of directions for their internal organization, Wellington returned by Lisbon, where he was received with extraordinary demonstrations of joy, to his old cantonments on the Coa, which he reached in the end of January 1813.[1]

[1] Nap. v. 401, 402. Tor. v. 141, 142. Gurw. x. 61.

Violent democratic passions at Cadiz, and abolition of the Inquisition in Spain.

Wellington's visit to Cadiz, though undertaken in order to bring about the more efficient organization of the Spanish armies, was attended with this important effect, that it brought forcibly under his notice the miserable state of the government at that place, ruled by a furious democratic faction, intimidated by an ungovernable press, and alternately the prey of aristocratic intrigue and democratic fury. He did not fail to report to the British government this deplorable state of things; but he accompanied his representations with the sage advice, which they had the wisdom implicitly to follow, on no account to interfere in the internal disputes of the Cortes and Regency; but leaving the authorities and people at Cadiz to arrange their domestic disputes, and settle their institutions in their own way, to bend their whole attention to the prosecution of the war, and

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the expulsion of the enemy from the Peninsula.* On the same principle he strongly recommended to the Cortes to suspend their meditated decree for the abolition of the Inquisition; urging, with reason, that without entering into the question, whether that institution should be maintained or abolished, and even admitting it should ultimately be abolished, it was to the last degree inexpedient to propose its suppression at that particular time, when half the Spanish territory was still in the hands of the enemy,

* "The legislative assembly at Cadiz has proclaimed itself supreme, and divested itself of all interference with the executive government; yet the executive itself is its creature: while, by a refinement of theory, it is not possible either that the legislative assembly should have a knowledge of the measures of the executive, or the executive know the feelings and sentiments of the legislative. The government and legislature, instead of drawing together, are like two independent powers, jealous and afraid of each other; and the consequence is, that the machine of government is at a stand. The whole system is governed by little local views, as propounded by the daily press of Cadiz—of all others, the least enlightened, and the most licentious.

"In a country in which almost all property consists in land—and there are the largest landed proprietors which exist in Europe—no measures have been adopted, and no barrier provided, to guard landed property from the encroachments, injustice, and violence to which it is at all times subject, but particularly in the progress of revolutions. The council of state affords no such guard; it has no voice in legislation, and it neither has the confidence of, nor influence over, the public mind. Such a guard can only be afforded by an assembly of the great landed proprietors, such as our House of Lords, having concurrent powers of legislation with the Cortes; and there is no man in Spain, be his property ever so small, who is not interested in the establishment of such an assembly.

"Legislative assemblies are swayed by the fears and passions of individuals; when unchecked, they are tyrannical and unjust: nay more, the most tyrannical and unjust measures are the most popular. Those measures are peculiarly so which deprive rich and powerful individuals of their properties, under pretence of the public advantage; and I tremble for a country in which, as in Spain, there is no barrier for the preservation of private property, excepting the justice of a legislative assembly possessing supreme powers."—WELLINGTON *to* DON DIEGO DE LA VEGA INFANZON, *29th January* 1813. GURWOOD, x. 61, 65.

and any proposal affecting that branch of the church would be sure to alienate the clergy, who had hitherto been the chief, and latterly the sole supporters of the war. This advice was much too rational to be palatable to men inflamed with the political passions which at that period raged with such fury in the breasts of the Cortes and the populace of Cadiz: it was received, accordingly, in sullen silence; and no sooner was the English general gone, than the dissensions between the two parties broke out with more rancour than ever. Instead of bending their undivided attention to the enemy, who were still at their gates, they were almost wholly engrossed by domestic reforms. The clergy were the objects of incessant and rancorous attacks from the democratic party; the Inquisition was abolished March 7. by a formal decree in the beginning of March; and as the clergy of Cadiz resisted the order, and the government supported them in the attempt, the Cortes instantly passed a decree by which they suppressed the regency; and the Archbishop of Toledo, with two old councillors, Pedro Agar and Gabriel — 8. Cesiar, were installed as regents. All the clergy who resisted these violent usurpations were immediately arrested, and thrown into prison in every part of Spain; and the revolutionary press, true to its principles, immediately began to vomit forth a torrent of abuse against the English government, which had so long supported their country in its misfortunes, and the heroic general and gallant army who were even then preparing to lead them to victory.[1]

[1] Wellington to Don Diego de la Vega, 29th Jan. 1813. Gurw. x. 61, 66. Nap. v. 401, 406. Tor. v. 143, 210.

The evacuation of the provinces to the south of the Sierra Morena by the French troops, led to a disclosure of the enormous, and, if not proved by

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authentic evidence, incredible amount of the contributions levied by them during their occupation of these districts. It is proved by the accounts of the royal commissary of Joseph, the Count of Montano, that the sums levied on the different communes of Andalusia, from the period of the entry of the French into the country in February 1810, till that of their final evacuation of it in August 1812, a period of only two years and a half, amounted to the enormous sum of six hundred millions of *reals*, or above twelve millions sterling, equivalent, if the difference in the value of money is taken into account, to at least thirty millions sterling in Great Britain.* When it is recollected that the population of Andalusia at this period did not exceed 1,400,000 souls; that commerce of every kind was entirely destroyed by the war, and occupation of their country by the French troops; and that the whole revenue of the monarchy, before the French invasion, was only 178,000,000 francs, or about L.7,200,000, sterling,[1] it must be confessed that a clearer proof of the oppressive nature of the imperial government cannot be imagined. On the little province of Jaen, to the south of the Sierra Morena, the burdens imposed during the same period were 21,600,000 reals, or above L.500,000 a-year: while before the war, the whole taxes, direct and indirect, which it paid, were only 8,000,000 of reals, or L.160,000 a-year. In the end of June 1812, the six prefectures of Madrid, Cuença, Guadalaxara, Toledo, Ciudad Real, and Segovia, which comprised the whole of the districts over which the authority of Joseph really extended, were compelled, in addi-

Enormous amount of the contributions levied in the provinces under the French.

[1] Malte Brun, viii. 133, 134.

* The real is .54 of a franc, or somewhat below sixpence, English money.—BALBI, *Geog. Univ.* p. 1226.

tion to their ordinary imposts, which were equally severe, to furnish an extraordinary contribution of 560,000 fanegas, of which 275,000 fanegas were oats; the value of which in whole was not less than 250,000,000 reals, or L.5,000,000 sterling! Such was the magnitude of this requisition, that it would have reduced the country to an absolute desert if the bayonets of the French had been able to extract it from the cultivators, which fortunately could not be entirely done. Such was the effect of these oppressive exactions, that cultivation totally ceased in many parts of the country, and the inhabitants abandoning their homes, lived as guerillas by plunder. All the French marshals were obliged to enjoin the sowing of the fields by positive orders, and under the severest penalties in case of neglect: seed corn, in many cases, had to be provided for this purpose from France; prices rose to an extravagant height; and in Madrid alone, though the population at that period was not above 140,000, twenty thousand persons died, chiefly of famine, between September 1811 and July 1812, when the English army entered the city. The enormous amount of these contributions, which afford a specimen of the French revolutionary system of government, at once explains how it happened that the Exchequer at Paris was able to exhibit such flattering accounts of the state of its finances, so far as they were drawn from the internal resources of the empire; how the imperial rule was so long popular among those who profited by this spoliation; and how it excited such universal and unbounded exasperation among those who suffered from it.[1]

[1] Tor. v. 43, 44, 99, 100.

The Portuguese government at this period exhibited the same mixture of arrogance and imbecility which had distinguished them in every period of the

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war; and it was only by the incessant efforts of Wellington, aided by the able and energetic exertions of the English minister at Lisbon, Sir Charles Stewart, that the resources of the country could be extricated from private pillage, to be brought forward for the public service. During the absence of the English general in Spain, all the old abuses were fast reviving, the sad bequest of centuries of corruption: the army in the field received hardly any succours; the field artillery had entirely disappeared; the cavalry was in miserable condition; the infantry reduced in numbers, desertion frequent, pay above six months in arrear, and despondency general. Nor was the civil administration on a better footing than the military service. The rich and powerful inhabitants, especially in the great cities, were suffered to evade the taxes and regulations for drawing forth the resources of the country for the military service; while the defenceless husbandmen were subjected to vexatious oppression, as well from the collectors of the revenue, as the numerous military detachments and convoys which traversed the country. The irritation produced by these causes was eagerly made use of by the malcontent democratic party, which, eager to obtain the power and consideration which was enjoyed by the republicans of Cadiz, lost no opportunity of inflaming the public mind against the English administration; and even went so far as to accuse Wellington of aspiring to the Spanish crown, and aiming at the subjugation of the Peninsula, for the purposes of his criminal ambition. But the English general, conscious of his innocence, simply observed, that "Every leading man was sure to be accused of criminal personal ambition; and, if he was conscious of the charge being false, the accusation did no harm."

Abuse in the government and administration of Portugal.

Disregarding, therefore, altogether these malignant accusations, he strained every nerve to recruit the army, correct the abuses in the civil administration, and provide funds for the army; and so ably was he seconded by Marshal Beresford in the military, and Sir Charles Stewart in the civil service, that, despite all the resistance they met with from the interested local authorities, a remarkable improvement soon became apparent. The holders of bills on the military chest at Lisbon, finding them not paid by government, became clamorous, and the bills sunk to a discount of fifteen per cent; but Sir Charles checked the panic, by guaranteeing payment of the bills, and granting interest till the payment was made. At the same time, the vigorous measures of Beresford checked the desertion from, and restored the efficiency of the army; the militiamen fit for service were drafted into the line; all the artillerymen in the fortresses were forwarded to the army, and their place supplied by ordnance gunners; and the worst cavalry regiments were reduced, and their men incorporated with those in a more efficient state. By these means a large addition was obtained to the military force, which proved of essential service to Wellington in the field; but the disorders in the civil administration could not be so easily rectified, and Wellington addressed a memorial on the subject to the Prince Regent in Brazil, which remains an enduring monument of the almost incredible difficulties with which he had to contend, in preparing the means of carrying on his campaigns against the French armies in the Peninsula.[1]*

[1] Wellington to Prince Regent of Portugal, April 12, 1813. Gurw. x. 283. Nap. v. 415, 419.

* "The transport service since February 1812, when we took the field, has been never regularly paid, and has received nothing at all since June. To these evils I have striven in vain to call the attention of the

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Miserable condition of the Spanish armies.

Bad as the condition, however, of the Portuguese troops was, that of the Spanish armies was still more deplorable; the unavoidable result of the occupation of so large a portion of the country by the enemy's forces, and the entire absorption of the attention of all classes in Cadiz with objects of personal ambition or political innovation, without any attention to the main object, the paying, equipping, and feeding of their troops. Their armies, indeed, were numerous, and the men not deficient in spirit; but they were for the most part ill-disciplined, and totally destitute of clothing, stores, magazines, and organization of any kind. Their condition was thus painted at the moment by a master-hand, who had had too much reason to be acquainted with the facts which he asserts:—"There is not a single battalion or squadron in the Spanish armies in a condition to take the field; there is not in the whole kingdom of Spain a depôt of provisions for the support of a single battalion in operation for one day; not a shilling of money in any military chest.[1] To move

[1] Wellington to Spanish Minister at War, March 11, 1813. Gurw. x. 181.

local authorities; and I am now about to open a new campaign with troops to whom greater arrears of pay are due than when the last campaign terminated, although the subsidy from Great Britain, granted specially for the maintenance of those troops, has been regularly paid, and the revenue of the last three months has exceeded by a third that of any former quarter. The great cities and some of the small towns have gained by the war: the mercantile class have enriched themselves by the large disbursements which the army makes in money; but the customs paid at Lisbon and Oporto, and the 10 *per cent* levied on the incomes of the mercantile class, are not really paid to the state; although their amount, if faithfully accounted for to the public, would be amply sufficient for the public service. The government do nothing to arrest these evils, from a dread of becoming unpopular; and therefore I have offered to take upon myself the whole responsibility of the measures. I propose to remedy them, and take upon myself all the odium they may create."—WELLINGTON *to* PRINCE REGENT OF PORTUGAL, 12*th April* 1813. GURWOOD, x. 283.

them forward at any point now, against even inconsiderable bodies of the enemy, would be to insure their certain destruction."

Forces with which Wellington was prepared to open the campaign.

By indefatigable exertions, however, these evils, so far as the supplies and reinforcements for the army were concerned, were overcome; and Wellington, in the beginning of May, was prepared to take the field with a much larger and more efficient force than had ever yet been assembled around the English banner since the commencement of the war. Nearly two hundred thousand allied troops were in readiness in the whole Peninsula; and although not more than the half of this great force were English, Germans, or Portuguese, upon whom reliance could really be placed, yet the remainder, being now under the direction of Wellington, and acting in concert with his army, proved of the most essential service, by taking upon them the duty of maintaining communications, guarding convoys, blockading fortresses, and cutting off light and foraging parties of the enemy; thereby leaving the Anglo-Portuguese force, in undiminished strength, to maintain the serious conflict in the front of the advance. What was almost an equal advantage, this great force, which, in the course of the campaign, came to stretch across the whole Peninsula, from the sources of the Ebro in Biscay, to its junction with the ocean, was supported on either flank by a powerful naval force, the true base of offensive operations for Great Britain, which at once secured supplies without any lengthened land carriage, and protected the extreme flanks of the line from hostile assault.[1]

[1] Nap. v. 505, 506. Tor. v. 234, 237.

Distribution of these forces.

This immense force, which now, for the first time in the history of the war, brought the British army to something like an equality with the imperial

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legions to which they were opposed, was thus distributed. The noble Anglo-Portuguese army, now mustering seventy-five thousand combatants, of whom forty-four thousand were British, with ninety guns and six thousand horse, was on the Portuguese frontier, near the sources of the Coa, burning with ardour, and ready at a moment's warning to start against the enemy, over whom they already anticipated a decisive victory. The Anglo-Sicilian army, under Sir John Murray, was at the extremity of the line, in the neighbourhood of Alicante, and numbered sixteen thousand men, of whom eleven thousand were English and King's German Legion, upon whom reliance could be placed, and the remainder foreign troops, chiefly from the Mediterranean, in the British service. Copons' Spaniards, six or eight thousand strong, occupied the mountain country and upper ends of the valleys in Catalonia, and might be expected to co-operate with Murray in the operations on the Lower Ebro. Elio's men, twenty thousand in number, were behind Murray in Murcia; but they were as yet in a very inefficient state, and could not be trusted in presence of the enemy. The third army, under the Duke del Parque, mustered twelve thousand combatants, who were posted in the defiles of the Sierra Morena. The first army of the reserve under the Conde d'Abisbal was in Andalusia, and consisted nominally of fifteen thousand men; but the greater part were mere raw recruits, who were wholly unfit for active service. The only Spanish force upon which reliance could really be placed, was the fourth army under Castanos in Estremadura, and on the frontiers of Leon and Gallicia, which was destined to act in conjunction with the grand army under Wellington. It included

the Spanish divisions in Estremadura; the Gallicians under Giron; the Asturians under Porlier; and the guerillas of Mina and Longa. It embraced the whole troops able to take the field in the west and north-west of Spain, and mustered forty thousand combatants, who, though not equal to the encounter of the French in regular conflicts, were for the most part old soldiers, inured to hardship, and trained to irregular warfare, and who rendered, in consequence, important service in the course of the campaign.[1]

1813. [1] Nap. v. 505, 506. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 243. Tor. v. 233, 236. Wellington to Sir T. Graham, April 7, 1813. Gurw. x. 270.

Position and strength of the French armies in the Peninsula.

The French forces in the Peninsula, though considerably reduced by the drafts which the necessities of Napoleon, after the disasters of Russia, compelled him to make from his veteran legions in that quarter, were still very formidable, and exhibited a sum total of combatants, both superior in number to, and incomparably more concentrated and better disciplined than the greater part of, the allied forces. The most powerful part of it consisted of the army commanded by Joseph in person, which, by drawing together the whole disposable military power of the French in the Peninsula, had compelled Wellington to evacuate the Spanish territory in the close of the last campaign. Their whole force, which, at the termination of the retreat into Portugal, was still two hundred and sixty thousand strong, was now reduced by the drafts into Germany, in March 1813, to two hundred and thirty-one thousand, of whom twenty-nine thousand were horse. Of these, only one hundred and ninety-seven thousand were present with the eagles; and sixty-eight thousand were under Suchet in Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia. Of the remainder, ten thousand were at Madrid; eight thousand were in Old Castile and Leon, to watch the motions of the Anglo-Portuguese army; and the

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rest, to the number of forty thousand, preserved the communications in the northern provinces, and maintained a painful partizan warfare with the insurrection, which had now assumed a very serious character, in Biscay and Navarre.[1]*

[1] Belm. i. 249. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 243. Nap. v. 505, 506. Imperial Muster-rolls. Ibid. 618.

But although the French forces were thus superior in numerical amount, and greatly stronger from their concentrated position, homogeneous character, and uniform discipline, than the multifarious host of the Allies to which they were exposed, yet there were many causes which tended to depress their spirit, and brought them into the field with much less than their wonted vigour and animation. It was universally felt that they had been worsted in the last campaign; that they had lost half, and the richest half of Spain; and that their hold of the remainder had been every where loosened. The charm of their invincibility, the unbroken series of their triumphs, was at an end: the soldiers no longer approached the English but with secret feelings of self-distrust, the necessary consequence of repeated defeats; their chiefs, dreading to measure swords with Wellington, became nervous about their responsibility; and, anticipating defeat, were chiefly solicitous to discover some mode of averting the vials of the imperial wrath, which they were well aware would burst on their heads the moment intelligence of disaster reached Napoleon. Co-operation there was none between the leaders of their armies. Suchet was jealous of Soult, and yielded a tardy obedience to the commands of Joseph himself; Jourdan, who commanded the army of the centre, was a respectable veteran, but wholly unequal to the task of meeting the shock

Their latent sources of weakness and disunion.

* App. C. chap. lxxii.

of Wellington at the head of eighty thousand men; and Soult, though a most able man in strategy and the preparations for a campaign, had shown himself at Albuera unequal to the crisis of a serious battle: he laboured, also, under heavy suspicions on the part of his royal master, and he had been called to Germany to assist in stemming the torrent of misfortune on the Elbe. The disasters of the Moscow campaign were known, the fatal twenty-ninth bulletin had been published, and its effects had become painfully visible in the march of a considerable part of the army across the Pyrenees, to be replaced only by raw battalions of conscripts, very different from the bronzed veterans who had departed. Thus the army had lost both its consistency and its spirit; its generals were at variance with each other, and each solicitous only for the objects of his separate province; and its supreme direction, divided between the distant commands, often found wholly inapplicable on the spot, of Napoleon, and the weaker judgment of Joseph and Jourdan, was little calculated to stem the torrent of disaster accumulating round a sinking empire and a falling throne.[1] Vict. et Conq. xxii. 241, 242. Belm. i. 248, 249.

It had been the sage policy of Wellington, during the winter which succeeded the campaign of Salamanca, to retain the Spanish armies, so far as it was possible, at a distance from the enemy; and rather to permit considerable districts meanwhile to be ravaged by the enemy's troops, than to run the hazard of blasting all the prospects of the campaign, by exposing his own ill-disciplined levies to certain destruction, by being prematurely brought into conflict with their veteran legions. On this principle, he had resolutely withstood the repeated instances of the minister of war at Cadiz, who had urged him to move forward the Duke del

Operations on the east coast of the Peninsula.

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1813. Parque's forces from the Sierra Morena, to rescue from devastation the southern provinces of La Mancha. Operations first commenced on the eastern coast of Spain, where Sir John Murray had landed at Alicante

Feb. 27. in the end of February, and hastened to put the army on a better footing than it had as yet attained; for so little had the British Government profited by their experience of the bad effect of a change of commanders at the time of the battle of Vimiera, that no less than three different generals were called to the direction of the army in Murcia within four months. By the united efforts of Murray and Elio, the allied army was soon put into a more efficient condition, and was found to amount to twenty-seven thousand infantry, three thousand horse, with thirty-seven guns. Deeming himself now in sufficient force to commence

March 6. active operations, the English general moved forward from Alicante towards Valencia, in four columns, and after some inconsiderable skirmishes, approached Suchet's intrenched camp behind the Xucar; but finding it too strong to risk an assault, he concentrated the bulk of his troops at CASTALLA, while a division of British troops under Roche was dispatched to Alicante, with orders to embark and endeavour to make itself master of Valencia, which was defended only by a garrison of a thousand infantry and eight hundred horse, while the attention of Suchet and the main body of his forces was occupied by the operations in the interior on the Xucar.[1]

[1] Nap. v. 454, 457. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 254, 255. Tor. v. 250. 251.

Force and position of Suchet at this period.

Suchet at this period had ceased to make Valencia his stronghold and *place d'armée*, and had transferred his principal magazines and military stores to Saguntum, the fortifications of which he had repaired and strengthened with the utmost care, and which was now become a most formidable point of defence.

He had forty thousand admirable veterans under his command, and thirty thousand more occupied the fortresses and level parts of Catalonia, from whom reinforcements could be drawn to resist any serious attack; but as his chief reliance for provisions was still placed on the great agricultural plains of Aragon, and the communication from them was much intercepted by the guerilla parties, a large part of this force required to be stationed in the rear, to keep up his communications, and he could not muster more than sixteen thousand infantry and two thousand horse, with thirty guns, for active operations beyond the Xucar. These, however, were all tried veterans, who had never yet suffered defeat, and whose confidence was far from being broken, as that of the troops opposed to Wellington had been, by repeated disasters. Though Valencia was nominally the seat of Suchet's power, yet it was now incapable of defence; he had razed all the external defences erected by the Spaniards, and confined his hold to the old walls. His real seat of power was Saguntum; to connect which with Tortosa he had strongly fortified Oropesa and Peniscola on the sea-coast, and established a line of blockhouses for infantry in the interior, through Morilla to Mequinenza. In the double range of mountains beyond the Xucar, at Xativa and Moxente, he had established an intrenched camp, which, though not strongly fortified, was very susceptible of defence from the natural strength of its situation; and he had strong outposts at Biar and Castalla, to observe and retard the advance of the allied troops.[1]*

[1] Suchet's Mem. ii. 303, 305. Nap. v. 450, 454. Tor. v. 251.

* "The able pacific administration of Suchet had enabled him successfully to levy the enormous war contribution of 200,000,000 of reals, or 53,000,000 francs, (L.2,120,000,) imposed on the city and

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Feeling himself thus secure from the quality of his troops, and the strength of the position on which he might, in case of need, fall back; and aware, also, that Murray's advance was part of the general plan of Wellington to force the French across the Ebro, Suchet resolved to assume the offensive, as soon as he learned that the detachment of Roche had been sent to Alicante. He was the more encouraged to do this, as Lord William Bentinck, alarmed at the dissensions in Sicily, and the threats of a descent by Murat, recalled the troops sent to Alicante to menace Valencia, for the defence of that island; and thus rendered entirely abortive the project of a double attack on the posts of the French general. Roche's English troops having embarked for Minorca in the first week of April, Suchet concentrated his troops and attacked the Spanish advanced guard at Yecla, which immediately fell back; but being overtaken in its retreat by Harispe's division, was totally defeated, with the loss of two hundred killed and fifteen hundred prisoners. On the same day the Spanish garrison of Villena, eight hundred strong, were made prisoners, from Elio's obstinate refusal to obey Murray's order to withdraw it. Murray upon this concentrated his troops, and leaving Colonel Adam with the rear-guard in front of the pass of Biar, withdrew the main body of his army through that rugged defile, and took post on strong ground about three miles

Suchet resumes the offensive, and defeats the Spanish advanced guard.

March 29.

April 6.

April 11.

provinces by order of Napoleon, after its surrender by Blake in 1811; and, independently of this enormous burden, Suchet's whole troops were clothed, fed, and lodged at the expense of the districts they occupied; and 25,000,000 francs (L.1,000,000) were realized in the last nine months of their occupation, part of which were remitted to Madrid. Yet Suchet's government was incomparably the most lenient and best administered of any of the French marshals in Spain."—See *Mémoires du Mareschal* SUCHET, ii. 291, 295.

above the upper end of the pass; the Spaniards under Whittingham forming the left, on the rugged sierra of Castalla; the right, composed of Clinton's British division and Roche's Spaniards, on the low ground, with the bed of a torrent in their front; and the town and old castle of Castalla, on a conical hill in the centre, being occupied by Mackenzie's division, and all its approaches strongly guarded by artillery.[1]

[1] Nap. v. 461, 462. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 255. Tor. v. 252, 253.

Emboldened by the early and rapid success of his arms against the Spaniards, Suchet, after much hesitation, determined to attack the British in their position, and for this purpose to force the pass of Biar. Adam's advanced guard, consisting of two Italian regiments, a British battalion, and two troops of foreign hussars, assailed by greatly superior forces, retreated, bravely fighting, up the pass: the French pursued with great vigour, their skirmishers swarming up the rocky acclivities on either side with extraordinary agility and resolution; it was the counterpart of the forcing of the defile at Rolica by the British, in the commencement of the Peninsular war.* Alarmed at this success of the enemy, by which he lost two guns, Murray, notwithstanding the strength of his position, gave orders for a retreat; but fortunately for the honour of England, the attack commenced before it could be carried into execution, and Suchet for the first time in his life was taught the quality of British troops.[2] The ascent on the left, where Whittingham's Spaniards were posted, was so rugged that it was with great difficulty that the steep was surmounted: slowly, however, the French gained ground, and in some places reached the summit, and were proceeding

Battle of Castalla, and defeat of the French.

[2] Vict. et Conq. xxii. 256, Sir J. Murray's account, April 13, 1813. Gurw. x. 353. Tor. v. 254. Suchet, ii 307.

* Ante, vii. 574.

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along it when they met the 27th regiment, who, lying down concealed among the rocks,* suddenly sprang up and gave them such a volley, within pistol shot, as sent the whole headlong, with dreadful loss, down the side of the ridge. The attack on the other points was, in like manner, repulsed by the steady valour of the English and German troops; and at length, Suchet, despairing of success, drew off his men in great confusion towards the pass of Biar.

Now was the time for the Allies to have advanced in pursuit: the narrow defile, three miles long, was in Suchet's rear, and in endeavouring to get back through the gorge, all his guns, and probably part of his army, would have been taken by a vigorous enemy thundering in pursuit. Donkin,† the quartermaster-general, who clearly saw that the decisive moment had arrived, put himself at the head of Mackenzie's division, and was gallantly assailing the French rear-guard, which strove to make good the entrance of the pass; Suchet, with his infantry, cavalry, and caissons, pell-mell, had plunged into the defile in great disorder, and a vigorous effort would have thrown the whole into irretrievable confusion in its narrow windings, and given the British, in their first essay in the east of the Peninsula, a triumph as decisive, though with inferior bodies of men, as those of Hohenlinden or

* An event happened here, which recalls the heroic ages of the Iliad or Amadis de Gaul. As the French were deploying their columns, a grenadier officer, advancing alone, challenged any English officer to single combat. The offer was immediately accepted by Captain Waldron of the 27th, who sprang out of his company to meet him; the hostile lines looked on without firing a shot, and at the first encounter the Frenchman's head was cleft asunder. The 27th with a loud shout brought down their arms, and gave the volley which hurled the French down the steep.—Nap. v. 465.

† Afterwards Sir Rufane Donkin, a most gallant and enterprizing officer.

the Katzbach—when Murray, satisfied with the success already achieved, snatched victory from their grasp, and, in spite of the energetic remonstrances of Donkin, drew off his forces, and allowed the French to make their way through the defile unmolested. The consequence was, that Suchet brought off his whole guns and ammunition waggons; but such had been the close and deadly fire of the British troops, that in the previous action he lost eighteen hundred men, and, what was of still more importance, his moral influence was materially weakened by having suffered a defeat in his first serious encounter with the British troops.[1]

Sir J. Murray's account, April 14, 1813. Gurw. x. 353. Nap. v. 465, 466. Tor. v. 254, 255. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 260.

After this defeat, Suchet resumed his position in his intrenched camp; and Murray, weakened by the loss of Roche's British troops, who had been recalled by Lord William Bentinck, did not feel himself in sufficient strength to resume offensive operations in that quarter till the battle of Vittoria gave a new complexion to the war.

Though Wellington had anxiously enjoined the whole Spanish generals, in every part of the Peninsula, to abstain from hostilities, and withdraw as much as possible from the attacks of the enemy, yet it was impossible to carry these directions implicitly into execution in the northern provinces. A most formidable insurrection, as already mentioned,* had broken out in Biscay, upon occasion of the concentration of the French troops after the battle of Salamanca, which had been powerfully supported by succours from the British fleet; and all the efforts of the French, during the winter and spring, had been unable to dispossess the insurgents from the principal stronghold which they then acquired. The guerillas

Operations in the northern provinces.

* Ante, vii. 506.

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had become much more experienced and systematic in their operations; their bands in the interior had swelled into small armies; they possessed several fortified posts on the coast, which enabled them to communicate at pleasure with, and receive supplies of arms and ammunition from the English ships of war, these supplies being now dealt with a judgment and liberality which proved of the most essential service. The partidas in these provinces were no longer composed of reckless and desperate characters, who had been ruined by the events of the war, but embraced young men of the best families, who had hitherto taken no part in the contest, but whom the dreadful severities of Marshal Bessieres had drawn forth into the ranks of their country.* In Biscay alone several battalions, each a thousand strong, of this description had been formed, and so completely had they succeeded in intercepting the communication along the great road from Bayonne to Madrid, that Joseph only received his despatches of the 4th January on the 18th March, and then by the circuitous route of Barcelona and Valencia.†

[1] Nap. v. 433, 434. Buquet to Berthier, Feb. 3, 1813. Belm. i. App. 109. p. 682.

* Ante, viii. 291.

† "If reinforcements do not speedily arrive in Navarre, I shall not be surprised at any catastrophe that may occur. The insolence of the brigands proves the confidence they feel in their operations. I am assured it has never been so great. Their organization into battalions, and the administration of the country, is complete; it is difficult to estimate the advantages they derive from it. If from the frontiers of Portugal our armies had sent some divisions to live on the left bank of the Ebro, before the winter was over, we would have purged this fine country of the brigands who infest it; and in spring these divisions, perfectly re-established, would have been able to resume their operations against the eternal enemies of the Continent. Much precious time has already been lost, and it will be necessary to do in spring what should have been done in winter. The brigands push their audacity to such a pitch as to levy contributions in the provinces occupied by our troops. My prince, the evil is great, and strong remedies are loudly called for. They are not to be found but in the development of a

This formidable insurrection excited, as well it might, the anxious attention of Napoleon, threatening as it did his principal line of communication with all his armies beyond the Pyrenees, and paralysing the whole operations in the Peninsula, by the impossibility either of obtaining information, dispatching orders, or sending succours, save under the guard of whole divisions. His instructions to meet the danger were characterized by his usual decision and ability. "Hold," said he to Joseph, "Madrid and Valencia only as points of observation; fix your headquarters, not as monarch, but as general of the French forces, at Valladolid; concentrate the armies of the south, of the centre, and of Portugal, around you: the Allies will not, and indeed cannot, make any serious offensive movement for several months; wherefore it is your business to profit by their forced inactivity, to put down the insurrection in the northern provinces, to free the communication with France, and re-establish a good base for operations, before the commencement of another campaign, that the French army may be in a condition to fight the Allies, if they advance towards France." To enable Joseph to effect the desired pacification of the northern provinces, he was authorized to summon to Valladolid, if necessary, the whole army of Portugal; but when he came to enquire of Count Reille, its commander, how soon these directions could be obeyed, he was answered, that that army, having recently remitted 3,600,000 francs, seized by force by Marmont, to France,[1] and being totally destitute

Napoleon's instructions on this emergency to Joseph.

[1] Napoleon to Joseph, Jan. 29, 1813. Nap. v. 606, and Reille to Duc de Feltre, Dec. 27, 1812. Belm. i. 680.

powerful military force."—*Lettre du* BUQUET, *Commandant de la Gendarmerie de l'Armée d'Espagne, au Prince* BERTHIER—*Vittoria, 3d Fevrier* 1813. BELMAS, i. 682, App.

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of horses and carriages, was in no condition to undertake any offensive operations.

Napoleon's instructions for the suppressing of the northern insurrection.

Joseph, however, was less intent on carrying into effect these judicious instructions, than on getting quit of Soult, whom he openly accused of criminal ambition, adding, that matters had come to that pass between them, that one or other must quit Spain.* In consequence of this flagrant disunion, as well as of Napoleon's own need of Soult's military abilities in the arduous German campaign on which he was entering, that marshal was summoned to Germany, where, as already noticed, he bore a distinguished part in the battles on the Elbe.† The Emperor, however, incessantly urged his brother to concentrate his troops on the Ebro, and strain every nerve to put down the insurrection in the north; and being discontented with the mode in which Caffarelli had conducted the partizan warfare there, he gave Clausel the command, and enjoined him to resume the offensive without loss of time, and strike at the enemy's principal depots and magazines, in

* "The Duke of Dalmatia or myself must quit Spain. At Valencia, I had so far forgotten my own injuries, and suppressed my own indignation, that instead of sending Soult to France, I gave him the direction of the operations of the armies; but it was in the hope that shame for the past, combined with his avidity for glory, would urge him to extraordinary exertion. Nothing of the kind, however, has happened: he is a man not to be trusted. Restless, intriguing, ambitious, he would sacrifice every thing to his own advancement; and he possesses just that sort of talent that would lead him to mount a scaffold at the time he thought he was ascending a throne, because he would want the courage to strike when the crisis arrived. At the passage of the Tormes, I acquit him of treachery, because there fear alone prevented him from bringing the Allies to battle; but he was nevertheless treacherous to the Emperor, and his proceedings in Spain were probably connected with Malet's conspiracy in Paris."—KING JOSEPH *to* NAPOLEON, *Feb.* 27*th*, 1813. NAPIER, v. 437, 438.

† Ante, ix. 230.

order to deprive them of the means of carrying on the contest.* Clausel assumed the command on the 22d February; reinforcements, nearly 20,000 strong, from the army of Portugal, soon after arrived; and the Spaniards soon felt that they had a very different antagonist to deal with from the general who, during the winter, had permitted so serious an insurrection to grow up in the mountain districts.[1]

1813.

[1] Nap. v. 485, 489. Napoleon to Clausel, Feb. 7. 1813. Ibid. v. 486.

Clausel repaired early in the middle of March to Bilboa, which was in a manner besieged by the guerillas, and, after some sharp fighting, drove them back into their mountain strongholds in the neighbourhood of Durango, and immediately began his preparations for the siege of Castro, the most important stronghold which they possessed on the coast, and by which they constantly communicated with the English ships of war. While he was so engaged, however, Bilboa was again threatened by the partidas, and very nearly fell into their hands. Mina defeated one of his columns near Leria, with the loss of eight hundred men; the same enterprizing chief had made himself master of Taffalla, with its garrison of five hundred men: forty thousand men were in arms in Navarre and Biscay, of which sixteen thousand were on the coast of Biscay and Guipuscoa, acting in conjunction with the British

Clausel's successful operations in Biscay.

March 15.

April 1.

— 5.

* "The partidas are strong, organized, exercised, and seconded by the general exultation produced by the battle of Salamanca. The insurrectional juntas have been revived; the posts on the coast abandoned by the French, and seized by the English; the bands enjoy all the resources of the country, and the system of warfare hitherto pursued has favoured this progress. The French have remained always on the defensive; you must adopt a contrary system; attack suddenly, pursue rapidly; aim at the Spaniards' magazines, depots of arms, and hospitals; disorganize the insurrection, and one or two successes will pacify the whole country."—NAPOLEON *to* CLAUSEL, *9th Feb.* 1813. NAP. v. 486.

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1813. fleet; and eighteen thousand, who could unite in a day, occupied both banks of the upper part of the Ebro. It was a serious and a harassing warfare, in the face of such a force, possessing the whole mountain strongholds of the country, to attempt the siege of Castro in form; but Clausel's vigour and ability were equal to the undertaking. With this view, he divided his forces into two divisions; and while Palombini, with six thousand men, commenced the siege, Foy, with ten thousand, covered the operations; and he himself, with thirteen thousand, took post at Puenta la Reyna, in Navarre, to make head against Mina, Longa, and the numerous bands of insurgents in that quarter. Several actions ensued, in which the Spaniards were worsted; and at

May 13. length Mina himself was totally defeated in the valley of Roncal, with a thousand killed or wounded; the remainder dispersed, and the chief himself escaped with only fourteen men. He soon reassembled his scattered band, however, and near Leria destroyed two regi-

— 22. ments of French cavalry; but still the dispersion of Mina's corps, even for a time, considerably lowered the spirit of the insurgents; and Clausel, establishing his headquarters at Pampeluna, succeeded in paci-

— 25. fying several of the valleys of Navarre. Meanwhile, Castro was carried by storm; and Sarrut, following up Napoleon's instructions, pushed forward against

— 29. the depots and magazines of the Biscayan insurgents, and nearly destroyed three of their finest battalions. But though this brilliant success attended the French arms on the coast and in Navarre, it was wellnigh balanced by the advantages gained by the enemy, who, during the absence of the main forces of the French in these flank operations, fell upon the high-road from Bayonne to Burgos, and captured several of

the blockhouses, putting the garrisons to the sword; insomuch that Clausel, worn out with this interminable warfare, declared it would require fifty thousand men and three months to put down the northern insurrection; and Napoleon bitterly complained that all the successes of Foy, Sarrut, and Palombini, had brought neither safety to his convoys nor regularity to his couriers.[1]

[1] Nap. v. 489, 502. Belm. i. 251. Tor. v. 238, 246.

But greater events were now on the wing; the chiefs on both sides repaired to their respective headquarters, and the mutual concentration of troops bespoke the approach of serious warfare. Joseph, who had quitted Madrid in the middle of March with his guards, had subsequently fixed his headquarters at Valladolid, from whence he had detached the divisions Foy, Taupin, Sarrut, and Barbot, to aid Clausel in the reduction of Biscay and Navarre. This large deduction from the main army was attended with the most important effects in the course of the campaign; for Wellington was now concentrating his forces, and the progress of spring having provided ample forage for his horses, he was prepared to march. Never had the army been so numerous or so healthy, never its spirits so high: twenty thousand men had rejoined their ranks since the troops went into winter-quarters in December, and the meanest drummer was inspired with the belief that he was about to march from victory to victory, till the French eagles were chased across the Pyrenees. Wellington's plan was to move the left wing of his army across the Douro, within the Portuguese frontier; to march it up the left bank of that river, as far as Zamora, and then crossing the Esla, unite it to the Gallician forces; while the centre and left, advancing from the Agueda by Salamanca, forced the passage of the Tormes, and drove

Wellington prepares to take the field, and his plan of operations.

March 17.

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the French entirely from the line of the Douro, towards the Carrion. Constantly threatening them in flank by the left wing, which was to be always kept in advance, he thus hoped the enemy would be driven back by Burgos into Biscay, and he himself would succeed in establishing there a new basis for the war, resting on the numerous and fortified seaports on the coast, and supported by the gallant mountaineers, who in such strength had maintained through the winter a bloody and equal contest with the enemy. In this way, while he advanced his forces, and drove back the enemy towards their own frontiers, he would at once draw nearer to his own resources, and intercept the whole communications of the enemy. This project was attended with this obvious danger, that the army being divided into two grand divisions, with great ranges of mountains and impassable rivers between them, either was exposed to the risk of a separate attack from the whole forces of the enemy; but Wellington relied with reason for the means of obviating this danger, upon the strong nature of the country to which either might retire in case of danger, the high spirit and admirable discipline of his troops, and the universal fidelity of the peasantry, which prevented his designs from becoming known to the enemy.[1]

[1] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, May 5, 1813. Gurw. x. 357. Nap. v. 567, 569. Belmi. 252. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 243.

The march began on the 22d May, and on the 23d headquarters were at Ciudad Rodrigo. Ample employment for Suchet was at the same time secured, by directions sent to Sir John Murray to embark his troops, and, landing in Catalonia, commence the siege of Taragona; a bridge equipage was prepared for the passage of the Douro; the army of the Duke del Parque advanced from the Sierra Morena into La Mancha, and that of the reserve in Andalusia

March of Wellington into Spain. May 22.

broke up from Seville on the 12th, and on the 24th was to be at the bridge of Almarez, so as to threaten Madrid and the provinces in the centre of Spain; and preparations were made, as soon as the columns reached the frontiers of Biscay or Gallicia, for throwing off the communications with Lisbon, and drawing the whole supplies of the army from the nearer harbours of these northern provinces. Seventy thousand English and Portuguese, and twenty thousand Spaniards were so disposed, that they were all to bear in front or flank on the surprised and disjointed columns of the enemy, who would be forced back, it was hoped, in confusion into the passes of the Pyrenees. Hope pervaded every bosom, joy beat high in every heart: the veterans marched over the scenes of their former glory, the halo of twenty victories playing round their bayonets; the new soldiers burned with desire to emulate their well-earned fame. The English commander shared the general exultation; and so confidently did he anticipate the defeat of the enemy, and the permanent transference of the seat of war to the north of the Peninsula, that, in passing the stream which marks the frontier of Spain, he rose in his stirrups, and waving his hand, exclaimed—"Farewell, Portugal!"[1]

[1] Nap. v. 512, 513. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, 25th May 1813. Gurw. x. 399.

The march of the Duke del Parque's army and the reserve from Andalusia, which commenced ten days earlier than that of the grand army of Wellington, to give them time to get forward before the latter moved, was attended with the very best effect; for they spread the alarm in Madrid and New Castile before the direction of the march of the British army could be known, and, by inducing the belief that a combined attack on the capital was intended, prevented that concentration of force on the Upper Ebro by which alone the march of the British gen-

He advances by Ciudad Rodrigo and Salamanca across the Douro.

CHAP. LXXII. 1813.

eral could have been arrested. Accordingly, when the centre and right of the English army were advancing from Ciudad Rodrigo to the Douro, and Graham, with the left in advance, was toiling through the Tras-os-Montes, not more than thirty-five thousand men, with a hundred guns, were concentrated at Valladolid; and the whole French posts at Madrid, and in the valley of the Tagus, were in alarm, expecting an immediate attack in that quarter.

May 25. Thus, when danger really threatened from the side of Salamanca, no means of resisting it existed; the line of the Tormes was at once abandoned, with some loss to the retreating army in passing; three days after, the Douro was crossed by them at Zamora, and the bridge there destroyed; the British passed the Esla by the fords, and the Douro by a bridge thrown over above Zamora, and at Toro. Wellington himself, who had set off in advance of

May 28. his troops, passed the river at Miranda, by means of a basket slung on a rope stretched from precipice to precipice, several hundred feet above the foaming torrent. Graham had encountered many difficulties on his march through the mountains within the Portuguese frontier; but his vigour and perseverance, seconded by the zeal and energy of his troops, had overcome them all: forty thousand men had been transported, as if by enchantment, in ten days, through two hundred miles of the most broken and rugged country in the Peninsula; and on the 3d June the whole army was in communication on the northern bank of the Douro, between Toro and the river Esla.[1]

[1] Nap. v. 520, 525. Belm. i. 252, 253. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 253, 254. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, June 6, 1813. Gurw. x. 421.

Burgos is evacuated, and the French retreat to the Ebro.

This formidable concentration of troops to the north of the Douro, in a line at right angles to the position which they had hitherto occupied fronting the English general, rendered the further stay of the

French army in the neighbourhood of Valladolid impossible; and a hasty ill-arranged retreat was commenced to the Upper Ebro. Valladolid, with considerable stores of ammunition, was occupied on the 4th. On the 7th and 8th, the British army, rapidly pursuing, crossed the Carrion at various points; and pressing forward with conquering violence, and in the highest spirits at seeing the enemy thus receding before them, soon arrived at the scenes which they had passed under such disastrous circumstances, at the commencement of the retreat from Burgos, in the close of the preceding campaign. Joseph at first thought he should be in a condition to give the enemy battle on the elevated plateaux around that stronghold, and he had now assembled fifty-five thousand men, including nine thousand excellent horse, and a hundred guns; but the force of the inundation was too great to be thus stopped: a hundred thousand men were on his front and flank; for the guerillas of Navarre and Biscay had now drawn together in the vicinity of the British army, and rumour, as usual exaggerating the danger, had magnified their amount to a hundred and ninety thousand combatants. The French retreat, June 14. therefore, was continued without intermission to the Ebro; the castle of Burgos, the theatre of such desperate strife in the former campaign, was blown up with a frightful explosion, and with such precipitation that three hundred French soldiers, defiling under its walls at the time, were crushed by the falling ruins; and the enemy, in deep depression, continued their retreat towards VITTORIA. With mingled astonishment and exultation, the allied troops triumphantly marched through the scenes of their former struggles and defeat.[1] "Clausel's strong position,

[1] Nap. v. 537, 541. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 245. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, June 13, 1813. Gurw. x. 435. Tor. v. 261, 262.

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Dubreton's thundering castle, had disappeared like a dream; and sixty thousand veteran soldiers, willing to fight at every step, were hurried with all the tumult and confusion of defeat across the Ebro."

Confusion and disorder of the French retreat.

In abandoning Burgos, Joseph took the road for Vittoria, by Pancorvo and Miranda del Ebro; but the consequences of this precipitate retreat now became painfully apparent, and it was evident to the whole army, that it would be impossible, when pressed by a victorious enemy in rear, to engage the troops in the defiles of the Pyrenees, encumbered as they were with baggage and spoil, not of a province but a kingdom. Under the terror produced by this unlooked-for and overwhelming force suddenly thrown on their line of communication with France, the whole French troops and civil authorities had evacuated Madrid, and taken refuge under shelter of the army: and the road from that capital to Bayonne was encumbered with an endless file of chariots, carriages, and waggons, which bore away the helpless multitude and rich stores of spoil towards the frontier. The French army thus encumbered, exhibited a lively image of those hosts which the luxury of Asiatic warfare has in every age accumulated round the standards of their sultauns: for the riches which they carried with them were such as bespoke the regal state of a great monarchy; and the train of civil functionaries, officers of state, and ladies of pleasure, who followed the troops, recalled rather the effeminacy of oriental magnificence, than the simple but iron bands of European warfare.[1]

[1] Vict. et Conq. xxii. 245. Tor. v. 264, 265, 267. Napier, v. 388, 541. Gurw. 444.

Prodigious success of the march of the Allies to Vittoria.

The secret of the astonishing success of Wellington's march consisted in his constantly keeping his left wing in advance, and by that means continually pressing round the right flank of the French; and in that way, coupled with a constant pressure in front,

he compelled them to evacuate every successive position, how strong soever, which they took up between Burgos and the Ebro. The British troops, in pursuing a triumphant advance through this rocky and mountainous country, were never weary of expressing their astonishment at the prodigious strength of the positions which were abandoned, and the numerous rocky defiles traversed only by single arches, which retarded but by a few hours the advance of the allied army. They were ignorant of the simultaneous pressure round the right wing of the French, which was going forward from the advance of Graham with the British left wing, and that the most alarming accounts were constantly received at the French headquarters of the progress of the allied troops in that direction. On the 13th, Graham pursued his indefatigable march through the hills at the sources of the Ebro, and on the 14th, passed that river at the bridge of Rockamund and San Martin. At the same time, the Spanish guerillas from Biscay crowded in great numbers to the same quarter, and occupied all the passes in the great mountains of Reynosa which lie between the Ebro and the sea-coast. The effects of this decisive manœuvre were, that not only was the French main army obliged to abandon all the successive positions which it took up on the great road, but the whole sea-coast of Biscay, with the exception of Bilboa and Santona, was evacuated by the enemy, and the British vessels of war, amidst the enthusiastic shouts of the inhabitants, entered all the harbours. A depôt and hospital station was immediately established at Santander; the whole supplies of the army were directed thither; a new base of operations was established close to the scene of the coming contest; and Portugal, like a heavy tender

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whose aid was no longer required, was cut away and forgotten. Meanwhile the sweep of the Allies round the extreme French right was continued with unabated vigour; the whole crest of the mountains, between the Ebro and the sea, was soon in their possession; the scarlet uniforms were to be seen in every valley; and the stream of war, descending with impetuous force down all the clefts of the mountains, burst in a hundred foaming torrents into the basin of Vittoria. With such accuracy were the marches of all the columns calculated, and with such precision were they carried into effect by the admirable troops, inured to war and all its fatigues, which Wellington commanded, that every thing happened exactly as he had arranged before he set out from Portugal; and the troops all arrived at the stations assigned them, in the prophetic contemplation of their chief, in the neighbourhood of Vittoria, at the very time when the French army, heavy laden and dejected, had accummulated its immense files of chariots and baggage-waggons, under the charge of seventy thousand men, in the plain in front of that town.[1]

[1] Nap. v. 540, 543. Wellington to Earl Bathurst. June 19, June 22, 1813. Gurw. x. 444, 446. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 245, 246.

Extraordinary beauty of the scenery through which the army passed.

No words can do justice to the exquisite beauty of the scenery through which the British troops, especially those on the left wing, passed during this memorable march. The romantic valleys of the mountain region whence the Ebro draws its waters, which at every season excite the admiration of the passing traveller, were at that time singularly enhanced by the exquisite verdure of the opening spring, and the luxuriance of the foliage which in every sheltered nook clothed the mountain sides. War appeared in these sequestered and pastoral valleys, not in its rude and bloody garb, but in its most brilliant and attractive costume; the pomp of

military music, as the troops wended their way through the valleys, blended with the shepherd's pipe on the hills above; while the numerous columns of horse, foot, and cannon, winding in every direction through the defiles, gave an inexpressible variety and charm to the landscape. Even the common soldiers were not insensible to the beauty of the spectacle thus perpetually placed before their eyes. Often the men rested on their muskets with their arms crossed, gazing on the lovely scenes which lay spread far beneath their feet; and more than once the heads of the columns involuntarily halted to satiate their eyes with a spectacle of beauty, the like of which all felt they might never see again.[1]

[1] Recollections of the Peninsula, 173, 176, and personal knowledge.

The immense baggage trains of Joseph's army had now fallen back into the basin of Vittoria; and seventy thousand men were assembled to protect their retreat into France. But it seemed hardly possible that even that large force could secure the safe transit of such an enormous multitude of carriages; and yet how could they be abandoned without confessing defeat, and relinquishing at the same time the whole ammunition waggons and military stores of the army? The rapacity of the French authorities in Spain; the general spoliation which, from the marshals downwards, they had exercised under the imperial orders in every part of the country, now fell with just but terrible force upon them: their gallant army was about to be overwhelmed by the immensity of its spoil. In retreating through Madrid and the two Castiles, the French authorities had levied contributions surpassing all the former ones in severity and magnitude; and the enormous sums raised in this way, amounting to five millions and a half of dollars, were all existing in hard cash, and

Accumulation of Joseph's army and baggage in the basin of Vittoria.

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constituted no inconsiderable part of the weight with which the army was encumbered. Not content with these pecuniary exactions, both Joseph and his generals had faithfully followed the example set them by the Emperor, in collecting and bringing off all the most precious works of art which adorned the Spanish capital and provinces. All the marshals, from Murat, who commenced the pillage in 1808, had gratified themselves by seizing upon the finest paintings which were to be found in convents or private palaces in every part of the country; and Marshal Soult in particular, had, from the rich spoils of the Andalusian convents, formed the noble collection of paintings by Murillo and Velasquez, which now adorns his hotel at Paris. But when Joseph and his whole civil functionaries came to break up finally from Madrid, the work of spoliation went on on a greater scale, and extended to every object of interest, whether from beauty, rarity, or antiquity, which was to be found in the royal palaces or museums. Many of the finest works of Titian, Raphael, and Correggio, were got hold of in this manner, especially from the Escurial and the royal palace at Madrid; while all the archives and museums in the capital and in Old Castile, had been compelled to yield up their most precious contents to accompany the footsteps of the fugitive monarch. All this precious spoil was dragged along in endless convoy in the rear of the French army; and when it halted and faced about in the basin of Vittoria, it was rather from a sense of the evident impossibility of transporting the prodigious mass in safety through the approaching defiles of the Pyrenees, than from any well-founded hope of being able to resist the shock of the Anglo-Portuguese army.[1]

[1] Tor. v. 262, 272.

The basin of Vittoria, which has become immortal from the battle, decisive of the fate of the Peninsula, which was fought within its bosom, is a small plain, about eight miles in length by six in breadth, situated in an elevated plateau among the mountains. It is bounded on the north and east by the commencement of the Pyreneean range, and on the west by a chain of rugged mountains, which separates the province of Alava from that of Biscay. A traveller entering the valley from the side of Miranda del Ebro, by the great road from Madrid, emerges into the plain by the pass of Puebla, where the Zadorra forces its way through a narrow cleft in the mountain, in its descent to the Ebro, and from whence the spires of Vittoria, situated at the extremity of the plain, are visible about eight miles distant. This little plain is intersected by two ranges of hills, which cross it nearly from east to west, and afforded two very strong positions, where the French army endeavoured to stop the advance of the Allies; the first being on either side of Arinez, and the second, which was a much stronger ground, was around Gomecha. Several roads from the mountains on all sides intersect each other at Vittoria, particularly those to Pampeluna, Bilboa, and Gallicia; but although they are all practicable for guns, yet that which leads direct to St Sebastian and Bayonne, through Gamarra Mayor, was alone adequate to receive the vast trains of carriages which were heaped up in and around that town. Two great convoys had already departed by this road, and were now far advanced on the way to France; but a still greater quantity, including the whole royal treasure, and all the guns and ammunition of the army, remained, and therefore it was of

Description of the basin of Vittoria, and the field of battle.

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the highest importance to the French at all hazards to keep possession of the great road to Bayonne, and, above all, not to suffer Gamarra Mayor to fall into the hands of the enemy, while the bulk of the army on the broken ground, in the middle of the plain of Vittoria, endeavoured to arrest the advance of the allied force.

[1] Nap. v. 548, 549. Tor. v. 274. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 246, 247.

Forces of the armies on the opposite sides.

The departure of the two heavy laden convoys for France, sensibly diminished the strength of Joseph's army; for they required to be guarded by strong escorts to prevent them falling into the hands of the Biscay guerillas. The guard attending the last, consisted of no less than three thousand troops under General Maucune. After this large reduction, however, the French army amounted to above seventy thousand men, of whom sixty-five thousand were effective combatants, and they had one hundred and fifty pieces of cannon. On Wellington's side there were only sixty thousand English and Portuguese sabres and bayonets in the field; for the sixth division, six thousand five hundred strong, had been left at Medina de Pomar, and some stragglers had necessarily fallen behind during so long and fatiguing a march as that which they had made from the Portuguese frontier. But in addition to this force, there were fully eighteen thousand Spaniards, so that the total force was above eighty thousand, with ninety guns. The strength of the French position consisted chiefly in the great number of bridges which the allied forces had to pass, over the numerous mountain streams which descend into the basin of Vittoria, some of which, particularly that of Puebla and Nanclares, to the south of Vittoria, and that of Gamarra Mayor and Ariega, to the north of that town, were of great strength, and easily susceptible of de-

fence. The ridges too, which cross the plain, afforded successive defensible positions, the last of which was close to the town of Vittoria. On the other hand, the weakness of their situation consisted in the single line of retreat passable for the carriages of the army, which was kept open for them in case of disaster; and the appalling dangers which awaited them if their army in the plain met with a serious reverse, and either lost the command of the great road to Bayonne, or was driven, with its immense files of ammunition and baggage-waggons, into the rough mountain road leading to Pampeluna.[1]

Nap. v. 500, 555. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, June 22, 1813. Gurw. x. 466.

Having anxiously surveyed the enemy's position on the afternoon of the 20th, and perceiving that they stood firm, and were making preparations for battle, Wellington, on his side, made his dispositions for an attack. Hill, with twenty thousand men, was to move with the right wing, at daybreak, into the great road to Vittoria, in the neighbourhood of Puebla, and advancing through the defile, which was not occupied in strength by the enemy, expand his force as he arrived in the open plain; Murillo, with his division of Spaniards, keeping on his right, on the heights between the great road and the hills. The right centre, under Wellington in person, consisting of the light and fourth divisions, with Ponsonby's cavalry and the dragoon guards, were to proceed through the pass which leads to Subijana-de-Morillos, and, crossing the ridges which formed the southern boundary of the basin of Vittoria, move straight forward to their respective points of attack on the Zadorra, especially the bridges of Mendoza, Tres Puentes, and Nanclares. The left centre, comprising the third and seventh divisions, was to move by the village of Gueta, direct upon the steeples of

British plan of attack.

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Vittoria; Sir Thomas Graham moving from Murguia on the left, with the first and fifth divisions, Longa's Spaniards, and Anson and Bock's cavalry, in all about twenty thousand men, by the Bilboa road, so as to fall on the extreme French right under Reille, and if possible force the bridge of the Zadorra at Gamarra Mayor, and thus intercept the line of retreat for the army by the great road to Bayonne. The effect of these dispositions, if simultaneously and successfully carried into execution, obviously would be to cut off the retreat of the French army by the only line practicable for their numerous carriages, at the very time that they were hard pressed by the main body of the Allies in front, and thus expose them to total ruin.[1]*

[1] Murray's Instructions in Wyld's Memoirs, 100, 102. Nap. v. 554, 555. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, 22d June 1813. Gurw. x. 446.

French position and order of battle.

The French order of battle, hastily taken up, without any master mind to direct it, was much less ably conceived, and bore the mark rather of the hurried defensive arrangement of several independent corps suddenly and unexpectedly assailed by superior forces, than the deliberate arrangement of a great army about to contend with a worthy antago-

* This is the first occasion in which the author has had an opportunity of referring to the late admirable publication of Wyld's Plans of the Peninsular Campaigns, accompanied by the valuable explanatory Memoir, which is enriched with so many of Sir George Murray's original orders and instructions, when quartermaster-general of the army. He has never travelled in Spain, and therefore cannot describe the fields of battle there from his own observation, as he has done those in Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and France; but he can hardly bring himself to believe that he has not visited the scenes of Wellington's victories, so admirably graphic are Mr Wyld's plans of the theatre on which they occurred, and so clearly do they bring before the mind the inequalities of ground and features of the country where the actions took place. It is no more than an act of justice to this magnificent publication to say, that it is more characteristic of the country which it portrays, and gives a better idea of the battles and military operations which then occurred, than any plans or maps which are to be found in the military archives or publications of any other country.

nist for the dominion of the Peninsula. The right, which was opposed to Graham, occupied the heights in front of the Zadorra, above the village of Abechuco, and covered Vittoria from approach by the Bilboa road; the centre extended along the left bank of the same river, commanding and blocking up the great road from Madrid; the left, behind the Zadorra, stretched from Arinez to Puebla de Arganzon, and fronted the defile of Puebla, by which Sir Rowland Hill was to issue to the fight. A detached corps, under Clausel, was stationed at Logrono, to secure the road to Pampeluna, on which it was already feared the army would mainly have to depend for its retreat; and Foy had been stationed in the valley of Senorio, towards Bilboa, to protect them from the incursions of Longa and the Biscay guerillas, and keep open the communications of the army in that direction. These two detachments weakened the disposable force of the French, on which reliance could be placed for the shock of battle, by more than twenty thousand men; so that not more than fifty-five thousand men could be calculated upon for the fight: but they were all veteran soldiers; they occupied a central position, so that their columns, if hard pressed, could mutually support each other; and they had a hundred and fifty pieces of cannon. On the other hand, their position, if worsted, was in the highest degree perilous; for the mountain road to Pampeluna was impracticable for the multitude of carriages which thronged the plain; and it was easy to see, that if the centre of the army, which covered the great road from Madrid, was forced, its whole artillery and equipage would be lost.[1]

[1] Vict. et Conq. xxii. 246, 247. Jom. iv. 348, 349. Belm. i. 254.

At daybreak, on the morning of the 21st, the whole British columns were in motion, and the

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centre and right soon surmounted the high ground which screened their night bivouac from the sight of the enemy, and their masses appeared in imposing strength on the summit of the ridges which shut in on the south the basin of Vittoria. The column on the left moved towards Mendoza, while Hill, at ten o'clock, reached the pass of Puebla, into which he immediately descended, and pressing through, began extending into the plain in his front, Murillo's Spaniards, with surprising vigour, swarming up the steep and rocky ascents on his right. There, however, the French made a stout resistance; Murillo was wounded, but still kept the field; fresh troops reinforced their line on the craggy heights, so that Hill was obliged to send the 71st, and a battalion of light infantry of Walker's brigade to Murillo's support, under Colonel Cadogan. Hardly had he reached the summit, when that noble officer fell while cheering on his men to charge the enemy; and though mortally wounded, he refused to be taken to the rear, and still rested on the field, watching with dying eyes the advance of his heroic Highlanders along the ridge. Still the battle was maintained with extraordinary resolution on the summit, and it was only by sending fresh troops to their support, and step by step, by force of sheer fighting, that the French were at length borne backwards to nearly opposite Subijana; while Hill, in the valley below, encouraged by the progress of the scarlet uniforms on the summit on his right, pressed vigorously forward, and emerging from the defile of Puebla, carried by storm the village of Subijana, and extended his line into communication with his extreme right on the summit of the ridge.[1]

Battle of Vittoria. Success of Hill on the right.

[1] Nap. v. 554, 555. Vict. et Conq. 242, 243. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, June 22, 1813. Gurw. x. 447. Gazan's Official Account. Wyld's Mem. 101.

While this bloody conflict was going on on the

steeps above the Zadorra on the right, Wellington himself, with the centre, had surmounted the heights in his front, and descended in great strength into the plain of Vittoria. His troops met with no serious opposition till they came to the bridges by which the rivers in the bottom were crossed; but as they were all occupied by the enemy, and the rocky thickets on their sides filled with tirailleurs, a warm exchange of musketry began, especially at the bridge of Nanclares, opposite the fourth division, and that of Villodar, by which the light divisions were to cross. The attack on these bridges was delayed till the third and seventh divisions, who formed the reserves of the centre, had come up to their ground, and they were somewhat retarded by the roughness of the hills over which they had to march; and meanwhile Wellington sent orders to Hill to arrest the progress of his extreme right on the summit of the ridge, in order that the whole army might advance abreast. Meanwhile, a Spanish peasant brought information that the bridge of Tres Puentes was negligently guarded, and offered himself to guide the light division over it; and the heads of the columns of the third and seventh divisions, forming the left centre, having now appeared on their ground, the advance was resumed at all points, both in the centre and on the right. Kempt's brigade of the light division, led by the brave peasant, soon gained the bridge; the fifteenth hussars, coming up at a canter, dashed by single file over, and the arch was won. It was now one o'clock; the firing was renewed with redoubled vigour on the heights above Subijana, while faint columns of white smoke, accompanied by a sound like distant thunder, showed that Graham's attack on Gamarra

Progress of Wellington in the centre.

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Mayor, in the enemy's rear, had commenced. At this moment the third and seventh divisions were moving rapidly down to the bridge of Mendoza; but the enemy's light troops and guns kept up a most vigorous fire upon the advancing masses, until the riflemen of the light division, who had got across at Tres Puentes, charged them in flank, when the position was abandoned, and the British left crossed without further opposition.[1] The whole French centre, alarmed by the progress which Graham was making in their rear, now retreated towards Vittoria, not, however, in disorder, but facing about at every defensible position to retard the enemy; while the British troops continued to advance in pursuit in admirable order, their regiments and squadrons surmounting the rugged inequalities in the ground with the most beautiful precision.

[1] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, June 22, 1813. Gurw. x. 448. Gazan's Official Account. Wyld, 102. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 213. Nap. v. 557, 559.

Decisive success of Graham on the left.

The decisive blow, however, had meanwhile been struck by Graham on the left. That noble officer, who, at the age of sixty-eight, possessed all the vigour of twenty-five, and who was gifted with the true eye of a general, had started before daylight from his bivouac in the mountains on the left, and by eleven o'clock, after a most fatiguing and toilsome march over the hills, reached the heights above Gamarra Mayor and Ariega, which were strongly occupied by the French right under Reille. General Oswald, who commanded the head of Graham's corps, consisting of the fifth division, Pack's Portuguese, and Longa's Spaniards, immediately commenced the attack, and not only drove the enemy from the heights, but got possession of Gamarra Menor, which cut off the road to Durango. Gamarra Mayor was the next object of attack; and the French, aware of its importance, as commanding the

great road to Bayonne, made the most strenuous efforts for its defence. At length Robinson's brigade of the fifth division burst in, bearing down all opposition, and capturing three guns; but Reille's men had barricaded the opposite end of the bridge, and their fire from the windows of the houses was so severe that they retained the opposite bank of the Zadorra. At the same time the Germans under Halket had, in the most gallant manner, assaulted the village of Abechuco, which commanded the bridge of Ariega. It was at length carried by the brave Germans and Bradford's Portuguese; but they were unable, any more than at Gamarra Mayor, to force the bridge, and a murderous fire of musketry was kept up from the opposite sides, without enabling either party to dislodge the other from its position. But meanwhile General Sarrut was killed; and some British brigades pushing on, got possession of the great road from Vittoria to Bayonne, and immediately the cry spread through the French army, that their retreat was cut off and all was lost.[1]

[1] Vict. et Conq. xxii. 248, 249. Nap. v. 364, 365. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, June 22, 1813. Gurw. x. 449. Belm. i. 254.

It was no longer a battle, but a retreat; yet, in conducting it, the French soldiers maintained the high character for intrepidity and steadiness which had rendered them the terror and admiration of Europe. A large body of skirmishers was thrown out to check the advance of the pursuing columns; and fifty guns, placed in the rear, which were worked with extraordinary vigour, retarded for some time the pursuit of the British centre. Wellington, however, brought up several British batteries, and the enemy were at length forced back to the ridge in front of Gomecha. An obstinate conflict took place in Arinez, into which Picton plunged at the head of the riflemen of his division; but at length the village

Retreat of the French to Vittoria.

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was carried; the 87th, under Colonel Gough, stormed Hermandad; and the French in Subijana, finding their right forced back, were obliged to retreat two miles towards Vittoria in a disordered mass. Thus the action became a sort of running fight or cannonade, which continued for six miles; but the French, notwithstanding all their efforts, were unable to hold any position long enough to enable the carriages in the rear to draw off; and as they were all thrown back into the little plain in front of Vittoria, the throng there became excessive, and already the cries of despair, as on the banks of the Berezina, were heard from the agitated multitude. Joseph now ordered the retreat to be conducted by the only road which remained open, that to Pampeluna; but it was too late to draw off any of the carriages; and "as the English shot went booming overhead," says an eye-witness, "the vast crowd started and swerved with a convulsive movement, while a dull and horrid sound of distress arose; but there was no hope, no stay for either army or multitude."[1] Eighty pieces of cannon, jammed close together near Vittoria, kept up a desperate fire to the last, and the gunners worked them with frantic energy; while Reille, with heroic resolution, maintained his ground on the Upper Zadorra; but it was all of no avail: the great road to France was lost; an overturned waggon on that to Pampeluna, rendered all further passage for carriages impracticable; the British dragoons were thundering in close pursuit; and soon the frantic multitude dispersed on all sides, making their way through fields, across ditches, and over the hills, leaving their whole artillery, ammunition-waggons, and the spoil of a kingdom, as a prey to the victors.[2]

[1] Napier.

[2] Nap. v. 561, 562. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 249. Jom. iv. 350. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, 22d June 1813. Gur. x. 449, 450.

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Never before, in modern times, had such a prodigious accumulation of military stores and private wealth fallen to the lot of a victorious army. Jourdan's marshal's baton, Joseph's private carriage, a hundred and fifty-one brass guns, four hundred and fifteen caissons of ammunition, thirteen hundred thousand ball-cartridges, fourteen thousand rounds of ammunition, and forty thousand pounds of gunpowder, constituted the military trophies of a victory, where six thousand also were killed and wounded, and a thousand prisoners taken. It at one blow destroyed the warlike efficiency of the French army, swept them like a whirlwind from the Spanish plains, and made Joseph's crown drop from his head. No estimate can be formed of the amount of private plunder which was taken on the field, but it exceeded any thing witnessed in modern war; for it was not the produce of the sack of a city or the devastation of a province, but the accumulated plunder of a kingdom during five years, which was now at one fell swoop reft from the spoiler. Independent of private booty, no less than five millions and a half of dollars in the military chest of the army were taken; and of private wealth, the amount was so prodigious, that for miles together the combatants may be almost said to have marched upon gold and silver without stooping to pick it up. But the regiments which followed, not equally warmed in the fight, were not so disinterested: enormous spoil fell into the hands of the private soldiers; and the cloud of camp-followers and sutlers who followed in their train swept the ground so completely, that only a hundred thousand dollars of the whole taken was brought into the military chest! But the effects of this prodigious booty speedily appeared in the dissolution of the bonds of discipline

Results of the battle, and prodigious amount of the spoil taken.

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in a large part of the army: the frightful national vice of intemperance broke out in dreadful colours, from the unbounded means of indulging it which were thus speedily acquired; and we have the authority of Wellington for the assertion, that three weeks after the battle, above twelve thousand soldiers had disappeared from their colours, though the total loss of the battle was only 5180, of whom 3308 were British; and these stragglers were only reclaimed by sedulous efforts and rigorous severity.[1] *

[1] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, June 22, 1813. Gurw. x. 452, 453; and July 9, 1813. Ibid. 519; and June 29, 1813. 472. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 252.

Spoil and booty taken.

So vast was the number of ladies of pleasure who were among the carriages in the train of the French officers, that it was a common saying afterwards in their army, that it was no wonder they were beaten at Vittoria, for they sacrificed their guns to save their mistresses. Rich vestures of all sorts; velvet and silk brocades, gold and silver plate, noble pictures, jewels, laces, cases of claret and champagne,

* "We started with the army in the highest order, and up to the day of the battle nothing could get on better; but that event has, as usual, totally annihilated all order and discipline. The soldiers of the army have got among them about a million sterling in money, with the exception of about 100,000 dollars which were got in the military chest. The night of the battle, instead of being passed in getting rest and food, to prepare them for the pursuit of the following day, was passed by the soldiers in looking for plunder. The consequence was, that they were incapable of marching in pursuit of the enemy, and were totally knocked up. The rain came on, and increased our fatigues; and I am convinced that we have now out of our ranks double the amount of our loss in the battle, and have lost more men in the pursuit than the enemy have, though we have never in one day made more than an ordinary march."—WELLINGTON *to* LORD BATHURST, *21th June* 1813. GURWOOD, x. 473.

"By the State of yesterday we had 12,500 men less under arms, than we had on the day before the battle. They are not in the hospital, nor are they killed, nor have they fallen into the hands of the enemy as prisoners: I have had officers in all directions after them, but have not heard of any of them. I believe they are concealed in the villages in the mountains."—WELLINGTON *to* LORD BATHURST, *9th July* 1813. GURWOOD, x. 519. The loss in the battle was just 5000; so that 7500 had straggled from the effects of the plunder.

poodles, parrots, monkeys, and trinkets, lay scattered about the field in endless confusion, amidst weeping mothers, wailing infants, and all the unutterable miseries of warlike overthrow. Joseph himself narrowly escaped being made prisoner: a squadron of dragoons pursued the carriage and fired into it, and he had barely time to throw himself out and escape on horseback under shelter of a squadron of horse; his carriage was taken, and in it the beautiful Coreggio of Christ in the Garden, which now adorns Apsley House in London. The great convoy of pictures, however, which Joseph was carrying off, after narrowly escaping recapture, reached France in safety, having set out a day previously. The bonds contracted during so many years' occupation of the Peninsula, many of them of the tenderest kind, were all at once snapped asunder by one rude shock; and amidst the shouts of joy which arose on all sides for a delivered monarchy, were heard the sighs of the vanquished, who mourned the severance of the closest ties by which the heart of man can be bound in this world. Wellington, in a worthy spirit, did all in his power to soften the blow to the many ladies of rank and respectability who fell into his hands; the Countess Gazan, with a number of other wives of the French officers, were next day sent on to Pampeluna with a flag of truce, in their own carriages, which had been rescued from the spoil. But a more important acquisition was obtained in the whole archives of the court of Madrid, including a great mass of Napoleon's original and secret correspondence, an invaluable acquisition to historic truth, to which this narrative has been more than once largely indebted. It is a remarkable fact that the battle was fought in the close vicinity of the spot where the gallant attempt

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of the Black Prince to establish the rightful though savage monarch, Peter the Cruel, on the throne of Spain, five hundred years before, had been victorious; and when pursuing the French troops near Arinez, over the hill which still bears the name of the "English hill,"[1] (Inglesmendi,) the English soldiers unconsciously trode on the bones of their fathers. Twice had the fate of Spain been decided, by the aid of British blood, in the plain of Vittoria.[1]

[1] Tor. v. 280, 281. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 250, 251. Southey, vi. 173.

Evacuation of Madrid and Valencia by the French, who retire behind the Ebro.

The battle of Vittoria resounded like a thunderclap in every part of Spain; Madrid was finally evacuated on the 27th, and the whole French authorities and partizans of the dethroned monarch, abandoning every part of Old and New Castile, made all imaginable haste to cross the Ebro. Suchet, who, notwithstanding his defeat at Castalla and the subsequent operations of Sir John Murray, of which an account will immediately be given, still retained his retrenched position on the Xucar, was compelled, with a heavy heart, to abandon the beautiful kingdom of Valencia, and all his magnificent establishments there, in which he had ruled for eighteen months with the authority and state of a sovereign; and, leaving garrisons only in Saguntum and Peniscola, retired with all his army across the Ebro, where he distributed his forces between Taragona and Tortosa. Elio immediately moved forward and occupied Valencia. The total evacuation of all Spain south of the Ebro by the French troops, necessarily rendered defenceless that very considerable portion, especially of the higher classes, in its central provinces, who had adhered to the fortunes of the French dynasty, and were known in the Peninsula by the contemptuous name of *juramentados;* and

June 27.

July 5.

— 9.

there was every reason to fear that the Cortes, having them now in their power, would hasten to gratify alike their long-cherished indignation, and present appetite for gain, by condemning a large portion of them to the scaffold, and confiscating their estates. To guard against this danger, Wellington, amidst his martial toils, addressed to the Cortes a long and able memoir, enforcing the propriety of granting, with a few exceptions, a general amnesty to those of the opposite party, and supporting it by a detail of the various circumstances which had so long rendered the contest to all appearance hopeless, and thereby extenuated, if they could not altogether excuse, their adherence to the intrusive monarch. The principles contained in this memoir, discriminating, humane, and politic, will not, by future ages, be deemed the least honourable monument to the fame of Wellington; and they came with singular grace from a victorious general in the very moment of his highest triumph—when he had rescued the country from the foreign yoke whose partizans he was thus shielding from the natural indignation of their countrymen.[1] *

[1] Wellington to Don Juan O'Donoju, June 11th, 1813. Gurw. x. 431. Tor. v. 298.

* "I am the last person who will be found to diminish the merit of the Spaniards who have adhered to the cause of the country during the severe trial which I hope has passed, particularly of those who, having remained among the enemy without entering their service, have served their country at the risk of their lives. But at the same time that I can appreciate the merit of those individuals, and of the nation at large, I can forgive the weakness of those who have been induced by terror, by distress, or by despair, to pursue a different line of conduct.

"I entreat the government to advert to the circumstances of the commencement, and of the different stages of this eventful contest; and to the numerous occasions in which all men must have imagined that it was impossible for the powers of the Peninsula, although aided by Great Britain, to withstand the colossal power by which they were assailed, and nearly overcome. Let them reflect upon the weakness of the country at the commencement of the contest, upon the numerous and

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On the day of the battle, Clausel with his division, fourteen thousand strong, quitted Logrono, and, taking the road to Vittoria, arrived at the gates of that town late at night, after the conflict was over, and when it had fallen into the hands of the British. Fearful of being cut off, he immediately retired, and, marching all night, fell back towards Saragossa, but halted at Logrono to receive intelligence, where he remained till the evening of the 25th. This long delay had wellnigh proved fatal to him, and undoubtedly would have done so, if the march of the British, immediately after the battle, had not been retarded by the heavy rains which fell for two days, and the relaxation of discipline occa-

Imminent danger and narrow escape of Clausel.

almost invariable disasters of the armies, and upon the ruinous disorganization which followed; and let them decide whether those who were witnesses of these events are guilty, because they could not foresee what has since occurred. The majority are certainly not guilty in any other manner; and many, as I have above stated, now deemed guilty in the eye of the law, as having served the pretended king, have, by that very act, acquired the means of serving, and have rendered important services to their country.

"It is my opinion that the policy of Spain should lead the government and the Cortes to grant a general amnesty, with certain exceptions. This subject deserves consideration in the two views of the effort now making, failing or succeeding, in freeing the country from its oppressors. If the effort should fail, the enemy will, by an amnesty, be deprived of the principal means now in his hands of oppressing the country in which his armies will be stationed. He will see clearly that he can place no reliance on any partizans in Spain; and he will not have even a pretence for supposing that country is divided in opinion. If the effort should succeed, as I sincerely hope it may, the object of the government should be to pacify the country, and to heal the divisions which the contest unavoidably must have occasioned. It is impossible that this object can be accomplished as long as there exists a large body of the Spanish nation, some possessing the largest properties in the country, and others endowed with considerable talents, who are proscribed for their conduct during the contest; conduct which has been caused by the misfortunes to which I have above adverted."—WELLINGTON *to* DON JUAN O'DONOJU, *Spanish Minister at War*. GURWOOD, vol. x. p. 431, 432.

sioned by the prodigious spoil they had taken. No sooner was Wellington informed of Clausel's position than he marched in person, with eighteen thousand men, by Tafalla upon Logrono, while twelve thousand were directed upon that town from the side of Salvatierra, and Mina followed on the enemy's rear. The French general was made aware of his danger just in time to escape being surrounded; and setting out with all imaginable expedition, he retreated by Calahorra and Tudela upon Saragossa, where he arrived on the 1st July, making a forced march of sixty miles in forty hours. Thence he retreated by Jaca, and through the passes of the Pyrenees into France,[1] closely followed by Mina, who managed the pursuit with such ability, that Clausel, though superior in number, was obliged to sacrifice a large portion of his heavy artillery and baggage, before he found a refuge within the French territory.[1]

[1] Nap. v. 571, 572. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 252. Tor. v. 288, 290.

While Clausel was making this narrow escape from the right wing of the allied forces, the centre, under Hill, pursued the main body of the routed army, which retired by Pampeluna and up the valley of Bastan into France, in the deepest dejection, with only one gun in their whole array, hardly any ammunition, and no baggage, military chest, or papers of any description; insomuch that the whole muster-rolls and pay-sheets of the army were lost, and their organization, as a military force, was at an end. The blockade of Pampeluna was immediately formed by the English general, into which a garrison of six thousand men had been thrown by the retreating army. Meanwhile Graham, with the left wing, moved against Foy, who, with his division, was in the neighbourhood of Durango during the battle, and who immediately after set about collecting the

Operations against Pampeluna and Foy's division.

July 25.

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small garrisons in Lower Biscay, with a view to a general retreat to St Sebastian. He arrived in Tolosa with twelve thousand men almost at the same time with Sir Thomas Graham; but having succeeded in making his entrance first, he barricadoed the streets, and maintained himself there, with the aid of a fortified blockhouse, with great resolution, till nightfall; when the entrance was forced by the British troops, amidst the cheers of the inhabitants, and the enemy retired to Irun with the loss of four hundred men. Graham's loss, however, was nearly as severe; and the vigour of Foy's resistance had gained time for his convoys to retire across the Bidassoa into France, whither he followed a few days afterwards, and Giron had the felicity of chasing the last French in that quarter from the Spanish territory. At the same time, the forts of Passages, with their garrison of a hundred and fifty men, were surrendered to Longa; Castro-Urdiales was evacuated, the garrison taking refuge in Santona; and the Conde d'Abisbal, who had come up with the army of reserve from Andalusia, carried by storm the forts of Pancorvo, garrisoned by seven hundred men, which commanded the great road in the rear between Burgos and Vittoria.[1]

June 25.

July 1.

[1] Tor. v. 284, 288. Nap. v. 569, 571. Viet. et Conq. xxii. 252. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, 3d July 1813. Gurw. x. 501.

Nothing remained to complete the entire expulsion of the French from the north-western provinces of Spain, but to root them out from the fortified strongholds of Santona, Pampeluna, and ST SEBASTIAN, which were the only fortresses in that quarter which they still held in the Peninsula. Pampeluna was already closely invested by Hill; and Graham lost no time in investing the latter fortress, which has acquired such celebrity from the dreadful assaults of which it shortly after became the object.

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Before, however, the British outposts could reach the town, Foy had succeeded in throwing in considerable reinforcements; and the garrison, swelled by detachments that took refuge there by sea, from Guetaria and other fortified posts on the coast which were abandoned, amounted to three thousand men, and was under the command of Emmanuel Rey, one of those rare characters whose resolution and constancy, unshaken amidst misfortune, are fitted to arrest or stay the fall of empires.

Description of St Sebastian.

St Sebastian is situated upon the extremity of a low sandy peninsula, which, curved in the form of a horseshoe, nearly surrounds the bay which forms its harbour, while on the other side it is bounded by the opening into which the Urumea stream empties its waters. Immediately behind the town, at the extremity of the curved peninsula, stands a conical hill four hundred feet high, the craggy base of which is washed by the ocean, while its summit is crowned with the old castle of La Mota. The southern face of this hill, which overlooks the town, is separated from it by a range of defensive works covered with batteries; so that the mountain called Monte Orgullo could hold out after the town was taken. The land front of St Sebastian, stretching across the isthmus, is three hundred and fifty yards broad, and consists of a lofty solid curtain of masonry, with a flat bastion in the centre, covered by a hornwork, having the usual counterscarp, covered way, and glacis. But the flank defences, running along the peninsula and facing the Urumea, consist merely of a simple rampart wall, ill flanked, without either ditch, counterscarp, outwork, or external obstacle of any kind; and this wall, such as it is, is exposed, from its summit to its base, to a fire from the Chofre range of sandhills on

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the right of the Urumea, at the distance of from five hundred to a thousand yards. It could not be said, therefore, to be a strong place, and in fact it had no pretensions to more than a third-rate fortress; and in addition to this, at the time of the battle of Vittoria, it was nearly dismantled, as many of the guns had been removed to form battering trains, or arm smaller fortified posts on the coast: there were no bomb-proof casements nor palisades, the wells were in bad order, and the place was supplied with water by a single aqueduct, which was cut off the moment the investment was formed. The Urumea is fordable for two hours before and after high water, so that troops during that period can approach by the dry sands the foot of the sea scarp wall of the town. Aware of this circumstance, Marshal Berwick, when he besieged St Sebastian in the last century, threw up batteries on the Chofre sandhills, to breach the eastern face of the town's sea-wall, while approaches were pushed along the isthmus, to prevent the approach to the breach being impeded; and it was on the footsteps of that accomplished commander that the British engineers now prepared to tread.[1]

[1] Jones' Sieges, ii. 13, 14. Nap. v. 66, 67. Belmas' Sieges, v. 591, 593.

Commencement of the siege by Sir T. Graham, and defensive measures of the governor.

The population of St Sebastian, which usually does not exceed eight thousand souls, had been more than doubled by the influx of Spanish families, most of them composed of persons of consideration and station, who had taken office under Joseph's government, and fled there, after the wreck of Vittoria, as the only stronghold which still held out for the intrusive monarch in the northern provinces. The governor being made aware at the same time by General Foy, that he was about to retire into France, and that St Sebastian must look to its own resources, was grievously oppressed by this load of

useless mouths, who yet were of such a station that he could neither render them serviceable nor treat them with severity; and he used all his influence, therefore, to get them to depart for France, which June 28. by land and sea was immediately accomplished. Delivered of this extraneous load, it was the first care of the French governor to occupy the convent of St Bartholomew, which is situated at the end of the isthmus, opposite to the land face of the fortress, in order to destroy all the buildings in it which might furnish a shelter to the besiegers. Fortifications were commenced at that point, in order to render it an outwork that might retard the enemy; the wooden bridge over the Urumea, which connected the town with its eastern shore, was burned; several houses in the suburbs destroyed, to make room for the firing place; the wells cleared out; palisades hastily run up in front of the outworks; and every preparation made for a vigorous defence; while all the women and children were ordered instantly to leave the place. But the British, on their side, were not idle. Graham rapidly approached with a besieging force about ten thousand strong; and as the Spanish troops were repulsed in an attack — 29. on the convent of St Bartholomew, advances were made against it in form. Meanwhile the garrison were reinforced by troops from Guetaria, who arrived by sea during the night; and they succeeded in mounting seventy-six heavy guns upon the ramparts, the greater part of which were on the face fronting the peninsula. The approaches, however, against the convent of St Bartholomew were vigorously carried on; and Wellington, having visited the works, gave his sanction to the advice of Major Smith, the chief of the engineers before Sir R.

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Fletcher arrived, that that outpost should first be carried, and the main attack then directed against the eastern face of the sea-wall of the town, which faced the Urumea, as had been done a century before by Marshal Berwick.[1]

[1] Belm. iv. 695, 704. Jones' Sieges, ii. 14, 19. Nap. vi. 68, 71.

Storming of St Bartholomew, and breaching of the fortress.

The breaching batteries against the convent of St Bartholomew were begun on the night of the 10th; and on the night of the 13th twenty guns of heavy calibre opened their fire. On the forenoon of the 17th, the convent, being nearly laid in ruins, was assaulted by a part of the 9th British and three companies of the Royals, under the command of Colonel Cameron, and detachments of the Portuguese. The assault of this isolated and elevated stronghold presented an animating spectacle, for it lay exposed to the guns both of the besiegers and of the fortress, and between the two sides sixty pieces of heavy cannon directed their fire upon the assailants or the convent, during the time the assault was going on. After a gallant resistance, however, the place was carried, amid loud cheers from the British troops who watched the contest from the opposite shore. But the assailants, carried away by their ardour, pursued the fugitives into the fortress, and thus sustaining some loss from the fire of the ramparts, were glad to seek shelter among the ruined walls of the convent. No sooner was this advanced post gained than the British established batteries on the height where the convent was placed, to annoy the enemy by a fire from that side; and meanwhile the main batteries were erected on the Chofre sandhills on the right bank of the Urumea. The approaches were pushed with great activity on that side, and speedily armed with heavy cannon landed from the ships; and on the night of the 20th July, the breaching

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batteries commenced their fire at the distance of about 800 yards; while a more distant battery on the Monte Olia sent its plunging shot across the Urumea, a distance of 1500 yards, with great effect upon the same point. The effect of the concentrated fire of these batteries was soon very apparent; a considerable part of the wall came down with a tremendous crash; and the besieged, who were now obliged to husband their ammunition, were seen to be indefatigable in their efforts to intrench the place inside the breach, and render the counterscarp after it was carried incapable of descent. At ten o'clock on the 21st, a flag of truce to surrender was held out, but the governor refused to receive it. The fire was consequently resumed, and with such extraordinary vigour, that the ten heavy pieces on the nearest Chofre sandhills, discharged three hundred and fifty rounds in fifteen and a half hours of daylight, being at the rate of about twenty-five discharges an hour, or one in every two minutes and a quarter—a rapidity of fire, to be sustained for so long a time, which is perhaps unexampled in artillery practice. The flanking batteries on the convent of St Bartholomew and in front of the Monte Olia, were also very destructive, and on the 23d a mortar battery and two sixty-eight pound carronades were turned upon the defences of the great breach, with such effect that the whole parapets near it were speedily destroyed, and the adjoining houses in the inside took fire and burned with extraordinary fierceness. The breach being now plainly practicable, the assault was ordered for the morning of the 24th; but so frightful was the conflagration at daybreak, that it seemed impossible for the assailants to penetrate into the town in that quarter, and therefore it was deferred till night,

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when the fall of the tide might again render the Urumea fordable, and it was hoped the fire would be abated by the houses being consumed. During the whole of the 24th, the besiegers' batteries kept up an incessant fire on the breach, as well with bombs and cannon-shot, as with shrapnell shells, then for the first time used in war, which did very great mischief to the besieged; but they, on their side, were not idle, and turned to the best account the breathing time thus afforded for making preparations against the assault. Live shells were placed along the top of the rampart, ready to be rolled down on the English troops as they threaded their way from the bridge. The houses behind the burning edifices were loopholed, and filled with troops; and heavy guns, loaded with grape-shot, placed on either side of the bridge, to cut down the assailants if they won the summit of the flaming ruins.[1]

July 24.

[1] Jones' Sieges, ii. 28, 37. Belm. iv. 618, 623. Nap: vi. 75, 79.

No sooner was it dark on the 24th than the storming column, consisting of two thousand men, under Major Fraser, Colonel Greville, and Colonel Cameron, silently defiled out of the trenches, and advanced with a swift pace over the intervening ground lying between them and the river. The ground, however, as it was dark, proved extremely difficult to pass over; it was strewed with rocks, covered with slippery sea-weed, which much impeded the march of the column; the water, when they reached the Urumea, was up to the soldiers' arm-pits, and when they got to the opposite side, they had to pass, for a considerable distance, immediately under the foot of the rampart, to the left of the breach, exposed to all the flaming projectiles which could be rolled down upon them from its summit. The column, however, advanced with great resolution, and got

Unsuccessful assault on the place.

through the water unperceived by the enemy; and before they reached the foot of the rampart on the opposite side, a globe of compression, which had been run into an old drain near the counterscarp and glacis of the hornwork which flanked the breach, exploded with tremendous violence, and shook all that part of the defences. The garrison, astonished at this event, abandoned the flanking outwork; and the advancing column, though severely galled by the firing flank of the British batteries on the other side of the Urumea, which, by firing too low, struck their own men, succeeded in reaching the foot of the breach without any very serious loss from the enemy. Major Fraser of the Royal Scotch, and Lieutenant Jones of the engineers, were the first to mount the breach, followed by a few brave men; and if the remainder of the column had come up in quick succession, as was expected, the place would have been taken in a quarter of an hour; for the enemy, thunderstruck at the rapidity of the advance, had retreated behind the ruins of the burning houses, and the pass might at that moment have been easily won. But the troops, who came straggling up irregularly and in small bodies, as they made their way over the rocks and through the water, did not support the gallant party in advance so quickly as was expected; and meanwhile the enemy, recovering from their consternation, opened a tremendous fire from all sides, as well upon the troops who had mounted the breach as those who were struggling at its foot, and wending their difficult way between the rising flood and the rampart. The heroic Fraser was killed amid the flaming ruins into which he had penetrated; Jones stood, with a few brave soldiers, alone for some time on the breach, expecting aid, but none

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came up; and before the arrival of the scaling ladders to escalade the ramparts, they were almost all killed or wounded. Colonel Greville and Colonel Cameron exerted themselves to the utmost to lead the troops up the breach; and Lieutenant Campbell of the 9th twice mounted it, almost alone, and was twice wounded. At length the fire became so dreadful, that the troops who had crossed the river got into inextricable confusion; and the whole column fled across the Urumea in disorder, after sustaining a loss of five hundred and twenty men, including the gallant Sir Richard Fletcher, who was severely wounded. The rising tide threatened to drown all the wounded who lay between the flood and the rampart, in consequence of which a flag of truce was displayed by the British for an hour, at daylight, to enable the enemy to rescue the wounded from their perilous situation; and, with admirable humanity, the French answered the appeal, and brought the whole of the maimed safe over the breach into the hospitals, where they were placed beside their own wounded men, and tended with equal care during the remainder of the siege.[1]

[1] Belm. iv. 623, 626. Nap. vi. 80, 83. Jones' Sieges, ii. 37, 41. Graham's Desp. July 27, 1813. Gurw. x. 589. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 272, 273.

Wellington arrives and turns the siege into a blockade.

As soon as Wellington received intelligence of this bloody repulse, he repaired to St Sebastian from his headquarters near Pampeluna; and convinced, from the experience he had now had of the quality of the enemy, that the place was not to be carried without a very considerable addition to the means of attack, which the present exhausted state of the besiegers' ammunition would not permit, it was determined to suspend active operations, and convert the siege into a blockade, until the arrival of the supply of warlike store from Portsmouth which had been written for a month before, and was hourly expected. They

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did not arrive, however, in consequence of adverse winds, for a considerable time; and, meanwhile, a vehement irruption was made by the French force into Spain, which wellnigh broke through the investment of Pampeluna, raised the siege of St Sebastian, snatched from Wellington the fruits of his glorious victory, and by damping the hopes of the allied sovereigns in Germany, after the repulse at Dresden, altered the whole face of the war. These disastrous consequences were prevented solely by the heroic resistance of a few British brigades, the daring intrepidity of their leaders, and the happy arrival of Wellington at the scene of danger, at the very moment when further resistance appeared hopeless. Such is the value of time in war, and such the magnitude of the consequences which often flow from the heroism or pusillanimity of a single regiment or brigade!

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No sooner did Napoleon receive intelligence at Dresden of the battle of Vittoria, than measuring at once, with prophetic eye, the extent of the danger, he dispatched Soult, as already mentioned, from his headquarters in Germany, to take the command of the whole French forces now assembled in the neighbourhood of Bayonne, under the title of lieutenant of the emperor.* The danger, great as it was, appeared to Napoleon more threatening than it actually proved; for it is now known, that so utterly unprepared were the enemy for the rapidity of Wellington's success, that Bayonne, at the time the English standards approached the Bidassoa, was wholly unprovided for a siege, the guns were not even mounted on the ramparts; and if the English general had been aware of its defenceless state, he might,[1] by pushing

Napoleon sends Soult with supreme powers to Bayonne.

[1] Vict et Conq. xxii. 264.

* Ante, ix. 357.

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on, have made himself master of that great frontier fortress almost without firing a shot.*

1813. Soult arrived at Bayonne on the 13th of July, and immediately commenced the most active measures for putting that fortress in a state of defence, and reorganizing the wreck of several different armies which were now assembled around its walls. These consisted of the remains of the once formidable armies of the south of Portugal, of the north, and of the centre; but although not a third of any of these immense hosts now remained, yet, being all united together under one head, and having a very narrow frontier to defend, they still presented a formidable force to repel the attacks of the enemy. From the imperial muster-rolls, it appears that the whole force which Soult now had at his disposal in the neighbourhood of Bayonne, amounted to 114,000 men, of whom ninety-eight thousand were present with the eagles—and of these seventy thousand infantry, and above six thousand cavalry were ready for active operations in the field—and the remainder formed the garrisons of St Sebastian, Pampeluna, Santona, and Bayonne.† The forces in Catalonia, at the same time, under Suchet, were about sixty-six thousand; so that Napoleon still had one hundred and fifty-six thousand men present under arms to oppose the Allies in the Peninsula, or on the French frontier,

Forces which Soult found there.

* "In consequence of a blind confidence in his [Napoleon's] good fortune, which a long series of uninterrupted triumphs can hardly excuse, Bayonne, the most important fortress on the southern frontier, was not at this moment beyond the reach of a *coup-de-main*. Struck with astonishment, the civil and military authorities had taken no steps whatever for its defence, and the English would have got possession, without firing a shot, of that important fortress, if they had been aware of its situation, and had had the boldness to continue their pursuit through the Pyrenees beyond the pass of Bioba."—*Victoires et Conquêtes*, xxii. 264. See also PELLOT, 23, 24.

† See App. D.

and Soult alone had eighty-six guns at his command. But although the physical resources of his army were thus great, it was very deficient in spirit and organization; long marches had exhausted the strength, and continued defeats broken the spirit of the soldiers; the divisions of so many different armies were blended together without any proper arrangement or direction; and vast numbers of soldiers, stragglers from regiments which had been destroyed or lost sight of, were huddled together in disorderly masses, without arms, or officers to direct their movements.[1]

[1] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Aug. 1. 1813. Gurw. x. 576. Belm. i. 261, 262. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 264, 266. Nap. vi. 68, 69. Belm. i. 261, 262.

But Soult was one of those persons whose resolute and persevering character is eminently qualified to infuse his own spirit into such a disorderly body of troops, and remedy all the defects in organization, equipment, and direction, which previous mismanagement had occasioned. Although his eye for tactics in the field was not of the quickest kind, and he was far from possessing the rapidity of conception and decision of execution which distinguished Napoleon, Ney, and Wellington on the field of battle, yet he was unrivalled in the ability with which he effected the reorganization of his armies and laid out his plans of strategy, and second to none in the tenacity with which he clung to their execution, under circumstances when, to all others, they appeared all but desperate. Had he possessed the vigour of Ney on the field of battle, he would have been a perfect general; had he been less inclined to acts of rapacity, his character as a man would have been comparatively unsullied. Although not of a strong make, and subject to a natural defect in the foot, which might be supposed to injure his seat on horseback,* yet he was capable of enduring the most severe fatigue, and was unwearied in the diligence

Character of Marshal Soult.

* One of his legs was club-footed.

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with which he set himself to work to execute any mission with which he was entrusted, or repair any disasters with which he was called upon to contend. Although he subsequently held the most important situations in the royal councils of France, and was more than once entrusted by its sovereign with the supreme direction, both of civil and military affairs, on the most important occasions; yet his fame as a general will mainly rest upon the admirable ability with which he struggled against Wellington in the campaign on which we are now about to enter, on the Pyrenees and in the south of France: and the interest of the contest between these two great commanders, is not a little enhanced by the cordial union which, long after the termination of the struggle, prevailed between them, and the constancy with which they exerted their great influence in their respective countries to preserve the blessings of peace, when the popular passions on either side were ready to rekindle the flames of war.

His division of his forces, and preparation for the campaign.

The first care of this great commander, upon taking the direction of the army, was to provide for the immediate security of Bayonne, which was in no condition to make any resistance to the enemy. The ramparts were instantly lined with guns, the ditches cleared out, the decayed parts of the wall hastily repaired, and palisades run up to prevent the approach of the enemy to the outworks. The army was next divided into three wings; the right being placed under the orders of General Reille, D'Erlon had the command of the centre, and Clausel of the left wing. The cavalry, which was not numerous, was arranged in two divisions—one of dragoons and one of hussars. This force occupied the whole northern issues of the passes of the Pyrenees, from the pass of Roncesvalles on the east,

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to the mouth of the Bidassoa on the west; and Soult himself established his headquarters at Ascain, where he was indefatigably engaged in organizing his forces and completing his arrangements; while Wellington's headquarters were nearly opposite at Lezaca, within the Spanish territory. With such vigour were Soult's labours conducted, and so admirably was he seconded by the spirit of the inhabitants of Bayonne, and of the adjoining province of Bearn, that in less than a fortnight his preparations were complete, and he was in a condition to take the field. He resolved immediately to re-enter the Spanish territory, and direct his march to Pampeluna, the garrison of which had not now remaining provisions for more than ten days; while that of St Sebastian was hourly expected to sink, if the siege were not raised, under the impetuous assaults of the British soldiery. Wherefore, after issuing a spirited proclamation to his troops—in which he ascribed their misfortunes to the faults of their commanders, and, without disguising the merits of the British general and army, promised again to lead them to victory*—his whole army was put in motion at

Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Aug. 1, 1813. Gurw. x. 576. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 265. Belm. iv. 262, 268.

* "While Germany was thus the theatre of great events, that enemy who, under pretence of succouring the inhabitants of the Peninsula, has in reality devoted them to ruin, was not inactive. He assembled the whole of his disposable forces—English, Spaniards, and Portuguese—under his most experienced officers; and, relying upon the superiority of his numbers, advanced in three divisions against the French forces assembled upon the Douro. With well-provided fortresses in his front and rear, a skilful general, enjoying the confidence of his troops, might by selecting good positions have braved and discomfited this motley levy. But unhappily, at this critical period, timorous and pusillanimous counsels were followed. The fortresses were abandoned and blown up, hasty and disorderly marches gave confidence to the enemy, and a veteran army—small indeed in number, but great in all that constitutes the military character—which had fought, bled, and triumphed in every fortress in Spain, beheld its glory tarnished, and itself compelled to abandon all its acquisitions—the trophies of many a well-fought and bloody

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daybreak on the 25th, being the very day on which Wellington was engaged at St Sebastian in inspecting the works after the failure of the first assault.

Position and strength of the British army.

The Allies mustered, in all, seventy-two thousand combatants of the Anglo-Portuguese army, of whom seven thousand were cavalry, besides twenty-five thousand Spaniards.* The relative force of the contending armies, therefore, was not materially different, the more especially as the numerous National Guards whom the French general could summon to his standard, of great service in mountain warfare, and well acquainted with the intricacies of the passes, fully compensated the Spanish troops at the command of the English general. Both armies occupied a line about eleven leagues in length, from the sea on the left, to the mountains on the westward of the

day. When at length the indignant voice of the troops arrested this disgraceful flight, and its commander, touched with shame, yielded to the general desire, and determined giving battle near Vittoria, who can doubt, from this generous enthusiasm—this fine sense of honour—what would have been the result had the general been worthy of his troops? had he, in short, made those dispositions and movements, which would have secured to one part of his army the co-operation and support of the other?

"Let us not, however, defraud the enemy of the praise which is due to him. The dispositions and arangements of their general have been prompt, skilful, and consecutive. The valour and steadiness of his troops have been praiseworthy; yet do not forget that it is to the benefit of your example they owe their present military character; and that, whenever the relative duties of a French general and his troops have been ably fulfilled, their enemies have commonly had no other resource than flight. Soldiers! I partake your chagrin, your grief, your indignation: I know that the blame of the present situation of the army, is imputable to others; the glory of repairing it is your own. The Emperor's instructions are, to drive the enemy from yonder lofty heights, which enable him proudly to survey our fertile valleys, and chase him beyond the Ebro. If won, the Spanish soil must bear your tents, and from thence your resources be drawn. No difficulties are insurmountable to your valour and devotion."—SOULT *to his Soldiers*, 22d July 1813. GURWOOD, x. 577.

* See App. C. Chap. LXXI.

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pass of Roncesvalles on the extreme right. But there was this difference between the two—and it was a difference which came to be of vital importance in the outset of operations—that although the British were on the higher ground, and occupied passes difficult of access, yet the columns posted in them, separated from each other by inaccessible ridges, could only communicate with, or receive support from each other, by a roundabout march of some days in the rear; while the French, who were grouped in the plain, from which access was easy from one part of the line to another, could at pleasure throw the weight of their force against the weakest part of the allied line, and overwhelm it by a vehement irruption, with superior forces, before succour could by possibility be obtained, by the long circuits in the rear, from the remoter parts of their position.[1]

[1] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, 1st August 1813. Gurw. x. 578, 579. Nap. vi. 93, 94. Belm. i. 262, 263.

Irruption of the French into the Pyrenees, and their success in the pass of Roncesvalles.

Having concentrated his troops, and selected his point of attack, Soult, at daybreak on the 25th, with thirty-five thousand combatants, ascended the French side of the pass of Roncesvalles, while D'Erlon with the centre, twenty thousand strong, threatened the British centre by the Puerta de Maya, at the head of the valley of Bastan; and Villatte, with eighteen thousand, remained in observation on the Bidassoa. Soult's object in this measure was to accumulate forces on Wellington's right more rapidly than the English general could collect forces to oppose him; to relieve Pampeluna, for the revictualling of which he had collected a large convoy; and then turning to his own right, descend upon St Sebastian and the forces covering the siege, at the same time that his centre and right forced the allied positions in their front. To facilitate this operation, great efforts had been made in the preceding days to smooth the

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doned, and the British general, united to Cole's division, which had come up from the left during the night, evacuated the great ridge, and descended on the opposite side towards the general rendezvous of the troops in that quarter, in the valley of Zubiri.[1]

While the pass of Roncesvalles was thus forced on the allied right, the Puerta de Maya in the centre had also been the theatre of a sanguinary conflict. D'Erlon had early in the morning put himself in motion on the same day, to attack that pass at the head of the valley of Bastan, and thus pour down by another road on the British blockading force around Pampeluna. Hill was there with the second division; and the ground at the summit of the pass was exceedingly strong, consisting of an elevated valley, three miles broad, flanked by lofty rocks and ridges on either side, and presenting scenery of the grandest description. The vale of Estevan, indeed, which leads to it, has at first an air of fertility and beauty; but it narrows as it rises towards the north, and is soon lost in the gloom and desolation of the frontier. Mountains are there crowded together in all varieties of savage magnificence; here crested with grey and jagged rock, there rounded and green upon the summits, to which the panting traveller is led by long and winding paths. The sides of the rugged barrier are strewed with vast masses of black rock, detached by winter's frosts from the cliffs above; the roads are narrow and stony; the fastnesses into which they lead, dark and shadowy; and the solitary traveller, in traversing them, in general hears only the dash of the waters, which descend in numerous cascades on all sides, or the scream of the eagles, which float high in the firmament above.[2]

[1] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, August 1, 1813. Gur. x. 579. Nap. v. 108, 113. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 267. Pellot's Guerre des Pyrenees, 23, 24.

Description of the Puerta de Maya.

[2] Scherer, ii. 234.

The better to conceal his real intentions, Count

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d'Erlon, early on the morning of the 25th, made some demonstrations against the small passes of Espegne and Lareta, which lie to the right of that of Maya, and were guarded by the Portuguese; and under cover of these movements, he skilfully brought forward his main body, long concealed from view by the great road leading direct from Urdax up the pass, and they were near the summit before they were perceived. The alarm guns were instantly fired; the pickets were driven in with heavy loss, and the light companies slowly retired, firing quickly as they fell back, with the most exemplary steadiness. Breathless with running up the Spanish side, from the bivouacs a little below the summit, the British regiments now came up. The 34th and 50th first arrived by companies, and immediately began to fire; and soon after the 92d appeared, and the Highlanders, at home among the rocks, long kept the enemy at bay by the most devoted courage.* But the enemy increased rapidly, and fought well; two-thirds of the 92d were at length struck down, and the ascent was literally blocked up by the prodigious piles of the slain. Other regiments, particularly the 71st and 82d, were brought up, and maintained the pass long and bravely against the enemy: but it was all in vain; they were literally

Combat there, and defeat of the British.

* The heroism of the 92d regiment on this occasion was the object of deserved admiration to the whole army. "The stern valour of the 92d," says Napier, "*principally composed of Irishmen*, would have graced Thermopylæ." No one can doubt the justice of this eulogium on the regiment; but the statement of its being composed principally of Irishmen is a mistake, arising from misinformation on the part of the gallant colonel. The author has ascertained from enquiry at its officers, particularly Lieut.-Colonel Macdonald, that at that period nine-tenths of the whole corps were Scotch Highlanders. See NAPIER, vi. 122, and App. E. Chap. lxxii. where the proportion of Irish and Scotch in the regiment are given; and *United Service Journal for* Oct. 1840, p. 42.

forced back, and sullenly retreated across the ridge, still resolutely combating. So long-continued and obstinate was the fight, that the whole ammunition of the 82d was exhausted; and at length, as they still kept their ground, they were reduced to roll down stones on the enemy. In this desperate condition, the Allies were driven back to the last ridge of the pass, and were on the point of abandoning the crest of the mountain altogether, when Barnes, with a brigade of the 7th division, came up from Echallar, and, by a brilliant charge with the 6th regiment, drove the French back to the first summit of the range. In this disastrous and bloody combat, the Allies had fifteen hundred men killed, wounded, and made prisoners; the French lost, by their own admission, as many, but they won the pass, and took four pieces of cannon.[1]

[1] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Aug. 1, 1813. Gurw. x. 579. Scherer, ii. 247. Nap. v. 118, 122. Pellot. 26, 27. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 267, 268.

So far, the most brilliant success had crowned Soult's operations: he had, unknown to the British, accumulated the bulk of his forces against his right, and thrown himself in such strength on the two principal passes leading to Pampeluna, that they were both won. Final success seemed inevitable; for if the Allies had been unable to make good the summit of the hill, with all the advantages of ground in their favour, it was not to be expected that they could arrest the victorious enemy in the course of the rapid descent, not above twenty miles in length from either of these passes, to the ramparts of Pampeluna. If the French generals had been as well aware as Soult was of the inestimable importance of time in all, but especially mountain warfare, it is more than probable that this would have been the result, and a new aspect been given to the campaign, and possibly the fortunes of the war, by the raising of the siege of St Sebastian

Advantages gained by Soult on this day's operations.

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and the blockade of Pampeluna. But D'Erlon, satisfied with having won the Puerta de Maya, remained there on the night of the 25th, without following up his successes; and Reille's three divisions, which had received orders to march from St Jean Pied-de-Port for Airola and Lindoys on the preceding day, lost much precious and irreparable time in incorporating some conscripts which had come up with their respective regiments, so that they did not ascend the rocks of Airola in time to seize that important pass before the British troops had got through. Thus, though the crest of the mountains was won, no decisive blow had been struck; and the allied and French troops, after nearly equal mutual slaughter, were wending their way down the valleys on the southern slope of the Pyrenees.[1]

[1] Pellot, 25, 26. Nap. vi. 113, 114. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 268.

Retreat of the British to the neighbourhood of Pampeluna.

On the morning of the 26th, Soult's march was retarded by a thick fog which hung on the higher parts of the mountains; he at length, however, got into motion, and descended the valley in pursuit of the British; but he soon found that in mountain warfare, though the assailant may have the advantage in the first onset, difficulties accumulate around him as he advances, if opposed by a resolute and persevering adversary. Cole, who was retreating down the valley from Roncesvalles, met Picton, who had hurried to the scene of danger in advance of his division, which, however, had crossed the hills and reached Zubiri, a few miles in his rear. Thither the British generals immediately retreated, with some sharp combats in the rearguard; and the two divisions united, now mustering eleven thousand bayonets, offered battle on the ridge in front of Zubiri: but Soult declined to attack, being desirous, before he did so, of being joined by D'Erlon or Reille's divisions; and, as they did not come

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up before night, he let fall some expressions of displeasure, discovering a secret apprehension of failure. Next day, Picton, with both divisions, now under his command, continued his retreat towards Pampeluna, desiring to concentrate his forces and give battle at SAUROREN, four miles in front of that fortress. Hill, finding his right uncovered, and being severely weakened by the combat of Maya, followed in the same direction down the valley of Bastan; and the mountain passes in the centre and right of the British position being now all abandoned, alarm and dismay spread far and wide in the rear. All the valleys leading down to Navarre were filled with baggage waggons, mules, artillery, and convoys, falling back in confusion; and rumour, with its hundred tongues, every where spread the report that an irreparable disaster had been sustained. Meanwhile the garrison of Pampeluna, taking advantage of the alarm, made a sally; O'Donnell, who commanded the blockading force, immediately spiked his guns and destroyed his magazines, to prevent their falling into the enemy's hands; and he would have raised the blockade entirely, had not Don Carlos D'Espana fortunately come up at the moment with his corps, and restored some sort of order in the besieging force.[1]

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[1] Nap. vi. 123, 125. Scherer, ii. 248. La Pene Camp. des Pyrenees, 32, 34. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 268. Robinson's Life of Picton, ii. 218, 219.

Wellington was on his way back from St Sebastian when he received intelligence of Soult's irruption—but only of the one at the pass of Maya; and as he did not conceive it possible, that with no larger force than D'Erlon had, he would attempt to penetrate the British lines, he thought that attack was only a feint, and that the real attempt would be made on the lower Bidassoa, to raise the siege of St Sebastian. In the course of the night, however, correct accounts arrived of the Roncesvalles and Maya

Wellington's measures on hearing of these disasters.

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combats; and he immediately adopted the same measures as Napoleon had done at Mantua in 1796, and Suwarrow at the same fortress in 1799,* by ordering Graham instantly to raise the siege, embark the stores and guns, and hasten with all his disposable forces to the support of Giron, in a defensive position previously selected for battle, on the southern side of the Bidassoa. These orders were punctually executed; and, meanwhile, Wellington set out on horseback with the utmost speed to join Picton and Cole's divisions in their position in front of Pampeluna. As he entered the village of Sauroren, he saw Clausel's division moving along the crest of the mountain opposite, which made an alteration of his dispositions advisable. He immediately dismounted, wrote the necessary orders in pencil on the parapet of the bridge, sent them off by Lord Fitzroy Somerset, the only one of his staff who had been able to keep up with his racing speed, and rode alone up the ascent to join the British troops. The moment he was descried, a shout was raised by the nearest battalion, which spread along the line till the very mountain re-echoed with the clang; and the French generals, startled by the sound, paused in their advance till they ascertained the cause of the tumult. The generals on the opposite sides were within sight of each other. Soult was so near, that his features with the aid of a telescope even were visible: "Yonder," said Wellington, "is a great commander; but he is a cautious one, and will delay his attack till he ascertain the cause of these cheers; that will give time for the sixth division to arrive, and I shall beat him." And so in effect it proved;[1] no serious attack was made that day, and, before the next, such reinforcements arrived as enabled Wellington to resume the

[1] Nap. vi. 129, 130. Pelet, 28, 29. Vict et Conq. xxii. 26. Robinson's Life of Picton, ii. 219, 226. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Aug. 1, 1813. Gurw. x. 580, 581.

* Ante, iii. 68; iv. 73.

offensive and complete his victory. A sharp fire of musketry along the front of the line, indeed, commenced at six o'clock in the evening; but a dreadful storm soon after arose, and prevented any important operations on either side till the following day.

Early on the morning of the 28th, the sixth division, to the infinite joy of their comrades, came up, and considerable reinforcements had arrived during the night: the whole allied centre, now thoroughly aroused, being directed to the scene of danger on the right. The position which the Allies occupied was very strong, and such as seemed well adapted to arrest the march of a successful enemy, and turn the flood-tide of victory into ebb. Their troops were drawn up in two lines, both on very strong ground; the first, posted on the summit of the ridge of Oricain, stretched in the form of a convex semicircle, from the village of that name on the left to Zabaldica on the right, and was about two miles in length, covered on the right flank by the river Guy, and on the left by the torrent Lanz. On this ridge, the guns from which commanded the roads down the valleys on either side, stood the fourth division under Cole; while the sixth division was drawn up across the Lanz in the valley on the left, and entirely blocked up the approach to Pampeluna in that direction; and the Spaniards, under Murillo, held in strength the crest of the ridge on the extreme right, above the Esteriba, the valley where the river Lanz flows. The second line was posted on a still more rugged ridge, which runs entirely across the valley, and is cleft asunder by two narrow openings, through the left of which the Lanz makes its way between overhanging rocks, while through the one on the

Battle of Sumoren, July 28.

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right the Guy descends, and these two streams, uniting in the rear of the ridge, form the Arga river, which, a mile further on, washes the ramparts of Pampeluna. On this strong ground, the front of which is uncommonly bold and abrupt towards the north, Picton's division was placed; his right in front of Huarte—which village lies immediately behind the opening through which the Guy flows—his left, communicating with the Spaniards under O'Donnell, who had been hurried up from the lines before Pampeluna, stretched on the heights across the gap formed by the Lanz, and in front of the village of Villaba.[1] *

[1] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, 1st Aug. 1813. Gurw. x. 580, 581. Nap. vi. 132, 133. Robinson's Picton, ii. 219. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 269. Pellot, 29.

Battle of Sauroren, and defeat of the French on the right.

The rocks on which the first line stood, consisted of huge piles, standing one above another, like the ruins of gigantic castles half gone to ruin; and none but the troops inured to the perils of the Peninsular warfare would have thought of assailing them. Soult's men, however, were equal to the task. Having minutely surveyed the ground, he resolved upon an attack; being unaware, from the hilly ground which concealed their march, of the arrival of the sixth division, and having learned from deserters that Hill, with three fresh divisions and a Portuguese brigade, was expected at latest on the following morning. D'Erlon's men had not yet come up; so that his forces did not exceed, after the losses in the advance, thirty-two thousand men. Not more than eighteen thousand of the Anglo-Portuguese army were assembled; but the Spaniards were ten thousand more, and the great strength of the position compensated for the inferiority in the quality of the latter of these troops. About mid-day on the 28th, the an-

* If Wyld's admirable plans of this battle be consulted, this description will be readily understood.

niversary of the battle of Talavera, the French tirailleurs, with the most admirable gallantry, began to swarm up the steep; while Clausel's division, in the valley of Lanz, burning with ardour, poured down the sides of the stream in one impetuous mass, even before the signal for attack was given. But just as it had turned Cole's left, and was preparing to double upon his rear, a Portuguese brigade of the sixth division appeared on the heights on its right flank; while the broad lines of the English uniforms, emerging from behind the same ridge, stood in battle array in its front! Time there was none, either for deliberation or retreat: the British in front opened a heavy fire on the head of the column; the Portuguese on the right poured in their shot on the one flank; while two brigades of the fourth division, descending from their rocky fastness on the left, smote the other with redoubled fury. Thus fiercely assailed at once in front and both flanks by an enemy heretofore invisible, the French columns recoiled, still bravely combating, and strewed their numerous slain along the line of their retreat.[1]

July 28.

[1] Nap. vi. 136, 137. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, August 1, 1813. Gur. x. 581. Scherer, ii. 251. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 269.

While this bloody repulse was going on upon the British left in the valley of the Lanz, a conflict of unequalled severity was raging along the top of the ridge in the centre and right. Without any proper unity in their efforts, but with surpassing valour, Clausel's other divisions rushed up the steep face of the mountain; and undismayed by a plunging fire, which in many cases swept off half their battalions, worked their toilsome way up to the top. In some instances their extraordinary gallantry met with deserved though but temporary success. The seventh Portuguese Caçadores shrunk from the terrible encounter on the summit, and the French established

Dreadful contest in the centre and on the right.

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themselves for a few minutes on their part of the left of the ridge; but Ross's British brigade, instantly advancing, charged with a loud shout, and hurled them down the steep. Again they returned, however, reinforced to the charge: another Portuguese regiment on Ross's right wing having given way, the French penetrated in at the opening, and that heroic brigade, assailed at once in front and flank, was compelled to give ground. Instantly the assailants stood on his position on the summit, their line began to deploy to a considerable breadth on either side, and the crest of the mountain, enveloped in cloud and flame, seemed already won. In this extremity Wellington ordered up Byng's brigade, which advanced in double-quick time; the 27th and 48th were brought down from the higher ground in the centre; with indescribable fury they charged the crowded masses on the summit, and the whole were rolled in wild confusion over the rocks, and lost half their numbers under the British bayonet. In the course of this desperate conflict, the gallant fourth division surpassed all its former exploits; every regiment charged with the bayonet,* some of them four different times, and the heroic Ross had two horses shot under him. Meanwhile Reille's division, on the left of Clausel's third division, had environed the right of the position above the Guy stream, where Murillo's Spaniards were placed; and, mounting fiercely the hill-side, dislodged them, after a brave resistance, from their ground on the left of the 40th British regiment. A Portuguese battalion, gallantly advancing, took its place in their room beside that noble corps, which waited in stern silence until the French set their feet on the broad summit;

* The 40th, 7th, 20th, and 23d.—Gurw. x. 582.

"but when their glittering arms appeared over the brow of the mountain, the charging cry was heard, the crowded mass was broken to pieces, and a tempest of bullets followed its flight. Four times this assault was renewed; and the French officers were seen to pull up their tired men by the belts, so fierce and resolute were they to win. But it was the labour of Sysiphus. The vehement shout and shock of the British soldiers always prevailed, and at last, with thinned ranks, tired limbs, and hearts hopeless from repeated failures, they were so abashed, that three British companies sufficed to bear down a whole brigade.[1]"

[1] Nap. vi. 138, 140. Pellot, 29, 30. Scherer, ii. 251, 252. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 269. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Aug. 1. 1813. Gurw. x. 582.

Disconcerted by this bloody repulse, Soult drew off his forces towards evening, and resumed his former position on a range of hills opposite to Wellington's. Just then the heads of D'Erlon's columns began to appear on the right; that general having during the action penetrated to within a league of Pampeluna and been prevented from reaching that fortress, chiefly by the violent fire which he heard in his rear, which induced him to remeasure his steps. It was too late to think of resuming the contest; the strength of Wellington's position had been proved: twelve thousand men on the first ridge, who alone had been engaged, had defeated all the efforts of twenty-five thousand, who had mounted to the assault with the most heroic bravery, and they were weakened by the loss of three thousand men. Hill's divisions, it was well known, would come up during the night; and before the morrow, fifty thousand men, posted on the strongest positions, would be ready in front of Pampeluna to dispute the further progress of the French troops. With a heavy heart, therefore, Soult gave

Soult determines to retreat.

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orders for a retreat at all points on the following day; to the infinite grief of the garrison of Pampeluna, who, hearing the cannon so near them, and on some heights even seeing the French uniforms, had deemed their deliverance at hand, and already raised the shouts of joy on their crowded ramparts. They had made, however, good use of the temporary suspension of the blockade, and exerted themselves so diligently in sweeping the adjacent plain for supplies while O'Donnell's troops were absent, that they were enabled to prolong the defence above a month longer than would have been otherwise practicable.[1]

[1] Pellot, 30, 31. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 269. Nap. vi. 139, 140. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Aug. 1, 1813. Gurw. x. 582, 583. Scherer, ii. 251, 252.

Though obliged to relinquish his design of relieving Pampeluna, Soult had not yet, however, abandoned all hope of gaining something by his irruption; and accordingly, on the 29th, instead of falling back by the direct road towards Roncesvalles, by which he had entered, he manœuvred on his right, with the view of throwing the weight of his forces towards St Sebastian, and raising the siege of that fortress, now that the whole centre and right of the British army was concentrated on the extreme right in front of Pampeluna. With this view he, during the night of the 29th, occupied in strength the crest of the ridge lying to the westward of the Lanz, thus connecting their centre in position with their right, destined to commence the offensive movement against Sir Rowland Hill. On his side, Wellington, perceiving that although preparations for retreat were making, yet the troops in his front stood firm, being now reinforced by Hill's three divisions, and having fifty thousand men in hand, of whom thirty-five thousand were English and Portuguese, resolved to asssume the offensive, and drive the enemy from their advanced position. With this view, he ordered Lord Dalhousie

Movement on both sides following the battle. July 29.

to possess himself with his division of the ridge in front of his position, which turned the enemy's right; while Picton with his division was to move forward to turn their left, by descending from the ridge of Sauroren, and advancing by Zobaldica up the valley of the Guy. Arrangements were at the same time made for attacking the enemy's central position, opposite to the heights which had been the theatre of such a bloody conflict on the preceding day, as soon as the effect of these flank operations began to appear. These movements were all made with the utmost precision, and proved entirely successful. Before daylight broke, Dalhousie was at the head of his division, (the 7th,) cheering them up the rugged paths which led to the lofty ridge they were to gain, on the right bank of the Lanz: the enemy's corps were driven before them like chaff, and the first rays of the sun glittered on the British bayonets on the summit of the range. Murillo's Spaniards and Campbell's Portuguese speedily followed, exhibiting an imposing mass of fifteen thousand combatants on the crest of the mountains, on the enemy's extreme right; while at the same time a general attack was made by the British centre, which now descended from its stronghold above the village of Sauroren, on the French centre, which still held its old position on the heights to its left. Picton, at the same time, pressed forward with his division up the valley of the Guy, on the extreme right; and not content with driving Reille's men in his front before him up the pass, detached a brigade which scaled the heights on the left of the French position. The effect of these advances and attacks, which were all made at the same time, and with that enthusiastic ardour which springs from the universal transport at returning victory, was to force the

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enemy to abandon entirely his position, and retreat up the valleys of the Lanz and the Guy towards Olague and Zubiri. Sauroren was now carried by storm by Byng's division and Madden's Portuguese, amidst deafening cheers, and fourteen hundred prisoners made. The whole valley was filled with smoke, which appeared to Dalhousie's men on the heights like agitated foam in the hollow; while the roar of the cannon and rattle of the musketry were re-echoed with awful effect from mountain to mountain. This general attack relieved the pressure on Hill, who had been assailed on the extreme British left by such superior forces early in the morning, that he was driven with considerable loss from the range of heights which he occupied to another in his rear in front of Marcalain; but Dalhousie's able movement compelled the enemy to retire in their turn; and at length both parties, thoroughly exhausted, sunk to sleep on their stony beds above the clouds. The Allies in this day's combats lost nineteen hundred men, of whom two-thirds were Portuguese, upon whom the weight of the action had fallen, and to whom its chief glory belonged; but the French were weakened by an equal number killed and wounded, and in addition three thousand prisoners were made, and great numbers dispersed and lost in the woods and ravines.[1] *

[1] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, August 1, 1813. Gur. x. 584, 585. Nap. vi. 146, 149. Pellot. 33, 34. Robinson's Picton, ii. 225, 226. Jom. iv. 500.

Soult, after this disastrous defeat, continued his retreat on the day following with all possible expedition up the valleys of the Lanz and Guy; but he was now in a most hazardous situation: his troops

* Five-and-twenty years ago, the author received a most interesting account of these days' actions from his noble and lamented friend, Lord Dalhousie, who bore so distinguished a part in them. The lapse of that long period has taken nothing from the vividness of the impression produced by his graphic narrative, from which the preceding detail is in great part taken, and which perfectly coincides with the positions of the troops as laid down in Wyld's admirable plans of these battles.

were all worn out with excessive toil; his fighting men were reduced to thirty-five thousand; Foy, with eight thousand whom he had rallied, was retiring up the Guy towards Zubiri, entirely separated from the main body, which was slanting down towards the Bidassoa; and the baggage, artillery, and caissons, could scarcely be hoped to be preserved while re-crossing the rugged summits of the Pyrenees. Graham, with twenty thousand, was ready to stop him on the side of St Sebastian; and it was only by an extraordinary exertion of skill and coolness that his army in these circumstances was preserved from total ruin. He directed his retreat, not by the valley of Bastan towards the Puerta de Maya, as D'Erlon had entered, but by the pass of Donna Maria towards the Elisondo, and the valley of the Upper Bidassoa. At the latter pass, his rearguard made a stand in a very strong defile to gain time for the carriages and artillery in their rear to get on; but Hill turned the left of the gorge, and Dalhousie the right, and after a vigorous resistance the enemy were driven from their stronghold in utter confusion, and with very severe loss. Meanwhile Byng pushed on, and in the Elisondo captured a large and valuable convoy of provisions, and, rapidly advancing, reoccupied the Maya pass. Wellington's troops had now almost entirely enclosed Soult's main body in a net, from which it seemed impossible for him to escape: for his soldiers, unconscious of their danger, were grouped close together in the deep and narrow valley of Estevan: three British divisions and one Spanish, under Wellington, were on his right flank concealed by the mountains; Hill was close behind him; Dalhousie held the pass of Donna Maria, which he had just won; Byng was at Maya, at the

Retreat of the French across the frontier.

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head of the valley; the light division would in two hours block it up at Estevan; and Graham was marching to close the only other exit from the valley by Vera and Echallar. Dispirited and worn out as his men were, Soult was in no condition to force any of these formidable defiles, defended by victorious troops, and his surrender seemed inevitable. So hopeful was the English general of such a result, that, screened by the rocks from behind which he surveyed the whole valley, he prohibited his men from issuing forth to capture Soult himself, who was seen riding in a careless way along its bottom, lest the catastrophe should awaken the French army from its perilous dream of security, and issued the strictest orders that not a man should show himself from behind the ridge which concealed them from the enemy. At this moment, when every bosom beat high with exultation at the expected glorious trophy of their valour they were so soon to obtain, in the surrender of a whole army with a marshal of France at its head, three British marauders issued from their concealment, to plunder in the valley. The sight of the red coats was not lost upon Soult, who instantly perceived the imminence of his danger: his whole army was immediately put in motion, and hurried towards the passes leading to the Lower Bidassoa, which they got through just before the Spainards under Longa, or the light division, could come up to close the terrible defiles! Such is war: the disobedience to orders by three soldiers saved France from the greatest calamity, and deprived England of the greatest triumph, recorded in the annals of either monarchy.[1]

[1] Nap. vi. 154, 156. Wellington to Lord Bathurst Aug. 1. 1813. Gurw. x. 585, 586. Pellot, 34, 35.

It soon appeared from what a fearful danger the emerging of these marauders from this retreat had delivered the French army. In their last march to

the defiles of Echallar, when the army was hurrying forward to win the pass before the enemy, great part of the French army, now thoroughly discouraged, broke its ranks and dispersed. Soult, who was endeavouring to form a rearguard to arrest the pursuit of the enemy, was seized with indignation when he beheld the disorderly bands which in wild confusion came hurrying forward. "Cowards," said he, "where are you flying to? You are Frenchmen, and you are running away! In the name of honour, halt and face the enemy!" Stung by these reproaches, twelve hundred men rallied under the directions of the marshal and his aides-de-camp, and formed a sort of rearguard; but the remainder fled on without intermission, and the torrent of fugitives rolled impetuously down, with the roar and whirl of a mighty rapid, to the defiles of Yanzi and Echallar. Before they got there the head of the column was as much disordered as the rear; the weather was oppressively sultry; and though the great body of the bewildered mass found vent during the night by the latter defile, yet a frightful scene ensued next day when Reille's divisions were rolling through by the gorge of Yanzi. The French were there Aug. 1. wedged in a narrow road, between inaccessible rocks on the one side and the river on the other. While struggling through this dreadful pass, the head of the light division reached the summit of the precipice, and immediately began firing down on the dense throng. Indescribable confusion followed; the cavalry drew their swords, and charged through the pass; the infantry were trampled under foot; numbers, horses and all, were precipitated into the river: some in despair fired vertically up at the summit of the cliffs; the wounded implored quarter as they

Dreadful disaster in the defiles of Echallar.

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were rolled over the brink, and hung suspended, yet bleeding, on the branches of trees over the roaring torrent. So piteous was the scene, that many even of the iron veterans of the light division ceased to fire, or discharged their pieces with averted gaze. With such circumstances of horror did the last columns of that mighty host leave Spain, who but a few days before had mounted the pass of Roncesvalles buoyant with spirit, and in all the pride of apparently irresistible strength! And yet the disaster, great as it was to the French arms, would have been still greater if all the men had been able to reach their ground at the time assigned them; for Longa's division, if they had come up in time, would have rendered the pass of Yanzi altogether impassable to the disorderly torrent of Soult's masses; and though the light division marched forty miles in nineteen hours, and bore their extraordinary fatigues with surprising spirit, yet, if they had not lost their way in the wilds, they would have been two hours earlier at the perilous bridge, and none of Reille's division would have escaped.[1]

[1] Cooke's Narrative, 84, 87. Pellot, 34, 35. Nap. vi. 158, 161. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, 4th Aug. 1813. Gurw. x. 597, 598.

Glorious combat at Echallar.

Next day the French troops, at all points, evacuated the Spanish territory, and both armies nearly resumed the positions they had held before Soult's irruption took place. Before they recrossed the frontier, however, an incident occurred, which showed, in a striking manner, how the steadiness of the bravest troops may be shaken, even in a short time, by a series of disasters. Clausel's divisions were the last which remained on the Spanish territory; and he occupied a strong position, with the rearguard, in the Puerto de Echallar. Wellington immediately determined to dislodge him; and for this purpose the fourth division was marched from Yanzi

to attack his front, the seventh division against his left, and the light against his right. Barnes' brigade of the seventh division, however, having a shorter distance to march over, arrived on the ground before the other divisions had come up; they were fifteen hundred against six thousand, and the enemy held a position as strong as the rocks of Sauroren. Such was the spirit, however, with which the British army was now animated, that this handful of heroes actually assaulted and drove the enemy from the rugged heights, amidst the enthusiastic cheers of the whole troops who witnessed this heroic exploit. And yet the French were the same men who, a few days before, had all but won, against similar natural difficulties, the bloody steeps of Sauroren. Clausel's men, thus dislodged, fell back to a strong ridge beyond the pass of Echallar, covered by the Ivantelly rock, which was strongly occupied. But they were not permitted to rest in this last stronghold. As evening came on, and a dark mist crowned the cloud-capped summit of the cliff occupied by the French, the riflemen of the 43d, whom Colonel Barnard led to the attack, were soon lost to the view; but the sharp clang of musketry resounded in the clouds, and erelong a British shout was heard from the shrouded summit, and the last French were hurled in confusion down the steep from the Spanish soil.[1]

[1] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Aug. 3, 1813. Gurw. x. 597, 598. Nap. vi. 161, 162.

The irruption of Soult into the Spanish territory does the highest honour to his persevering character, and skill in the movements of strategy which preceded the final shock; but it may be doubted whether his vigour and firmness at the decisive moment were equal to the ability of his previous conceptions. With an overwhelming force he had thrown himself

Result of the battles of the Pyrenees.

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on the British right, and gained such success before succour could arrive, that the issue seemed no longer doubtful, when victory was snatched from his grasp, and a succession of disasters brought on the French arms, attended in the end with the most decisive effects upon the ultimate issue of the war. There can be no doubt that the vigour with which the stroke, thus happily conceived, was followed up at the decisive moment, was by no means proportioned to the felicity of its original conception. Soult was in front of the rocks of Sauroren with thirty thousand men on the evening of the 26th, when only two divisions, eleven thousand of the Anglo-Portuguese, were assembled to stop his progress. Had he attacked that night or next day with such a preponderance of force, it can hardly be doubted that he would have succeeded; and, supported by the ramparts of Pampeluna, he might have seen with indifference the arrival of the sixth, and all the subsequent divisions of the British army which came up on the 28th and 29th. Wellington's right wing was undoubtedly in one sense out-generaled—that is, it was assailed by a force greatly superior to that anticipated, or for which it was prepared—and the troops at the Maya pass were clearly surprised; but this is unavoidable in mountain warfare, where the attacking party may select his own point of onset, and the attacked cannot, from intervening ridges, obtain succour till after a long time, and a painful circuit in the rear; and Soult experienced the same, in his turn, in the forcing of his position shortly after on the Nive. On the other hand, the rapidity with which the British general gathered up all his forces to the menaced point; the firmness with which he held his ground in the first instance against a vast superiority

of force; and the admirable combinations by which, in the subsequent advance, he defeated all Soult's attempts, and all but made him prisoner with thirty thousand men, are worthy of the highest admiration, and justly place the battles of the Pyrenees among the most brilliant of Wellington's martial achievements. The French loss, from the time of their entering Spain on the 25th July, till their evacuating it, was not less than fifteen thousand men, including four thousand unwounded prisoners; that of the British was seven thousand and ninety-six men, of whom four thousand seven hundred and fifty-six were British soldiers; but, what is very remarkable, such was the effect of the trumpet of war in bringing back the stragglers, loosened by the Vittoria plunder, to their standards, that the muster-rolls after the battles exhibited only fifteen hundred less than those taken before they commenced.[1]*

[1] Wellington to Sir T. Graham, Aug. 4, 1813. Gurw. x. 592. Beim. i. 265, and to Earl Liverpool, Aug. 4, 1813. Gurw. x. 596.

The first object which occupied the attention of the English general after the defeat of Soult's irruption, was the renewal of the siege of St Sebastian, which had been so rudely interrupted. The governor had made good use of the breathing-time thus afforded him by the cessation of active operations, in repairing the breaches in the sea-wall, retrenching the interior parts of the rampart, and taking every imaginable precaution against a second

Renewal of the siege of St Sebastian.

* "That vain attempt cost the French army nineteen hundred killed, eight thousand five hundred and forty wounded, and two thousand seven hundred prisoners; in all thirteen thousand one hundred men."—BELMAS, *Journaux des Sieges dans la Peninsule*, i. 265. The prisoners taken were really four thousand, which shows that this estimate is in some respects below the truth, though founded on official documents, and probably very near it. See WELLINGTON *to* LORD LIVERPOOL, *4th August* 1815, where he says, "Their loss cannot be less than fifteen thousand, and I am not sure if it is not twenty thousand; we have four thousand prisoners."—GURWOOD, x. 597.

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assault. In particular, he had constructed out of the ruins of the houses which had been destroyed, immediately behind the great breach, a second or interior rampart, parallel to the outer, very thick, and fifteen feet high, with salient bastions, which it was hoped would entirely stop the progress of the enemy, even if they won the front wall. During the intermission of active operations, the efforts of the English were confined to a blockade position taken up on the heights of St Bartholomew, which were much strengthened, and a distant fire upon the men engaged in these vast undertakings; and they lost two hundred Portuguese in a sally made by the garrison in the night of the 26th July. But when Soult was finally driven back, matters soon assumed a very different aspect. The heavy guns which had been shipped at Passages were all relanded, and again placed in battery; a fleet of transports, with twenty-eight additional pieces of great calibre, and immense stores, arrived from Portsmouth, and they were soon succeeded by as many more from Woolwich; and the battering train, with the guns landed from the ships, now amounted to the large number of a hundred and eighteen pieces, including twelve sixty-eight pounders. By the night of the 25th this immense train of artillery was all in readiness, and fifty-seven pieces actually in the batteries; and on the morning of the 26th they reopened their fire with a roar so awful, that, re-echoed as it was from all the rocks and precipices in the wooded amphitheatre around, it seemed as if no force on earth could withstand the attack. The fire continued without intermission for the next four days, and before the 30th sixty-three guns were in constant practice; two wide breaches were gaping, and seemed

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— 23.

easy of ascent; the fire of the place was almost entirely silenced, and three mines had been run in front of the advanced batteries on the isthmus, close under the sea-wall, in order to counteract any mines of the enemy near the great breach. Still the brave governor, after informing Soult of his desperate situation, was resolute to stand a second assault, although his resistance of the first had fulfilled to the letter Napoleon's general orders; and the storm was ordered for the 31st at noonday.[1]

[1] Jones' Sieges, ii. 48, 70. Belm. iv. 630, 638. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Sept. 2. 1813. Gurw. xi. 61, 62, 63. Graham's Official Account. Subaltern, 48, 49.

At two in the morning of the 31st, the three mines were exploded under the sea-wall, and brought it completely down. At this awful signal the brave garrison all repaired to their posts, each armed with several muskets; and, relying on the successful resistance of the former assault, confidently anticipated the defeat of the present. Nor was their confidence without reason; for, notwithstanding the vastly increased means now at the disposal of the besiegers, they had not yet beat down the enemy's parapets nor established a lodgement in the hornwork, so that the assaulting columns would be exposed when near the breach to a destructive fire in flank—a fatal error, contrary to Vauban's rules, and which was only washed out by torrents of British blood. Dissatisfied with the steadiness of some of the troops at the former assault, Wellington had brought fifty volunteers from fifteen regiments in the first, fourth, and light divisions; "men," as he expressed it, "who could show other troops how to mount a breach." Leith, however, who had resumed the command of the fifth division, by whom the former assault had been made, was urgent that his men should be allowed the post of honour, and they were accordingly placed under General Robinson to head the attack, sup-

Commencement of the assault.

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ported by the remainder of the same division, and the seven hundred and fifty volunteers from the other regiments of the army. Major Snodgrass of the 52d, had on the preceding night forded the Urumea alone, opposite the smaller breach, clambered up its face at midnight, and looked down on the town! After the troops in the trenches were all under arms, deep anxiety pervaded every bosom; and before orders were given for the forlorn hope to move forward, the excitement felt had become almost intolerable. The heroic band took its station at halfpast ten; the tide, which all watched, was fast ebbing; the enemy's preparations were distinctly visible—the glancing of bayonets behind the parapets, the guns pointed towards the breach, the array of shells and fire barrels along its summit, told but too clearly the awful contest which awaited them. Little was said in the assaulting columns; the bravest occasionally changed colour; the knees of the most resolute smote each other, not with fear but anxiety; and time seemed to pass with such leaden wings, that the watches were looked to every half minute. Some laughed outright, they knew not why; many addressed a mental prayer to the throne of grace. The very elements seemed to have conspired to increase the impressive character of the moment; a close and oppressive heat pervaded the atmosphere, lowering and sulphurous clouds covered the sky, large drops fell at intervals, and the very animals, awestruck by the feeling of an approaching tempest, were silent in the camp and on the hills.[1]

[1] Gleig's Subaltern, 51, 54. Nap. vi. 197, 199. Graham's Official Account. Gurw. xi. 62, 63.

Dreadful assault of the breaches, which is repulsed.

Noon had barely passed, when, the tide being considered sufficiently fallen, the signal to advance was given. Silently the men moved forward, and not a shot was fired till the column had reached the middle of

the stream, when such a tempest of grape, musketry, and canister was at once opened upon it, as well-nigh choked the Urumea with the killed and the wounded. With dauntless intrepidity, however, the survivors pressed through the now crimsoned waves, and soon gained the strand on the opposite side, headed by the gallant Lieutenant M'Guin of the 4th, who led the forlorn hope, and rushed on, conspicuous from his plume, noble figure, and buoyant courage. Two mines were exploded rather prematurely by the enemy under the covered way of the hornwork; but they crushed only twenty men, and the column, bounding impetuously forward, streamed up the great breach, and soon reached its summit. There, however, they were assailed by a dreadful tempest of grape, shells, and hand-grenades, while the head of the column found it impossible to get down into the town, as the reverse of the breach consisted of a wall twelve or fourteen feet high, the bottom of which was filled with sword blades placed erect, and every kind of offensive obstacle, while the newly constructed rampart within, and the ruins of the houses burned on occasion of the former assault, were lined with grenadiers, who kept up so close and deadly a fire, that the whole troops who reached the summit were almost instantly struck down. Still fresh troops pressed on; the Urumea incessantly resounded with the splash of successive columns hurrying forward to the scene of carnage, until the whole fifth division was engaged; the volunteers from the different corps, who had with difficulty been restrained, were now let loose, and rushed on, calling out that they would show how a breach should be mounted. Soon the crowded mass made their way up the face of the ruins, won the summit, and with desperate resolu-

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tion strove to get over by a few ruined walls, which connected the back of the old with the front of the new rampart. Vain attempt! A steady barrier of steel awaited them on the other side, the bravest who got across were bayoneted or thrown down into the gulf below, and after two hours of mortal strife, the heroic defenders still made good the dreadful pass, and not a living man was to be seen on the breach. As a last resource, Major Snodgrass, with his Portuguese battalion, volunteered to make a simultaneous assault on the lesser breach; but here, too, the slaughter was dreadful—a shower of grape smote the head of the column, and the obstacles proved insuperable, even to the most ardent valour. Matters seemed desperate—the Urumea was rapidly rising, and would soon become impassable; the great breach was choked with the dead and the dying; and already the shouts of victory were heard from the French ramparts.[1]

[1] Jones' Sieges, ii. 73, 78. Belm. iv. 639, 641. Rey's Official Account. Ibid. 719, 720. Graham's Official Account, Gurw xi. 62, 63. Subaltern, 55, 57.

In this extremity, Graham, having consulted with Colonel Dickson of the engineers, adopted one of the boldest, and yet, with his artillerymen, safest expedients recorded in military annals. He ordered that the whole guns of the Chofre batteries should be brought to bear upon the high curtain above the breach in the demi-bastions, from which the most destructive fire issued; while the British soldiers at the foot of the rampart remained quiescent, or lay down, while the shot flew only two feet over their heads! In a few minutes, forty-seven guns were in this manner directed with such effect on the traverses, that they were in great part broken down, and the troops who manned them were obliged to retire to more distant cover; and yet so accurate was the aim, that not one man among the assailants was

struck. Twenty minutes after this fire had commenced, one of the shells from the British batteries exploded among the numerous train of fire barrels, live shells, hand grenades, and other combustibles, which the garrison had arranged along the ramparts for the close defence of their traverses and interior works; the flame ran along the walls, and soon the whole exploded with a bright flash, succeeded by a smoke so dense as to obscure all vision. Three hundred brave Frenchmen were blown into the air by this awful catastrophe, which, like the blowing up of the L'Orient at the Nile, so impressed both sides, that for a minute not a shot was fired either from the ramparts or the batteries. At length, as the smoke and dust cleared away, the British troops, seeing an empty space before them, rushed forward, and with an appalling shout made themselves masters of the first traverse. The defenders, however, even at this terrible moment, soon rallied, and a fierce conflict, breast against breast, bayonet against bayonet, ensued at the top of the high curtain; and for some time the result seemed still to be doubtful. At length, however, the increasing numbers and vehemence of the assailants prevailed over the stern resolution of the besieged. The French colours on the cavalier were torn down by Lieutenant Gethin of the 11th; the hornwork and ravelin on the flank of the great breach were abandoned; while about the same time, Snodgrass, with his valiant Portuguese, stormed the lesser breach; and the bulk of the garrison, now every where overpowered, were rapidly driven from all their interior retrenchments, and sought refuge with the governor in the castle,[1] leaving seven hundred prisoners

[1] Jones' Sieges, ii. 77, 80. Graham's Official Account. Gurw. xi. 63. Rey's Official Account. Belm, iv. 720; and Ibid, iv. 641, 643. Subaltern, 57, 58. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 271, 272.

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rescued from instant death, in the hands of the victors.

And now commenced a scene which has affixed as lasting a stain on the character of the English and Portuguese troops, as the heroic valour they displayed in the assault has given them enduring and exalted fame. The long endurance of the assault, which had continued in mortal strife for three hours, the fearful slaughter of their comrades which had taken place at the breaches, had wrought the soldiers up to perfect madness; the battle which occurred the same day with the centre and right wing at San Marcial, prevented fresh columns of troops from being introduced, and, as not unusual in such cases, while they spared their enemies who were made prisoners with arms in their hands, the soldiers wreaked their vengeance with fearful violence on the unhappy inhabitants. Some of the houses adjoining the breaches had taken fire from the effects of the explosion; and the flames, fanned by an awful tempest of thunder and lightning, which burst on the town just as the ramparts were carried, soon spread with frightful rapidity; while the wretched inhabitants, driven from house to house as the conflagration devoured their dwellings, were soon huddled together in one quarter, where they fell a prey to the unbridled passions of the soldiery. Attempts were at first made by the British officers to extinguish the flames, but they proved vain amidst the general confusion which prevailed; and soon the soldiers broke into the burning houses, pillaged them of the most valuable articles they contained, and rolling numerous spirit-casks into the streets, with frantic shouts emptied them of their contents, till vast numbers sunk down like savages, mo-

tionless, some lifeless, from the excess. Carpets, tapestry, beds, silks, and satins, wearing apparel, jewellery, watches, and every thing valuable, were scattered about upon the bloody pavements, while fresh bundles of them were continually thrown down from the windows above, to avoid the flames, and caught with demoniac yells by the drunken crowds beneath. Amidst these scenes of disgraceful violence and unutterable woe, nine-tenths of the once happy smiling town of St Sebastian were reduced to ashes; and what has affixed a yet darker blot on the character of the victors, deeds of violence and cruelty were perpetrated, hitherto rare in the British army, and which cause the historian to blush, not merely for his country, but his species.[1]

[1] Vict. et Conq. xxii. 278, 279. Subaltern, 59, 61. Nap. vi. 205, 206. Southey, vi. 240.

Let not the French writers fear that such atrocities will be palliated or excused because they occurred beneath the English standard. Justice knows no distinction of country; humanity acknowledges no excuse for cruelty; and they are purposely transcribed from the contemporary records, as an eternal damning blot on the past, and warning to the future.* A consideration of these mournful scenes, combined with the recollection of the mutual atroci-

Reflections on these atrocities.

* "Oh wretched day! oh cruel night! The troops seemed to neglect the most ordinary precautions in a place recently taken, and, with one end of it still in the enemy's hands, to give themselves up to the most unheard-of excesses. Pillage, assassination, rape, were pushed to an incredible pitch: and the fire, which broke out early in the night, after the enemy had retired to the castle, put the finishing stroke to this scene of woe. On all sides were heard cries of distress from women who were violated, without regard either to tender youth, respected family, or advanced years; women were outraged in presence of their husbands, daughters dishonoured in presence of their parents; one girl was the victim of the brutality of a soldier on the corpse of her mother! Other crimes more horrible still, which our pen refuses to record, were committed in that awful night; and the disorders continued for some days after, without any efficient steps being taken to arrest them. Of above six hundred houses of which St Sebastian consisted

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ties perpetrated by both parties on each other in England during the wars of the Roses, the horrors of the Tyrone rebellion in Ireland, the cold-blooded vengeance of the Covenanters after the battle of Philiphaugh in Scotland, the systematic firing and pillage of London during Lord George Gordon's riots in 1780, and the brutal violence in recent times of the Chartists in England, suggest the painful doubt whether all mankind are not at bottom the same, in point of tendency to crime, when exposed to the influence of the same temptations; and whether there do not lie smouldering beneath the boasted glories of British civilization, the embers of a conflagration as fierce, and devastation as wide-spread, as those which followed and disgraced the French Revolution.

Siege and capture of the citadel.

Though the town of St Sebastian was taken, the citadel remained to be reduced; and such was the tenacity and hardihood of the governor and his brave adherents, that, hopeful of deliverance from the effort they were aware Marshal Soult was to make in their favour, they still held out even on that wasted and half-ruined stronghold. The rugged nature of the ground rendered it almost impossible to carry trenches up the rocky face of Monte Orgullo, and the Duke of Berwick in consequence had, in 1719, consumed nineteen days in a bombardment to induce the gar-

on the morning of the assault, there remained at the end of three days only thirty-six."—*Manifeste par la Junte Constitutionale chapitre ecclesiastique et les habitans de St Sebastian*—given in *Vict. et Conq.* xxii. 278, 279, and in BELMAS, iv. 469, App. Yet Wellington had done all in his power to save the town; he had purposely avoided a bombardment to spare the citizens; and both he and Graham, as well as the officers engaged, did their utmost to stop the fire, and avoid the disorders; but all their efforts were ineffectual, from the impossibility of bringing up fresh soldiers to occupy the town after the assault, as is usual in such cases, from the employment of the whole troops not engaged in it, on the same day, at the battle on the Bidassoa.—See WELLINGTON *to Spanish Minister at War, 17th Sept.* 1813. GURW. x. 353.

Sept. 8.

rison to surrender. Wellington, however, having visited the works on the 1st September, resolved to push the approaches, notwithstanding these natural obstacles, and at the same time try the effect of a bombardment and cannonade on the castle. A heavy fire was kept up from mortars till the 8th, when the breaching batteries from the side of the town having been completed, a tremendous fire was opened from sixty pieces of heavy artillery, which played with such effect, that every thing in the castle was torn up or destroyed before it. The English prisoners suffered even more than the garrison from this terrific tempest: for the governor, now irritated by the sufferings of his followers, would not permit the black flag to be hoisted to avert the fire from the hospital where they were confined. At length the brave governor, having exhausted all his means of defence, was obliged to surrender at discretion, with 1756 men, including 535 wounded in the hospital; and the Spanish flag, amidst a salute of twenty-one guns, was hoisted from the citadel.[1]

Sept. 9. Jones' Sieges, ii. 83, 91. Nap. vi. 207, 209. Rey's Official Account. Sept. 7. 1813. Belm. iv. 739, 742. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 281, 282.

The siege of St Sebastian, a third-rate fortress, garrisoned only by three thousand men, hastily got together during the tumult of defeat which succeeded the battle of Vittoria, cost the allied army three thousand eight hundred men, two thousand five hundred of whom, including seventeen hundred and sixteen British, were struck down in the final assault;*

Reflections on the siege, and losses it occasioned to the Allies.

* The French engineer, Belnas, in his elaborate and accurate work on the Sieges in the Peninsula, makes the total allied loss in the siege 5069, and quotes Graham's Despatches for his authority. This, however, is a mistake; the loss of the troops employed in the siege was exactly 3800: and the larger amount is arrived at, by the French author including, by mistake, in the returns, the Spaniards, 1436 in number, who were killed and wounded on the 31st August, at the heights of St Marcial on the Bidassoa.—See BELMAS, iv. 728, *and* GRAHAM'S *Despatches, with the loss in the Siege*, GURWOOD, xi. 66, *and* x. 590, *and* JONES, ii. 89.

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and it detained the army sixty-three days, of which thirty were open trenches, and thirty-three blockade. It gave time to Soult to reorganize his army, and make two desperate attacks, one towards Pampeluna, another, which shall be immediately noticed, on the Bidassoa, to re-establish his affairs; and delayed by above three months the invasion of the southern provinces of France. The Allies expended on the siege no less than 71,000 rounds of ammunition, and were obliged to place seventy heavy guns in battery. It must be admitted, that a stronger proof can hardly be imagined of the vital consequence of fortresses in war, or of the decisive effect which the courageous defence even of an inconsiderable stronghold often has upon the fortunes of a campaign, or the fate of a monarchy. The defence of the French governor and garrison was skilful and heroic in the highest degree, and justly entitles them to place their prolonged resistance among the brightest military glories of their country. But, notwithstanding all their exertions, the place must have fallen in half the time, if it had not been for obvious faults, both in the conduct of the siege, and those who had the direction of forwarding supplies to carry it on, from Great Britain. The first assault in July should have succeeded, and would have done so, if the troops who composed the rear of the column had duly followed the advance of their heroic leaders. The last assault was rendered so murderous as it was, chiefly because the engineers had not adopted the precaution of knocking away the parapets of the traverses which commanded the breach, before they declared it practicable; and of the facility with which this might have been done, and the vast effects with which it was attended, decisive proof is to be found in the statement of Colonel

Jones—"that the tremendous enfilade fire on the high curtain, while the troops were at the foot of the breach, though only maintained for twenty minutes, had dismounted every gun but two. Many of the pieces had their muzzles shot away; the stone parapets were damaged; the cheeks of the embrasures knocked off; and the terrepleine cut up and strewed with headless bodies."[1]

[1] Jones' Sieges, ii.

But more than all, the authorities at home were to blame for not sending out military stores in time to carry on the siege. They were written for in the end of June by Wellington, but did not arrive till the 18th and 23d August; and it was this long delay which enabled the governor to erect those formidable interior retrenchments which proved so fatal to the Allies in the second assault. They came out in profusion, indeed, when they did come, but it was too late; the enemy had turned to too good purpose the prolonged delay thus afforded him.*

Delay in sending out stores for the siege from England.

* Wellington remonstrated again and again, in the most energetic terms, against this inexplicable delay in forwarding supplies. "Your lordship will see by my report that we are still waiting for the battering-train, and we have thus lost sixteen days in the month of August, since I should have renewed the attack upon St Sebastian if I had had the means. This is a most important period in the campaign, particularly for the attack of a place in the Bay of Biscay. How we are to attack Bayonne afterwards, I am sure I do not know. A British minister cannot too often have under his view the element by which he is surrounded, and cannot make his preparations for the operations of a campaign at too early a period."—WELLINGTON *to* LORD BATHURST, 18*th August* 1813. GURWOOD, xi. 12.

"In the attack of a maritime place some assistance is usually received from the navy by the army; but the naval force on this coast is too weak to give us any of the description I require, and for the want of which we shall now be so much distressed. The soldiers are obliged to work in the transports, to unload the vessels, because no seamen can be furnished; and we have been obliged to use the harbour boats of Passages, *navigated by women*, in landing the ordnance and stores, because there was no naval force to supply us with the assistance we should have required in boats. If we had a sufficient naval force, we might, if the weather permitted, make an attack from the sea at the

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Men could not be more zealous than the British government were at this period in the prosecution of the contest, and none ever made such stupendous efforts to carry it on as they did in this year; but they were still insensible to the value of time in war, and bore, in their best combinations, too much of the character of their Saxon ancestors, of whom Athelstane the Unready is the true personification. So frequently has this ignorance of the simplest principles of military combination, on the part of government, marred the greatest efforts, or disconcerted the best-laid enterprizes of the British nation, that it deserves the serious consideration of all those who have the direction of the studies of youth, whether some instruction on the subject should not form part of elementary education to all those at least who are likely, from their station or prospects, to be called to the supreme direction of affairs.

Soult's attempt to raise the siége.

Soult was not unmindful of his promise to attempt a serious diversion for the relief of the distressed garrison of St Sebastian. Before daylight on the 30th August, he crossed the Bidassoa by the fords between the destroyed bridge on the great road and Andara, with Villatte and Reille's corps, mustering eighteen thousand combatants; while Clausel, with twenty thousand men, was concentrated in the woods behind the Bayonette mountain, and Foy, with seven thou-

same time that we should make the attack upon the breaches from the walls. This would at all events divide the enemy's attention, and would probably prevent much of the loss in the assault of the breaches, if it did not tend to ensure the success of the assault. If the navy of Great Britain cannot afford more than *one frigate and a few brigs and cutters*, fit and used only to carry despatches, to co-operate with this army in the siege of a maritime place, the possession of which before the bad season commences, is important to the army as well as the navy, I must be satisfied, and do the best I can without such assistance."—WELLINGTON *to* LORD BATHURST, *19th August* 1813. GURWOOD, xi. 1819.

sand, was ready to support the attack. Little ground required to be gained to raise the siege; for it was only eight miles from the point of passage, Oyarsun, from whence the invading force might at once advance upon the rear of the besieging force. Notwithstanding all the secrecy of his preparations, however, Wellington received intimation of his designs, and made his dispositions accordingly. Reinforcements to the amount of five thousand had arrived from England, including the brigade of guards which had just come up from Oporto; and the greater part of the stragglers from Vittoria had now rejoined their colours, so that the army was stronger than it had been before the battles in the Pyrenees; but though he brought up the British troops to the close vicinity of the scene of action, so as to be ready to support their allies in case of any disaster, he wisely determined to make a trial of the Spaniards, in a strong position, to guard the entrance into their own territory. With this view, he stationed the troops of that nation, composing the fourth army, about eighteen thousand strong, on the heights of SAN MARCIAL, on the southern side of the Bidassoa, already illustrated by a severe action between the Spaniards and French in the beginning of the revolutionary war.* Longa's men were in reserve at a little distance in the rear, with the Portuguese of the fourth division, and the British brigades of the same division ready to support them. Thus, nearly thirty thousand men in all might be brought to stop the progress of the enemy; but the uncommon gallantry and steadiness of the Spanish troops, rendered all assistance needless, and left them the whole weight and glory of the fight.[1]

[1] Tor. v. 324, 325. Nap. vi. 221, 225. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 274. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Sept. 2, 1813. Gurw. xi. 67.

Though Soult's troops were collected on the 30th,

* Ante, ii. 304.

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it was not till the 31st that the attack was made. At daybreak on that morning, Reille's columns crossed by the fords above Biriatru, and soon got footing on the opposite bank, where they made themselves masters, without much difficulty, of a small battery; but when they came to ascend the opposite hill, which is there covered with brushwood, and is uncommonly steep, they fell into disorder, and, before they could recover themselves, were charged by the Spaniards, who in firm array descended upon them with such vigour, that they were driven headlong down. During this conflict, the French had succeeded in throwing a bridge across, under cover of some guns they had placed on the heights on their own side, about a mile further up; and Villatte's reserve advanced to the support of their defeated comrades. Encouraged by this assistance, Reille's men again advanced to the charge; and one brigade even succeeded in gaining the chapel of San Marcial on the summit at the left of the line, upon which Wellington ordered up the 85th regiment to repel the attack, and himself rode forward with his staff to the menaced point. Upon seeing him, the Spanish troops, without waiting for the English succour which was approaching, set up a loud shout, and, rallying on their own reserve, which was brought forward, returned to the charge, and dashed the French down the hill so vehemently, that they were in great part driven into the river, and several ponton boats which had come across, were sunk by the fugitives who crowded into them. Thus the Spaniards had the glory, which Wellington carefully acknowledged, of defeating, by their unaided efforts, an attack by a powerful body of the enemy. At the same time, Clausel crossed over higher up, near Vera, with three divisions, and immediately com-

Defeat of the French by the Spaniards Aug. 31.

menced an attack on Inglis' Portuguese brigades. The latter were driven, by the vast superiority of the enemy's force, from the heights which they at first occupied; but rallied on those of San Antonia, which they succeeded in maintaining: and Wellington, having brought up Kempt's brigade to his support, ordered Dalhousie to advance in the same direction, who sent forward Barnes' brigade before daylight next morning. Clausel, upon this, fearful of having his retreat cut off, fell back across the river on the following morning, by forcing the bridge of Vera, of which the Allies had regained possession; and Soult, despairing of success, drew back his forces at all points on the same day, and with no small difficulty and heavy loss, in consequence of the swelling of the river by the dreadful tempest which came on at night, regained the French side of the Bidassoa.[1]

[1] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Sept. 1, 1813. Gurw. xi. 71. Nap. vi. 233. Pellot, 52.

In this untoward affair, Soult lost about three thousand six hundred men, including General Vandermaens, killed, and four other generals of inferior note wounded. The allied loss was two thousand six hundred and eighty-three, of which no less than one thousand six hundred and eighty were among the Spanish troops—a clear proof that with them had rested the heat and glory of the day. But what was of far more importance, the French weakness was now clearly demonstrated to both armies, their inability to keep the field established by decisive evidence, and the spirit of the Spanish troops greatly augmented by having defeated them, unsupported, in a pitched battle. On the very day on which the whole efforts of Soult, with all his disposable forces, had been in this manner defeated by a part only of the allied army, St Sebastian had fallen before the assault of the British soldiery;[1] and as Mar-

Results of this action.

[1] Vict. et Conq. xxii. 274. Belm. i. 266. Pellot, 52, 53. Wellington to Lord Bathurst Sept. 1, 1813. Gurw. xi. 71. Nap. vi. 233, 234.

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shal Soult, from the heights on the north of Bidassoa, which still bear the name of Louis XIV., beheld, amidst the whirlwind tempest which fell upon his retreating columns, the destruction of all his hopes of offensive warfare, he could in the distance perceive the glancing of the fires and volumes of smoke, which, like a burning volcano, bespoke at St Sebastian the fatal termination of the assault.

Nothing remained to complete the expulsion, in this quarter, of the French from the Spanish territory, but the surrender of Pampeluna; and till that event took place, the British general resolved to suspend all offensive operations. But, meanwhile, success deserted the English, and unwonted disgrace was incurred in the east of the Peninsula; as if to demonstrate that victory was still the reward only of persevering and resolute conduct, and to mark by the force of contrast, what they owed to the chief who had so long apparently chained it to their standards.

Operations in the east of Spain.

With a view to establish a good base for operations at the mouth of the Ebro, and at the same time hinder Suchet from dispatching any succour to resist the general offensive movement which he was meditating in the north-west of the Peninsula, Wellington directed Sir John Murray, early in May, to embark the great bulk of his troops at Alicante, and attempt a descent near Taragona; in the hope either of regaining that fortress, or, at all events, drawing Suchet back for its defence from his advanced position on the Xucar, and withdrawing the beautiful and fertile province of Valencia from the imperial domination. To aid him in its reduction, a powerful battering train of fifty guns was placed at his disposal; and as Admiral Hallowel with a squadron of the Mediterranean fleet was at hand, both to facilitate his disembarkation and aid in the operations, it was

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hoped they would prove successful, before an adequate French force could be collected from beyond the Ebro to raise the siege. The troops placed at Murray's disposal for this purpose were very considerable, consisting of the British and foreign divisions which had come from Sicily, Whittingham and Roche's Spaniards, and the most efficient part of Elio's and the Duke del Parque's armies; but the first only were to be embarked for Catalonia; the latter being left to threaten the French positions covering Valencia on the Xucar. The forces embarked at Alicante were somewhat above fourteen thousand, of which eight thousand were British and German foot, and fifteen hundred British and German cavalry and artillery; the remainder being Spanish and Sicilian infantry.[1]*

[1] Wellington's instructions to Murray, April 14th, 1813. Gur. v. 297. State, 17th June 1813. Nap. vi. 704.

This army embarked at Alicante on the 31st May, and arrived with a fair wind in the neighbourhood of Taragona on the 3d June, where they were immediately landed by the active co-operation of Admiral Hallowel, the intrepid captain of the Swiftsure at the Nile.† They had thus gained the start entirely of Suchet, who could not possibly be up for a week to come, for he had a hundred and sixty miles to march; and meanwhile, the besiegers, with the ample means at their disposal, might make themselves masters of Taragona, the works of which were in a very dilapidated state, and which was defended only by sixteen hundred men. Fort Olivo, the scene of such desperate conflicts on occasion of the former siege,‡ was occupied, as well as the heights of Loretto, without resistance, the first day. An expedition was at the same dispatched under Colonel Prevost to attack San Felippe de Balaguer, a strong

First operations against Taragona, which are successful.

June 3.

* App. K, chap. lxxii. † Ante, iii. 439. ‡ Ante, viii. 222.

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fort perched on a rock, which commanded and blocked up the only carriage road from Tortosa to Taragona; and the fire of two mortars, which were with great difficulty brought up to bear on the fort, having blown up its magazine, the governor surrendered at discretion, with two hundred and sixty men. This early success greatly elevated the spirits of the allied army, and they confidently anticipated the immediate capture of the main fortress; for its works, incomplete, ill flanked, without palisades or casements, could not have withstood a vigorous attack, and once taken, a few hours' breaching with the noble battering train which they possessed, would have brought down the wall of the town, and a general assault might have been made with every prospect of success.[1]

June 6.

[1] Nap. vi. 14, 15. Murray's Official Despatch, 9th June 1813. Gur. x. 482.

But the general is the soul of an army, and no valour or skill on the part of the officers and men employed, can supply the want of resolute determination on the part of the general-in-chief. There is no reason to doubt the personal courage of Sir John Murray; but he proved himself destitute of the rarer qualities of firm resolution, moral courage, and confidence in his followers, which are indispensable in a commander. His troops were brave, and such was the spirit with which they were animated, that an Italian regiment which at Alicante had been ready to go over to the enemy, now volunteered to head the assault on Fort Royal. But the general was far from sharing the confidence of his followers; he had despaired of victory even in the moment of glorious triumph at Castalla, and he was not likely to be more sanguine when in front of the bastions of Taragona. The operations were by no means pushed with the rapidity which circumstances required, and the ample means at his disposal rendered

Murray delays the assault, and is obliged to raise the siege.

practicable. The guns, though close at hand, were not put into the batteries till the 11th, and though the order to assault the outworks was given that night, it was countermanded; orders for embarking the guns were given, and, when half executed, countermanded. Thus the precious time, when the place might have been carried, was lost in irresolution; and meanwhile, the intelligence of the approach of formidable bodies to raise the siege, completed the embarrassment of the English general. On the 11th, eight thousand French under Maurice Mathieu, began their march from Barcelona, and intelligence was received that Suchet was approaching the Col di Balaguer from Valencia with nine thousand more, including Copons' mountain-bands, who had drawn into the neighbourhood of Taragona; Murray had twenty thousand men, whereof one half were British and Germans on whom reliance could be placed; but instead of pushing the siege with this respectable force, which would have taken the place before either army could have got up, Murray gave orders for the embarkation of the troops and battering train. It began on the 12th, and was not completed till next day, when the French had not yet arrived even within sight of Taragona. The soldiers and sailors could not conceal their indignation at abandoning the guns, nineteen in number, which were left in the advanced batteries—for they were part of the time-honoured train which had torn down the ramparts of Badajoz.[1]*

[1] Murray's Official Despatch, June 14, 1813. Gurw. x. 486. Nap. vi. 19, 21. Tor. v. 294, 295. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 259, 260.

* Murray after this disaster was deprived of the command, and, when he returned to England, brought to a court-martial after the peace, which acquitted him of the serious charges preferred against him for his conduct on the occasion, but found him guilty of want of judgment. There was no harm in this; vindictive prosecutions are of no service in military affairs: it is the judgment of posterity which is the real reward

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After the troops had got on board, Murray disembarked part of them near Balaguer, in hopes of cutting off a French brigade which lay there; but finding it had escaped, he again put to sea, and steered for Alicante, while Copons retired with his Spaniards into the mountains, and the French entered Taragona amidst the shouts of the garrison. Meanwhile Lord William Bentinck arrived from Sicily, though without troops, and took the command. A violent storm, which overtook the fleet, and wrecked some of the transports, prevented the soldiers being all disembarked before the 27th; and meanwhile, Elio and the Duke del Parque, with twenty-five thousand men, attacked in two columns Habert, who with nine thousand maintained the line of the Xucar, but they were defeated at both their points of attack with the loss each of some hundred men. Thus every thing seemed disastrous on the eastern coast; and, to complete the untoward state of affairs, Lord William Bentinck had come alone from Sicily, fearing a descent from Murat in that island; though, after having entered into secret negotiations with the Allies, he soon after set out for Saxony, where, as already mentioned, he bore an important part in the battle of Dresden. But the triumphs of the French were not of long duration. On the 27th, intelligence was received of the battle of Vittoria, accompanied by orders, which were a necessary consequence of that event, for Suchet entirely to evacuate Valencia, and retire behind the Ebro. He immediately made preparations for abandoning the province, and left Valencia, with a heavy

The army returns to Alicante, and Lord W. Bentinck assumes the command.

June 15.

or punishment of public conduct. Sir John was a man of talent, and had many estimable qualities: the fault lay in his appointment to a situation for which he was wholly disqualified.

heart, on the 5th July, which was entered, four days afterwards, by Lord William Bentinck; but, faithful to the positive instructions of Napoleon to keep a tenacious grasp of all his conquests, he left twelve hundred men in Saguntum, five hundred in Peniscola, and four thousand five hundred in Tortosa—a fatal error, the counterpart of the Emperor's obstinate retention of the fortresses on the Elbe and the Oder during the German campaign, and to which, more than any other cause, the little subsequent success of Suchet in the field is to be ascribed.[1]

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It was Suchet's first intention, when he retired behind the Ebro, to have marched upon Saragossa, and forming with the troops left in that province, to have united with Clausel, and, together, threatened the right flank of Wellington. But the rapid retreat of the latter general from Saragossa, by Jaca, into France, totally disconcerted this well-conceived project. The plain of Aragon being entirely inundated with guerillas, while Wellington's masses in Navarre were on its flank, he felt it necessary to concentrate his forces in Catalonia and on the Lower Ebro, and, accordingly, gave orders for the evacuation of Saragossa and the fortresses of Aragon, the troops retiring to Mequinenza, Lerida, and Tortosa. Bentinck followed with the Anglo-Sicilian army; but it was soon found, however, by the British general, that though his forces were of considerable numerical amount, yet they were not of such a composition as to enable him to hazard offensive operations, without the utmost caution, beyond the Ebro. He had, indeed, thirty thousand men nominally under his orders; but of these the British and Germans, not quite ten thousand strong, could alone be relied on. Elio and Roche, with ten thousand more, were at Va-

Suchet, ii. 324. Bentinck follows him to the Lower Ebro.

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lencia in a very destitute condition; and the Duke del Parque, with twelve thousand, was several marches in the rear; and his troops, though paid by British subsidies, were, from the inherent vice of procrastination common to all the Spaniards, almost as unprovided as the former. Decaen, however, at this moment was himself in nearly as difficult a situation; for the news of the battle of Vittoria had again roused all the upper valleys of Catalonia, and the insurrection, nourished by supplies from the English fleet off Palermo, was making rapid progress. Thus neither party were in a condition to undertake any operation of importance; and though Suchet had sixty-eight thousand of the best troops of the empire at his command, they were so scattered over the numerous fortified posts and cities which the Emperor had ordered him to garrison and maintain, that he was little more than a match in the field for Bentinck with his motley array of thirty thousand.[1]

[1] Suchet, ii. 324, 334. Nap. vi. 44, 49. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 262, 263.

The evacuation of Aragon and Valencia, like that of all the other places which had been under the dominion of the French armies, revealed the extraordinary system of forced contributions and organized plunder, by which they had so long succeeded in maintaining their ascendency in Europe without any sensible addition to the burdens of France itself. Immediately after the occupation of Valencia in the end of 1811, the French marshal, as already mentioned, had imposed an extraordinary contribution of 200,000,000 reals, or about L.2,000,000 sterling, a burden equal, if the value of money be taken into consideration, to at least L.5,000,000 in Great Britain. The half of this enormous requisition entirely exhausted the whole money, gold, silver plate,

and jewels of the province, and the remainder was taken in grain, stuffs, clothing, and other articles necessary for the subsistence of the troops. Next year the burden was fixed at 70,000,000 reals, or L.750,000, equal in like manner to L.1,500,000 in England; but by the vigour of the French marshal's government, and the regularity and justice of his rule in the distribution and exaction of these enormous burdens, nearly the whole was brought, chiefly in kind, into the imperial treasury. Aragon at first, after the capture of its capital, had been subjected to enormous burdens, great part of which was irrecoverable from their excessive magnitude; but from the time that the regular government of Suchet began, the impositions were more uniform, and amounted to about four times what the province had paid in the most flourishing days of the old monarchy. While these facts illustrate in the clearest manner the oppressive nature of the imperial government, and explain the unbounded exasperation which it every where excited in Europe, as well as the long enthusiasm which it awakened in France itself, it must at the same time be added, to the honour of Marshal Suchet, that he carried this onerous system into execution with far more attention to the interests and wishes of the inhabitants than any of the other French marshals; that no private plunder disgraced his footsteps, or military disorders rendered hateful his government; that, unlike the other parts of Spain, the monuments of the fine arts remained untouched in Valencia during his administration; and that, despite the grievous weight of the burdens he was obliged to impose, such was the protection to industry which he simultaneously afforded,[1] that the receding footsteps of the French

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[1] Suchet, ii. 290, 298, and i. 279, 314. Tor. v. 304, 306.

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army were beheld with regret by the grateful inhabitants.

1813. Bentinck long hesitated whether he should commence active operations in Catalonia with the siege of Tortosa or Taragona; but he at length determined for the latter, chiefly in consequence of the facilities for carrying it on which the vicinity of the sea and the Mediterranean squadron afforded. Having crossed the Ebro accordingly, he sat down before the place in the end of July with ten thousand good troops; while the Spanish armies, about twenty thousand more, but of very indifferent quality, were drawn to the neighbourhood to cover the siege. Suchet was long unable to collect any sufficient force to interrupt his operations; but having at length formed a junction with Decaen, he advanced at the head of thirty thousand men to raise the siege. Bentinck was at the head of an equal force, but twenty thousand of them were Spaniards, upon whom no reliance could be placed; and he therefore wisely declined battle, retreating to the defiles of the Hospitalat, near the Col di Balaguer; and Suchet, without pursuing him, passed on to Taragona, which he entered on the 18th, and immediately blew up the fortifications and brought away the garrison. Such was the strength of the ancient masonry, the work of the Romans, that it was with no small time and labour that the demolition was effected. Having destroyed these renowned bastions, he retired to the neighbourhood of Villa Franca and the Ilobregat, while Decaen was sent into Upper Catalonia; and Taragona, with its ruined battlements and fertile fields, was occupied by the British forces.[1]

Bentinck besieges Taragona, and is compelled to raise the siege.

Aug. 15.

Aug. 18.

[1] Nap. vi. 50, 54. Tor. v. 328, 331. Suchet, ii. 334, 338.

Gradually after this the British army gained ground, and the French were cooped up into more

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contracted limits within the war-wasted province of Catalonia. On the 5th September, the advance entered Villa Franca, and Suchet retired altogether into the Ilobregat, leaving Tortosa, Lerida, and Mequinenza, now blockaded by the Spanish troops, to their own resources. An event, however, erelong occurred, which showed that it was not without reason that Bentinck, with his heterogeneous array of troops, had hitherto avoided a general engagement with the admirable veterans of Suchet. On the 12th September, twelve hundred German and British infantry, with two British and two Spanish guns, under Colonel Adam, and three battalions of Sarsfield's Catalonians, occupied, twelve miles in advance of Villa Franca, the position of Ordal, a ridge which rose gradually from a deep and impassable ravine, crossed by a noble bridge in front. Suchet, hearing that this advanced guard, not more in all than three thousand men, was not adequately supported, conceived the design of cutting it off. For this purpose the divisions Harispe and Habert were put in motion at nightfall, by bright moonlight passed the bridge without resistance, and at midnight suddenly assailed the allied advanced guard at all points. The second battalion of the 27th, who were on the right, were first assailed; but the men, who were lying beside their muskets in battle array, instantly started up and fought fiercely; and the Spaniards, who were next attacked in the centre, made a most gallant resistance. Harispe's men, however, crossing the bridge in great numbers, soon turned the allied flank; Adam was wounded early; Colonel Reeves, who was second in command, was also soon struck down; and amidst all the confusion of a nocturnal combat, the troops, without any recognized leader,[1] fought with great fury

Unfortunate combat at the pass of Ordal.

Sept. 12.

[1] Bentinck's Official Account. Gurw. xi 147, 148. Suchet, ii. 341, 349. Nap. vi. 57, 59. Tor. v. 331, 332.

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in detached bodies, but without any general plan. At length the Spaniards in the centre were broken, the 27th regiment turned and forced through, and the whole dispersed, four guns being taken. Captain Waldron, with eighty of the 27th, and Captain Muller, with the like number of Germans, effected their retreat by the hills; but all the rest were dispersed or slain, and the total loss was not less than a thousand men.

The Allies retire to Taragona.

Encouraged by this blow, which seems to have been induced by undue confidence on the part of both Bentinck and Adam, in thus exposing an advanced guard without support to the blows of superior bodies of the enemy, Suchet pursued his march, and came up at eight o'clock with the main allied army near Villa Franca; but they retreated in admirable order, and a charge of their cavalry was stopped with remarkable resolution by Lord Frederick Bentinck, at the head of the 28th dragoons and German horse, who engaged in single combat and wounded Colonel Myers of the French horse, and defeated them with the loss of three hundred men. Great numbers of the missing at the pass of Ordal, who had been supposed to be taken, rejoined their colours two days afterwards; but this disaster had the effect of causing the allied army to retire to the neighbourhood of Taragona, while the Catalonians fell back to Igualada. While the campaign in the east of Spain was thus checkered with misfortunes, yet it had a most important effect on the issue of the campaign, and clearly demonstrated on what erroneous principles Napoleon's defensive system of retaining garrisons in so many fortresses was founded; for during a period when Soult was pressed by superior forces in the western Pyrenees, and France itself was menaced with invasion, sixty-eight thousand of the best soldiers of the French empire,[1]

Sept. 13.

[1] Suchet, ii. 342, 345. Bentinck's Official Account, Sept. 13, 1813. Gurw. xi. 147, 148. Nap. vii. 57, 59, Tor. v. 332, 333. Vict et Conq. xxii. 306, 310.

were kept in check by ten thousand British and German troops, supported by twice that number of ill disciplined Spaniards; all pressure on Wellington's right flank from that formidable body was prevented, and the whole of Valencia and half of Catalonia rescued from their grasp by a motley array, which could not for three days have kept the field in presence of his united forces.

Reasons which at this period induced Wellington to desire not to invade France.

Meanwhile, Wellington having completed his preparations, and received considerable reinforcements both from England and the hospitals, from whence the wounded men were discharged in such extraordinary numbers, and with such rapidity, under the influence of the mental excitement produced by continued and glorious success,* as to excite the astonishment of the whole army, was taking measures for an invasion of France. He was desirous, indeed, himself not to hazard that attempt at the present moment, for several reasons:—Pampeluna, though again closely blockaded, and now severely distressed for provisions, had not yet fallen; and till that event took place, not only could the blockading forces not be reckoned on to support the allied army in its advance, but he himself could not be considered as solidly established on the Spanish frontier. The Spanish troops who were acting in co-operation with his army, were fully forty thousand, and they had now acquired, from acting with the Anglo-Portu-

* "We have gained on the strength the 76th, 84th, and 85th regiments, 1797 rank and file, and 800 recruits; and 500 British and 1500 Portuguese from the hospitals last week, and we are gaining some every day. We are now as strong as we were on the 25th July, before the battles of the Pyrenees, and in a short time we shall be within 5000 or 6000 as strong as we were before the battle of Vittoria. The troops are uncommonly healthy, indeed there is no sickness amongst them."—WELLINGTON *to* LORD BATHURST, *25th August* 1813. GURW. xi. 45.

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guese forces, a far superior degree of consistence and efficiency than they had ever before attained during the war; but still there were many circumstances in their condition which rendered them likely to prove at least as dangerous as serviceable to an invading army. In spite of all the representations of Wellington, which had been as energetic as they were innumerable, the government at Cadiz, wholly engrossed with democratic ambition, had taken no efficient steps to provide for their armies; they were neither clothed nor paid, and in great part depended for their subsistence upon the British rations; and there was too good reason to fear, that if they entered France they would rouse a national resistance, by the license with which they retaliated upon its inhabitants the misery which their own countrymen had so long suffered at their hands. The Cortes, inflamed almost to madness by the incessant efforts of the republican press at Cadiz, who now dreaded nothing so much as the success of the allied arms, did all in their power to thwart the designs of Wellington for the common cause; the excesses at St Sebastian afforded too plausible a ground, which was amply taken advantage of, for inflaming the popular passions against the English general; they were represented as not the designless work of the unbridled soldiers, but a deliberate attempt of an heretical nation to destroy a mercantile community, of which they were jealous. Wellington himself was openly accused of aspiring to the crown of Spain, and to such a height did the mutual recriminations rise, that he more than once offered to resign the supreme command; and, despairing of success with such lukewarm or treacherous allies, advised the British government to demand St Sebastian as a hostage,[1] and,

[1] Wellington to the Spanish Minister at War, Aug. 30, 1813. Gurw. xi. 56, 57. to Lord Bathurst, Sept. 5, 1813. Ibid. xi. 90, 91; and xi. 172, 200; xi. 327, 349.

if refused, to withdraw their forces altogether from the Peninsula.*

* "More than half of Spain has been cleared of the enemy above a year; and the whole of Spain, excepting Catalonia and a small part of Aragon, since the months of May and June last. The most abundant harvest has been reaped in all parts of the country; millions of money, spent by contending armies in the Peninsula, are circulating every where; and yet your armies, however weak in numbers, are literally starving. The Allied, British, and Portuguese army under my command, have been subsisted—particularly latterly—almost exclusively upon the magazines imported by sea; and I am concerned to inform your Excellency that, besides money for the pay of all the armies, which has been given from the military chest of the British army, and has been received from no other quarter, the British magazines have supplied quantities of provisions to all the Spanish armies, in order to enable them to remain in the field at all; and notwithstanding this assistance, I have had the mortification of seeing the Spanish troops on the outposts obliged to plunder the nut and apple trees for subsistence; and to know that the Spanish troops, employed in the blockade of Pampeluna and Santona, were starving upon half an allowance of bread, while the enemy whom they were blockading were, at the same time, receiving their full allowance.

"It cannot be pretended that the country does not produce the means of maintaining the number of men necessary for its defence; those means are undoubtedly superabundant; and the enemy has proved that armies can be maintained in Spain, at the expense of the Spanish nation, infinitely longer than are necessary for its defence.

"Sir, the fact is notorious, that there is no authority in the country to enforce the law and the due payment of the contributions to government; and the officers of the Hacienda do not perform their duty.

"They are infinitely more numerous than is necessary, and their maintenance exhausts the revenues which ought to be employed in the maintenance of the troops on the frontiers. I have sent to your Excellency's office proofs that some branches of the revenue cost 70 and 80 per cent to collect them.

"It must be obvious to your Excellency that matters cannot go on long as they are. The winter is approaching, and no magazines, or other provision of any kind, have been made for the Spanish troops, who, as I have above stated, have not at present even enough for their daily subsistence."—WELLINGTON *to the Spanish Minister at War, 30th August* 1813. GURWOOD, vol. xj. pp. 56, 58.

"Our character is involved in a greater degree than we are aware of, in the democratical transactions of the Cortes, in the opinion of all moderate and well-thinking Spaniards, and, I am afraid, with the rest of Europe; and if the mob of Cadiz begin to move heads from shoulders,

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By desire of the British Government he undertakes it.

Although the British government were far from being insensible to the cogency of these arguments, yet they wisely determined to follow Wellington's advice, in cautiously abstaining from all interference with the Regency and Cortes at Cadiz, how criminal or absurd soever their conduct might be, and to bend all their efforts to the vigorous prosecution of the war; yet they were induced, by other considerations of a still higher importance, to urge their general to undertake the immediate invasion of the south of France. The coalition in Germany, they were well aware, was still very nearly matched by Napoleon; the disasters at Dresden had wellnigh dissolved his

as the newspapers have threatened Castanos, and the assembly seize upon landed property to supply their necessities, I am afraid we must do something more than discountenance them.

"It is quite impossible that such a system can last. What I regret is, that I am the person that maintains it. If I was out of the way, there are plenty of generals who would overturn it. Ballasteros positively intended it; and I am much mistaken if O'Donnell, and even Castanos, and probably others, are not equally ready. If the King should return, he also will overturn the whole fabric, if he has any spirit; but things have gone so far, and the gentlemen of Cadiz are so completely masters of their trade of managing that assembly, that I am afraid there must be another convulsion; and I earnestly recommend to the British government to keep themselves clear of the democracy, and to interfere in nothing while the government is in their hands, excepting in carrying on the war, and keeping out the foreign enemy."—WELLINGTON *to* EARL BATHURST, *5th Sept.* 1813. GURWOOD, vol. xi. p. 90, 91.

"In consequence of the existing regency of Spain having departed from all the engagements entered into with me by the late regency after repeated personal discussions, and notwithstanding that I had received what I conceived was a confirmation of the engagements, and a declaration to adhere to them by the existing regency, I thought it proper, on the 30th August last, to resign the command of the Spanish armies, which resignation I have been informed, by a despatch from the Minister at War of the 22d of September, has been accepted by the regency, and I continue to exercise the command only till the new Cortes shall have been assembled."—WELLINGTON *to* EARL BATHURST, *5th October* 1813. GURWOOD, vol. xi. p. 164.

heterogeneous materials; and therefore so important an event as the invasion of France by the British forces, might be expected to produce a moral effect of the highest importance throughout Europe. Wellington, who at that period had little confidence in the stability of the Grand Alliance, and looked, not without reason, to the security of the Peninsula as the main object of his efforts, was desirous that his troops, or a principal part of them, should be turned against Suchet in Catalonia, in order that, during the absence of Napoleon with the greater part of his forces in Germany, the important strongholds in that province, an effectual barrier against France in the East, might be recovered to the Spanish monarchy. But the English government, looking to the general interests of Europe, and the probable effect of the measure on the determinations of the Allied Sovereigns on the Elbe, decided otherwise; the invasion of France, even before Pampeluna had fallen, was resolved on, and Wellington, like a good soldier, set himself to execute, to the best of his ability, an offensive campaign, which on military principles he deemed premature.[1]

[1] Nap. vi. 239, 246. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Gurw. xi. 132, 176.

Soult's position on the northern side of the Bidassoa consisted of the base of a triangle, of which Bayonne was the apex, and the great roads running from them to Irun on the sea-coast, and St Jean Pied-de-Port in the interior, were the sides. The interior of this triangle was filled with a mass of rugged and in great part inaccessible mountains, affording little means of subsistence to troops, and presenting ridges and passes at every step capable of arresting an invading army. The French army was stationed on the summit of the last ridge of this wild and rocky district, which immediately overlooked

Description of the French position on the Bidassoa.

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the valley of the Bidassoa, and various parts of it were strengthened with field-works; while the summit of the Rhune mountain, the highest part of the ridge terminating in a peak, surrounded on three sides by inaccessible precipices, and to be reached only from the eastward by a long narrow ridge on the top of the rocks, was crowned with a complete redoubt. All the hill roads which penetrated through this strong position, were commanded by works, the greater part of which were nearly completed; and the position, flanked by the sea on the one side, and the Rhune mountain, which, rising to the height of 2800 feet, and overlooking all the neighbouring hills, on the other, could hardly be turned on either side. Wellington, nevertheless, determined to hazard an attack, and he first intended to have made it in the middle of September, immediately after the castle of St Sebastian fell; but the excessive storms of rain which afterwards came on, and swelled the Bidassoa into a raging torrent, rendered it impossible to attempt the crossing of the fords till the beginning of October; and the state of the tides, upon which the threading through them was mainly dependent, would not permit the passage being attempted till the 7th of that month. Soult, not expecting that Wellington would attempt to force his strong positions in this quarter, had not above fifteen thousand men immediately in front of the Bidassoa; as in truth he did not regard the heights in front as the principal part of his position, but it was in the fortifications on the Nive in their rear, that the principal line of defence was constructed, by which he hoped to prevent the invasion of the south of France. The French general had recently been joined by sixteen thousand new conscripts,

who were distributed through the veteran corps of the army, so that his numerical force was little inferior to what it had been before the battle of the Pyrenees; but this accession of force was fully counterbalanced on the allied side by the arrival of three thousand fresh troops from England, and the approach of the Andalusian army of reserve under the Conde D'Abisbal, fully twelve thousand strong, which bore an important part in the action which followed.[1]

[1] Belm. i. 266, 267. Soult to the Minister at War at Paris, Oct. 26, 1813. Ibid. 692, 694. Nap. vi. 246, 252. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Oct. 9, 1813. Gurw. xi. 176.

The troops which Wellington employed in the attack were very considerable, and proportioned rather to the strength of the enemy's position, than the actual force he had at his command to defend it. Graham, with the first and fifth divisions of Lord Aylmer's brigade, and a brigade of Portuguese, commanded the left wing, and received orders to cross the Bidassoa by the fords immediately above and below the site where the bridge on the great road from Paris to Madrid formerly stood; Major-General Alten with the light division, and Longa and Giron's Spaniards, were to cross the upper fords, and attack the Bayonette mountain and the Pass of Vera; while on the right the army of reserve of Andalusia, under the command of General Giron, was to attack the enemy's posts on the mountain of La Rhune, while the fourth and sixth divisions were in reserve to support them, if necessary. Altogether, the English general directed twenty-four thousand men against the Lower Bidassoa, and twenty thousand against the Rhune mountain and its adjacent ridges.[2]

Wellington's dispositions for forcing the passage.

[2] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Oct. 9, 1813. Gurw. xi. 176. Murray's general orders in Wyld's Memoirs, 129, 130, 133.

The night preceding the attack was unusually stormy and tempestuous. A thunder storm rolled down from the summit of the Rhune mountain, and broke with the utmost violence on the French posi-

Commencement of the attack, and forcing of the French right.

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tions on the Lower Bidassoa. During the darkness and storm, Wellington advanced a number of his guns up to the heights of San Marcial, while the troops and pontons were brought down, still unperceived, close to Irun, at the mouth of the Bidassoa; and the troops who were to cross over further up, were moved close to the respective points of passage, which were no less than ten in number, in order to be able simultaneously to commence the attack on the French position. All the tents of the allied army on the hills were left standing, and the pontons, which had been brought down to the water's edge, were carefully concealed from the enemy's view. At seven o'clock Lord Aylmer's brigade, which led the advance on the right, suddenly emerged from behind their screen, and advanced with a rapid pace towards the sands adjoining Irun, and immediately all the guns on the heights of San Marcial commenced their fire along the whole line; and so completely were the enemy taken by surprise, that Marshal Soult was passing troops in review in the centre of his position at the moment when the first guns were heard at the Lower Bidassoa. He immediately set out at the gallop in that direction; but before he could arrive in its vicinity, the positions had been carried, and the British were solidly established in the French territory. From the summit of San Marcial, seven columns could be seen descending rapidly from the heights, and advancing with beautiful precision and a rapid step towards the fords of the Bidassoa. Those on the upper parts of the stream descended at once into the enemy's fire; but those on the lower wound like huge snakes through the level sands, and were in some places almost immersed in water before they

reached the firm ground on the opposite side. The surprise, however, was complete, and the enemy on the heights opposite made no very strenuous resistance. Several redoubts in the sand-hills were taken, and seven pieces of cannon captured. A much more obstinate resistance was made, however, at the mountain of Louis the Fourteenth, and the heights of the Croix des Bouquets, which was the key to the whole position in that quarter, and towards which both parties brought up their troops and guns with the greatest rapidity. The Germans, who first made the attack on this point, were repulsed with severe loss; but the 9th regiment, under Colonel Cameron, at this moment came up, and stormed the post with the utmost gallantry; the French falling back at all points, and in great confusion, on the high-road towards Bayonne; and it was only by the arrival of Soult at this moment, with the reserve and several guns, that order was in part restored.[1]

[1] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Oct. 9, 1813. Gurw. xi. 177. Nap. vi. 254, 258. Subaltern, 94, 104. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 283. Pellot, 57, 58.

While this rapid and important success was achieved on the left, Alten, with the light division, having forded the river, attacked the enemy's intrenchments in the Pass of Vera; and Giron, with the Andalusians, was led against the mountain of La Rhune. Taupin's division guarded the stupendous rocks in front of the Allies which were to be assailed; while the sixth division, under Cole, who were posted on the heights of St Barbara, formed an imposing reserve, full in view of the French troops, and ready to co-operate at a moment's warning in the attack. The French troops in this quarter were posted on the summit of enormous rocky ridges, one of which, called by the soldiers the Boar's Back, projected, like a huge redoubt, far into the valley of Beira. No sooner did Clausel, who commanded

The French are driven from their position on the left.

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there, however, hear the first cannon shots on the Lower Bidassoa, than he hurried four regiments up to the summit of the Great Rhune, and advanced with the remainder of his forces to the support of Taupin on the ridges beneath. But before he could arrive, the action in that quarter was decided. Soon after seven o'clock, the Boar's Back was assailed at both ends; at its western extremity, that is, on the British right, by Giron's Andalusians, and on the left, towards the British centre, by Colonel Colborne, at the head of the 43d, the 95th, and 52d, and a Portuguese brigade of light troops. Soon the slopes of the mountain were covered with men and fire, while the dark forests, at the bottom of the ravines, were filled with volumes of white smoke, that came curling up out of their inmost recesses. The Portuguese Caçadôres were the first who made the attack, but they were overmatched by the French, who, rushing out of the redoubt at the summit, hurled them over the rocky slopes with great violence; but in the middle of their pursuit, the 52d regiment suddenly emerged from the wood, and startled the victorious French by the apparition of the red uniforms. At this sight the French wavered and fled, closely followed by the British regiment, who entered the redoubt with them. Following up his success, Colborne next attacked the second intrenchment, which was carried with equal impetuosty, and 400 prisoners were taken. Meanwhile Giron's Spaniards, on the right, had also worked their way with great difficulty up the eastern end of the Boar's Back, and stormed some intrenchments which the enemy had thrown up in that quarter. They were repulsed, however, in the attack of the strong position of the Hermitage, from

the summit of which the enemy rolled down immense rocks, which made huge gaps in the assailing companies. On this rugged height the French succeeded in maintaining themselves all night; but as soon as the mist had cleared away on the following morning, Wellington directed an attack by Giron's Spaniards by the eastern ridge, which alone was accessible. This important and difficult operation was performed with the utmost gallantry by the Andalusians, who drove the enemy from one fortified post in the rugged slopes to another, till the Great Rhune itself was in a manner environed by enemies. Clausel, upon this, fearful of being cut off, drew off his regiments from that elevated position in the night, and on the following morning the whole ridge occupied by the enemy, from the summit of La Rhune to the sea-coast, was in the hands of the Allies.[1]

[1] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Oct. 9, 1813. Gurw. vi. 177, 178. Nap. vi. 264, 267. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 283, 284. Pellot, 60, 61, Tor. v. 364, 366.

Though not so celebrated as some of his other achievements, there is none which reflects more lustre on Wellington as a general than this extraordinary action. With assiduous care, the French had for more than a month fortified their mountain position in the Pyrenees; it was guarded by an army as numerous, so far as the regular troops on either side were concerned, as those of the British general; and the heights on which the French were placed, far exceeded the far-famed steeps of Torres Vedras in strength and ruggedness. From this all but impregnable position they had been driven in a single day, by an enemy who, to reach it, had to ford a difficult and dangerous river, forming, as it were, a vast wet ditch to the intrenchment. Great as was the spirit evinced by the whole troops, Spanish as well as British or Portuguese, who had been engaged, it was not by their ef-

Reflections on this battle.

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forts alone that the battle was won. It was the combinations of the general, which rendered their attacks irresistible. It was the secrecy of his preparations, and the suddenness of his onset, which carried the enemy's position on the Lower Bidassoa. It was the admirable combinations which threw an overwhelming force against the rocks in the centre, which won the dizzy heights of La Rhune. In defence of their rocky intrenchments, the French were far from displaying their wonted spirit and vigour; and, what is very remarkable, the same troops who had ascended with so intrepid a step the crags of Sauroren, now abandoned with little resistance the loftier rocks of the Bayonnette—a remarkable proof of the old observation, that the French are much better adapted for offensive than defensive warfare, and how much the courage of the bravest troops may be lowered by a long series of defeats. In this battle the Allies lost about 1600 men, of whom one half were Spaniards. The French were weakened by not more than 1400, their troops during the greater part of the fighting being protected by the intrenchment which they defended. But this was of little consequence. The enemy's intrenched position, upon which they had so long laboured, had been lost; the territory of the great nation was violated; and a vast hostile army, for the first time since the Revolution, permanently encamped within the territory of France. And thus was England, which throughout the contest had been the most persevering and resolute of all the opponents of the Revolution, and whose government had never yet either yielded to the victories or acknowledged the chiefs of the Revolution, the first of all the forces of Europe who succeeded in planting its victorious standards on the soil of France.[1]

[1] Nap. vi. 268, 269. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, 9th Oct. 1813. Gurw. xi. 179.

The first care of Wellington, after the army was established within the French territory, was to use the most vigorous measures to prevent plundering on the part of his troops, and to establish that admirable system of paying regularly for the supplies of the army, which, as much as the bravery of the British soldiers, had contributed to his previous successes. The better to effect these objects, he issued a noble proclamation to his troops, in which, after recounting the incalculable miseries which the exactions of the French soldiers had brought upon Spain and Portugal, he declared that it would be unworthy of a great nation to retaliate these miseries upon the innocent inhabitants of France, and therefore that plundering and every species of excess would be rigorously punished, and supplies of every kind paid for with the same regularity as they had been in the Peninsular kingdoms.* Neither the Spanish troops nor the French peasantry

Wellington's noble and humane conduct on entering France.

* "The officers and soldiers of the army must recollect that their nations are at war with France, solely because the ruler of the French nation will not allow them to be at peace, and is desirous of forcing them to submit to his yoke; and they must not forget that the worst of evils suffered by the enemy, in his profligate invasion of Spain and Portugal, have been occasioned by the irregularities of the soldiers, and their cruelties, authorized and encouraged by their chiefs, towards the unfortunate and peaceful inhabitants of the country.

"To revenge this conduct on the peaceful inhabitants of France would be unmanly, and unworthy of the nations to whom the commander of the forces now addresses himself; and, at all events, would be the occasion of similar and worse evils to the army at large, than those which the enemy's army have suffered in the Peninsula, and would eventually prove highly injurious to the public interests.

"The rules, therefore, which have been observed hitherto in requiring, and taking, and giving receipts for supplies from the country, are to be continued in the villages on the French frontier; and the Commissioners attached to each of the armies of the several nations will receive the orders from the Commander-in-chief of the army of their nations respecting the mode and period of paying for such supplies."—WELLINGTON'S *Proclamation, 8th October* 1813. GURWOOD, xi, p. 169.

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at first gave any credit to this proclamation, so utterly at variance was it with the system by which the former had been accustomed to suffer, and the latter to profit, during the Peninsular campaigns. But Wellington was at once serious in his intention and resolute in his determination; and he soon gave convincing proof of both by instantaneously hanging several soldiers, both British and Spanish, who were detected in the act of plundering; at the same time, the perfect regularity with which supplies of all kinds were paid for with ready money in the English camp, awakened the covetous feelings of the French mountaineers, who hastened to profit by the prolific stream of war, which, fortunately for them, had entered their valleys; meanwhile, fourteen French peasants, who had been taken near the pass of Echallar firing on the British troops, were conducted to Passages as prisoners of war, where they were embarked for the British islands. The effect of this stroke was incalculable, for the peasants could not deny its justice, or accuse the British general of harshness when treating them as prisoners of war; while at the same time the idea of being carried to England, appeared like an exile to the world's end to these simple mountaineers. Thus, impelled by terror on the one hand and attracted by love of gain on the other, the peasantry generally laid aside all feelings of hostility, and the English dollars succeeded in revealing stores of subsistence in the mountains, which all the rigour of the French requisitions had been unable to discover.[1]*

[1] Pellot, 80. Tor. v. 366. Nap. vi. 268. Gurw. xi. 169.

* The system which the Allies adopted on entering France, was eminently calculated to render the inhabitants favourable to their operations; money, the sinews of war, was as abundant with them as it was wanting with us; they scattered it abroad with profusion, and took nothing without paying for it with hard cash on the spot. The English

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What rendered the impression of this conduct the greater upon the French peasantry, was the wide contrast which the conduct of their enemies thus presented to that which was at the same time pursued by their own defenders in the French army. The revolutionary generals, now for the first time thrown back upon the territory of France, had no means which the government of Paris would sanction, for the subsistence, clothing, and often pay of the troops, but by forced requisitions on the countries in which they were cantoned. This system did admirably well, and was in the highest degree popular in France, as long as the requisitions fell on foreign countries; but the case was very different now when they were driven back into their own territory, and these oppressive burdens had to be borne by themselves. Their eyes were suddenly opened with appalling effect to the injustice which they so long practised upon others. When the whole arrondissements around Bayonne accordingly were laid under contribution for the support of Soult's army, and these demands were necessarily repeated as the wants of the troops called for fresh supplies, their indignation knew no bounds; and such was the general exasperation, that already they were contrasting these enormous revolutionary burdens with the comparatively light weight of the old *Corvées*, which had been so much complained of before the Revolution. Soult, indeed, did his utmost to prevent plundering, and even exe-

Contrast presented by the French requisitions.

knew well that that affected generosity would do us more mischief than their arms; and, in point of fact, they thus obtained resources which we had been incapable of discovering. The peasants who could not reason were rapidly seduced by that politic conduct, and received as friends the army of the stranger whose footsteps sullied the soil of their country, and whose arms were stained with the blood of their brethren.—PELLOT, *Mémoires de la Guerre des Pyrénées*, p. 80.

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cuted an officer and some soldiers who had been detected pillaging some houses in Sarre, immediately after the action; but this was not the evil that was complained of: it was the forced requisitions; in other words, the organized rapine of government, that was the real evil that was so sorely felt. And thus, while the English army spread wealth and prosperity around its cantonments, the presence of the French was known only by the oppressive weight of the military exactions by which they were maintained; and such was the magnitude of these burdens, and the exasperation which they excited among the peasantry of the country, that Soult's principal commissary, Pellot, has not hesitated to ascribe chiefly to that cause the general indisposition manifested by the rural population of France, during the invasion of 1814, to support the cause of Napoleon.[1]*

[1] Pellot, 39, 42, 79.

When Wellington found himself once established in the territory of France, he immediately began strengthening his position with field-works, facing towards the north, in order to be the better able to resist any attacks Soult might make to expel him from the French soil. He waited only the surrender of Pampeluna to resume offensive operations; but such had been the activity which the governor had

Distress and capitulation of Pampeluna.

* The system of forced requisitions conceals, under the appearance of a just division of the burdens of war, an inexhaustible source of abuses. It weighs exclusively on the rural proprietors, while the capitalist, who has no productions, escapes it altogether. This system, born of the Revolution, applicable, perhaps, under a popular government, exasperates the mind under the rule of a single monarch. I do not hesitate to say that it is one of the causes which has chiefly contributed to render the departments subjected to requisitions so impatient of the government of Napoleon; the people incessantly pronounced with loud groans the words requisition and corvée.—PELLOT, *Commissaire-Général de Guerre dans les Pyrénées*, en 1813, p. 39.

displayed in replenishing his magazines during the short interruption of the blockade by the battle of Sauroren, that it was not till two additional months had expired that his resources were exhausted. The garrison had confidently expected to be delivered on the 25th of July, and gazed with silent rapture on the mountains of Zubiri and Esteribar, which reflected at night the glow of the French bivouacs; but these hopes gradually died away as the fire receded on the day following, and their aching eyes beheld no friendly columns surmounting the nearest ridges of the Pyrenees; and on the 30th, the blockading forces resumed their old position, and the blockade became more strict than ever. Early in August, the Gallicians, about nine thousand strong, replaced O'Donnell's Andalusians in the blockade; while Mina, with ten thousand more, lay in the defiles of the Pyrenees to intercept the garrison, in case they should escape the vigilance of the troops around the town. With such vigilance, however, was the blockade conducted, that during the three months it lasted the garrison never once received even a letter from their comrades. In the middle of October, the governor, who had conducted the defence with the most persevering constancy, put his troops on scanty rations of horse flesh; and on the 26th, his resources being now exhausted, and the garrison subsisting only on the most revolting reptiles and unwholesome plants which grew on the ramparts,* negotiations were entered into for a surrender. Cassan, the governor, at first proposed to capitulate, on condition of being allowed to retire into France with six pieces of

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15th Oct.

* Dogs and cats were esteemed a luxury; rats and mice had long been sought out with avidity; and several soldiers had died from eating the roots of hemlock which grew on the ramparts.—BELMAS, iv. 774.

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cannon; but this was positively refused, as Wellington's instructions were peremptory that the garrison must surrender at discretion. Upon this refusal, hostilities were resumed, and the governor undermined some of the bastions, threatening to blow them up, and cut his way sword in hand to France, as Brennier had done at Almeida three years before. But three days more of hunger so tamed the spirit and reduced the strength of the garrison, that they were unequal to such an effort: Wellington's orders were positive, if such an attempt were made, to give no quarter to the governor or officers, and to decimate the garrison. Fortunately for the honour of England, and the fame of her chief, it was not necessary to have recourse to such extremities, which, in the case of the soldiers and inferior officers at least, would have been of very doubtful legality: on the 31st, the garrison surrendered at discretion, to the number of three thousand, including eight hundred sick and wounded, and were made prisoners of war.[1]

[1] Belm. iv. 776, 779 Jon.'s Sieges, i. 5, 11. Nap. vi. 290, 294. Wellington to Don Carlos de Espana, 20th Oct. 1813. Gurw. xi. 210. Tor. v. 368, 369.

Santona now was the only fortress which remained to the French in the north-west of Spain; and though Lord Aylmer, with his gallant brigade, was ordered to embark at Passages to aid in the reduction of that place, yet circumstances prevented the design being carried into effect, and it continued blockaded to the end of the war. Meantime Soult was at first anxious to abandon the lines in front of Bayonne, and proposed to debouche by Jaca with fifty thousand men into Aragon, unite with Suchet, who, he thought, might join him with thirty thousand more and a hundred pieces of cannon, and with their combined forces again invade Spain, maintaining the war on the resources of that country, instead of the now exhausted provinces of the south

Soult's designs, at this period, of foreign operations.

of France. But this project, which afforded by far the most feasible plan for averting from the imperial dominions the horrors of invasion, was rendered abortive by the obstinacy of Napoleon, in insisting upon the retention of so many fortresses in Catalonia by Suchet, which so reduced his effective force in the field, that, after providing a body of men to watch the Anglo-Sicilian army, he could not operate in Aragon with any respectable body. Suchet accordingly at once agreed to Soult's proposals, and declared his willingness to ascend the Ebro with thirty thousand men and a hundred guns, to co-operate with him in driving the Allies over that river; but only on condition that he got the artillerymen and draught horses of Soult's army sent to Catalonia; his own being absorbed in the fortresses; which was out of the question, as it would have entirely paralysed Soult himself; and, moreover, he declared that he must, in conformity with the Emperor's instructions, return, as soon as the English were driven across the Ebro, to his principal duty, that of watching over the fortresses in Catalonia.* Thus, this

* "Informed as you are by the letters of the Duke of Dalmatia of the part assigned in his projects to the armies of Aragon and Catalonia, you will from this moment take measures to concur with all your disposable means in the general plan of joint operations; so as to be in a condition, the moment that I transmit to you his majesty the Emperor's sanction, to take the field: *taking care, however, to leave the fortresses of Catalonia and Aragon well garrisoned, and in the best possible state of defence.*"—Duc de Feltre, *Ministre de la Guerre, au* Duc D'Albufera, *13th Sept.* 1813. Suchet, ii. 454, *Pièces Just.*

"In examining the dispositions which your excellency has ordered to meet the case of the army being ordered to commence active operations, his majesty sees, as well as your excellency, grave objections to the plan as at present combined. It leaves the frontier altogether unguarded; and whatever movement you may execute with a corps in the field, *the first and indispensable condition to its commencement is, to leave a strong garrison in Barcelona, Figueras, and Puycerda.*"—Duc de Feltre *au* Duc D'Albufera, *15th Nov.* 1813. Suchet, ii. 457.

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project of joint operations came to nothing; and meanwhile Wellington's passage of the Bidassoa and invasion of France rendered all idea of offensive hostilities in the Peninsula out of the question, and fixed the theatre of war permanently in the south of France; a striking proof of the wisdom of the British government in urging, against Wellington's opinion, that bold undertaking.[1]

[1] See Belm. i. 267. Soult to Duc de Feltre, Oct. 1813. Ibid. i. 693. Suchet, ii. 348, and App. 454, et Subseq.

Soult made good use of the month's respite afforded him, by the prolonged resistance of the garrison of Pampeluna, to strengthen to a most extraordinary degree his position on the Nivelle. It consisted of three lines of defence, one behind

Description of Soult's position on the Nivelle.

"On the 7th October, Lord Wellington crossed the Bidassoa, and transported the war into the French territory. By that stroke every thing was changed, and offensive operations became no longer possible to the French armies. Marshal Suchet, however, conceived he would still have time to succour the distant garrisons in the east of Spain: and he flattered himself he should be in a condition at their head to make an effort and march upon the Ebro. The minister at war entered into his views; and the Emperor himself, when he returned to Paris, breaking the silence which he had previously preserved on the projects submitted to him, seemed to approve of their execution. *Unhappily he directed that, when the army marched, a portion of it should be left in garrison at Barcelona, Figueras, and Puycerda.* The Duc D'Albufera beseeched in vain for the combinations promised in that event to enable him to march. He received proofs of confidence, but no increase of force. He grieved at seeing the precious time pass away, while nothing was done: he desired not less ardently than the government to deliver the garrisons, but he had not the means of realizing his wishes."—SUCHET, *Mémoires*, ii. 348, 349.

Colonel Napier (vi. 282, 284) represents the failure of this well conceived project, of joint operations on the part of Soult and Suchet, as the result of the latter throwing unnecessary and unfounded difficulties in the way of its execution. But it is plain, from the correspondence above quoted, that it in reality arose from the invincible repugnance which the Emperor felt to give up any of the great fortresses his arms had conquered, which necessarily deprived Suchet of the means of carrying it into execution, and was part of the same system which caused him to lose such noble armies in the garrisons on the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula.

another, which equalled those of Torres Vedras in strength and solidity. They ran along a line of hills forming the northern boundary, for the most part, of the valley of the Nivelle, and stretched from the sea and St Jean de Luz on the right, to Mount Daren on the left: from thence to St Jean Pied-de-Port, the line was protected by a ridge of rocks, so rugged that neither army could pretend to cross them. Numerous field-works constructed on every eminence, especially on the right, where the great road to St Jean de Luz and Bayonne crossed the ridge, protected the line in every part where it appeared to be not adequately secured by the obstacles of nature. A second line in rear of the former ran from St Jean de Luz on the right to Cambo on the left, and embraced the camps of Espelette and Sunaide, and the camp of Sarre, the principal points where the enemy's forces were assembled. A third line was established behind Santa Pe, on the road to Ustaritz; but the redoubts on it were only commenced. Those on the two former were completed, and armed with heavy guns drawn from the arsenal of Bayonne. Soult having been reinforced by sixteen thousand conscripts, had eighty thousand effective combatants under his orders, of whom seventy thousand were in the field, and could be relied on for active operations. The right, near St Jean de Luz, under Reille, consisted of three divisions of infantry: Clausel in the centre guarded the redoubts behind Sarre with three divisions; the left, under D'Erlon, of two divisions, was behind D'Ainhoa: Foy, with his division, was on the extreme left, between St Jean Pied-de-Port and Bidarray, to threaten the allied right, and act as circumstances might require.[1]

[1] Vict. et Conq. xxii. 286, 287. Pellot, 70, 71. Nap. vi. 332, 333. Tor. v. 270.

The heavy rains usual in the end of autumn

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having fallen, and fine weather returned, Wellington, on the 9th November, prepared for a general attack. After carefully surveying the enemy's position, Wellington judged that it was weakest in the centre, in the opening between the Rhune mountains and the bridge of Amotz, over the Nivelle, and it was there accordingly that he resolved to make his principal effort. His plan of attack was thus arranged. Hill, with the right wing, consisting of the second and sixth divisions, under Stewart and Clinton, Murillo's Spaniards, and two Portuguese brigades, was to assail the enemy's left, behind D'Ainhoa. The right centre, under Beresford, consisting of the third, fourth, and seventh divisions, under the command of Generals Colville, Le Cor, and Cole, was to direct their attack against the redoubts in front of Sarre and the heights behind it, supported on the left centre by Giron's Spaniards, who were to attack the slopes situated to the westward of Sarre. General Alten, with the light division and Longa's Spaniards, was in the first instance to attack the heights of La Petite Rhune, which the enemy still held as an advanced redoubt in front of the middle of his line, and having carried them, co-operate in the general attack on the centre; while Sir John Hope, who had succeeded Graham in the command of the left wing, consisting of Freyre's Spaniards, was to engage the enemy's attention by a feigned attack on their right, near the sea, on the hills in front of St Jean de Luz. Thus Hill and Beresford's corps, forming a mass of forty thousand admirable infantry, of whom above thirty thousand were British and Portuguese, were to be thrown on the weakest part of the enemy's line in the centre, near the bridge of Amotz, between Clau-

Wellington's plan of attack.

sel's and D'Erlon's corps. It will be seen from these directions how many of England's best generals, Picton, Dalhousie, Leith, Oswald, and others, were absent from ill health, or other unavoidable causes; but, on the other hand, the posts assigned to the Spaniards in the fight told how sensibly their discipline and efficacy had improved under Wellington's directions in the course of the campaign.[1]

[1] Murray's General Orders, Wyld, 142, 143. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Nov. 13, 1813. Gurw. xi. 280, 281. Tor. vi 371, 372.

The action began at daylight by an assault on the enemy's fortified outworks on the lesser Rhune, which was so far in advance of their main line that it required to be carried before the general attack could commence. This fort, perched on a craggy summit, surrounded on three sides by precipices two hundred feet high, was accessible only on the east by a long narrow ridge, which in that direction descended towards Sarre, in the valley of the Nivelle. The troops destined for this operation, consisting of the light division under Alten on the left, and Giron's Andalusians on the right, had been formed, concealed from the enemy, as near as possible to their respective points of attack on the evening of the 9th; and at the signal, on the following morning, of three guns from the lofty summit of Atchubia, they sprang up; the level rays of the sun glanced on ten thousand bayonets, and immediately the shaggy sides of the Petite Rhune rang with the thunder of cannon, and was enveloped in smoke. The French fired fast from the summit of their inaccessible cliffs; but the 43d, which headed the attack of the light division, pressed boldly upward, and the first redoubt was soon carried. From thence to the second was an ascent almost precipitous, to be surmounted only by narrow paths, which amidst the steep crags wound up to the summit. There a desperate conflict, bayonet against

Battle of the Nivelle, and storming of the Petite Rhune.

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bayonet, man against man, ensued; but the enthusiastic valour of the 43d overcame every opposition, and the fort was won. Upon this, the French retreated to their last stronghold, at the summit of the Petite Rhune, called the Donjon; but here the impetuous assault of the 43d was stayed by a natural ditch or cleft in the rocks fifteen feet deep. Soon, however, the Portuguese Caçadores came to their aid; the 52d threatened them on the other side, and the outer works were abandoned. Upon this, the 43d with a loud shout leaped down into the clefts in a minute, the old walls were scaled, and the British colours planted on the highest summit of the castle. At the same time, Kempt, though sorely wounded, kept the field, and expelled the enemy from the elevated plateau from which La Petite Rhune arose, and the French, driven out of all their advanced positions, fell back in great confusion to their main line of defence behind Ascain, leaving a battalion which was made prisoners at the summit of the mountain.[1]

[1] Nap. vi. 338, 341. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 288. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Nov. 13, 1813. Gurw. xi. 281, 282.

Progress of the action on the right, and in the centre.

While the rocky summits of the lesser Rhune were thus wrested from the enemy, the fourth and seventh divisions in the right centre under Beresford, moved against the redoubt of St Barbara and Grenada, and eighteen guns placed in battery against them soon sent such a stream of shot upward into the works, that the garrison, upon seeing the troops advancing with the scaling ladders, leaped down from their intrenchments and fled. Far on the right, Hill, after a long and difficult night's march, had got, a little before seven, to the front of the enemy's extreme left, and after driving them from their rugged positions immediately opposite, near Urdax, inclined upwards, and with the aid of the sixth division soon ap-

proached the broken ground where D'Erlon's redoubts were placed, near the bridge of Amotz. To the spectator on the Petite Rhune, which overlooked the whole of this complicated battle field, it presented a scene of unequalled grandeur. Far to the right, Hope's Spaniards were coming into action, and a hundred guns below, answered by as many on the summits of the rocks, made a deafening roar in the lesser hills near the sea; while in the centre and right, fifty thousand men, rushing like an impetuous torrent down the slopes of the Atchubia mountain, with loud shouts chased the receding French divisions into the lower grounds near the Nivelle.[1]

Nap. vi. 342, 343. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 267, 268. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Oct. 13, 1813. Gurw. xi. 281, 282. Tor. v. 372, 373.

The enemy's troops, retreating at various points at the same time through broken ground, and having their line of defence pierced through in many places, were in no condition to resist this terrible onset, and gave way in a manner that proved that long-continued disaster had weakened their spirit. Clausel's divisions in the centre, in particular, yielded in a manner which called forth the severe animadversions of that general and Marshal Soult.* Clinton, with the sixth division, broke through all the works guarded by D'Erlon's men, which covered the approaches to the bridge of Amotz, and then wheeling to the right, attacked and carried in the most gallant style the enemy's redoubts behind Ainhoa, so as entirely to turn their defences in that quarter. The Portuguese division and Byng's brigade, with equal vigour, stormed the redoubts to which they

* "General Clausel was the first to declare with regret, that the divisions under his orders had not in all cases done their duty. If they had fought with the ardour which they had evinced in previous combats, and subsequently showed, the enemy, in spite of his superiority of number, would not have forced our lines without a loss of 15,000 or 20,000 men."—PELLOT, *Guerre des Pyrénées*, 73.

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were opposed in front of D'Ainhoa; and the French of D'Armagnac's division, finding that their line of defence was entirely broken through, set fire to their huts, and retreated behind Santa Pe, nearly two leagues to the rear. The rough nature of the ground caused the French left to fall into confusion while executing this retrograde movement; and Abbé's division, which stood next on the line, was entirely uncovered on its flank, and exposed to the most imminent danger. That brave general, however, stood firm, and for a short time arrested the flood of conquest; but D'Erlon, seeing his danger, at length ordered him to retreat. Couroux's division, which extended from Sarre to Amotz, was at the same time broken through at several points by the third and sixth divisions, and their gallant commander mortally wounded. Though occasionally arrested by the formidable redoubts which lay in their way, the flood of war did not the less roll impetuously on, until these isolated landmarks, cut off from each other, were overwhelmed, as a stream tide breaking on rock-bestrewed shores, rushes round the black masses which obstruct its rise, till, surrounded by the foaming surge, they are finally submerged.[1]

Vict. et Corq. xxii. 288, 289. Nap. vi. 342, 345. Belle, 72, 73. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Nov. 13, 1813. Gurw. xi. 282, 283.

Rout of the French right centre, and completion of the victory.

Clausel's right wing, however, forming the French right centre, consisting of Taupin's division and a large body of conscripts, still stood firm; and the position, resting on three large redoubts near Ascain, which they occupied, was such as to afford a fair prospect of rallying the fugitives, and still retreiving the day. But at this critical juncture the light division, which had won the Petite Rhune, pressing forward with unabated vigour, led by the gallant 52d, attacked Taupin's front; and Longa's skirmishers, having turned the Smaller Rhune, and approached

their flank, the French, seized with a sudden panic, broke and fled. Four regiments of the whole division alone remained unbroken, and the seventh and fourth British division quickly assailed them in front and flank, and they were put to the rout. The signal-post redoubt, the strongest in the whole French line, situated on a high hill in the centre, was now left to its fate, and Colborne, at the head of the 52d, advanced to storm it; but two attacks were repulsed with heavy loss, though on the third, the garrison, seeing themselves entirely cut off and surrounded, surrendered at discretion. During this rout of the right centre, Clausel's divisions fled through the Nivelle in great disorder; and Soult, in extreme alarm, hurried from St Jean de Luz, with all his reserves, to endeavour to arrest the progress of defeat. Wellington, upon seeing the force which was thus ready to be thrown upon the flank of his victorious centre when hurrying on in the tumult of success, wisely halted the fourth and seventh divisions, and Giron's Spaniards, upon the northern slope of the heights they had won, looking down upon the enemy's camp at Sarres. No sooner, however, had the sixth division, which was in reserve, come up, than the pursuit was renewed; the whole British centre crossed the Nivelle, drove the enemy from the heights beyond it, which formed his second line of defence, and established themselves on that advantageous ground, about two leagues in advance of the position occupied by them in the morning. Upon this the enemy's right, under Reille, which had been engaged all day with Freyre's Spaniards, fell back also, and St Jean de Luz and Ascain were evacuated, and the whole line of the Nivelle, with its superb positions and six miles of intrenchments, fell into the hands of the Allies.[1]

[1] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Nov. 13, 1813. Gurw. xi. 282, 283. Nap. vi. 349, 351. Tor. v. 372, 373. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 288, 289.

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Next morning the victors advanced in order of battle at all points. Hope, with the left, forded the Nivelle above Bidart; Beresford, with the centre, moved direct upon Arbonne; and Hill, with the right, occupied Espelete and Suraide, and approached Cambo. During the battle on the preceding day, Foy, who with his division was in front of the Puerto de Mayas, had gained some success against Mina and Murillo's Spaniards, to whom he was opposed, and captured a considerable part of their baggage; but the defeat of the main army obliged him also to fall back, and he effected his retreat, not without difficulty, by Cambo and Ustaritz, on the following day. Soult had now rallied his army in his third line of intrenchments, about eight miles in rear of the first; but the troops were too dispirited, and the works in too unfinished a state to think of defending them; wherefore, abandoning that line also altogether, he retired into the intrenched camp he had constructed in front of Bayonne, leaving the whole intermediate country in the hands of the Allies. In this battle, Wellington lost 2694 men; but the loss of the French was 4265, including 1400 prisoners. They abandoned fifty-one pieces of cannon, and all their field magazines; and, what was of more importance, the great mountain barrier, on which they had been labouring assiduously for three months, was broken through and captured, the Allies were firmly established in the French territory, with the harbour of St Jean de Luz to bring supplies of all sorts into the heart of their cantonments, and the flames of war had been seen lighted upon the summit of their mountain screen, far and wide through the plains and valleys of France.[1]

The French retire to the intrenched camp in front of Bayonne, Nov. 11.

[1] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Nov. 13, 1813. Gurw. xi. 284. Belm. i. 268. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 290, 291. Pellot, 73, 74. Nap. vi. 352, 353.

Though Wellington, however, had thus driven

the French from their position, and gained very considerable extension for the cantonments of his troops, yet his situation was far from being free from anxiety and even peril. He was uneasy for his right flank as long as Soult held, which he still did, the *tête-du-pont* over the Nive, at Rothsay; and, in consequence, Hill received orders to menace it on the 16th. This was accordingly done, and at his approach the French retired across the river and blew up the bridge, which effectually secured his right flank. But the disorders of the Spanish and Portuguese soldiers in the Spanish villages, as well as the pillaging of the British, was a more serious and durable subject of anxiety. With the latter, plunder was the result merely of the passing desire of gain and intoxication; but with the former it was a deeper feeling, for it was founded on a profound thirst for vengeance, arising from the innumerable evils of a similar description which the French troops had inflicted upon every part of the Peninsula. There was hardly a soldier in the Spanish or Portuguese armies who could not tell the tale of a parent or brother murdered, a sister or daughter ravished, or a patrimony destroyed, from the violence of the French soldiers, or the more lasting scourge of their contributions; and they not unnaturally imagined, that now that they had got into France, it was their turn to indulge in the same excesses, and satiate at once their thirst for vengeance and desire for plunder, on the blood and the property of the wretched inhabitants.* Plundering, accordingly, im-

Wellington's efforts to repress pillage among his troops.

* "We ran up and found a poor old French peasant lying dead at the bottom of the garden. A bullet had passed through his head, and his thin grey hairs were dyed with his own blood. A Caçadore rushed out and attempted to elude us. On entering, we saw an old woman, the

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mediately began. On the very day of the battle, Freyre's and Longa's soldiers began pillaging Ascain the moment that they entered it, and murdered several of the inhabitants; Mina's battalions on the right, some of which had shaken off all authority, dispersed themselves, marauding through the mountains; and the Portuguese and British soldiers of the left had begun the same disorders, and two persons had been killed in one small town. Natural as the feelings were which led to these excesses on the part of the Peninsular soldiers, they were utterly abhorrent to the disposition of Wellington—they were subversive of the principles on which he had throughout maintained the contest, and were only the more dangerous that they arose from such deeply moved passions of the human heart. Immediate and decisive, accordingly, were the measures which he adopted to remedy the evil. On the 12th, though in hourly expectation of a battle, he put to death all the Spanish marauders he could take in the act; and as the Peninsula generals were tardy or reluctant in carrying his orders into execution, and even remonstrated against them, he at once sent the whole Spaniards, except Murillo's division, which had conducted itself properly, out of France; obliging Freyre's Gallicians to retire into Biscay, Giron's Andalusians

wife of the peasant, lying dead in the kitchen. The desperate Portuguese did not attempt to deny having perpetrated these murders: he seemed on the contrary wound up to a pitch of frenzy,—'They murdered my father,' said he; 'they cut my mother's throat, and they ravished my sister before my eyes; and I vowed at the time I would put to death the first French family that fell into my hands;—you may hang me if you will, but I have kept my oath, and care not for dying.' He was hanged, however; indeed, no fewer than eighteen were suspended, on this and the following days, to the branches of trees. Such extreme measures were requisite to check the ardent thirst for vengeance in the Peninsular soldiers.'—*Subaltern*, 146.

into the valley of Bastan, and Longa's men over the Ebro; while Mina's mutinous battalions were disarmed and sent across the Pyrenees. By these vigorous measures, he deprived himself, at a period when he much required it, of the aid of twenty-five thousand now experienced troops; but the effect was decisive:—it marked the lofty character of the man who would rather arrest success, even at its flood tide, than purchase it by iniquity; it restored his authority in the army, and at once checked its excesses; and, by dissipating the fears of the French peasantry, brought them back to their homes, where, finding the strictest discipline established, and every thing paid for in ready money, an amicable intercourse was immediately established between them and the invaders.[1]

[1] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Nov. 27, 1813. Gurw. xi. 325. Nap. vi. 365. Wellington to Freyre, Nov. 14, 1813. Gurw. xi. 287, 288. Beauchamp, Guerre de 1814, ii. 31, 32.

But although the disorders with which he was immediately surrounded were effectually checked by these energetic steps, it was not so easy a matter for the English general to make head against the dangers which were accumulating in his rear, and which threatened to snatch the fruits of victory from his grasp at the very time when they were within his reach. The democratic government at Cadiz, actuated by the furious passions and insatiable ambition which could not fail to be engendered by vesting the supreme power in an assembly elected by the universal suffrage of an old community, was indefatigable in its efforts to throw obstacles in his way, and excite the national passions against him. A slight reverse would have blown the flame thus kindled into a conflagration; and it was only by the unbroken series of his successes that the Peninsular confederacy, at the moment when it had triumphed over all its external enemies, was prevented from falling the victim to unworthy jealousy and preju-

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diced ambition. To such a length did they carry their hostility, that though Wellington had nominally forty thousand Spaniards under his orders, he did not venture to advance them into France, because their total state of destitution rendered pillage almost unavoidable; and immediately after he had borne the British standards in triumph across the Pyrenees, he was so thwarted in all his designs by the democratic leaders at Cadiz, that he actually resigned the general command of their armies, and recommended to the British government entirely to withdraw their army from the Peninsula if their demands were not acceded to.* Nor were his difficulties less formidable at Lisbon, where the ample British

* "It is quite clear to me, that if we do not beat down the democracy at Cadiz, the cause is lost; how that is to be done, God knows."—WELLINGTON *to* SIR H. WELLESLEY, *16th Oct.* 1813. GURW. xi. 200.

"The persons who propagate the libels against the British army in Spain, are not the people of the country, but the officers of government, who would not dare to conduct themselves in this manner if they did not know that their conduct would be agreeable to their employers. If this spirit is not checked, we must expect that the people at large will soon behave to us in the same manner; and we shall have no friend, or none who will avow himself as such, in Spain. A crisis is approaching in our connexion in Spain; and, if you do not bring the government and nation to their senses before they go too far, you will inevitably lose all the advantages which you might expect from the services you have rendered them. I recommend to you to complain seriously of the conduct of government and their servants: to remind them that Cadiz, Carthagena—and, I believe, Ceuta—were garrisoned with British troops at their own earnest request, and that, if they had not been so garrisoned, they would long ere this have fallen into the hands of the enemy, and Ceuta of the Moors. I recommend to you to demand as a security for the safety of the King's troops, against the criminal disposition of the government and their servants, that a British garrison should be admitted to St Sebastian, with the intimation that, if this demand is not complied with, the troops should be withdrawn. And, if this is not conceded, I recommend you to withdraw the troops, be the consequences what they may, and to be prepared accordingly."—WELLINGTON *to* LORD BATHURST, *27th Nov.* 1813. GURW. xi. 327.

subsidy was so dissipated by official corruption, that not one half of it reached its proper destination: the muleteers of the army were two years, the soldiers nine months in arrear of their pay; the magazines empty; the stores deficient; although the subsidy was amply sufficient to have kept all these services in plentiful circumstances. Fortunately the Spanish authorities had still sufficient recollection of their defeat to appreciate the consequences of being left to their own resources; the resignation of Wellington was not accepted; the stern measure of sending back the marauders to Spain, restored discipline to the Peninsular armies; and Wellington was again enabled, with undiminished force, to renew the career of victory in the south of France.[1]

[1] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Nov. 27, 1813. Gurw. xi. 327. Nap. vi. 424, 434.

While Wellington was thus experiencing, in the rancour and jealousies which were accumulating in his rear in the Peninsula, which he had delivered, the baseness of factious opposition, and the usual ingratitude of men to those from whom they have received inestimable services, he was preparing to follow up his successes over Marshal Soult, and confound his democratic calumniators at Cadiz by fresh obligations. His vast army, eighty thousand strong even after the Spaniards were withdrawn, and powerful artillery and cavalry—the former numbering a hundred pieces, and the latter eight thousand six hundred sabres—were restrained in the contracted space which they occupied, and he was anxious to extend his cantonments, and gain possession of more fertile districts, by forcing the passage of the Nive, and throwing the enemy entirely back under the cannon of Bayonne; but the heavy and long-continued winter rains, which in the deep clay of Bearn

Wellington prepares to force the passage of the Nive.

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rendered the roads knee-deep, and wholly impassable for artillery or chariots, prevented him from undertaking any offensive operations till the end of the first week in December. At that period, however, the weather cleared up, and the Nive having become fordable, he brought up fifty pieces of cannon, and the passage of the river was attempted; an effort which led to one of the most desperate and sanguinary actions of the war.[1]

[1] Vict. et Conq. xxii. 291. Nap. vi. 368, 369. Pellot, 79, 80.

Soult's position in front of Bayonne.

Soult's situation on the Nive, though strong, was full of difficulties. Bayonne, situated at the confluence of that river and the Adour, commanded the passage of both; and though a weak fortress of the third order, it had now, from its situation, and the intrenched camp of which it formed a part, become a point of first rate importance. The camp, being commanded by the guns of the fortress immediately in its rear, could not be attacked in front, on which account the French general stationed only his centre there, composed of six divisions under D'Erlon. The right wing, consisting of Reille's two divisions and Villatte's reserve, was stationed to the westward of the fortress on the lower Adour, where there was a flotilla of gun-boats; and the approach to it was covered by a swamp and artificial inundation. The left under Clausel, posted to the westward of Bayonne, stretched from its right to the Nive, and was protected partly by an inundation, and partly by a large fortified house, which had been converted into an advanced work. The country in front consisted of a deep clay, much enclosed and intersected by woods and hedgerows, and four divisions of D'Erlon's men occupied it beyond the Nive, in front of the Usteritz, and as far as Cambo; the remainder being in reserve, occupying a strong range of heights in front of Mousserolles,

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stretching from Villefranque on the Nive almost to Old Moguerre on the Adour. The great advantage of this position was, that the troops, in case of disaster, might securely find refuge under the cannon of Bayonne; while the general-in-chief, having an interior and protected line of communication through that fortress, could at pleasure, like Napoleon at Dresden, throw the weight of his forces from one flank to another, when unforeseen and unguarded against, upon the enemy.[1]

[1] Vict. et Conq. xxii. 290, 291. Nap. vi. 369, 370. Belm. i. 269.

His political difficulties.

But although, in a military point of view, the position of Soult was thus favourable, his political situation was very different; and it required all his perseverance, and vigour of administrative powers, to make head against the difficulties which were hourly accumulating round the sinking empire. His soldiers, though depressed by defeat, were still brave and docile; it was the difficulty of procuring supplies which was the real evil; it was the system of making war maintain war, which now pressed with terrible but just severity on the falling state. Money there was none to be got from headquarters in Paris; and the usual resource of the imperial government on such emergencies to levy contributions, however warmly and unanimously approved of so long as they were laid on other countries, was now complained of as the most intolerable of all grievances when they fell upon themselves. Nor is it surprising that this universal indignation burst forth when the imperial system of government came to be really felt in France itself; for we have the authority of official documents for the assertion, that in Navarre, for some years before the French were driven out of the country, the requisitions had often amounted to two hundred *per cent* of the whole income of the

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landowners and farmers. So oppressive were the exactions of the French authorities felt to be, that numbers migrated into the British lines, where they not only were subjected to no such burdens, but found a ready and well-paid market for all their commodities. An official letter written from Bayonne at this period said, "The English general's policy, and the good discipline he maintains, does us more harm than ten battles—every peasant wishes to be under his protection." The conscripts raised in all the southern provinces were indeed marched in great numbers into Bayonne; but the ancient spirit of the imperial armies was gone; they deserted by hundreds at a time, although every possible care was taken to treat them with gentleness, to spare their inexperienced frames, and to set them only on duty in the interior of the fortress.[1]

[1] Soult's corresp. MS. in Nap. vi. 506, 507. Pellot, 79, 80. Toreno, v. 369.

Having taken his resolution to force his adversary's position in front of Bayonne, Wellington made the following dispositions for the attack:—Sir John Hope and General Charles Alten, with the first, fifth, and light divisions, Vandeleur's cavalry and twelve guns, in all twenty-four thousand combatants, were to drive back the French advanced posts along the whole front of the intrenched camp from the Nive to the sea. On the right, Sir Rowland Hill with the second and Portuguese divisions, Vivian and Victor Alten's cavalry, and Ross's horse artillery, was to put himself in motion in the night between the 8th and 9th, so as to pass the Nive by the fords of Cambo at daybreak on the latter day, and advance by the great road from St Pied-de-Port towards Bayonne. At the same time Beresford, in the centre, with the third and sixth divisions, was to cross the Nive by

Wellington's dispositions for the attack.

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bridges to be thrown over it during the night; while the fourth and seventh divisions were to be in reserve a little in the rear, concealed from the enemy, but ready to support any part of the line which might require it. The main attack was to be made by the centre and right; the principal object of the advance by Hope on the left, was to acquire an accurate view of the nature of the enemy's works between Bayonne and the sea on the lower Adour. Wellington's object in these movements was not to force the intrenched camp before Bayonne, which, from its being under the guns of that fortress, could not be effected without very heavy loss; but to place his right upon the Adour, after crossing the Nive, whereby the enemy, already distressed for provisions, would lose the means of communication with the interior by the aid of that river, and would be compelled to fall back to other and more distant quarters, from which to draw his resources.[1]

[1] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Dec. 14, 1813. Gurw. xi. 365. Murray's Gen. Orders in Wyld, 147. Wellington to Sir J. Hope, Dec. 9, 1813. Wyld, 150.

The requisite preparatory movements having been made with perfect accuracy on the night of the 8th, a huge fire, lighted on a height behind Cambo at daybreak on the 9th, gave the signal of attack. The French had broken down the bridges at Ustaritz in the centre; but the island which connected them was in the possession of the British, and the passage was immediately forced under cover of a heavy fire of artillery, and D'Armagnac's division, which lay opposite, driven back by the sixth division. At the same time, Hill's troops, under the cover of artillery, forced the passage on the right above and below Cambo, and drove the French left wing back on the great road from St Jean Pied-de-Port to Bayonne. With such vigour was this onset made, that Foy, who commanded in that quarter, was separated from his

Forcing of the Nive in the French centre and left.

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men, and driven across the fields, with a few followers, towards Hasparen. No sooner, however, did the French troops behold the bale-fire lighted behind Cambo, than they all flew to arms, and Abbé's division, which was nearest, soon joined Foy's men, and their united forces took a position on a range of heights running parallel to the Adour, with Villefranque on their right. At the same time Hope, with the left wing, moved forward by the great road from St Jean de Luz towards Bayonne; drove in all the enemy's advanced posts after a vigorous resistance, and approached so near to his intrenchments under that fortress, as completely to achieve the object entrusted to him in the general plan of operations. Shortly after noon, the Portuguese of the sixth division having come up, Hill attacked D'Armagnac's troops at Villefranque and the heights adjoining, and after some sharp fighting, and one repulse, drove them out of the former, and established himself in strength on the latter, the French retiring, amidst a heavy rain, by deep and almost impassable roads, towards Bayonne.[1]

[1] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Dec. 14, 1813. Gurw. xi. 505, 366. Nap. vi. 373, 374. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 291, 292.

Soult's able plan for retrieving his affairs.

The passage of the Nive was now forced, the French left driven under the cannon of Bayonne, and the English general established in a position from whence he could at pleasure, by a slight extension of his right, intercept the navigation of the Upper Adour, the great artery by which the French army was supplied, and the chief object of the attack to cut off. But though this passage had thus been surprised, and the operations successful, his situation had become one of no inconsiderable peril. The Nive, flowing in an oblique direction from south-east to north-west, cut his army in two; while Soult with his troops concentrated in the intrenched camp, and

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enjoying ample means of communicating at pleasure, by the bridges of Bayonne, from the one bank to the other, might, unknown to the Allies, throw the weight of his forces on either half of their army, when deprived of the means of co-operation from the other. He immediately resolved to take advantage of this singular good fortune, and did so with an ability and decision which would have done honour to Napoleon himself. During the night he drew back the whole of his troops into the intrenched camp, yielding thus to the Allies the ground they had won on his left, and permitting them to extend themselves to the Adour, and intercept his principal communications by that river. But while thus abandoning in appearance the whole objects of the contest, he was preparing a blow which was calculated to effect, and had well-nigh produced, a total change in the fortunes of the campaign. He gave orders in the night for the whole troops to hold themselves in readiness to start at daylight; and early on the morning of the 10th he issued forth on the left of the Nive, with nearly his whole disposable forces—after providing for the defence of the intrenched camp and the fortress—about sixty thousand strong, to assail one half of the Allies, not mustering more than thirty thousand combatants.[1]

Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Dec. 14, 1813. Gurw. xi. 367, 368. Nap. vi. 375, 376. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 293. Belm. i. 269.

At daylight this formidable apparition burst upon the British left, by which such an onset, after the success of the preceding day, was wholly unsuspected. Hope's troops, with the exception of Wilson's Portuguese, deeming the contest over, had retired to their cantonments; the first division was at St Jean de Luz, six miles from the outposts; the light division had orders to retire from Bussussary to Arbonne, but had fortunately not begun to move,

Situation of the British left and centre at this period. Dec. 10.

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nearly four miles in the rear; and the fifth division was near Bidart, so that the troops were scattered in a way of all others the most favourable for being cut up in detail. The British brigades which were left in front, occupied indeed a strong position, stretching along the ridge of Barroilhet, on the left of the great road to the Bidassoa, and along the ridge of Arcangues on its right; and the country in that direction, much intersected by woods and hedgerows, and capable of being traversed, like La Vendée, only by narrow and deep roads, was very susceptible of defence; but the risk was extreme that the light division, not more than six thousand in number, would be crushed before any succour could arrive for its support. The chateau and church of Arcangues, and the village of the same name, constituted strong points of defence; and three tongues of land extended from its front to the northward by which the enemy must approach; they were held by the 52d, the pickets of the 43d, and the Riflemen, while the valleys between them were clothed with copsewoods, which were almost impenetrable. Intrenchments had been ordered to be constructed on a great scale, to strengthen this part of the position; but they were only traced out, and the fourth division, the nearest support, was several miles in rear of the light.[1]

[1] Nap. vi. 377, 379. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 393. Pellot, 82, 83.

Desperate combats at Arcangues and Bidart

In these circumstances, if Soult had adhered to his original design of massing his whole army together on the plateau of Bussussary, and falling at once on the light division at Arcangues, it must inevitably have been destroyed. But in the night he changed his plan, and, instead of concentrating his force on one point, divided it into two corps, the one of which, under Clausel, advanced against Arcangues, while

the other, led by Reille, moved against Hope by the great road to the Bidassoa. A heavy rain fell in the night; and it was some time after daybreak ere the enemy, whose vast accumulation of force in front of Arcangues was wholly unsuspected, were observed to be lining the hedgerows, and silently stealing up the wooded hollows in front of Arcangues. Kempt, who was with the pickets, no sooner observed these ominous symptoms, than he gave orders to occupy the church and village with his reserves, and there was barely time to complete these preparations when the enemy were upon them. Issuing from the woods and the hollows with loud cries, and all the restored confidence of victory, the French fell upon the pickets on all the tongues of land in front of Arcangues in overwhelming numbers, and the assured anticipation of success. To maintain their ground against such vast odds, would have exposed themselves to certain destruction; and the 43d, 52d, and Rifles, with a Portuguese regiment, fell swiftly back along the tongues for above a mile, firing all the way; but no sooner had they reached the open ground at their extremity in front of Arcangues, than these incomparable troops suddenly united their seemingly routed bodies, faced about, and presented an impenetrable front to their pursuers. The French, with loud cries, and extraordinary enthusiasm at their now unwonted success, advanced to the attack, and Soult brought up a battery of twelve guns directly in front of Arcangues, which opened a heavy cannonade on the church and village; but the 43d, Rifles, and Portuguese, by an incessant and well-directed fire of small arms, made good their post, while the 52d held the open ground on the left, towards the great road, with invincible courage.[1]

[1] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, 14th Dec. 1813. Gurw. xi. 367. Subaltern, 183, 185. Nap. vi. 381, 383. Vict et Conq. xxii. 294.

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Bloody conflict on the left at Barrouilhet.

While this desperate conflict was going on in the centre, in front of Arcangues, a still more sanguinary and doubtful fight had commenced on the left, at Barrouilhet. There the attack was so wholly unexpected, that the first division and Lord Aylmer's brigade were at St Jean de Luz and Bidart, six miles in the rear, when the action commenced about nine o'clock. At that hour, Reille with two divisions attacked a Portuguese brigade in Anglet, the advanced post of the left, and soon drove them out of that village, and pursued them with heavy loss to the ridge of Barrouilhet, where they rallied on Robinson's brigade of the fifth division, and stood firm. A confused but desperate and bloody conflict immediately ensued along the whole line in that quarter, as the assailants, hot and vigorous with their success, pushed through the openings in the hedges, at some places successful, in others vigorously repulsed. But by degrees the troops from the rear came up; Lord Aylmer's brigade of the Guards, and Bradford's Portuguese, arrived in breathless haste, and relieved Robinson's men, who by this time had suffered severely; and Sir John Hope, who received a severe contusion, with his whole staff, set a noble example of ability, coolness, and devoted valour. Thus time was gained, and meanwhile Wellington, who during the night of the 9th had been on the right bank of the Nive, alarmed by the heavy fire on his left, repaired in person at daybreak to the threatened side of the river, and made the third and sixth divisions cross, while Beresford threw another bridge to facilitate the passage. As soon as he arrived near Arcangues, and saw how matters stood, he ordered up in addition the fourth and seventh divisions; and the sight of these imposing masses, which now appeared on the

field, so disconcerted Soult, that he suspended all further attacks, and both parties rested on their arms on the field of battle. Just before dark, however, the two fresh divisions of Taupin and Maransin having arrived in the centre, Clausel made a fresh attack on the village of Arcangues, and the Allies were so worn out and reduced in number by incessant fighting all day, that the village and mayor's chateau were both carried; the Portuguese broke and fled, and some of the British regiments began to waver. At that moment, Wellington himself rode up to the troops at the foot of the church—"You must keep your ground, my lads," cried he; "there is nothing behind you—charge!" Instantly a loud shout was raised; the fugitives on the flank rallied and re-formed line; a volley was poured in, the bayonets levelled, and the enemy were driven, still obstinately fighting, out of the village and chateau, which remained in possession of the British, as one bull, his horns close locked in his adversary's, is fairly mastered and pushed back by the superior strength of his antagonist.[1]

[1] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Dec. 14, 1813. Gurw. xi. 367, 368. Nap. vi. 385, 386. Gleig's Subaltern, 188, 189. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 294, 295. Pellet, 83, 84.

Soult's blow, ably conceived and bravely executed, had now been delivered, and failed; the attack of his concentrated masses on the allied left had been met and driven back by a small part only of the British force. But that indefatigable officer did not yet hold himself beat; instead of being disconcerted by his repulse, he immediately set about fresh combinations to recall victory to his standards. But in the night a disheartening reverse occurred, strikingly characteristic of the sinking fortunes of Napoleon. Two German regiments, one of Nassau and one of Frankfort, came over to the Allies, and were received with unbounded joy, drums beating and arms presented by the British

Three German regiments pass over to the Allies in the night.

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battalions, who were drawn up to receive them. They were not deserters, but acted in obedience to the command of their prince, who, having joined the ranks of Germany's deliverers on the Rhine, now sent secret instructions to his troops in Soult's army to do the same. Several other German regiments were in Catalonia, and both generals immediately sent advices of what had occurred to the rival chiefs in that province—the one hoping to profit, the other to take warning from the occurrence. Before the intelligence arrived, however, Suchet had already, by the Emperor's orders, disarmed the troops of that nation, two thousand four hundred strong, in his army —with a heavy heart, for they were among the best soldiers he had: so that they were merely lost to the French, but not gained to the Allies. Those which joined Wellington were immediately embarked at Jean de Luz, and soon after rejoined the ranks of their countrymen on the banks of the Rhine.[1]

[1] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, 14th Dec. 1813. Gurw. xi. 368. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 296. Nap. vi. 387. Suchet, ii. 357. Subaltern, 193.

The forenoon of the day following, the 11th, passed without any considerable action; but about two o'clock Wellington ordered the 9th regiment to make a reconnoissance on the left towards Pucho, which led to a sharp skirmish at that point, in which the 9th, being at first unsupported, was at first worsted, but at length, with difficulty, brought off by the aid of some Portuguese which Hope advanced. Soult upon this, seeing the British unprepared, ordered a general attack on the ridge of Barrouilhet, and he did so with such vigour and celerity, that the French quickly got into the midst of the British position before they were ready to receive them; and a confused action began with great animosity in the village of Barrouilhet and adjoining wood. General Hope, however, soon came up with the 85th regiment; and that noble

officer, whose overflowing courage ever led him to the front, where the fire was hottest and the danger greatest, was to be seen among the troops, his lofty figure overtopping all the motley throng with which he was surrounded, animating his men by his voice and example.* By great exertions he at length restored order, and the enemy were repulsed, with a loss of about six hundred on each side; but the fifth division, being now exhausted with fatigue, and much reduced in numbers, was relieved by the first in the front of the position.[1]

[1] Nap. vi. 388, 389. Pellot, 84. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, 14th Dec. 1813. Gurw. xi. 369.

Nothing but a severe cannonade, which consumed fruitlessly four hundred men on each side, took place on the 12th; and Soult, seeing that the bulk of the enemy's forces were now concentrated on the left of the Adour, resolved to renew his attack on the British right, under Hill, on the right bank of that river. With this view, in the night of the 12th, he again drew the bulk of his forces through Bayonne; and leaving only two divisions and Villatte's reserve in the intrenched camp on the left bank of the Nive, crossed over with seven divisions to the right bank, in order to crush Hill, who had now two divisions only and some brigades—in all fourteen thousand com-

Soult passes over again to attack Hill on the right of the Nive

* "I have long entertained the highest opinion of Sir John Hope, in common, I believe, with the whole world; and every day's experience convinces me of his worth. We shall lose him, however, if he continues to expose himself to fire as he has done in the last three days: indeed, his escape was then wonderful. His hat and coat were shot through in many places, beside the wound in his leg. He places himself among the sharpshooters, without, as them, sheltering himself from the enemy's fire."—WELLINGTON *to* COL. TORRENS, 15*th Dec.* 1813. GURW. xi. 371. The author has a melancholy pleasure in recording these lines to the memory of his noble kinsman, now no more; whose private worth and patriotic spirit, when in the management of his great estates, as Earl of Hopetoun, have enshrined his memory as imperishably in the hearts of his friends and tenantry, as his public services have in the annals of his country.

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batants with fourteen guns, in that quarter. The advantages of the French marshal's position singularly favoured this operation; for his internal line of communication, from the one bank to the other, by the bridge of boats above Bayonne, was three quarters of a league only in length, while Wellington's, on the outer circle, was no less than three leagues. In this way he succeeded, before daylight on the 13th, in placing thirty-five thousand combatants in Hill's front on the right of the Nive at ST PIERRE, while seven thousand more menaced his rear. In expectation of this attack, Wellington ordered the sixth division to cross at daylight again to the right of the Nive, and the fourth division, and a part of the third, were soon after moved in the same direction, by the bridge which Beresford had thrown across two days before; while a division of Gallicians were brought forward to St Jean de-Luz, and one of Andalusians from the Bastan to the rear of the British army at Itzassu, and fed from the British magazines; but before any of these succours approached, Hill had, by the native valour of his men, defeated the whole efforts of his antagonists, three times more numerous than themselves.[1]

[1] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, 14th Dec. 1813. Gurw. xi. 369. Nap. vi. 388, 392. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 296. Pellot, 84, 85.

His force was stationed on both sides of the high-road from Bayonne to St Pied-de-Port, and occupied a line about two miles in length. The centre, consisting of Ashworth's Portuguese and Barnes' British brigade, was strongly posted on a rugged conical height, one side of which was broken with rocks and brushwood, while the other was closed in by high and thick hedges, with twelve guns pointing directly down the great road by which the enemy were to advance. The left, under Pringle, occupied a wooded and broken ridge, in the middle of which was the old chateau of Villefranque; the right, under

Position of Hill's corps.

Byng, was posted on the ridge of Vieux Moguerre, nearly parallel to the Adour. The French occupied with their pickets a range of counter-heights, nearly parallel, at the distance of about a mile. Between the two armies was a wide valley or basin, open, and commanded in every part by the allied guns; while the roads were too deep, and the soil too wet, for the action of cavalry. The position was intersected in its centre by the great road to St Pied-de-Port, as that at Waterloo by the chaussée leading through La Belle Alliance to Charleroi. The heavy rains during the night so swelled the Nive, that Beresford's bridge of boats was swept away; and though it was soon restored next morning, yet during the early and most critical period of the action, Hill's corps was entirely separated from the remainder of the army.[1] CHAP. LXXII. 1813.

[1] Nap. vi. 392, 393. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 297. Pellot, 85.

A thick mist on the morning of the 13th, enabled Soult to form his columns of attack unperceived by his adversary, and they were extremely formidable. In front, on the great road, came D'Erlon, leading on D'Armagnac's, Abbé's, and Daricau's infantry, with a large body of cavalry and twenty-two guns; next came Foy's and Maransin's men, and behind the other two divisions in reserve. These huge and dark masses, closely grouped together on the high-road and fields immediately adjoining, at one time entirely shrouded in mist, at another dimly descried through openings of the vapour, seemed of portentous magnitude. With dauntless hearts, however, the little army of the British beheld the imposing array, albeit well aware that the bridge of the Nive had been swept away, and that no succour would be obtained till the day was far spent. At half-past eight the sun broke forth; Soult immediately pushed forward his light

French order of attack.

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troops, and drove in the allied pickets in the centre, which fell back towards St Pierre. Abbé attacked them with great vigour; D'Armagnac, standing off to the left, directed his troops against Vieux Moguerre and Byng's men; the sparkling line of fire soon crept up the slopes on either side of the basin, and the more distant hills re-echoed with the roar of forty guns, which were worked with extraordinary vigour.[1]

[1] Nap. vi. 395. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 297. Pellot, 85.

Battle of St Pierre, and imminent danger of the British.

Abbé's onset in the centre was pushed with such energy, that Ashworth's Portuguese were soon driven in; and the 71st, which were sent with two guns to their aid, were likewise forced to give ground; but the 50th having advanced to their support, the French in their turn were repulsed. The enemy upon this brought up a strong battery of cannon, which played on the British centre with such effect that it was seriously weakened; and Abbé, seeing the impression, pushed forward a deep and massy column, which advanced with great vigour, in spite of a crashing cannonade which tore its front and flanks, drove back the Portuguese and 50th, and won the crest of the hill in the centre. Barnes upon this brought up the 92d Highlanders, who were in reserve behind St Pierre; and that noble corps, charging down the highway, soon cleared away the skirmishers on either side, and driving home, met the shock of two French regiments which were advancing up the causeway, but which soon wavered, broke, and fled, closely followed by the mountain plumes. Soult immediately advanced his guns on either side, the shot from which plunged through the flanks of the pursuing mass, while fresh regiments were brought up to arrest its advance. Despite all their valour, the Highlanders were unable

to resist this accumulation of enemies. The French corps in front advanced steadily forward with admirable resolution, and the 92d were borne back desperately fighting, but in disorder, to their old ground behind St Pierre. The Portuguese guns upon this drew back to avoid being taken; the French skirmishers every where crowded forward to the summit. Barnes fell, badly wounded; the Portuguese gunners, who had resumed their post in the rear, fell so fast beside their pieces that their fire was almost extinguished. The 71st were withdrawn from the field, gnashing their teeth with indignation at being taken out of the battle; the 3d, on the right, had yielded to the impetuous attack of D'Armagnac; nothing but the thick hedge in their front prevented Ashworth's Portuguese from being driven from their ground; and already the once dreaded, but long unheard, cries of victory resounded through the French lines.[1]

[1] Pringle's Memoir, 37, 39. Nap. vi. 395, 397. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 297, 298. Belm. i. 270.

Then was seen in its highest lustre what can be effected in war by individual firmness and resolution, and how vital are the duties which, at the decisive moment, devolve on the general-in-chief. No sooner did Hill, who had stationed himself on a mount in the rear, from whence he could survey the whole field of battle, behold the critical position of the centre and right, and especially the retreat of the 71st and 3d regiments, than he descended from his eminence, and in person led on one brigade of Le Cor's Portuguese infantry to support Barnes' men in the centre, while the other was dispatched to aid the right on Vieux Moguerre against D'Armagnac. Meanwhile, the right wing of the 50th, and Ashworth's Cacadores, spread out as skirmishers behind the impenetrable hedge; and still with the most heroic

Hill restores the action by supporting the centre.

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courage made good their post; the 92d in consequence had time to re-form behind St Pierre; and their gallant colonel, Cameron, led them again down the road with colours flying and music playing. At this sight the skirmishers on the flanks again rushed forward; the French tirailleurs were in their turn driven back, and the 92d charged at a rapid pace down the highway, until they met the solid column of French infantry, in all the pride of victory, marching up. For a moment the dense mass stood firm; a shock with crossed bayonets seemed inevitable, when suddenly the enemy wheeled about and retired across the valley to their original position, hardly pursued by the victors, who were so thoroughly exhausted with their desperate encounter as to be ready to drop down with fatigue. At the same time, the brave 71st, indignant at being withdrawn from the fight, returned to aid the tartan plumes with such alacrity, and were so gallantly supported by Le Cor's Portuguese, headed by Hill and Stewart, that the enemy on the right centre also were overthrown, though not without heavy loss, among whom was Le Cor himself, who fell severely wounded.[1]

[1] Pringle's Memoir, 39, 43. Nap. vi. 397, 398. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 297, 298.

Progress of the battle on the two wings, which are at length victorious.

While this terrible conflict was going forward in the centre, D'Armagnac, on the British right, with the aid of six pieces of horse artillery, had all but carried the ridge of Vieux Moguerre, where Byng bravely struggled against vastly superior forces. But just as that division, with Foy's, which had now also come up, had established themselves on the summit, and appeared in threatening masses on the right of the British centre, the brigade of Portuguese, so opportunely detached by Hill, arrived in double quick time to their support. These admirable troops, ascending the reverse slope of the ridge

under a raking fire from the French guns, now established on the summit, succeeded in rallying the 3d regiment; and both united, charged again up the hill with the utmost gallantry, and with loud shouts won the top. At the same time, Soult was obliged to withdraw D'Armagnac's reserve to support Abbé in the centre; and Byng, now more feebly opposed, succeeded in re-establishing himself in a solid manner on the Partouhiria range. Meanwhile Daricau, on the British left, maintained a brave and balanced contest on the hills of Villefranque with Pringle's brigade, who stoutly stood their ground; but the repulse of Abbé, in the centre, rendered it impossible for the gallant Frenchman to maintain the advanced position he had attained, and his own losses having been very severe, he was obliged to fall back, like the rest, to his original position on the other side of the basin.[1]

[1] Pringle's Memoir, 47, 52. Nap. vi. 398, 400. Vict. et Conq. xxii. 298, 299.

The arrival of Wellington with the other divisions completes the victory.

Thus the victory was complete at all points before the other divisions came up from the left bank of the Nive; but at half-past twelve the sixth division, which had marched without intermission since daylight, and crossed by the re-established bridge of boats behind Villefranque, appeared, led on by Wellington in person, in imposing strength, on the mount in the rear from which Hill had descended; and they were soon followed by the fourth and third divisions, and some brigades of the seventh, who were seen hurrying forward in great haste from the bridge. At this joyful sight, the wearied British, forgetting their fatigues, resumed the offensive at all points. Buchan and Byng's brigades, with loud cheers, hurled D'Armagnac and Foy's divisions down the Partouhiria slope, and the centre rushing impetuously forward, enveloped and carried all the

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advanced positions still held by the enemy in front of St Pierre, taking two guns, which had galled them excessively from the beginning of the fight. In vain Soult hurried to the front, and, exposing his life like the meanest of his followers, besought his men by the remembrance of their past glories, and the sight of the present dangers of their country, to return to the charge. Nothing could withstand the onward movement of the British; and the French, baffled at all points, recoiled to the ground they had held before the action commenced. The battle now died away, first to a declining interchange of musketry, and then to a distant cannonade; and before night, Soult, despairing of success in any further attacks, withdrew his troops into the intrenched camp, and himself crossed with Foy's division to the right bank of the Adour, to guard against any attempts on the part of the enemy to cross that important river.[1]

[1] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, 14th Dec. 1813. Gurw. xi. 369. Nap. vi. 399, 400. Vict. et Comp. xxii. 299, 300. Pellot, 85, 87.

Results of the battle.

This desperate battle, one of the most bloody and hard fought which had occurred in the whole course of the Peninsular war, cost the British two thousand five hundred, and the French three thousand men. The total loss of the Allies, from the time when the passage of the Nive commenced, was six hundred and fifty killed, three thousand nine hundred and seven wounded, and five hundred and four prisoners; in all five thousand and nineteen, and this included five generals, Hope, Robinson, Barnes, Le Cor, and Ashworth, wounded: a clear proof of the obstinate nature of the conflict, and of the stern necessity which had compelled the chiefs to expose themselves as much as the humblest soldiers. The French lost six thousand men, killed or wounded, on the field, besides two guns, the hard-earned trophies of the fight at St Pierre: including the German troops who

came over on the night of the 10th, they were weakened by eight thousand five hundred men. But, what was of still more importance, they had lost the object for which they fought: the Allies had crossed the Nive, and were established in strength on the left bank of the upper Adour; the navigation of that river was intercepted; and Soult, with all the advantage of an intrenched camp and fortress in his rear, with an interior and central line of communication for his troops, had not only been unable to obtain any durable advantage over the portions of the allied army which he had successively assailed with his whole force; but he had been deprived of his principal line of communications, and disabled, as the event soon proved, from continuing in his defensive position under the cannon of Bayonne.[1]

[1] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, 14th Dec. 1813. Gurw. xi. 371. Belm. i. 270. Pellot, 89. La Pene, 72.

The good effects of the ground which Wellington had won with so much toil and bloodshed, soon appeared in the extended cantonments for his troops, and the enlarged comforts of his men. While the French army, cooped up in its intrenched camp, was deprived of all communication on either side by the Adour, and driven for their forage and support upon the vast and desolate *landes* of Bordeaux, traversed only by land carriage, and yielding almost nothing for the support of an army; the British troops, comfortably established in Urogne, St Jean de Luz, and the other towns on the coast, drew ample supplies from the sea on the one side, and the rich fields of Bearn, the birthplace of Henry IV. and the garden of France, on the other. St Jean de Luz was declared a free port, and by a special proclamation protection was afforded to all vessels, even French, which had been or might be found in the Nivelle or the Adour, or in any harbours on the coast of France.

Great advantages of Wellington's winter quarters.

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By these wise and disinterested measures, joined to the admirable discipline established among his troops, and which he rigorously maintained, and their constant payment for every thing in ready money,* Wellington indeed deprived himself of much prize-money, which would otherwise have fallen to his lot;†

* "I do not believe that the union of the two nations depends on pillage; but if it does, I declare for one, that I desire neither the command nor the continuation of such a bond, founded on plunder. I have lost twenty thousand men in this campaign; and I have not done so in order that either General Murillo, or any other general, should come here to pillage the French peasants; and as long as I command I will not permit it. If you are resolved to pillage, look out for another commander than me; for as long as I am at its head, I declare aloud I will not permit it. You have large armies in Spain; if you desire to plunder, take away the command from me. Enter France, and I will withdraw into Spain; you know well you would be driven out in fifteen days, having neither magazines, money, nor any thing requisite to carry on a campaign. France, rich as it is, would never maintain your troops if it is given up to plunder; even those who go on the principle of levying contributions to make war maintain war, are well aware that the first thing to do is to stop private disorders. I am the best friend of the soldiers and their real interests, when I prevent them from destroying both by pillage. I could also say something in justification of my conduct on political considerations; but I have said enough, and I repeat it. I am altogether indifferent whether I command a large or a small army; but, be it large or small, it must obey me, and there must be no pillage."—WELLINGTON *to* GENERAL MURILLO, *24th Dec.* 1813. GURWOOD, xi. 396.

† "The proclamation which I issued, declaring that private property should be respected on entering France, has been applied by their owners to the vessels taken in the Nivelle and the Adour; and though I had not such an application in my contemplation when I issued it, yet, as far as I am concerned, who in personal interest may be considered a principal party, I am desirous for the general good that it should be so applied, and that the owners of these vessels should retain their property. If the law-officers of the Crown construe the proclamation otherwise, as applying only to property ashore, I request the authority of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent to issue another proclamation, to protect the vessels found in the rivers and ports of France belonging to persons remaining in these houses, as described in my proclamation of November last."—WELLINGTON *to* EARL BATHURST, *8th Jan.* GURWOOD, xi. 423, 424.

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but he secured ample supplies of all sorts for his soldiers. The harbour of St Jean de Luz was speedily crowded with the pendants of all nations, wafting in profusion every thing requisite for the maintenance of his army; while the peasants of Bearn brought their produce more regularly to the British market than they had ever done to that of Bayonne. This admirable conduct indeed proved a severe drain upon the British finances, especially as all the payments required to be made in specie; it threw the army in consequence seven months into arrear, and accumulated debt to an immense amount in every part of the Peninsula; but Wellington and the government had the firmness to adhere to it with scrupulous fidelity under every difficulty, and their constancy was not without its reward. It entirely stopped the growth of a national war in the south of France, which the pillage of the Spaniards at one period was beginning to excite; it sent the conscripts home by thousands from the tricolor standards; and by the prodigious contrast which it afforded to the ruinous requisitions of Napoleon, contributed to prepare that general indignation at his government, which so soon after hurled him from the throne.[1]

[1] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Jan. 8, 1814. Gurw. xi. 423, 425.

Reflections on the battles in front of Bayonne.

The battles in front of Bayonne afford one of the most remarkable examples which the whole annals of war have preserved, of the importance of an interior line of communication, and the prodigious effect which the skilful use of that advantage can afford in the hands of an able general. Like Napoleon around Mantua in 1796, or in the plains of Champagne in 1814, Soult contrived by means of this circumstance, with an army inferior upon the whole to that of his adversary, to be always superior at the point of attack; and such was the

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weight of the columns which he thus hurled in succession at different parts of the British force, that he more than once all but gained a decisive advantage, and reft from Wellington the fruits of all his conquests beyond the Spanish frontiers. This close approximation to success, also, was attained with troops disheartened by long-continued defeat, and against an enemy flushed with an unparalleled series of victories, and against a commander who never was outdone in the sagacity with which he divined the intentions of his opponent, and the rapidity with which he moved his forces to counteract them. On the other hand, the ultimate defeat of all these efforts, though planned with the utmost ability and executed with surpassing gallantry by a comparatively small body of the allied troops, proves what so many other events in the war conspire to demonstrate, that a certain degree of firmness in the generals, and courage in the troops, which are thus assailed by the powers of strategy, will generally counterbalance all their advantages, and that it is to the want of these qualities among his opponents, as much as his own genius, that the triumphs of Napoleon in Italy and Champagne are to be ascribed.

Reflections on Soult's conduct in the campaign.

Soult's conduct in the campaign, from the time that he assumed the command in the middle of July, was a model, so far as the general direction of its movements is concerned, of vigour and ability; and probably no other commander in the French army, excepting the Emperor, could, with the same means, have made a resistance equally obstinate and protracted. When it is recollected, that when he took the command of the army in the middle of July at Bayonne, he found it routed and disorganized, and in such a state of depression as to be almost unequal to any

active operations, and that in the end of December he was still under the walls of the same fortress, after having, in the intervening period, fought seven pitched battles, and sustained a loss of thirty thousand men, it must be admitted that a more glorious example of tenacious resolution and patriotic resistance is not to be met with in the long and melancholy annals of military exploits. His immediate resumption of the offensive, and advance towards Pampeluna, is one of the happiest instances that ever occurred of a defensive, maintained by a vigorous offensive warfare; and though defeated both then and in the subsequent engagements on the frontier, by the admirable promptitude and moral courage of his antagonist, yet, in prolonging the contest for such a considerable period, he evinced resources of no ordinary kind. In the execution of his admirable projects, however, in the actual shock of battle, he did not by any means display the same capacity; and if he had evinced as much vigour at Sauroren on the 26th July, or at Bussussary on the 10th, or St Pierre on the 13th December, as he showed ability in the previous conception of the movements which led to these battles, the result might have been different, and the British arms been rolled back with defeat behind the Ebro.

And on Wellington's glorious successes.

The campaign of Vittoria is the most glorious, both in a moral and political point of view, which is to be found in the British annals. When we reflect that at its commencement the English forces were still on the Coa and the Agueda, and the French armies occupied more than one half of Spain, including the whole of its northern fortresses, and that at its conclusion they had been wholly expelled from Spain, the mountain barrier of the Pyrenees forced, and

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their troops maintaining a painful defensive warfare on the banks of the Adour—it is hard to say whether we have most cause to admire the ability of the chief who, in so short a time, achieved such unparalleled successes—the hardihood of the soldiers who followed him, unwearied, through such toils and dangers, or the strength of the moral reaction which, in so brief a space, produced such astonishing results. They must appear the more wonderful, when it is recollected that, at the commencement of the campaign, the Anglo-Portuguese army could muster only seventy thousand combatants, and the British and Germans in Valencia ten thousand more; that the Spaniards were incapable of being trusted in serious conflict, while the French had one hundred and ninety-seven thousand men present with the eagles, not, as in former campaigns, disseminated over an immense surface from the Pyrenees to Gibraltar, but concentrated in the plains of old Castile and the north of Spain, and in possession of all its frontier fortresses. In three months, the vast fabric, erected with so much toil and bloodshed during five years of previous warfare, was overthrown, and the French armies, which so long, in the pride of irresistible strength, had oppressed the Peninsula, were driven like chaff before the wind into their own territories. The march from the frontiers of Portugal to the Ebro, with the left constantly in advance, so as to compel the French to evacuate all the defensive positions which they took up; the skill with which the troops were disposed who gained the decisive battle of Vittoria; the moral courage and quick determination which arrested the torrent of Soult's successes in the Pyrenees; the persevering energy which broke through the mountain barrier of France, and established the British stan-

dards under the walls of Bayonne—are so many examples of the highest military ability, which never were surpassed. But it would have been in vain that her chief was endowed with all these rare qualities, if the troops of England, which he commanded, had not been adequate to the duties to which they were called; but such was the admirable state of discipline and efficiency to which the British and Portuguese soldiers had now arrived, and such the heroic spirit with which they were animated, that it may safely be affirmed they never were surpassed in the annals either of ancient or modern war.

Comparative merit of England and Spain in the struggle.

The national historians of Spain and Great Britain differ widely, and will probably always differ, as to the comparative merit to be assigned to the efforts of their respective nations for the deliverance of the Peninsula; and the French military writers, more jealous of the fame of the descendants of those who fought at Cressy and Agincourt, than of the comparatively dim light of Spanish glory, are anxious to ascribe it chiefly to the consuming effects of the guerilla warfare. Perhaps the English military historians, and those especially who were actually engaged in the conflict, and witnessed the innumerable defeats of the Spanish armies, and the unworthy jealousy with which they were actuated, both towards the generals and troops of this country, have gone into the other extreme, and both unduly overlooked the patriotic ardour, and underrated the military influence of the indomitable spirit of hostility to French aggression, which for so long a period animated a large portion of the Peninsular people. Impartial justice will probably ascribe to both their due share in this glorious deliverance; it will admit that the power of Spain was utterly prostrated until England entered as a

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principal into the strife, and that the prolonged resistance of its people was mainly owing to the necessity of concentrating the French troops on the Portuguese frontier from the effects of Wellington's victories; but that, notwithstanding all the heroism of the Anglo-Portuguese army, and all the ability of its chief, it never could have effected the deliverance of the Peninsula against the forces, generally three, often four times superior, of the French empire, unless the indomitable perseverance and resolute hostility of the Spanish character had come to their aid, by the distraction which they occasioned to the French armies.

Peculiar moral lustre with which England was encircled from the contest.

But there is one glory connected with the Peninsular war, which the British empire shares with no other power, and which the biographer of Wellington is entitled to claim as exclusively his own. During all the difficulties of the contest, and in the midst of the almost overwhelming embarrassments which arose from the long continuance and oppressive burdens of the war, England never adopted the odious revolutionary principle, of drawing the resources for the contest from the country in which it was carried on; and from first to last firmly, to her own great immediate loss, repudiated the maxim that war should maintain war. Whatever she did, she did with her own forces and from her own means alone: no ravaged country had to rue the day when her standards appeared among them; no wasted realm showed where her armies had been; no tears of the fatherless and the widow, mourning cold-blooded massacres, dimmed the lustre of her victories. If disorders occurred, as occur they did, and occur they will, it was against her system of warfare, and despite the utmost efforts of her chief. With unconquerable constancy Wellington and the British Government adhered to this noble

system, in the midst of pecuniary difficulties which would have crushed any other man, and financial embarrassments which would have overwhelmed any other nation. During all this time, Napoleon's generals and armies were revelling in wealth and affluence, and France itself was enjoying comparatively light taxation, the fruit of the unbounded and systematic extortion which they practised in all the countries which their armies occupied. But mark the end of these things, and the final opposite effect of the gains of oppression and the rule of justice upon the fortunes of nations. Napoleon, driven with disgrace behind the Rhine and the Pyrenees, was unable to protect even the mighty empire he ruled from the aroused and universal indignation of mankind; while Wellington, commencing from small beginnings, had at length burst, with an overwhelming force, through the mountain barrier of the south, liberated the whole Peninsula from the oppressor's yoke, and planted his victorious standard, amidst the blessings of a protected and grateful people, on the plains of France.

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

APPENDIX.

CHAPTER LXVIII.

Note A, p. 85.

Statistics of the French Empire, on 27th February 1813, from Montalivet's *Exposé of the Empire.*

Population of the whole empire, . . . 42,700,000 souls.

I. Value of Productions in Agriculture.

	Francs.	£
230,000,000 quintals of grain, .	2,300,000,000 or	92,000,000
4,000,000 hectolitres wine, .	800,000,000 ...	32,000,000
Woods, ...	100,000,000 ...	4,000,000
Lint, ...	80,000,000 ...	3,200,000
Oil, ...	250,000,000 ...	10,000,000
Tobacco, ...	12,000,000 ...	480,000
Silk, ...	30,000,000 ...	1,200,000
Wool, 120,000,000 lbs. equal to .	120,000,000 ...	5,200,000
Carcases of sheep, . . .	56,000,000 ...	2,300,000
Annual increment on 3,500,000 horses, viz., 280,000 four year old horses,	75,000,000 ...	3,000,000
Annual consumption of horned cattle, viz., 250,000 cows and oxen, 2,500,000 calves.	161,000,000 ...	6,400,000
Skins of these animals, . .	36,000,000 ...	1,500,000
Milk, butter, and cheese, . .	150,000,000 ...	6,000,000
4,900,000 pigs annually consumed,	274,000,000 ...	11,000,000
Minerals, ...	50,000,000 ...	2,000,000
Coals, ...	50,000,000 ...	2,000,000
560,000,000 of pounds of salt, .	28,000,000 ...	1,120,000
Fruits, vegetables &c. &c., .	450,000,000 ...	18,000,000
Totals,	5,032,000,000	201,400,000

II. Manufactures.

	Francs.	£
Silk Manufactures,	84,000,000 or	3,360,000
Woollen do.	210,000,000 ...	8,400,000
Linens and lace do.	139,000,000 ...	5,600,000
Cotton goods,	235,000,000 ...	9,400,000
Iron manufactures,	70,000,000 ...	2,800,000
Glass, coarse linen, &c.	82,000,000 ...	3,280,000
Beer brewed,	40,000,000 ...	1,600,000
Cyder,	60,000,000 ...	2,400,000
New branches of industry, with various lesser articles,	65,000,000 ...	2,600,000
	985,000,000 ...	39,440,000
Operations on the rude material as linen, cotton, cloth,	639,600,000 ...	25,600,000
Total manufacturing industry,	1,624,600,000 ...	65,000,000

III. Foreign and Domestic Commerce.

Foreign and domestic commerce,	378,000,000 or	14,700,000

Summary.

Total agriculture,	5,032,000,000 ...	201,400,000
Do. Manufactures,	1,624,600,000 ...	65,000,000
Foreign commerce and lesser branches,	378,000,000 ...	14,700,000
Grand Total,	7,034,600,000	281,400,000

Exports in 1810.	376,000,000 or	15,040,000
Imports,	336,000,000 ...	13,500,000

—*Report of* Montalivet, *27th Feb.* 1813. Goldsmith's *Recueil*, vi. 77, 84, 144.

Note B, page 87.

The following account of the estimated cost of, and sums actually expended on the principal great works and architectural structures of Napoleon from 1800 to 1813, will be not a little interesting to the lovers of public improvements and the fine arts:—

	Estimate of Total Cost. Francs.	£	Sums expended from 1800 to 1831. Francs.	£
Road over the Simplon,	9,200,000 or	368,000	6,100,000 or	244,000
Do. over Mont Cenis,	16,000,000 ...	640,000	13,500,000 ...	240,000
Do. over the Corniche,	15,500,000 ...	620,000	6,500,000 ...	260,000
Do. over Mont Genevre,	5,400,000 ...	216,000	2,800,000 ...	112,000
Do. from Paris to Amsterdam,	6,300,000 ...	252,000	4,300,000 ...	172,000
Do. from Paris to Madrid,	8,000,000 ...	320,000	4,200,000 ...	168,000
Do. from Paris to Hamburg,	9,800,000 ...	392,000	6,000,000 ...	240,000
Do. from Lyons to Chambery,	4,000,000 ...	160,000	100,000 ...	4,000
Harbour of Cherbourg,			26,000,000	1,240,000
Harbour of Antwerp,			18,000,000 ...	720,000
Harbour of Flushing,	131,000,000 or	5,240,000	5,600,000 ...	230,000
Harbour of Havre,			252,000 ...	10,500
Harbour of Dunkirk,			4,500,000 ...	180,000

	Estimate of Total Cost. Francs.	£	Sums expended from 1800 to 1831. £	
Canal of Ourcq at Paris,	38,000,000	or 1,520,000	19,500,000	or 680,000
Do. of St Quintin,	11,000,000	... 440,000	10,000,000	... 400,000
Do. of the Seine and Aube,	15,000,000	... 600,000	6,000,000	... 240,000
Do. Napoleon,	17,000,000	... 680,000	10,500,000	... 420,000
Do. of Burgundy,	24,000,000	... 960,000	6,800,000	... 272,000
Do. from Nantes to Brest,	28,000,000	... 1,120,000	1,200,000	... 48,000
Draining of Rochfort,	7,000,000	... 280,000	3,000,000	... 120,000
Do. of Larentan,	4,500,000	... 260,000	2,600,000	... 104,000
Quays of Paris,	15,000,000	... 600,000	11,000,000	... 440,000
Church of the Madelaine,	8,000,000	... 320,000	2,000,000	... 80,000
Bourse,	6,000,000	... 240,000	2,500,000	... 100,000
Palace of Legislative Body,	3,000,000	... 120,000	3,000,000	... 120,000
Palace of the Archives,	20,000,000	... 800,000	1,000,000	... 40,000
Column in the Place Vendôme,	1,500,000	... 60,000	1,500,000	... 60,000
Arch of Etoile,	9,000,000	... 360,000	4,500,000	... 180,000
Jardin des Plantes,	3,000,000	... 120,000	800,000	... 32,000
Slaughter Houses,	13,500,000	... 530,000	6,700,000	... 274,000
Markets,	8,500,000	... 340,000	4,000,000	... 160,000
Halle aux Vins,	12,000,000	... 480,000	4,000,000	... 160,000
Grande Halle	12,000,000	... 480,000	2,600,000	... 104,000
Bridge of Austerlitz,	3,000,000	... 120,000	3,000,000	... 120,000
Do. of Jena,	6,200,000	... 248,000	4,800,000	... 192,000
Do. of the Arts,	900,000	... 36,000	900,000	... 36,000
Pantheon at Genevieve,	2,500,000	... 100,000	2,000,000	... 80,000
Louvre,	14,000,000	... 560,000	11,100,000	... 440,000
Musée Napoleon,	36,000,000	... 1,440,000	10,300,000	... 412,000
Arch of the Carousel,	1,400,000	... 52,000	1,400,000	... 52,000
Palace of King of Rome,	30,000,000	... 1,200,000	2,500,000	... 100,000

—*See Rapport de* MONTALIVET, *25th Feb.* 1813, *Moniteur, 26th Feb.* 1813; *and* GOLDSMITH'S *Recueil*, vi. 77, 120; *and* FAIN, *Guerre de* 1813, i. 80, 91.

Note C, page 87.

French Finances for the Year 1812.

I. RECEIPTS.

	Receipts to 1st Jan. 1813. Francs.
Direct Contribution,	336,715,106
Regie de l'enregistrement—	
Droits ordinaires,	135,162,256
Bois,	2,706,387
Administration de douanes—	
Droits ordinaires,	64,991,621
Droits extraordinaires,	25,474,574
Droits sur le sel,	38,779,887
Regie de droits réunis—	
Droits ordinaires, Tabacs,	115,335,770
Carry forward,	719,165,601

	Receipts to 1st Jan. 1813. Francs.
Brought forward,	719,165,601
Loterie,	10,058,084
Postes,	4,708,656
Sels et tabacs au de là des Alpes,	3,861,076
Salines de l'est,	3,000,000
Monnaies,	1,000,000
Poudres et salpètres,	
Illyrie,	7,445,034
Recettes diverses et accidentelles,	1,701,396
Recettes extérieures,	30,000,000
Total Receipts,	780,959,847 or £31,238,000

II. EXPENDITURE.

Dette publique et pensions,	142,046,343
Liste civile, y compris les princes Français,	28,000,000
Grand juge, ministre de la justice,	25,683,246
Relations extérieures,	8,364,295
Interieur,	58,540,028
Finances,	23,367,943
Tresor imperial,	8,367,889
Guerre (ministère),	295,764,866
Guerre (administration),	187,742,915
Marine (y compris le supplément accordé par le decret du 5 Avril 1812,)	149,022,182
Cultes,	16,627,824
Police générale,	1,631,341
Frais de negotiations,	8,500,000
Fonds de reserve,	
Total,	953,658,772 or £38,146,000

—*Exercise*, 1812, *Au 1st Jan.* 1813, GOLDSMITH, vi. 144, 145.

CHAPTER LXIX.

Note A, p. 184.

Allied and French Forces at the opening of the Campaign on the Elbe.

I. Allied Troops at the Battle of Lutzen.

RUSSIANS.

Corps of Lieutenant-General Berg,	7,450
Corps of Lieutenant-General Winzingerode,	10,525
Corps of reserve of General Tormassoff,	17,350
Artillery sent to the aid of Blucher,	450
Total,	35,775

PRUSSIANS.

Corps of Blucher,	23,350
Corps of General York,	10,000
Detached corps of St. Priest,	2,800
Total,	36,150
Total, Russians,	35,775
Grand total, Allies,	71,925

—PLOTHO, vol. i., App. 114.

II. French Troops at the Battle of Lutzen.

Infantry of the Guard,	10,000
Cavalry of the Guard,	5,000
3 Corps of Marshal Ney,	40,000
4 Corps of General Bertrand,	20,000
6 Corps of Marshal Marmont,	25,000
11 Corps of Marshal Macdonald,	15,000
Grand total,	115,000

—SCHOELL, *Traités de Paix*, vol. x., p. 213.

Total French Forces in Germany at the opening of the Campaign.

Infantry of the Guard,	10,000
Cavalry of the Guard,	5,000
2d Corps, Victor,	7,400
3d Corps, Ney,	40,000
4th Corps, Bertrand,	20,000
5th Corps, Lauriston,	15,000
6th Corps, Marmont,	25,000
7th Corps, Regnier,	14,000
11th Corps, Macdonald,	15,000
12th Corps, Oudinot,	25,000
1st Corps of Cavalry, Latour Maubourg,	10,000
2d Corps of Cavalry, Sebastiani,	6,210
1st Corps, Davoust, detached,	10,000
Grand total,	202,610
Total, cannon,	350

—PLOTHO, vol. i., Appendix.

Total Allied Forces in Germany at the opening of the Campaign.

RUSSIANS.—DETACHED CORPS ON THE ELBE.

	Men.	Horses.
Detachment of Tettenborn,	1,579	1,685
Detachment of Dorenberg,	1,844	505
Detachment of Chernicheff,	1,985	1,992
Corps of Woronzow,	5,450	
Detachment of Harpe,	2,200	
Detachment of Roth,	3,000	
Corps of Milaradowitch,	11,599	
Free Corps,	3,000	
Total,	30,657	4,182

RUSSIANS THAT FOUGHT AT LUTZEN—VIZ.

	Men.
Corps of Lieutenant-General Berg,	7,450
Corps of Lieutenant-General Winzingerode,	10,525
Reserve under General Tormazoff,	17,350
Battery sent to the assistance of Blucher,	450
Total,	35,775

RUSSIANS BETWEEN THE ELBE AND THE VISTULA.

Corps of Barclay de Tolly,	13,450
Corps of Sacken,	9,800
Army of Reserve of Doctoroff,	50,000
Blockading Zamosc, General Rowtt,	3,000
Blockading Force before Dantzig, the Prince of Wirtemberg,	15,000
Blockading Force before Glogau,	1,500
Total,	92,750

Summary.

Russians detached on the Elbe,	30,657
Russians who fought at Lutzen,	35,775
Russians between the Elbe and the Vistula,	92,750
Russians—Grand Total,	159,182

—PLOTHO, vol. i., App. 99.

PRUSSIANS.

Blucher's Corps,	16,700
D'York and Kleist's Corps,	7,600
Reserve under Stutterheim,	3,700
In the field,	28,000
Blockading the fortresses, about	37,000
Total—Prussians,	65,000
Do.—Russians,	159,182
Grand total of Allies,	224,182

—PLOTHO, vol. i., App. 126.

Note B, page 185.

French Force at the Battle of Bautzen.

The Guards under Marshal Mortier,	20,000
3d Corps, Ney,	20,000
4th Corps, Bertrand,	15,000
5th Corps, Lauriston,	12,000
6th Corps, Marshal Marmont,	20,000
7th Corps, Regnier,	14,000
11th Corps, Marshal Macdonald,	12,000
12th Corps, Marshal Oudinot,	25,000
The Corps of Cavalry under General Latour Maubourg,	10,000
Grand total,	148,000

Russians and Prussians at the Battle of Bautzen.

RUSSIANS.

The Third Army of the West under General Barclay de Tolly,	13,550
The Advanced Guard of General Milaradowitch,	7,550
The Corps-de-bataille of Prince Gorchakoff, the 11th,	15,050
The Reserve of the Grand Duke Constantine,	19,600
The Russian Corps of Lieutenant-General Kleist,	2,950
Detached Corps,	9,300
Total,	68,000

PRUSSIANS.

The Corps of Cavalry under Blucher,	16,700
The Corps of Lieut.-General York and Kleist,	7,600
The Battalions of Reserve under Lieut.-Colonel Stutterheim,	3,700
Total—Prussians,	28,000
Do.—Russians,	68,000
Grand total,	96,000

—SCHOELL, vol. x., p. 211.

CHAPTER LXX.

Note A, page 395.

Total French Army in Germany at the resumption of Hostilities on 15th August 1813.

Imperial Guard, Infantry.—Marshal the Duke of TREVISO.

Divisions.—*Old Guard.*

	Bats.	Squads.	Infan.	Cav.
Friant, grenadiers,	4		6,000	
Curial, chasseurs,	4			
Young Guard.				
Dumoutier,	8		22,400	
Barrois,	8			
Boyeldieu,	8			
Roguet,	8			
Cavalry.—General NANSOUTY.				
Guyot, grenadiers,		6		
Ornano, dragoons,		6		
Lefevre Desnouettes, chasseurs,		6		5,000
Krazinski, lancers,		6		
Guards of Honour,		10		
Carry forward,	40	34	28,400	5,000

Division.	Bats.	Squads.	Infan.	Cav.
Brought forward,	40	34	28,400	5,000
1st Corps.—General VANDAMME at Zittau.				
1 Dumonceau,	8			
12 Philippon,	8		13,000	
23 Dufour,	8			
Brigade Corbineau,		8		1,000
2d Corps—VICTOR at Zittau.				
4 Teste,	8			
5 Corbineau,	8			
6 Monton Duverney,	8		22,400	
6 Bis,	8			
3d Corps.—NEY at Leignitz.				
8 Souham,	15			
9 Delmas,	13		33,800	
10 Albert,	13			
11 Ricard,	13			
Brigade Bourmann,		10		1,300
4th Corps.—General BERTRAND at Sprottau.				
12 Morand,	8			
15 Fontanelli, Italians,	12		20,000	
18 Franquemont, Wurtembergers,	8			
5th Corps.—General LAURISTON at Goldberg.				
16 Maison,	12			
17 Puthod,	10		23,800	
19 Rochambeau,	12			
6th Corps.—MARMONT at Bunztlau.				
20 Compans,	10			
21 Bonnet,	8		18,200	
22 Friedrichs,	8			
7th Corps.—General REGNIER at Goerlitz.				
32 Dunette,	10			
37 Zecoq, (Saxons,	8		24,000	
38 Sahrer, (ib.)	8			
39 Marchant, (Hessians,)	10			
8th Corps, (Poles.)—PONIATOWSKI at Zittau.				
25 Dombrowsky,	8		12,000	
27 Roznietyky,	8			
A brigade,		6		800
11th Corps.—MACDONALD at Zoewenberg.				
31 Gerard,	10			
35 Fressinet,	8		18,200	
36 Charpentier,	8			
A brigade,		8		1,000
Carry forward,	316	66	213,800	9,100

Division.	Bats.	Squads.	Infan.	Cav.
Brought forward,	316	66	213,800	9,100
12th Corps.—Oudinot at Dahme.				
13 Gruyère,	10			
14 Guilleminot,	14		21,000	
Raglowich, (Bavarians,)	6			
A brigade,		6		800
14th Corps.—St Cyr at Pirna.				
43 Claparede,	9			
44	3		13,500	
45 Rayout,	9			
Total,	367	72	248,300	9,900
Reserve of Cavalry.—The King of Naples.				
1st Corps.—Latour Maubourg at Goerlitz.				
Light Cavalry, Andenarde,		24		
Do. Castex,		30		12,000
Cuirassiers, Doumerc,		18		
Do. St Germain,		24		
2d Corps.—Sebastiani at Leignitz.				
Light Cavalry, Excelmans,		28		
Do. Defrance,		21		8,300
Cuirassiers, Bordesoult,		18		
3d Corps.—Arrighi at Leipzic.				
Chasseurs, Jacquinot,		24		
Do. Fournier,		24		6,000
Dragoons, Lorge,		30		
Do.		33		
4th Corps.—Kellerman at Zittau.				
Sokolnitzki, (Poles,)		15		
Ulminski,		14		6,000
Sulkonzky,		16		
Total of Grand Army,	367	391	248,300	42,200
Detached Divisions.				
13th Corps.—Davoust at Hamburg.				
	Bats.	Squads.	Infan.	Cav.
3d Loison,	8			
40th Pecheux,	8		18,000	
41st Thiebault,	8			
A Brigade,		8		1,200
Augereau at Wurtzburg, Bamberg, and Bayreuth.				
42d,	9			
51st,	8		21,000	
52d,	13			
Carry forward,	54	8	39,000	1,200

	Bats.	Squads.	Infan.	Cav.
Brought forward,	54	8	39,000	1,200
5th Corps of Cavalry, Milhaud.				
Light Cavalry, Piré,		12		
Dragoons, Berkhaim,		16		3,000
Ib. L'Heiritier,		18		
Danes under Davoust,			15,000	900
Bavarian Army of Observation on the Inn,			22,200	1,800
Total, detached,	54	54	76,200	6,900
Summary.				
Total of French Grand Army,	367	391	248,300	42,200
Total of detached divisions of French army in Germany,	54	54	76,200	6,900
Grand Total of French in Germany,	421	445	324,500	49,100

—Vandoncourt, vol. i., p. 128.

Prince Eugene's Army in Italy, viz.:

	Battalion.	Guns.	Men.
1st Division, Quesnel,	12	18	7,777
2d Division, Gratien,	11	16	8,200
3d Division, Verdier,	11	18	7,486
4th Division, Marcognet,	11	20	7,189
5th Division, Palombini,	12	16	9,562
6th Division, Lecchi,	12	16	7,891
Reserve.			
Three Battalions,			2,469
Cavalry.			
Twelve Squadrons, Mermet,			1,800
Cannon.			
Reserve, 12 guns, 6 bombs,		18	
Great Parc, 6 guns, 5 bombs,		11	
Total,	69	133	52,374

—*Victoires et Conquêtes*, xxii. p. 192.

French Blockaded Forces.

The Garrison of Dantzig,	20,000
Garrison of Zamosc,	4,000
Garrison of Modlin,	3,000
Garrison of Stettin,	10,000
Garrison of Austria,	5,000
Garrison of Glogau,	6,000
Garrison of Torgau,	8,000
Garrison of Wittenberg,	5,000
Garrison of Magdeburg,	10,000
Garrison of Wurtzburg,	1,500
Garrison of Dresden,	5,000
Garrison of Freiberg,	800
Garrison of Erfurt,	2,000
Total,	80,300

—Plotho, vol. ii. App. 90.

Summary of French Forces in Germany and Italy.

	Infantry.	Cavalry.
In the field,	260,000	42,200
Detached,	39,000	4,200
Prince Eugene's army in Italy,	50,574	1,800
Blockaded Garrisons,	80,300	
Danes,	15,000	900
Bavarian Army of Observation,	22,200	1,800
Total,	467,074	50,900
Grand Total,	517,974	

Allied Forces in Germany and Italy at Resumption of Hostilities on 15th August 1813.

ALLIED FORCE.

	Men.	Cannon.
The Grand Army of Bohemia under Prince Schwartzenberg,	237,770	698
The Army of Silesia under Blucher	93,322	356
The Army of the North under the Crown-Prince,	154,012	387
The Russian Reserve under Benningsen,	57,329	198
The Corps d'Armée of the Prince of Reus,	24,750	42
The Austrian Army of Reserve,	50,000	120
Total in the Field,	617,183	1,801

BLOCKADING FORCES.

Before Dantzig,	35,000	
Before Zamosc,	14,700	
Before Glogau,	29,450	
Before Custrin,	8,450	
Before Stettin	14,600	
Total Blockading Force,		102,200
Total in the Field,		619,183
Total Blockading Force,		102,200
Grand Total,		721,383

—PLOTHO, vol. ii, App. 72.

The composition of this immense force was as follows:—

I. AUSTRIANS.

The Grand Army of Bohemia under Prince Schwartzenberg,	130,000
Army under the Prince of Reus on the Inn,	24,750
Army of Italy under Field-Marshal Hiller,	50,000
Army of Reserve under the Archduke Ferdinand, and the Prince of Wurtemberg,	60,000
Total of Austrians,	264,750

—PLOTHO, vol. ii. App. 26.

II. Russians.

Russian Troops in the Grand Army of Bohemia.

	Battal.	Squadrons.	Batteries.	Cossack Regts.	Men.
1. Corps of Wittgenstein,	39	36	7	4	22,400
2. Guards under the Grand Duke Constantine,	46	72	21½	20	36,020
Total,	85	108	28½	24	58,420

Russian Troops in the Silesian Army.

1. Corps of Langeron,	46	49	11	7	27,600
2. Corps of Sacken,	24	20	5	8	15,000
3. Corps of St Priest,	21	4	3	0	9,400
Total,	91	73	19	15	52,000

Russian Troops in the Army of the North.

1. Corps of Winzingerode,	11	8	3	8	8,826
2. Corps of Worowzof,	7	15	4	8	8,667
3. Corps of Walmoden,	11	12	1	18	8,056
Total,	29	35	8	34	25,549
The Russian Army of Reserve under Beuningsen,	75	68	15	8	57,329
Total in the Field,	270	284	99½	81	193,298

Infantry,	121,092
Cavalry,	31,272
Artillery,	14,691
Cossacks,	26,243
Total Men,	193,298
Cannon,	834

Army of Reserve under Benningsen.

	Bat.	Squad.	Guns.	
1 Corps of Markow,	14	70	38	16,467
2 Corps of Doctoroff,	29	25	120	26,571
3 Corps of Count Osterman Tolstoi,	30	27	40	17,045
Total,	73	122	198	60,083

Effective in the Field.

Infantry,	40,449
Cavalry and Cossacks,	12,886
Artillery and Pioneers,	3,944
Total, Men,	57,477
Cannon,	198

Plotho, vol. ii. App. 8.

Army of the Prince of Reus on the Inn.

	Men.
Infantry,	16,450
Cavalry,	7,250
Artillery,	1,050
Total,	24,750
Corps in Italy under Hiller,	50,000

—Plotho, vol. ii., App. 70.

CHAPTER LXXI.

Note A, p. 522.

Number of different persons who were quartered in Dresden and its suburbs during the periods undermentioned, viz.:—

	New Town.	Old Town.	Suburbs.	Frederichstadt.	Total.
From 26th Feb. to 25th Mar. 1813,	117,338	67,250	43,832	8,385	236,805
From 26th Mar. to 7th May,	208,600	95,862	49,128	21,137	374,727
From 8th May to 14th June,	499,146	274,709	273,832	90,513	1,088,293
From 15th June to 15th November,	1,635,275	1,270,457	1,523,595	633,344	5,062,871
From 16th Nov. to 31st December,	280,375	162,646	110,068	61,160	614,249
From 1st Jan. to 31st Dec. 1814.	1,346,971	463,465	724,735	177,174	2,712,345
	4,087,705	2,334,389	2,725,190	991,713	10,089,290

—Odeleben, *Campagne de* 1813 en Saxe, vol. ii., p. 287.

Note B., p. 522.

Three different approximative statements of the force of the French army received at the head-quarters of the Allies:—

Assembled in front of Dresden, and opposed to the great Allied army.

	Aug. 13th.	Sept. 20th.	Sept. 24th.
Old Guard,	6,607	4,000	25,000
Young Guard,	32,000	24,000	3,000
Cavalry of the Guard,	10,500	6,000	
Vandamme,	25,000	4,000	6,000
Victor,	21,000	18,000	14,000
Marmont,	30,000	20,000	18,000
Poniatowski,	15,000	10,000	11,000
St Cyr,	31,000	20,000	20,000
Latour Maubourg's Cavalry,	10,000	6,000	7,000
Total,	181,107	112,000	104,000

Opposed to the Northern Army, under the Crown Prince of Sweden.

	Aug. 13.	Sept. 20.	Sept. 24.
Bertrand,	21,000	14,000	15,000
Regnier,	20,000	8,000	6,000
Oudinot,	24,000	10,000	18,000
Arrighi and Kellerman (Cavalry,)	10,000	7,000	6,000
Total,	75,000	39,000	45,000

Opposed to Blucher in Silesia.

Souham,	32,000	22,000	18,000
Lauriston,	35,000	10,000	3,000
Macdonald,	21,000	14,000	12,000
Sebastiani and Milhaud, (Cavalry,)	13,000	3,000	5,000
Total on the right,	101,000	49,000	38,000
Total on the left,	75,000	39,000	45,000
Total at Dresden,	181,107	112,000	104,000
Grand Total,	357,107	200,000	187,000

—BURGHERSH's *War in Germany in* 1813, p. 316.

Note C, p. 531.

Holograph notes of Napoleon on plans of the campaign at Dresden.

First Note.—Position of the Enemy.

"It appears certain that the enemy's army of Silesia will move on Wittemberg, and that the grand army of Tœplitz will make a movement to its left.

"The enemy's army of Silesia cannot be considered less than sixty thousand men, with the corps of Yorck, of Blucher, and of Langeron.

"The army of Berlin, composed of a Swedish corps, a Russian corps, and the corps of Bulow and of Tauenzien, ought not to be less.

"There will be then upon the Lower Elbe an army of a hundred and twenty thousand men; it is doubtful whether it has not detached a body towards Hamburg.

"The army of Tœplitz—composed of Austrians, of a Prussian corps, and of a Russian corps—cannot be considered less than a hundred and twenty thousand men. The project of the Allies, then, will be to march two large armies, one by the right, the other by the left, and to oblige the Emperor to quit Dresden."

Second Note.—Position of the French Army.

"The fourth and seventh corps, under the orders of the Prince of Moskwa, are on the Lower Elbe.

"The Duke of Ragusa, with the first corps of cavalry and the third of infantry, on Eilenburg and Torgau. These two armies form, together, a force of eighty thousand men, covering the left.

"The first, the fourteenth, the second, the fifth, and the eighth, form a force of seventy thousand men, covering the right.

"*Enfin*, the eleventh, the guard, and the second corps of cavalry, forming a force of sixty thousand men, are in the centre."

Third Note.— What should be done.

"It will be ascertained this evening if all the army of Silesia, or only a part of it, has marched on Wittemberg.

"In the one or the other hypothesis, one may retake the offensive by the right bank, and move upon Torgau with the guard and the eleventh corps; there join the second and third; and thus, with an army of a hundred thousand men, debouche from Torgau by the right bank, on the bridges of the enemy.

"All the corps which cover the right, will retire before the enemy upon Dresden, as soon as they shall have perceived the movement, and, if necessary, give up Dresden to move upon Torgau."

Another Project.

"This project will consist in moving all the forces on Leipsic in entirely giving up Dresden.

"For that object, the eleventh, the guards, and the second corpsof cavalry, will set out for Wurtzen; the third and fifth will move upon Coblentz; the first and the fourteenth will move upon Dresden.

"Having thus sacrificed the magazines, the fortifications, and the hospitals, we will try to beat the right wing of the enemy; and if we succeed, we will return to Dresden.

"If we do not succeed in beating the right wing of the enemy because they get out of our reach, we will evidently be obliged to take the line of the Saale."

Third Project.

"Fortify the left wing of the eleventh corps, and await the course of events in that position.

"*Dresden, 5th October*, 1813."

Other Notes on the situation of the Army.

"It is impossible to enter winter-quarters at Dresden without a battle. There are two plans to follow.

"The one, to watch Dresden, and to seek an engagement; *enfin*, to return there, and to find all things in the same position, if we conquer.

"The other, to leave Dresden entirely; endeavour to give battle; and, if we gain it, to return to Dresden, in beating the Austrian army in Bohemia. We will then not arrive but accidentally at Dresden; because, even after we have gained the battle, there is no Elbe during the winter, and it is hardly possible to carry on offensive operations; and then Dresden cannot be the centre of operations. It would much more naturally be at Leipsic, or at Magdeburg."

Movements on the first Plan.

"If we wish to preserve Dresden, it will be necessary to act in the following manner:—

"To intrust the guard of Dresden to the first and fifteenth corps.

"To leave the second, the fifth, and the eighth in observation at Chemnitz and Freyberg, and to give battle with the sixth, the third, the fourth, the seventh, the eleventh, and the guard."

Movements in the second Plan.

"It will be necessary to place, the day after to-morrow, the second, the fifth, and the eighth corps, the last on Altenburg, and not move on Dresden, holding Chemnitz, but as if they came from Leipsic; to march the first and the fourteenth on Dresden, to follow up the movement; or perhaps to bring up the first and the fourteenth, and to place them in like manner on the road from Nossen, near the heights of Waldheino, having their rear at Leipsic."

Difference of the two Plans.

"In the first plan, being obliged to leave the second and the fifth corps, the rear, at Dresden, they may be reached by the enemy who may move on Altenburg, and from thence may advance so quickly on Leipsic, that that town will find itself exposed; and that the troops which will be left at Dresden can, by the slightest fault, be compromised; and, in place of evacuating Dresden, be driven from it.

"In the second plan, as they may form in the end two armies, which one may place in the natural order in which they find themselves, preserve the central position, to march either to the right or left.

"The Emperor having gone from Dresden, the first and fourteenth corps, the second and fifteenth, may not understand their position, and be enable to combine their operations, and may find themselves cut off.

"In the first plan, I have left the corps to guard Dresden; it is then necessary that his majesty should undertake that business, and that he should remain either in Dresden or the environs. In that case they lose many opportunities on the left; it is even doubtful that his majesty not being present in person, it is advantageous to give battle. If we chance to lose it, the position will become such, that it will be necessary to save ourselves from the Elbe on the Saale."
—NORVIN'S *Portefeuille de* 1813, ii. p. 570.

Note D, p. 568.

French Army at Leipsic.

Right Wing. Under the command of the KING OF NAPLES.

	Infantry.	Cavalry.
8th Corps, Prince Poniatowski,	8,000	
2d Corps, Victor,	16,000	
4th Corps of Cavalry, Kellermann,		3,000
Centre.		
Corps of	10,000	
5th Corps, General Lauriston,	9,000	
11th Corps, Macdonald,	15,000	
1st Corps of Cavalry, General Latour Maubourg,		4,500
2d Corps of Cavalry, General Sebastiani,		4,500
5th Corps of Cavalry, General Milhaud,		3,000
Carry over,	58,000	15,000

	Infantry.	Cavalry.
Brought over, .	58,000	15,000
Left Wing.—Under the command of Ney.		
6th Corps, Marmont, . . .	18,000	
3d Corps, General Souham, . . .	15,000	
7th Corps, General Regnier, . .	8,000	
3d Corps of Cavalry, Arrighi, . .		3,000
Total, .	99,000	18,000
Behind Leipsic.		
4th Corps, General Bertrand, . .	15,000	
Reserve.		
Old Guard, Mortier, . . .	4,000	
Young Guard, Oudinot, . . .	26,000	
Cavalry of the Guard, General Nansouty, .		4,800
Grand total, .	144,000	22,800
	166,800	

Not taken in.

The first and fourteenth Corps, at Dresden.
The thirteenth Corps, at Hamburg.
—Vaudoncourt, *Campagne de* 1813, p. 201.

N.B.—Plotho, Kausler, and the German writers, make the French forces 140,000 infantry and 35,000 cavalry; or, in all, 175,000, which is probably nearly the truth.—Kausler, 932.

Allied Army at Leipsic.

	Men.	
Austrians under Schwartzenberg:		
Hesse-Homberg, . . .	20,000	
Meerfeldt, . . .	20,000	
Klenau, . . .	15,000	
Total,		55,000
Russians:		
Wittgenstein, . . .	20,000	
Barclay de Tolly, . . .	35,000	
Total,		55,000
Prussians:		
Kleist, . . .	20,000	
Ziethen, . . .	5,000	
Platow, . . .	5,000	
Total,		30,000
Army of Blucher:		
Langeron, . . .	30,000	
York, . . .	25,000	
Sacken, . . .	15,000	
Total,		70,000
Corps de Giulay, . . .		20,000
Total in the field on the first day, .		230,000

Number of the Allies who fought on the 18th.

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Men.	Guns.
Army of Bohemia, Schwartzenberg,	128,850	29,550	158,400	626
Army of Reserve, Benningsen,	23,000	5,000	28,000	132
Army of Silesia, Blucher,	46,000	10,600	56,600	356
Army of the North, Prince Royal of Sweden,	36,450	11,000	47,450	270
Grand Total,	234,300	56,150	290,450	1,384

—KAUSLER, p. 931.

Blockading Forces.

	Men.
Corps at Dantzig,	29,100
at Zamosc,	10,300
at Glogau,	12,600
at Modlin,	4,000
Total,	56,000

Total Russian Force in Germany.

In the Field,	193,298
Blockading Force,	56,000
Grand Total of Russians,	249,298

—PLOTHO, vol. ii., App. 32.

III. PRUSSIANS.

	Battalions of the line.	Battalions of landwehr.	Jager Companies.	Squadrons of the line.	Squadrons of landwehr.	Batteries
Royal Guard,	6		2	8	...	2
1 Corps,	20	24	4	28	16	13
2 Corps,	24	16	4	28	14	16
3 Corps,	28	12	2	29	16	10
4 Corps,	11	69	...	...	58	11
Corps of Walmoden,	5	...	...	5	...	1
Blockading force before Glogau,	...	...	...	...	4	2
Blockading force before Dantzic,	...	...	...	...	6	1
Total,	94	121	12	98	114	56

Infantry of the Line,	72,200
Landwehr Infantry,	112,000
Jager Infantry,	2,400
Pioneers,	700
Cavalry of the Line,	14,700
Landwehr Cavalry,	17,400
Artillery,	8,100
Total,	227,500

Summary.

Infantry,	190,300
Cavalry,	32,100
Artillery,	8,100
Grand Total of Prussians	230,500

—Plotho, vol. ii., App. 23.

IV. Swedes and English Troops from the North of Germany.

	Batal.	Squad.	Batteries.	Gunners.	Cossack Reg.	Men.
Swedes,	35	32	9	62		24,018
English,	4	6		6		3,000
				Swedes and English		27,018

Composition and Strength of the different Armies employed.

Army of Silesia.

	Infantry.	Cavalry	Artillery.	Cossacks.
Corps of D'York,	29,783	6,033	1,917	
Corps of Sacken,	9,600	2,000	1,000	3,600
Corps of Langeron,	18,464	2,800	2,600	4,400
Corps of St Priest,	8,400	2,920	600	1,200
Total,	66,247	13,753	6,117	9,200

—Plotho, vol. ii., App. 51.

Infantry,	66,247
Cavalry,	13,753
Artillery,	6,117
Cossacks,	9,200
Total,	95,317
Cannon,	536

Army of the North.

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Cossacks.
Swedish Army,	18,573	3,742	1,703	
Corps of Winzingerode,	5,465	834	583	2,214
Corps of Woronzof,	4,262	2,910	883	4,197
Corps of Walmoden,	19,635	3,850	561	1,350
Corps of Bulow,	32,000	6,350	1,800	1,200
Corps of Tauenzien,	33,000	5,200	700	
Total,	112,935	22,886	6,230	8,961

Infantry,	112,936
Cavalry,	22,886
Artillery,	6,230
Cossacks,	8,961
English Troops,	3,000
Grand Total	154,013

—Plotho, vol. ii., App. 62.

GRAND ARMY OF BOHEMIA.

	Bat.	Squad.	Batteries.	Cossack Regiments.	Men.
Austrians,	112	124	45		130,870
Russians,					
Wittgenstein,	39	36	5	4	58,420
Reserve and Guards,	46½	72	21½	21	
Prussians,					
Kleist,	41	44	14		48,500
Guards,	6½	8	2		
Total,	245	284	87½	25	237,770

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Cossacks.
Austrians,	99,300	24,800	6,750	
Russians,	34,600	10,900	5,750	7,200
Prussians,	38,300	7,800	2,400	
Total,	172,200	43,500	14,900	7,200

Infantry,	172,200
Cavalry,	43,500
Artillery,	14,900
Cossacks,	7,200
Grand total—Men,	237,770
Cannon,	698

—PLOTHO, vol. ii., App. 44.

CHAPTER LXXII.

Note A, p. 700.

Military Force of Great Britain, and its Cost, in the year 1813.

	Men.	Great Britain. Charge.	Ireland. Charge.
Land forces, (including various contingencies,)	227,442	£3,196,188	£331,012
British Regiments in the East Indies,	28,009	836,649	...
Troops and companies for recruiting do.,	533	30,236	...
Embodied militia,	93,210	1,983,961	1,098,529
Staff and garrisons,	...	513,792	109,226
Full pay to supernumerary officers,	...	32,088	940
Public departments,	...	308,201	11,960
Half-pay,	...	206,250	25,443
In-Pensioners of Chelsea and Kilmainham hospitals,	...	39,284	18,332
Out-Pensioners of ditto,	...	432,695	91,239
Widows' pensions,	...	50,011	8,103
Volunteer corps, cavalry,	68,000	209,237	266,123
Local militia,	304,000	636,623	...
Foreign corps,	32,163	1,174,019	31,623
Royal Military College,	...	38,993	...
Royal Military Asylum,	...	23,096	...
Allowance to retired chaplains,	...	19,394	1,923
Medicines and hospital expenses,	...	105,000	22,081
Compassionate list,	...	30,055	...
Carry over,	753,357	9,865,672	2,016,534

	Men.	Great Britain.	Ireland.
Brought over,	753,357	£9,865,672	£2,016,534
Barrack department, (Ireland,)	...	...	460,583
Commissariat department, (Ireland,)	...	...	295,605
Superannuated allowances,	...	11,630	4,334
Total military force,	753,357		
Deduct Local M. and Volunt.	372,000		
Total regulars and militia,	381,357	13,921,494	3,213,063
Deduct regts. in East Indies,	28,009	836,649	...
Remain to be provided for, 1813,	353,348	13,044,844	3,213,063
Regulars and militia, exclusive of the native troops in the East Indies, who were,	201,000		

—*Parliamentary Debates*, vol. xxiv. p. 346.

Note B, p. 702.

Public Income of Great Britain for the year 1813, ending 5th January 1814.

I. *Permanent Revenue.*

	Net Produce.	
Customs,	£8,086,313	
Excise,	18,526,839	
Stamps,	5,552,460	
Land and Assessed Taxes,	7,803,459	
Post-office,	1,619,136	
Pensions, 1s. in the pound,	20,423	
Salaries, 6d. in the pound,	12,151	
Hackney-coaches,	22,245	
Hawkers and pedlars,	18,201	
Total permanent and annual duties,		£41,661,22

Small Branches of the Hereditary Revenue.

Alienation fines,	£8,392
Post fines,	3,953
Seizures,	22,638
Composition and proffers,	586
Crown lands,	83,303

Extraordinary Resources and War Taxes.

Customs,	£3,235,358
Excise,	6,113,853
Property-tax,	14,588,286
Arrears of income-duty,	1,593
Lottery, nett profit (of which one-third part is for the service of Ireland,	238,666
Monies paid on account of the interest of loans raised for the service of Ireland,	3,198,956
On account of the balance due by Ireland on joint expenditure of the United Kingdom,	3,956,286
Carry over,	£73,113,097

Brought over,	£73,113,097
On account of the commissioners for issuing exchequer bills for Grenada,	£54,230
On account of the commissioners for issuing commercial exchequer bills,	490,591
On account of the interest of a loan, &c., granted to the Prince-Regent of Portugal,	53,130
Surplus fees of regulated public offices,	107,355
Imprest money repaid by sundry public accountants, &c., including interest,	56,504
Other monies paid to the public,	65,660
Total, independent of loans,	£73,940,537
Loans paid into the Exchequer, including £6,000,000 for the service of Ireland,	35,050,534
Grand Total,	£108,991,071

—*Annual Register for* 1814, *page* 367.

Public Expenditure of Great Britain for the year 1813, *ending 5th January* 1814.

I. For interest on the Public Debt of Great Britain unredeemed, including annuities for Lives and terms of years,			£39,815,846
II. Interest on Exchequer Bills,			2,081,529
III. Civil List,		£1,028,000	
IV. Other charges on the Consolidated Fund, viz.			
Courts of Justice,		69,992	
Mint,		13,333	
Allowance to Royal Family,		332,412	
Salaries and Allowances,		67,955	
Bounties,		79,956	
			1,591,648
V. Civil Government of Scotland,			133,176
VI. Other payments in anticipation of the Exchequer Receipts, Bounties for Fisheries, Manufactures, Corn, &c.		228,341	
Pensions on the Hereditary Revenue,		2,770	
Militia and Deserter's Warrants,		134,614	365,725
VII. Navy,		11,372,513	
The Victualling Department,		6,568,320	
The Transport Service,	£3,565,790		
Miscellaneous Service,	490,000		
		4,055,790	21,996,623
VIII. Ordinance,			3,404,527
Carry over,			£69,255,898

	Brought over,		£69,255,898
IX. Army, viz.—Ordinary Services,		£18,500,790	
Extraordinary Services and Subsidies,		£22,262,951	
Deduct the Remittances and Advances to other Countries,		40,763,741 11,294,416	29,469,325
X. Loans, &c., to other Countries, viz.—			
Ireland,		4,700,416	
Sicily,	£600,000		
Portugal,	2,000 000		
Spain,	1,697,136		
Sweden,	1,563,804		
Russia,	1,758,436		
Prussia,	1,757,669		
Austria,	545,612		
Hanover,	15,166		
Holland,	419,996		
North of Europe,	963,174		
Emperor of Morocco,	14,419		
		11,338,412	16,035,828
	Total expenditure,		£114,761,000
XI. *Miscellaneous Services:*—			
At Home,		3,507,934	
Abroad,		497,890	4,005,824
			£118,766,875
Deduct sums, which, although included in this account, form no part of the expenditure of Great Britain, viz.			
Loan for Ireland,		4,300,416	
Interest at 1 per cent, and management on Portuguese Loan,		57,170	
Principal, Interest, &c. of Commercial Exchequer Bills,		4,525	
Sinking Fund on loan to the East India Company,		141,091	4,503,202
			£114,263,673

—*Annual Register for* 1814, p. 374.

Note C, p. 717.

TABLE I. Exhibiting the Progress of the Sinking Fund from its Commencement in 1786 to 1813.

	Stock redeemed.	Money applied to redemption of debt in Sinking Fund.
At 1st Feb. 1787,	£662,750	
... 1788,	1,503,054	£1,000,000
... 1789,	1,506,350	150,000
... 1790,	1,558,850	152,250
... 1791,	1,587,500	157,367
... 1792,	1,507,100	162,479
... 1793,	1,962,650	1,834,281
... 1794,	2,174,405	1,634,615
... 1795,	2,804,945	1,872,957
... 1796,	3,083,455	2,143,596
... 1797,	4,390,670	2,639,724
... 1798,	6,790,023	3,369,218
... 1799,	8,102,875	4,294,325
... 1800,	10,550,094	4,649,871
... 1801,	10,713,168	4,767,992
... 1802,	10,491,325	5,310,511
... 1803,	9,436,389	5,922,979
... 1804,	13,181,667	6,287,940
... 1805,	12,860,629	6,851,200
... 1806,	13,759,697	7,615,167
... 1807,	15 341,799	8,325,329
... 1808,	16,064,962	9,479,165
... 1809,	16,181,689	10,188,607
... 1810,	16,656,643	10,904,451
... 1811,	17,884,234	11,660,601
... 1812,	20,733,354	12,502,860
... 1813,	24,246,059	13,483,160
... 1814,	27,522,230	15,379,262

—MOREAU'S *Tables given in* PEBRER, pp. 154 and 247.

II. TABLE showing the progressive diminution of the Sinking Fund and growth of the Deficit, from 1813 to 1840—year ending

	Deficit of Revenue.	Stock redeemed.	Money applied to redemption of debt in Sinking Fund.
1st February 1814,	£ ...	27,522,230	15,379,262
... 1815,	...	22,559,683	14,120,963
... 1816,	...	24,001,083	13,452,096
... 1817,	...	23,113,841	1,826,814
5th January 1818,	...	19,460,982	1,624,606
... 1819,	...	19,648,469	3,163,130
... 1820,	...	31,191,762	4,978,019
... 1821,	...	24,518,885	4,104,457
... 1822,	...	28,605,981	2,962,564
... 1823,	...	17,966,680	5,261,725
... 1824,	...	34,828,530	6,456,559
... 1825,	...	10,583,132	5,900,725
... 1826,	...	3,313,834	1,195,531

	Deficit of Revenue.	Stock redeemed.	Money applied to redemption of debt in Sinking Fund.
5th January 1827,	£ ...	£2,886,528	£2,023,028
... 1828,	...	7,281,414	4,667,965
... 1829,	...	4,964,807	2,670,003
... 1830,	...	2,738,162	1,935,465
... 1831,	...	3,469,216	2,763,858
... 1832,	...	7,364	5,696
... 1833,	...	1,439,261	1,023,784
... 1834,	...	2,561,866	1,776,378
... 1835,	...	1,942,111	1,270,050
... 1836,	...	2,232,142	1,590,727
... 1837,	...	1,932,671	1,252,041
... 1838,	1,428,000	...	...
... 1839,	430,000	...	...
... 1840,	1,457,000	...	...
... 1841,	1,851,000	...	...
... 1842,	2,456,000	...	...

—MOREAU'S *Tables, and* PEBRER, 247, *and Parl. Pap. May* 18, 1841; *and Finance Accounts for* 1837, 1838, 1839, and 1841.

Note D, p. 736.

Imperial Muster Rolls of the Armies in Spain, 15th March, 1813.

	Present under Arms		Detached		Hospitals.	Total.		
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.		Men.	Cavalry.	Train.
Army of the South,	36,605	6,602	2,060	1,617	7,144	45,809	8,650	2,601
Army of the Centre,	16,227	1,966	940	76	2,401	19,568	2,790	451
Army of Portugal,	31,825	3,654	157	—	7,731	42,713	6,726	2,141
Army of Arragon,	36,315	3,852	55	—	2,442	38,812	6,123	1,799
Army of Catalonia,	27,323	1,109	110	—	2,013	29,446	1,884	635
Army of the North,	40,476	1,678	41	—	8,052	48,547	3,171	850
Army of Bayonne,	3,877	55	85	—	634	6,591	78	21
Total,	195,648	19,216	3,443	1,697	30,397	231,486	29,422	8,478

—NAPIER'S *Peninsular War*, vol. v. p. 618. *Imperial Muster Rolls.*

Note E, p. 762.

Morning State of the Anglo-Portuguese Army, 21st June, 1813.

	Present, Under Arms.	On Command	Total, Present.	Total, On Command.
British Cavalry,	7,791	851		
Portuguese Cavalry,	1,452	225		
Total Cavalry,	——	——	9,243	1,076
British Infantry,	23,658	1,771		
Portuguese Infantry,	23,905	1,038		
Total Infantry,	——	——	47,563	2,809
Sabres and bayonets,			56,806	3,885
Deduct the 6th Division, left at Medina de Pomar,			6,320	
Total Sabres and bayonets,			50,486	3,885

Spanish Auxiliaries.

	Men.
Infantry:—	
Murillo's Division, about	3,000
Giron's Division, about	12,000
Carry over,	15,000

	Men.
Brought over,	15,000
Carlos d'Espagna's Division, about	3,000
Longa's Division, about	5,000
Cavalry:	
Ronne Villemur, about	1,000
Julian Sanchey, about	1,000
Total, Spanish,	23,000
Total, Anglo-Portuguese,	50,486
Grand total,	73,486
Cannon,	90

—NAPIER's *Peninsular War*, vol. v., p. 622.

Note F, p. 786.

Detailed State of the Spanish Army, July 1813, when Soult took the command.

Right Wing.—Lieutenant-general REILLE.

	Effective Men.	Horses.	Total Effective Men.	Total Horses.	Effective and Non-effective Men.	Grand Total.
First Division, Foy, 9 battalions,	5,922	189	17,235	450	6,748	21,330
7th Ditto, Maucune, 7 battalions,	4,186	110			5,676	
9th Ditto, La Martiniere, 11 ditto,	7,127	151			8,906	

Centre.—DROUET, Count D'ERLON.

2d Division, D'Armagnac, 8 batts.	6,961	116	959	624	8,580	23,935
3d Ditto, Abbé, 9 ditto,	8,030	285			8,728	
6th Ditto, Daricau, 8 ditto,	5,968	223			6,627	

Left Wing.—Lieutenant-General CLAUSEL.

4th Division, Conroux, 9 batts.	7,056	150	17,218	432	7,477	20,265
5th Ditto, Vandermoeren, 7 ditto,	4,181	141			5,201	
8th Ditto, Taupin, 10 ditto,	5,981	141			7,587	

Reserve.—General VILLATTE.

French,	14,959	2,091	14,959		17,929
Foreign, 4 battalions of the Rhine, 4 battalions of Italians, General St Pol. 4 battalions Spaniards General Casabianca,	Strength of these not given.				
Carry over,	70,371	1,595			83,459

Cavalry.—PIERRE SOULT.

	Effective Men.	Horses.	Total Effective Men.	Total Horses.	Effective and Non-effective Men.	Total.
Brought over,			70,371	3,597	83,459	83,459
22 Squadrons	4,723	4,416	7,081	6,691	5,098	7,621
Ditto Trielhard,	2,358	2,275			2,523	
Total, according to the organization in the field, exclusive of the foreign battalions.			77,452	10,288		91,080

Detached.

	Men under Arms.	Effective and Non-effective Men.
Troops not in the field,	14,888	16,946
General Rey, garrison of St Sebastian, 1st July, forming part of this number,	2,731	3,086
Cassan, ditto, of Pampeluna, 1st July,	2,951	3,121
Lammette, ditto, of Santona, 1st May,	1,045	1674
Second Reserve net in the above,	5,595	6,103

SUMMARY.

	Effective Men.	Horses.	Effective and Non-effective Men.
Grand Total,	104,710	10,676	122,016

Note G, p. 841.

Detailed state of the French army in Spain, 16th September 1813.

	Men.	Present under arms.	Effective and Non effective men.
Right Wing.			
Foy,	5,002		
Maucune,	4,166		
Mene,	5,707		
		14,875	
Centre.			
D'Armagnac,	4,358		
Abbé,	5,903		
Maransin,	4,842		
		15,103	
Left Wing.			
Conrad,	4,736		
Roguet,	5,982		
Taupin,	5,071		
		15,789	45,767
Reserve.			
Villatte,	8,256		
The Italian brigade, about 2000, ordered to Milan,	2,000		
Provisional troops of the Right Wing, destined to reinforce the garrison of Bayonne,	2,168		12,424
Carry over,			58,191

	Men	Present under arms.	Effective and Non effective men.
Cavalry.			
Brought over,			58,491
Pierre Soult,	4,456	4,617	
Trielhard, ditto.	2,368	2,583	
Gens d'armes, mounted,	291		
... ... dismounted,	1,210		
			8,325

Detached.	Men.	Horses.
Parc,	895	885
Engineers,	504	127
Garrisons.		
Pampeluna,	3,805	191
San Sebastian, prisoners of war,	2,366	
Santona,	1,633	
Bayonne,	4,631	137
St Jean Pied de Port,	1,786	
Navarens,	843	
Castle of Lourdes,	107	
	16,569	
Deduct garrison of San Sebastian,	2,366	
		14,203
Grand total present under arms,		80,719

—Napier's *Peninsular War*, vol. vi., p. 708.

No. 1.—*General State of the French Armies under Soult and Suchet, extracted from the Imperial Muster-rolls, July* 1813.

	Present under Arms.		Detached.			Total.	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.	Hospitals.	Men.	Horses.
Army of Spain,	97,983	12,676	2,110	392	14,071	114,167	13,068
Army of Arragon,	32,362	4,919	3,621	551	5,2 1	39,184	5,470
Army of Catalonia,	25,910	1,869	168	"	1,374	27,452	1,254
Grand Total,	156,255	19,464	5,899	943			

No. 2.—*15th September*

Army of Spain,	81,251	11,159	4,004	1,138		107,813	11,272
Army of Arragon,	32,476	4,447	2,721	320	5,618	38,813	5,305
Army of Catalonia,	24,026	1,670	120	"	2,137	26,283	2,497
Grand Total,	137,853	17,276	6,845	1,758	28,241	172,939	20,074

Note H, p. 790.

Forces of the Allied Army in Spain at the following Periods.

No. 1.—*Force of the Anglo-Portuguese army under the Marquis of Wellington's command, extracted from the original Morning States for the 24th of July* 1813.

	Officers, Sergeants, &c.	Rank and File.	Total. Men.	Horses.
British and German cavalry present under arms,	916	5,834	6,750	5,834
Ditto infantry,	4,665	29,926	34,581	
Portuguese Cavalry,	251	1,241	1,492	1,178
Ditto Infantry,	2,849	20,665	23,4[illegible]	...
Total sabres and bayonets, exclusive of sick and absent on command,	8,726	57,566	[illegible],292	7,012
Artillerymen and Drivers.			4,000	

No. 2.—*Anglo-Portuguese Force, extracted from the original Morning State, 15th October* 1813.

	Officers, Sergeants, &c.	Rank and File.	Total.
British and German Cavalry and Infantry,	5,859	37,250	43,109
Portuguese Ditto,	4,253	21,274	25,526
Total sabres and bayonets, exclusive of sick and absent on command,	10,112	58,524	68,635
Artillerymen and drivers,			4,000
Grand Total,			72,635

Anglo-Portuguese Force, from the original Morning State, 16th October 1813.

	Officers, Sergeants, &c.	Rank and File.	Total.
British and German Cavalry and Infantry,	5,356	39,687	45,043
Portuguese ditto,	2,990	22,237	25,227
Total sabres and bayonets, exclusive of sick and absent on command,	8,346	61,924	70,270
Artillerymen and drivers,			4,000
Grand Total,			74,270

Sir Rowland Hill's Force at the battle of St Pierre, extracted from the original Morning State of 13th December 1813.

SECOND DIVISION.

	Officers and Sergeants.	Rank and File.	Total.
British,	802	5,371	6,173
Portuguese,	277	2,331	2,608
Lecor's Portuguese Division,	507	4,163	4,670
Total under arms, exclusive of Artillerymen,	1,586	11,865	13,451

—NAPIER's *Peninsular War*, vol. vi., p. 706.

Note I. p. 832.

No. I.—Extracted from the official state of the allied army, commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir John Murray, at the Col di Balaguer, 17th June 1813, exclusive of officers, sergeants, and drummers.

	Present fit for duty.	Sick.	Command.	Horses.	Mules.	Total Men.
British and German cavalry,	739	12	6	733	...	757
British, Portuguese and Sicilian Artillery,	783	8	197	362	604	990
British Engineers and Staff Corps,	78	5	36	...	...	119
British and German Infantry,	7,226	830	637	...	...	8,893
Whittingham's Infantry,	4,370	503	316	...	...	5,189
Sicilian Infantry,	935	121	272	...	...	1,378
Grand Total,	14,131	1,479	1,466	1,095	604	17,126

No. II.—Extract from the original weekly state of the Anglo-Sicilian force commanded by Sir William Clinton. Headquarters, Taragona, 25th September 1813, exclusive of officers, sergeants, and drummers.

	Present fit for duty.	Sick.	Commd.	Horses.	Mules.	Total Men.
Cavalry,	663	61	215	875	40	939
Artillery, Engineers, and Staff Corps,	997	67	58	507	893	1,122
Infantry,	9,124	1,390	1,019	115	429	11,533
Grand Total,	10,784	1,518	1,292	1,497	1,365	13,594

—NAPIER'S *Peninsular War*, vol. vi., p. 704.

Note K., p. 794.

The following is the state of the 92d Regiment at the time of the battle in the Puerto de Mayas.—Return of the number of each country composing the 1st Battalion of the 92d Highland Regiment, taken from the Prize List, Vittoria, 1813:—

Country.	Sergeants.	Corp.	Drum.	Priv.	Total.
Scotland,	56	47	8	784	895
England,			2	34	36
Ireland,		2	1	58	61
Foreign,	1		3		4
Unknown,		3		14	17
Grand Total,	57	52	14	890	1,013

Copy extracted from Inspection Report 1st Battalion 92d Highland Regiment, 15th October 1813.

Scotland,	62	45	13	702	822
England,			2	32	34
Ireland,		2	1	59	62
Foreign,				1	1
Grand Total,	62	47	16	794	919

For these, to Scotsmen, interesting details, the author is indebted to the kindness of Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonald, the present commander of that distinguished corps, to whom he is happy to make this public acknowledgment.

END OF VOLUME NINTH.

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